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ABSTRACT

This thesis provides a critical legal analysis of the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission’s Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct. The Immunity
Policy is touted as the ‘most effective anti-cartel enforcement tool in the world’ as it
aims to increase cartel detection and deterrence by offering the first cartel participant
full immunity from civil and criminal penalties. This thesis presents a detailed
examination of the theory underpinning the policy’s design and intended operation to
question whether the current model of assessing the effectiveness of the policy needs
to be enhanced in light of more recent theoretical developments.
Building upon this analysis, this thesis employs: a qualitative and crosscomparative investigation into the eligibility and cooperation requirements of the
policy; an analysis of how the policy intersects with public and private enforcement
within Australia and how this impacts upon confidentiality and third party actions;
and a critical examination of some alternative measures to increase cartel detection
and deterrence in addition to immunity.
Despite the lionised rhetoric that surrounds the use of immunity policies
worldwide, these claims are largely untested. Given the nature of cartel conduct,
many quantitative assessments of the Immunity Policy are generated from
incomplete or unknown information about cartel conduct and heavily rely on
overgeneralised conceptions of rationality to inform the economic modelling upon
which these studies are based. As a result, the research in relation to the Immunity
Policy is currently quantitatively skewed and in need of a comprehensive analysis
using qualitative methods to provide valuable and unique insight into the design and
actual operation of the policy.
A qualitative and cross-comparative analysis was conducted to assist that
analysis. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 16 prominent stakeholders
in Australia to provide detailed insight into the current design and operation of the
policy. This qualitative study helped inform the content and structure of the cross
comparative research. To complement these empirical insights, the respective
immunity policies in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States were
analysed and compared to the Australian version to develop a model of best practice.
i

As a result of this analysis, this thesis finds that the current approach to
assessing the effectiveness of the Immunity Policy is narrow and outdated. To
overcome these limitations, an enhanced model is developed, which is used to inform
the recommendations produced by the research. The use of this enhanced approach to
the assessment of the Immunity Policy will ultimately strengthen the Immunity
Policy and the recommendations made are therefore commended for adoption by the
ACCC.
This thesis reveals that there are a number of limitations inherent in the
design and operation of the Policy, including the approach most commonly used to
assess its effectiveness in achieving cartel detection and deterrence. In light of this,
the Immunity Policy should not be viewed as the single most effective anti-cartel
enforcement tool but as one important component of the ACCC’s overall
enforcement armory.
Most importantly, in order for this claim to be truly tested, there is a need for
the ACCC to implement viable alternative measures to Immunity, as outlined in this
thesis, which can also achieve cartel detection and deterrence and prevent the
overreliance on a single enforcement tool.
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I

THE ACCC IMMUNITY POLICY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT - AN
INTRODUCTION

This research will focus on a finite aspect of competition law, that being cartel
conduct. Put simply, cartel conduct is conduct that is highly meditated, typically
secretive and sophistically designed for personal profit at the expense of consumers
and the economy. It generally occurs when two or more competitors in a market
illegally collude to exploit the market for individual gain. In Australia, this conduct is
regulated by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).1
Cartel conduct was criminalised in Australia in 2009, in response to strong
calls from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ('ACCC'), as well
as a brief and incomplete report by the Dawson Committee released in 2003.2 The
approach taken to make cartel conduct criminal has been to use the same physical
elements as those used for the civil cartel prohibitions but require the fault elements
of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) to be satisfied in order for a criminal cartel offence
to be established. This cartel statutory framework has been criticised as broad and
overly complex, creating considerable uncertainty in relation to the way these
provisions will be interpreted and applied.3
The focus of my thesis will be on the primary method used by the ACCC to
detect this type of secret and deliberate behaviour, namely the Immunity Policy.
The Immunity Policy operates as follows: a cartel participant will be offered
immunity from suit by the regulator if they are the first member to come forward
with information about a cartel that will assist the regulator in 'unveiling' the cartel.
There has been global acknowledgement by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Competition Network
(ICN),4 and key competition regulatory agencies in the United States, Canada and the

1

ss 44ZZRD-44ZZRK.
Trade Practices Committee of Review, 'Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices
Act' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003) Chapter 10: Penalties and other remedies (‘The Dawson
Report’).
3
Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse, Australian Cartel Regulation: Law Policy and Practice in an
International Context (Cambridge University Press, 1 ed, 2011) Chapter 5.
4
OECD, 'Hard Core Cartels – Harm and Effective Sanctions' (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2002); International Competition Network, 'Anti-Cartel Enforcement
Manual: Chapter 2: Drafting and Implementing an Effective Leniency Policy' (International
Competition Network, May 2009).
2

1

United Kingdom,5 that indicate that an effective immunity policy is essential for the
encouragement of both businesses and individuals to disclose cartel behaviour.
According to the competition authorities, immunity policies are designed not
only to assist the regulatory agencies to prosecute participants, but also to provide a
powerful disincentive for the formation of future cartels.6 The authorities argue that
there is a greater risk of regulatory detection and enforcement where an effective
immunity policy is in place.7
It is important to note that a number of different terms are used to describe an
immunity policy, including ‘Amnesty policy’ and ‘Leniency policy’ as commonly
used in the United States and Europe. As these terms refer to essentially the same
notion of an immunity policy, they will be used interchangeably throughout this
research.
In Australia, a cartel member must apply to the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’) for immunity from suit, who will then decide
whether immunity should be granted, according to the criteria outlined in its
Immunity Policy.8 The Immunity Policy was revised by the ACCC during the time of
writing this thesis; the discussion to follow reflects the current position.9
In criminal proceedings, the ACCC will make recommendations to the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (‘CDPP’), and the CDPP will

5

See, eg, Competition Bureau, 'Immunity Program under the Competition Act' (Competition Bureau,
7 June 2010); Competition and Markets Authority, 'Applications for Leniency and No-Action in
Cartel Cases - Detailed Guidance on the Principles and Process' (Competition and Markets Authority,
2013)
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284417/OFT1495.pdf
>; DOJ Department of Justice, 'Corporate Leniency Policy' (0091, Department of Justice - Antitrust
Division, 1993); DOJ Department of Justice, 'Leniency Policy for Individuals' (0092, Department of
Justice - Antitrust Division, 1993).
6
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for
Cartel Conduct ' (2014) 1;International Competition Network, above n 4, s 2.2.
7
International Competition Network, above n 4.
8
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, s C, ss 16, 28.
9
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC Releases Discussion Paper in Cartel
Immunity Policy Review (September 2013) <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-releasesdiscussion-paper-in-cartel-immunity-policy-review>. As part of this review, a number of submissions
were put to the ACCC based on the research undertaken in this thesis: Pariz Marshall, 'Submission to
the ACCC for the Review of the ACCC Immunity Policy 2013' (University of Wollongong, 2013);
Pariz Marshall, 'Submission to the ACCC for the Review of the ACCC Immunity Policy 2013 Response to the Discussion Paper on Cartel Immunity' (University of Wollongong 2013); Pariz
Marshall, 'Submission to the ACCC for the Review of the ACCC Immunity Policy 2013 - Comments
on the Draft Immunity Policy' (University of Wollongong, 2014).

2

ultimately determine whether or not to grant immunity to an applicant.10 This
bifurcated model of cooperation between the ACCC and CDPP is outlined in a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the agencies.11 According to the
MOU, cases will be referred to the CDPP where the conduct is deemed to be ‘serious
cartel conduct,’ which is determined by reference to a number of factors.12
According to the competition authorities, the immunity policy is thus
designed to create a ‘race to the finish line;’ in terms of creating an atmosphere of
distrust between cartel members, which in turn creates an incentive to apply for
immunity. This is particularly important as full immunity is only available to the first
cartel member to come forward to the regulator. There are a number of requirements
that an immunity applicant must comply with before immunity is granted. Most
significantly, a corporation will be eligible for conditional immunity from ACCCinitiated proceedings where:
(i)

the corporation is or was a party to a cartel, whether as a primary contravener or in
an ancillary capacity

(ii)

the corporation admits that its conduct in respect of the cartel may constitute a
contravention or contraventions of the CCA

(iii)

the corporation is the first person to apply for immunity in respect of the cartel
under this policy

(iv)

the corporation has not coerced others to participate in the cartel

(v)

the corporation has either ceased its involvement in the cartel or indicates to the
ACCC that it will cease its involvement in the cartel

(vi)

the corporation’s admissions are a truly corporate act (as opposed to isolated
confessions of individual representatives)

(vii)

the corporation has provided full, frank and truthful disclosure, and has cooperated
fully and expeditiously while making the application, and undertakes to continue to
do so, throughout the ACCC’s investigation and any ensuing court proceedings, and

10

Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions, 'Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth Guidelines for the Making of Decisions in the Prosecution Process' (Australia's Federal Prosection
Service, 2014) <http://www.cdpp.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/Prosecution-Policy-of-theCommonwealth.pdf> Annexure B.
11
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission, 'Memorandum of Understanding Between the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Regarding Serious Cartel
Conduct' (15 August 2014 ). See Chapter V: Eligibility and Cooperation – Relationship between the
ACCC and CDPP, pg 194.
12
Ibid s 4.2.

3

(b) at the time the ACCC receives the application, the ACCC has not received written legal advice that
it has reasonable grounds to institute proceedings in relation to at least one contravention of
the CCA arising from the conduct in respect of the cartel.13

The requirements for individual conditional immunity are the same as outlined
above except that individuals are not required to prove their admissions are a
corporate act.14
The Immunity Policy also provides for derivative immunity, where an immunity
applicant can list all of its related corporate entities and/or current and former
directors, officers and employees who will also be immunised from enforcement
proceedings.15
In the event that an applicant was not the first cartel participant to come forward
for immunity, their application will be assessed in accordance with the cooperation
section of the Immunity Policy:
(a) did the party approach the ACCC in a timely manner seeking to cooperate
(b) has the party provided significant evidence regarding the cartel conduct
(c) has the party provided full, frank and truthful disclosure, and cooperated fully and
expeditiously on a continuing basis throughout the ACCC’s investigation and any
ensuing court proceedings
(d) has the party ceased their involvement in the cartel or indicated to the ACCC that they
will cease their involvement in the cartel
(e) did the party coerce any other person/corporation to participate in the cartel has the party
acted in good faith in dealings with the ACCC, and
(f) (for individual cooperating parties only) has the party agreed not to use the same legal
representation as the corporation by which they are or were employed?16

Prior to recent court decisions, the ACCC would endeavor to reach an agreement
with leniency parties as to joint submissions about penalties to be placed before the
court for adjudication.17 As a result of these court decisions, the determination of
penalties for leniency applicants now rests firmly with the court.18
Whilst there has been widespread discussion and endorsement of the immunity
policy by competition agencies worldwide who claim it to be the most effective anticartel enforcement tool in the world, there has not been a comprehensive critical
13

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, s 16.
Ibid s 28.
15
Ibid s 21.
16
Ibid s H.
17
Martin Law and McMillan LLP, Getting the Deal Through – Cartel Regulation (Global
Competition Review, 2011) 17; See Chapter VIII: Alternatives to Immunity – Cooperation, pg 277.
18
See ChapterVIII: Alternatives to Immunity – Cooperation, pg 277.
14

4

analysis of the immunity policy that supports these claims. Importantly, there has not
been a significant review of the theoretical model that underpins the policy’s design
and operation or how this model has influenced the way the immunity policy is most
commonly assessed. This calls into question the need to revise the criteria and
approach currently used to assess the effectiveness of the policy. This thesis will
demonstrate that the theoretical assumptions underpinning the Immunity Policy are
flawed, and as a result the criteria and approach used to assess the Immunity Policy
needs to be enhanced. An overview of the main findings in relation to the policy will
reveal the gaps in the current research that this thesis will address, thus emphasising
the significance of this research.

A

Summary of Main findings in Relation to Immunity

An immunity policy is claimed to be one of the primary and most effective methods
in anti-cartel enforcement; designed to encourage cartel participants to come forward
to the authorities and reveal their misconduct in exchange for immunity from
prosecution or other enforcement action.19
This policy was designed in the United States and has been commended by
anti-cartel authorities worldwide for its effectiveness at ‘cracking secret cartels.’20 A
substantial portion of the research in the past has involved comparative analyses of
leniency policies, particularly the United States and the European Union.21 Much of
this research has been carried out with the aim of harmonising immunity policies
across jurisdictions.
Nicolo Zinglas provides a comprehensive critique of immunity policies in the
United States and the European Union by assessing the relative effectiveness of each
policy and how this is significantly influenced by the enforcement culture and
antitrust perception of the respective jurisdiction. Zinglas observes that although the
European Union and United States immunity regimes have come a long way in terms
19

See eg, Scott D Hammond, 'Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program ' (Department of
Justice, 2004) 2.
20
Ibid; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, 1.
21
See eg, Nicolo Zingales, 'European and American Leniency Programmes; Two Models Towards
Convergence?' (2008) 5 The Competition Law Review 5; William J Baer, Tim Frazer and Luc
Gyselen, 'International Leniency Regimes: New Developments and Strategic Implications' (2005) 246
Corporate Counsel's International Advisor 2.

5

of revising their leniency programs and improving them, the paper concludes by
stating that many of the key differences in the immunity policies between the two
regimes stem from the inherent differences in competition policy.22
According to Zinglas, the United States is more deterrence focused and the
European Union is more detection focused. He concludes that the United States
program is nevertheless more effective due to its history of enforcement which
(obviously) differs from the newly revised European Union regime. This kind of
comprehensive comparative analysis has not been undertaken in the Australian
context. There is a gap in the literature as to how the ACCC Immunity Policy
compares internationally and how it has been shaped by the ACCC’s enforcement
strategy and culture.
One of the key issues emerging in the international cartel enforcement
context relates to the opportunity for a cartel participant to be granted immunity in
one jurisdiction and then denied it in another jurisdiction, based on the ‘first in, best
dressed’ approach.23 Additionally, there is the added complexity involved with the
issue of immunity confidentiality, whereby information provided by an immunity
applicant in one jurisdiction can potentially lead to the proceedings or investigation
in another jurisdiction where the cartel participant has not yet sought or been granted
immunity.24 The approach taken to address this issue differs from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, which creates a high level of uncertainty for potential immunity
applicants that may dissuade them for applying for leniency altogether, in which
event the cartel continues to operate.25
In terms of designing the most effective immunity policy, much of the legal
22

Zingales, above n 82, 5.2.
See eg, Marc Hansen, Luca Crocco and Susan Kennedy, 'New Fault Lines In International Cartel
Enforcement And Administration Of Leniency Programs - Disclosure Of Immunity Applicant
Statements', Mondaq Business Briefing 30 January 2012; D. Daniel Sokol, 'Cartels, Corporate
Compliance, and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement' (2012) 78 Antitrust Law
Journal 201, 208; Thomas Obersteiner, ‘International Antitrust Litigation: How to Manage
Multijurisdictional Leniency Applications’ (2013) 4 Journal of European Competition Law and
Practice 16, 18.
24
Kon Stellios and Caterina Cavallario, 'Immunity - A Dilemma for Both Whistleblowers and the
ACCC' (2011) 19 Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer Law 1876; Michelle Chowdhury,
'From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling The Obstacles to Transatlantic
Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement' (2011) AAI Working Paper No. 11-09 ; European Competition
Network, 'Protection of Leniency Material in the Context of Civil Damages Actions' (European
Competition Network, Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of the European Competition Authorities
of 23 May 2012, 2012).
25
Christopher R Leslie, 'Editorial -Antitrust Leniency Programmes' (2011) 7 The Competition Law
Review 175, 178-179, See also, Chapter VII, Confidentiality Across Borders, pg 261.
23
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research in this respect has been produced by the United States authorities. The
views of Scott Hammond, former Head of Antitrust Enforcement at the Department
of Justice, are prominent and have been endorsed by many of the competition
authorities internationally. The viewpoint has emerged is that the three key
characteristics of an effective immunity policy are (1) Threat of Severe Sanctions (2)
High Risk of Detection (3) Transparency and Predictability in Enforcement.
1

Threat of Severe Sanctions

It has been accepted in a number of jurisdictions that the threat of criminal
sanctions provides the most effective deterrence of serious cartel conduct, making
the incentive to apply for immunity even greater. In a simple cost-benefit analysis,
the perceived benefits must outweigh the perceived costs.26 The criminalisation in
Australia of serious cartel conduct has resulted in a maximum goal sentence of 10
years.27 That reform brought Australia in line with other criminal penalties in other
countries, with the maximum imprisonment terms in Canada and the United
Kingdom and the United States, being 14 years,28 5 years29 and 10 years30
respectively.
2

High Risk of Detection

According to the DOJ, a high risk of detection from regulatory enforcement
agencies is another crucial element of a successful Immunity Policy and it is
important that sufficient resources are allocated to these agencies to assist in
achieving this end.31 Without a high risk of detection, cartel members will not be
inclined to come forward to report their misconduct in exchange for immunity.
Additionally, regulatory agencies must be given robust investigatory powers to
ensure that there is a real perceived risk of action being taken by the authorities for
those who engage in cartel conduct.32
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3

Transparency and Predictability in Enforcement

The third hallmark of an effective immunity policy is transparency and
predictability. According to this view, an immunity applicant needs to be able to
assess, with a sufficient level of certainty, that their application will be successful.33
To achieve this there needs to be more than simply the publication of regulatory
policies and education and compliance programs, but more significantly, the
abdication of prosecutorial discretion.34 It is common for prosecutorial authorities to
have wide prosecutorial discretion in relation to instigating criminal proceedings. In
the context of an immunity policy, prosecutorial discretion can create a high level of
uncertainty as to whether an immunity application will be successful. Such
uncertainty is therefore undesirable.
These three factors, as advocated by the DOJ, are the most commonly used
criteria to assess the effectiveness of an immunity policy in achieving its aims of
cartel detection and deterrence. These criteria rely heavily on quantitative methods of
assessment and are predicated on the assumptions of the rational actor model. This
neo-classical economic model presupposes that humans are rational actors as ‘the
basis of an economic approach to law is the assumption that the people involved with
the legal system act as rational maximizers of their satisfactions.’35 Despite these
limitations, there has not been a comprehensive review of these criteria or their
usefulness in providing insight into the design and operation of the immunity
policies.
Due to this reliance on quantitative methods of assessment, there appears to be a
gap in the discussion of immunity policies from a qualitative and empirical
perspective, including a detailed analysis of the theory underpinning such policies.
The difficulties associated with researching this area have been acknowledged at an
international competition law conference, which confirmed that the lack of
transparency of competition agencies and also the secrecy/confidentiality of
immunity applications pose a challenge to researchers in this area.36
There has been limited discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of
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immunity policies37 with Leslie providing a theoretical breakdown of the operation
of an immunity policy based on an analysis of the prisoner's dilemma and economic
game theory as applied to cartels. Leslie asserts that trust is the foundational element
that ensures the continuing formation of cartel behaviour and as a corollary, in order
for an immunity policy to be effective, it needs to create distrust between the cartel
participants.38
Leslie’s observations are largely based on the rational actor and classical
deterrence theory associated with the Chicago School of thought, as will be further
discussed in Chapter II. As will be outlined in Chapter III, there has been a shift
away from these traditional perspectives, some of which have been critical of the
assumptions that underpin the orthodox thinking on immunity policies and Leslie’s
analysis.
In this respect, the direction of this thesis will more closely resemble the
approach of Wouter P.J Wils and Professor Caron Beaton Wells, whose
commentaries consider some of the underlying social and moral implications of an
immunity policy and are more comprehensive in this respect, as compared to other
comparative studies.39
Wils aims to analyse the immunity policy, primarily in the United States and
European Union, with a view to assessing both its positive and negative effects on
optimal antitrust enforcement.40 Through a theoretical discussion, Wils explores the
concept of optimal deterrence (discussed above) in the context of an immunity policy
before turning to consider both the positive and negative effects that may be
produced by an immunity policy. Moreover, Wils' analysis extends to a consideration
of some of the difficulties that may occur in the implementation of immunity
policies, primarily objections of principle and institutional problems, which he
believes can be overcome or reduced through an effectively designed immunity
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policy.41
In addition to his discussion of the framework of an immunity policy, Wils
also considers a number of factors that can impact on the effectiveness of an
immunity policy, namely: criminal penalties for individuals; follow on private
damages actions; and penalties in other jurisdictions.42
Wils discusses the positive and negative effects of the United States based
‘Amnesty Plus' policy, which is essentially a policy ‘under which a cooperating
company that does not qualify for immunity as to a first cartel being investigated but
that uses the occasion of that first investigation to report a second, distinct cartel will
receive, in addition to the immunity for the second cartel, a further reduction of the
fine for the first cartel.’43 Amnesty Plus was recently introduced into the ACCC
Immunity Policy and also exists in the Canadian regime.44
Wils also discusses the policy of providing positive financial rewards or
bounties to cartel informers. This policy has recently been introduced in South Korea
and the United Kingdom.45 Wil's analysis is limited and the issues warrant more
thorough and comprehensive examination.
Professor Beaton-Wells, from Melbourne University, provides an Australian
perspective on many of the issues outlined by Wils.46 Beaton-Wells' analysis focuses
on four primary issues raised by the ACCC Immunity Policy:
(1) Immunity Policy and Criminalisation: With the introduction of a criminalised
cartel regime, Beaton-Wells discusses the potential problems associated with a
bifurcated enforcement system between the ACCC and the CDPP and the adverse
impact that this may have on immunity applications.
(2) Immunity Policy and Private Enforcement: As mentioned previously, the issue of
private enforcement of cartel activity has gained academic momentum. In her
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analysis, Wells questions the level of information disclosure needed to facilitate
private cartel actions, comparing the newly implemented cartel protection provisions
in Australia with the approach adopted in the United States and more recently in
Europe.
(3) Immunity Policy and Settlement: In this section, Beaton-Wells contends that the
Canadian approach to cartel settlement could benefit ACCC enforcement efforts and
suggests ways in which the ACCC’s Cooperation Policy could be improved upon in
this respect.
(4) Immunity Policy and Alternative Informant Rewards: Beaton-Wells explores the
more controversial concept of implementing an informant reward system for cartel
behaviour, similar to the policies adopted in South Korea and in the United
Kingdom.
This research is directly relevant to this thesis, as many of the issues canvassed by
Beaton Wells' require further cross-comparative analysis and supplementation by
empirical evidence.47 Despite the comprehensiveness of Beaton-Wells' research in
this area there appears to be a "gap" in the literature surrounding the design and
operation of an immunity policy from a qualitative and cross-comparative
perspective.
More importantly, whilst Wils alludes to the notion of negative moral effects of
an immunity policy, he does not extend his analysis to a deeper probing of what
impact this may have on the detection or deterrent capabilities of an immunity
policy, despite the fact that detection and deterrence is advocated to be one of the key
aims of an immunity policy.48 A critical study of the theory underpinning the policy
and how this may have influenced the criteria most commonly used to assess the
effectiveness of the policy is also absent from the work of Beaton-Wells.
During the writing of this thesis, another study emerged conducted by Professor
Andreas Stephan and Ali Nikpay that seeks to question the theoretical assumptions
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underlying immunity policies using data derived from the European Commission.49
The research indicates that the decision to apply for immunity is not as simplistic as
the rational actor model would predict and this is compounded by the complexities
inherent within the decision to apply.
Stephan and Nikpay present empirical data to refute the theoretical assumptions
underlying the decision to apply for immunity by demonstrating that the incentives to
apply may not be as strong as the competition regulators would suggest. This is
evidenced by data that suggests cartels in the European Union ceased to operate prior
to the firm self-reporting in return for immunity and also evidence that the policy
may be used strategically.50 The authors conclude that immunity may not destabilise
cartels as much as the theoretical literature would suggest. They outline three key
areas that may strengthen immunity policies (1) the need for individual sanctions to
create a ‘tangible deterrent effect on those responsible’51 (2) the recognition of the
need for competition regulators to be equipped with appropriate resources and
powers to detect cartel conduct without the use of leniency in order to maintain a
credible threat and (3) the importance of strengthening compliance programs for
corporations.
The existence of this study reflects both the relevance and importance of the
research conducted in this thesis. The fact that other researchers, such as those
outlined above, are beginning to question the theoretical assumptions underpinning
the immunity policy and how this impacts on the policy’s operation, serves to
strengthen the arguments within this thesis. It reinforces the need for a
comprehensive breakdown of both the theoretical and practical components of the
immunity policy, including a cross-comparative analysis and recent empirical data to
test the claim that the immunity policy is the most effective anti-cartel enforcement
tool in the world.
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B

Theoretical Approach and Aims of Thesis

As previously stated, the immunity policy is designed with the aim that it will
lead to the detection of cartel conduct. The ultimate policy goal is this sense is
deterrence, based on the assumption that greater detection will result is more
effective deterrence. As demonstrated by the summary of main findings above, there
has not been a comprehensive study conducted into the theory underpinning the
immunity policy, which has been designed through an adaptation of game theory and
the prisoner’s dilemma. Both of these theories are based on economic theoretical
models, which presuppose that humans are rational actors.
As Chapter II will demonstrate, Richard Posner has been a leading advocate of
these economic models of behaviour, pioneering the Chicago school of thought,
which has had a significant impact on the development of competition policy and
specifically the design of the Immunity Policy. This theoretical model has also
influenced the way in which the policy’s effectiveness is assessed, through the
adoption of the DOJ’s three effectiveness criteria: (1) Transparency and
Predictability (2) Threat of Sanctions (3) Fear of Detection.
This thesis will demonstrate that the rational actor assumptions underpinning the
immunity policy are flawed, and as a result the criteria used to assess the ACCC
Immunity Policy needs to be enhanced. This is the first gap that this research will fill
by critically analysing the current theoretical model underpinning the Policy with a
view to outlining an enhanced set of criteria that can be used to assess the
effectiveness of the Immunity Policy.
The second gap relates to the overreliance on quantitative methods to assess the
policy’s effectiveness. As previously stated, there are many difficulties associated
with researching cartel conduct, given the extensive number of ‘unknowns’ in this
research area, where reliance is placed on the data available from ‘discovered’
cartels.
Despite these limitations, the research conducted in relation to cartel conduct and
immunity policies specifically, is predominantly quantitative.52 This thesis will seek
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to enhance the way the immunity policy is currently assessed by utilising qualitative
methods to investigate the way the policy operates in reality, and reveal the nuances
in its design and operation that cannot be captured by quantitative studies.
To this end, the aim of the project is to provide a comprehensive legal and crosscomparative analysis of the ACCC Immunity Policy in order to formulate
recommendations for its improvement. Importantly, this thesis will critically analyse
the viability of alternative methods to immunity, and whether these alternatives can
also achieve the ACCC’s aims of detection and deterrence.
C

Significance of Research

This thesis will contribute to original knowledge by firstly formulating an
enhanced set of criteria to assess the immunity policy and secondly by using a
qualitative and cross-comparative method to inform these recommendations. This
will be the first comprehensive analysis of the ACCC Immunity Policy that includes
a theoretical breakdown; formulation of new criteria to assess the policy; empirical
insight and a cross-comparative analysis of its kind. Such an analysis is critical given
the strong claims from competition regulators of the policy’s detection and
deterrence capabilities and endorsement of the policy as the most effective anti-cartel
enforcement tool in the world. It is necessary to pierce the rhetoric that surrounds the
policy in order to assess its true strengths and limitations. This will ultimately reveal
that the policy is but one enforcement tool in the ACCC’s arsenal and that more is
needed to combat the overreliance on immunity, which will be addressed by this
thesis.
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D

Methodology

The purpose of this research is to conduct a policy analysis using a
combination of summative and formative evaluation. The focus will extend beyond
the goals of the immunity policy to also consider the strengths and weaknesses of the
policy, which will ultimately be useful for those who engage with the immunity
policy, including applicants, their legal counsel, the regulators and policymakers.
Firstly, an analysis of the origin, design and policy objectives of the
immunity policy will be conducted focusing specifically on the United States
immunity policy, as this is where the policy was first designed and implemented.
Secondly, the theory underpinning the immunity policy will be examined, namely
game theory and an adaptation of the prisoner’s dilemma, to determine how the
Chicago school of neo-classical economic thought has specifically influenced the
design and operation of the Immunity Policy. The analysis will turn to recent
theoretical developments that shed light on the limitations of the rational actor
model, and the criteria currently used to assess the effectiveness of the Immunity
Policy.
This analysis will involve conducting classical legal research (narrowly
defined) in order to locate policy statements, media statements, second reading
speeches, international legal materials and other related policy documents. This will
also include examining the enforcement, compliance and prosecution practices of
relevant competition authorities.
The third step in the research design will involve an analysis of the practical
components of the immunity policy with a view to critically evaluating the ACCC
Immunity Policy as an anti-cartel enforcement tool. This stage of the research will
involve a cross-comparative analysis of the immunity policies from the United
States, Canada and the United Kingdom. The utility of comparative methodology has
been described in many academic studies, with its core value not only in 'suggesting
a foreign legal institution or solution as a model or guide, but also in showing what
solution to avoid.' This step of the research method will adopt the theoretical
framework espoused in the work of Kamba 'Comparative Law - A theoretical
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framework,'53 which structures a comparative framework into three key phases:
1. The Descriptive Phase
2. The Identification Phase
3. The Explanatory Phase.
The first step involves the selection of the jurisdictions for the comparative study.
The three main criteria that were used for the selection of the jurisdictions for
comparison were as follows:
1. A jurisdiction that is a developed nation, based on a system of the common
law;
2. A jurisdiction that has an active anti-cartel regime. Importantly this
includes the criminalisation of cartel behaviour;
3. A jurisdiction that has, as part of its anti-cartel regime, adopted an
immunity policy that is designed for the detection of cartel conduct.
Based on these criteria, the United States was chosen for comparative study
of the Immunity Policy. This is largely due to the fact that the United States is
deemed to be the 'Father' of the Immunity Policy, having designed the idea in
response to its growing enforcement against cartels. The United States will therefore
provide the basis for researching the impetus for the design of an immunity policy,
its theoretical underpinnings and its implementation and effectiveness in the United
States pursuit of serious cartel conduct.
Secondly, the United Kingdom was selected, in accordance with the
abovementioned criteria, primarily due to its historic similarities in law and policy to
Australia. An examination of the operation of the immunity policy in the United
Kingdom will provide valuable insight into the way in which the policy will
potentially operate in the recently criminalised Australian cartel regime. The United
Kingdom will be especially useful in this respect, as their anti-cartel enforcement
record is more akin to that of Australia, in contrast to the United States, which has
had an active criminal cartel regime for several decades.
The cartel regime in the United Kingdom is governed by Section 2 of the
Competition Act 1998 (United Kingdom) c. 41 (‘The Competition Act United
Kingdom’), which is principally concerned with the civil prohibition against cartel
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conduct; and Section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (United Kingdom) c. 40 (‘The
Enterprise Act’), which creates the criminal cartel offence. The Competition and
Market Authority (CMA) first introduced its immunity policy in 2000.54 The CMA
has had a solid civil penalty regime in place since the introduction of the civil
offence in 1998. The United Kingdom’s first, and only, contested criminal cartel case
has been generally deemed to be a failure, as it collapsed five days into the trial.55
The immunity applicant played a significant role in the demise of this case and has
led to criticism directed at the overreliance by the authorities on immunity programs
for cartel enforcement in the United Kingdom.56 This criticism has ramifications for
the use of immunity policies across the globe, and will be particularly pertinent to the
Australian regime.
In Canada, cartel law is governed primarily by section 45 of the Competition Act
RSC 1985, c C-34. In 2012, the Competition Bureau has updated its immunity
program'57 alongside a comprehensive FAQ's bulletin58 that is designed to answer
questions relating to the operation of the immunity regime. Additionally, the
Competition Bureau released its competitor collaboration guidelines in December
2009,59 which describe the general approach of the Bureau in applying sections 45
and 90.1 of the Act to collaborations between competitors.
Importantly, like the United Kingdom and Australian regimes, the Canadian
cartel regime is divided between that of the Competition Bureau (‘The Bureau’) for
investigation and civil offences, and in the event of a criminal prosecution, the matter
is referred to the Canadian Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’).60 An analysis of
the bifurcated immunity system is one of the crucial components of the practical
operation of the immunity policy, and will therefore be pertinent to the ACCC
Immunity Policy.
54
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The use of these three comparative jurisdictions will provide a comprehensive
account of the operation of an immunity policy, and will further provide a platform
for discussion of some of the more innovative immunity policy developments, as
well as identify and explain the challenges that have occurred overseas and its
potential impact on the Australian regime. Given the focus on the specific practical
design and operation of the immunity policy, the use of three different models of the
immunity policy from three selectively chosen jurisdictions will be necessary to
channel the appropriate scope of research and the potential breadth of this research.
The

analysis

however,

will

be

confined

mostly

to

the

immunity

policy itself, as opposed to an overview of each of the anti-cartel enforcement
regimes within each jurisdiction.
First, the descriptive phase of comparison will largely involve obtaining the
immunity policy in each chosen jurisdiction and outlining the cartel regime and
process for immunity. This will require gathering secondary material from
competition authorities, international bodies, journal articles and the respective
governments for analysis.
Secondly, the identification phase will be primarily focused on identifying the
similarities and differences inherent within the immunity policy design and operation
across the respective jurisdictions.
Once these areas have been identified and examined, the final explanatory phase
will involve evaluating the perceived failures and successes of the immunity policies
in each jurisdiction and how they compare with the ACCC Immunity Policy. These
areas of examination will be grouped and form respective chapters in this thesis in
order to develop recommendations that will improve the design and operation of the
immunity policy and the likelihood of their implementation.
Most importantly, the explanatory phase will be complemented by qualitative
empirical research in the form of interviews with carefully selected competition
lawyers, high profile scholars and ACCC representatives. These qualitative findings
will help inform the structure of the remaining thesis chapters. Due to the universal
design of the immunity policy, the fact that empirical data will be conducted in
Australia will not adversely affect the research findings, as it is intended that the
comparative analysis of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States will
supplement these research findings.
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Finally, the results from the critical legal analysis of the immunity policy,
including those obtained from the empirical data, will be collated with a view to
formulating recommendations for the improvement of the design and operation of the
ACCC Immunity Policy and the likelihood of any action being taken to implement
these recommendations.
E

Outline of Chapters

This thesis will begin by providing an overview of the origins and design of the
immunity policy, focusing predominantly on the influence of neo-classical economic
theory on competition law in the United States and how this led to the policy’s
inception. The chapter will provide a theoretical breakdown of the immunity policy,
as an adaptation of game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma. Christopher Leslie’s
theoretical analysis of the immunity policy will be critically analysed with a view to
revealing the assumptions underpinning the operation of the policy are largely
speculative and over-generalised.
Chapter 3 will be discussed in three parts. The first part will build upon the
analysis in Chapter 2 by focusing on the development of the rational actor model and
the theoretical developments that have dominated competition law development,
most notably, the Chicago neo-classical economic school of thought, and briefly
Post-Chicago and the newly devised Neo-Chicago theory. The second part will
provide an overview of the Behavioural Economics (‘BE’) literature and questions
whether this model provides a more accurate account of human behaviour than the
rational actor model. Whilst the limitations of the rational actor model are clearly
exposed by the BE movement, the BE approach is still in its infancy, and thus it does
not provide cogent criteria that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the
immunity policy. The third part of this chapter will focus on enhancing the existing
criteria used to assess the immunity policy to reflect more broadly the principles of
public policy. This allows the policy to be viewed in the wider enforcement context
in which it operates and its impact on and interactions with other areas of the law.
These enhanced criteria will then inform the recommendations made in relation to
the ACCC Immunity Policy.
Chapter 4 is the key empirical chapter. This chapter will first outline the
methodology used to conduct the semi-structured qualitative interviews. This is
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followed by an outline of the key empirical findings in relation to the design and
operation of the Immunity Policy. The issues are divided into four main themes
based on the level of importance attributed to these issues, which informed the
structure of the remainder of the thesis:
1. Perceptions of & Attitudes towards the Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct
2. Eligibility & Cooperation Requirements of Immunity
3. The Tension between Public & Private Enforcement – Confidentiality and
Third Parties
4. Alternatives to the Immunity Policy
Chapter 5 analyses the key features in relation to the eligibility and cooperation
requirements of the Immunity Policy based on the empirical data and a crosscomparative analysis of the respective policies in Canada, the United Kingdom and
the United States. The issues explored include: whether recidivists should be granted
immunity on multiple occasions; how the ‘coercion’ test as an automatic exclusion
should be defined; the relationship between the ACCC and CDPP in the bifurcated
system of cartel enforcement; and the process of revocation of immunity, including
an assessment of the legal basis of the policy. These requirements will be assessed in
light of the enhanced criteria in order to formulate recommendations that strengthen
the policy, both as a tool of cartel enforcement and also regulatory public policy.
The focus of Chapter 6 will be on how the Immunity Policy intersects with the
role of public and private enforcement. The key issue centres upon the confidentiality
afforded to immunity applicants and: (1) how this must be balanced against the
interests of third parties seeking compensation; and (2) how multijurisdictional
applications can impact on the level of confidentiality that can be guaranteed by the
regulators to these applicants and the consequences of such disclosure. This chapter
will be divided into two parts.
The first section of this chapter will analyse the position in Australia regarding
the disclosure of immunity information, before turning to the recent developments in
the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada which have significantly
impacted upon the issue of disclosure of immunity information on a global scale and
pose a threat to the effective operation of immunity policies. The analysis will then
focus on restitution as a potential solution to balance the competing interests of
private and public enforcement.
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The second section of this chapter will focus on the information provided to
foreign regulatory agencies pursuant to international formal and informal
information-sharing mechanisms. The focus of this section will be upon the waiver
of confidentiality agreements in Australia and the aforementioned jurisdictions and
its impact on the confidentiality assurances of an immunity policy. The chapter will
then advocate for a more streamlined approach to international immunity
applications and briefly analyse the proposed avenues for this to be achieved through
an analysis of the enhanced criteria.
Given the number of limitations of the Immunity Policy that will have been
exposed throughout this research, the final substantive chapter will outline some
viable alternatives to immunity that may serve to complement the aims of the
existing Immunity Policy. This will include an analysis of the cooperation section of
the Immunity Policy and the treatment of second and subsequent applicants who fail
to secure immunity. This approach will be compared to the respective policies in
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States to reveal that the current method
is unsatisfactory and in a state of flux given recent case law developments.
Secondly, this chapter will outline the current whistleblower protection
provisions that exist in Australia pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and
analyse its effectiveness in providing protection for private corporate whistleblowers.
Given that this Act does not apply specifically to cartel conduct, these provisions will
be compared to the whistleblower protection frameworks that exist in the above
jurisdictions. This comparative analysis will demonstrate that these whistleblower
protection frameworks are generally insufficient at providing adequate protection for
corporate whistleblowers.
Given these inadequacies, this chapter will analyse the more controversial notion
of introducing a cartel informant scheme aimed at encouraging third parties who are
not directly involved in the cartel to reveal pertinent information to the regulator in
exchange for financial incentives. This analysis will draw upon the extensive
experience of the United States in relation to these bounty-type arrangements and
will also focus on the specific cartel informant systems in the United Kingdom,
South Korea and Hungary in order to formulate a workable model for Australia.
This thesis will conclude by reinforcing the number of limitations inherent within
the design and operation of the Immunity Policy, including the approach most
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commonly used to assess its effectiveness in achieving cartel detection and
deterrence. In light of this, this thesis argues that the Immunity Policy should not be
viewed as the single most effective anti-cartel enforcement tool but as one important
component of the ACCC’s overall enforcement arsenal. Most importantly, in order
for this claim to be truly tested, there is a need for the ACCC to implement viable
alternative measures to immunity, which have been developed in this thesis, that are
also aimed at achieving cartel detection and deterrence.
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II

THE HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
THE IMMUNITY POLICY

The aim of this chapter is to theoretically deconstruct the cartel immunity
policy to analyse the policy's origins, its history and to critically examine the
theoretical underpinnings that have dominated the policy's design and use in
jurisdictions worldwide, since its inception in the United States in 1978. This will
involve outlining the context in which the immunity policy was designed in the
United States to demonstrate how the United States DOJ has shaped and influenced
the immunity program to create a policy that is in line with United States
enforcement norms and culture. The focus will be on the United States as this
country has had the greatest impact on the design and operation of the immunity
policy.1
This chapter will outline the influence that neoclassical theory, based on a
combination of game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma, has had on the design of
cartel immunity policies and how these theories inform the policy’s design and
operation. This is an important area of focus. Despite the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission’s (“ACCC”) recent review of the ACCC Immunity Policy,2
there remains a significant theoretical void in relation to the assumptions that
underlie the policy’s design and operation. There have been very few investigations
into the theoretical design of the immunity policy and how this may influence its
operation or the anomalies surrounding its effectiveness, particularly in Australia.3 In
particular, the criterion commonly used to assess the Immunity Policy has been
developed within a neo-classical economic framework and presents a very limited
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Andreas Stephan and Ali Nikpay, 'Leniency Theory and Complex Realities' (University of East
Anglia & Centre for Competition Policy - CCP Working Paper 14-8, 2014)
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means of assessing the policy’s effectiveness.4
The recent review of the Immunity Policy conducted by the ACCC did not
review the theoretical underpinnings or criteria used to assess the effectiveness of the
Policy. The discussion paper released in September 2013 outlined a very confined
area of review. This included:
•

streamlining the processes of granting civil and criminal immunity by utilising a letter of
comfort from the CDPP regarding criminal immunity;

•

clarification of the terms ‘clear leader’ and ‘coercion’ in assessing a party’s eligibility for
immunity;

•

clarification of how cooperation by second and subsequent parties to the cartel will be
assessed by the ACCC;

•

simplifying the format of the policy.5

The review was concluded in September 2014 and a revised Immunity and
Cooperation Policy was released.6
In order to fill this theoretical void, this chapter will analyse the theory
underpinning the immunity policy to reveal that it suffers from significant limitations
in its ability to accurately predict the immunity policy’s operation. This will pave the
way for a critical analysis of the way in which the policy should be assessed in the
following chapter.

A

The Birth of the Immunity Policy

The immunity policy was first designed and implemented in the United States in
1978. Cartels by their very nature are difficult to detect, so the immunity policy was
designed as a method of detection, by providing an incentive for the cartel
participants to reveal the cartel to the authorities themselves. The original United
States leniency policy was announced by John H Shenefield on the 4th of October
1978 at the 17th Annual Corporate Council Institute and was designed for cases of
horizontal anticompetitive conduct such as price-fixing, bid rigging, output

4

For an overview of the way in which the Immunity Policy is commonly assessed, please see:
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5
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6
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for
Cartel Conduct ' (2014).
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restrictions and market allocation. 7
The decision to grant leniency by the United States DOJ under the original
leniency policy for corporations was based on an evaluation of the following factors:
•

Whether the party was the first to come forward;

•

Whether the confession was a truly corporate act;

•

Whether the DOJ could have reasonably expected it would become aware of the activities in
the near future if the corporation had not reported them;

•

Whether the corporation promptly terminated its involvement in the activities;

•

The candor and completeness with which the corporation reported the wrongdoing and
assisted the DOJ in its investigation;

•

The nature of the violation and the party's role in it; and

•

Whether the corporation had made or intended to make restitution to injured parties.8

Originally, the policy left almost all discretion with the DOJ as to whether
leniency would be granted, meaning that the DOJ had ultimate discretion to grant
leniency, even if all the leniency requirements were met. Therefore, unlike the
current incarnation of the policy, the granting of immunity was not automatic.9 More
significantly, leniency would not be granted if the DOJ had already commenced an
investigation. Obviously, many companies were not in a position to know what
investigations the DOJ had underway. Thus, in theory, they would have been more
reluctant to reveal their misconduct without any guarantee that they would have
received leniency.
This version of the leniency policy was deemed largely unsuccessful, with the
DOJ receiving only one request for leniency a year, and only 17 applications for
leniency in total for the period 1978-1993.10 During this period, the policy failed to
uncover a single international cartel.11 It was clear that the policy was not achieving
its aims of cartel detection and deterrence.12 This resulted in the announcement of a
revised leniency policy by the Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman of the
DOJ in August 1993 at the Annual American Bar Association Spring Antitrust

7
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Meeting.13 These changes are reflected in the United States leniency policy as it
stands today.

The United States Corporate Leniency Policy Incarnate

The DOJ Corporate Leniency Policy is tiered in order to induce the first person to
come forward and claim leniency, but also to encourage members who may not be
the first member to cooperate and receive a discount. In order to qualify for Type A
leniency, the corporation must comply with the following:
1.

At the time the corporation comes forward to report the illegal activity, the Division has not
received information about the illegal activity being reported from any other source;

2.

The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported, took prompt and
effective action to terminate its part in the activity;

3.

The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full,
continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation;

4.

The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to isolated confessions of
individual executives or officials;

5.

Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and

6.

The corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly
was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.14

If a corporation does not meet any of the six criteria, then the corporation
must apply for Type B leniency, which will be judged in accordance with the same
six criteria. However, to qualify for Type B leniency, an additional condition is
required to be satisfied namely that 'the Division determines that granting leniency
would not be unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal activity, the
confessing corporation's role in it, and when the corporation comes forward.'15 This
is determined on a case-by-case basis. According to the DOJ, this condition will be
assessed by factors such as the timeliness of the application and whether the
corporation coerced another party to participate in the illegal activity or clearly was

13

See Anne K Bingaman, 'Antitrust Enforcement, Some Intial Thought and Actions' (0867, Antitrust
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15
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the leader in, or originator of, the activity.16
One of the policy's most innovative revisions was the abdication of
prosecutorial discretion. If a cartel participant was the first to come forward to the
DOJ and fulfilled the leniency criteria, then it could be certain to receive leniency.17
This removed the previous uncertainty in relation to the granting of leniency by the
DOJ on a discretionary basis. The revisions also included the creation of a process to
assess applications of cartel participants who were not the first to come forward so
that the value of their contribution to the investigation could be assessed by the DOJ
in exchange for lenient treatment.18
The DOJ also introduced the concept of vicarious immunity, where all
directors, officers, and employees who come forward with the corporation and agree
to cooperate also receive automatic immunity, dubbed Type C leniency.19
Pursuant to the individual leniency policy, an individual can seek leniency,
independent of their employer, before an investigation has commenced, if they meet
the following criteria:
1.

At the time the individual comes forward to report the illegal activity, the Division has not
received information about the illegal activity being reported from any other source;

2.

The individual reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full,
continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation; and

3.

The individual did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly
was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.20

If an individual satisfies the above criteria, then they will be granted leniency from
criminal prosecution.
In addition, executives of a corporation seeking immunity after an
investigation has begun will be given serious consideration for lenient treatment – in
the form of individual leniency – in exchange for their full cooperation.21
Another significant development that accompanied the introduction of the
revised United States leniency policy, and a global first, was the creation of the
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‘marker’ system. Essentially, this system allows a leniency applicant to secure a
place in the leniency ‘queue.’ This innovation is said to add to the creation of the
‘race to the finish’ line.
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In 2008, the DOJ published its ‘Frequently Asked

Questions’ (FAQ) document outlining the marker process and how it is intended to
operate.23
According to this guidance, in order for a potential applicant to obtain a marker, their
counsel must:
1.

Report that he or she has uncovered some information or evidence indicating that his or her
client has engaged in a criminal antitrust violation;

2.

Disclose the general nature of the conduct discovered;

3.

Identify the industry, product, or service involved in terms that are specific enough to allow
the Division to determine whether leniency is still available and to protect the marker for the
applicant; and

4.

Identify the client.24

The ‘marker’ system has largely been considered by the international
competition community law as a ‘success,’ as outlined by the International
Competition Network in its document titled 'Drafting and implementing an effective
leniency policy.'25 A component of leniency that is unique to the United States
concerns the civil liability of leniency applicants. Prior to 2004, a cartel participant
who was granted full leniency could be sued by victims of the cartel and be liable for
‘treble damages.’26 This factor would have placed a heavy burden on the decision to
come forward for leniency in the first place, as it was almost certain that a
corporation would need to pay treble damages to those adversely affected by the
cartel.
To resolve this issue, on 22 June 2004, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty
Enhancement and Reform Act27 was introduced. This Act sought to limit the total
private civil liability of corporations that have entered into leniency agreements with
the Antitrust Division, including their officers, directors and employees, to actual
damages ‘attributable to the commerce done by the applicant in the goods or services
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affected by the violation.’28 This limits damages for corporations who have met the
requirements and obtained leniency to ‘single’ as opposed to ‘treble’ damages, and
also makes them no longer jointly and severally liable for damages suffered by their
co-conspirator’s customers. If a corporation does not obtain leniency, then they may
be held jointly and severally liable for thrice the actual damages suffered by
customers of the leniency applicant.29 The legislation also significantly increased the
potential criminal penalties for price-fixing by introducing higher fines and up to ten
years gaol.30
The purpose of outlining the basic requirements of the Antitrust Division's
leniency policy in this chapter is to provide the context in which the policy was
designed and developed, given that many countries around the world have
uncritically adopted a similar policy in their own competition regimes. This outline
will set the scene for the development of the succeeding chapters, as many of the
elements surrounding the design and operation of the policy will be critically
analysed by comparing the immunity policies in Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom, in addition to the United States.

B

The Influence of Economics on Cartel Enforcement

The role of economists in the decision to prosecute cartels in the Antitrust
Division of the United States DOJ was elevated in the 1970s, which altered the way
in which competition authorities used their enforcement powers. The Antitrust
Division is responsible for enforcing the Sherman Act;31 the primary act that
regulates competition in the United States. The Antitrust Division serves an advisory,
as well as prosecutorial function, and is structured in a hierarchical fashion.32
The Division is invested with wide investigatory powers, where the division
can issue civil investigative demands, which are the equivalent of administrative
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subpoenas, in the case of a formal civil investigation.33 Criminal investigations are
more often dealt with through the grand jury investigation, which are inherently
broad in both scope and nature, as the scope of inquiry is virtually unlimited.34 In
terms of its advisory functions, the Division regularly informs businesses in relation
to the legality of proposed activities in the hope of serving a preventative function;
this has mostly come to effect under the Merger Guidelines with the passage of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.35
The Antitrust Division’s history of enforcement did not gain traction until the
appointment of Thurman Arnold, a Yale professor and social critic appointed to lead
the division in 1938. Arnold significantly expanded and transformed the division.36
During this time, there was a growing reliance on economic evidence as a source for
determining which cases the Division would pursue and an increasing belief in the
credibility of economic expertise.37 Donald Turner’s appointment as Assistant
General for Antitrust in 1965 can be seen as influential in this respect, which began
with the employment of a small group of special economic assistants in order to
review existing and proposed cases.38
During this period, the use of economics in the policy process was
significantly enhanced, and the annual number of investigations conducted more than
doubled.39 Underpinning this shift towards economic analysis were two sources of
underlying tension; the first relating to the intellectual battle between the structural
economists and the emerging Chicago School of neo-classical economics during this
period.
At a basic level, within the Chicago School, the ‘fundamental assumption
underlying this position is that the most efficient level of activity is the market.
33
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Managers tend to act rationally, seeking out new and greater efficiencies as a means
of maximizing profits.’40 On the other hand, Economic Structuralism places its
emphasis on barriers to entry.41 These subtle but important differences between the
two schools of thought fuelled the tension between the Structural Economists and the
Chicago Economists within the Antitrust Division, whereby the appointed
economists viewed the Division’s policy from different perspectives, creating
inconsistencies in the Division’s activities.42
The second source of tension related to the division between the economists
and the lawyers, where the lawyers saw cases through the paradigm of the law,
whilst the economists wished to pursue cases based on their economic credibility,
and in many cases, regardless of the state of the law. This tension reverberated in the
Division over a number of years, leading to a shift in the goals of the Division from
‘winning cases’ to targeting practices that harm consumers.43 By that time, it became
more apparent that the role of economists in the Division had in many instances
circumvented the opinion of the lawyers, and became more fully integrated into the
culture and practice of the Division.44 Accompanying this shift were initiatives such
as the establishment of the Economic Policy Office, which served the purpose of
forming an economic staff that were assigned to every case at an early stage and who
acted as independent analysts, as opposed to technical assistants.45
Furthermore, the Assistant Attorney General in the 1970s only brought cases
that had economic merit.46 Not surprisingly, the growing influence of the Chicago
School in the ranks of the Division was marked by the subtle shift towards
deregulation of competition within this era, under the neo-classical assumption that
markets are efficient and self-correcting and that less state invention would result in
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better results for competition.47 Not all members of the Division unequivocally
accepted the influence of the Chicago School assumptions, with John Shenefield
noting that whilst antitrust was important, populist traditions, as well as popular
suspicion of large corporations, could not be ignored.48
A majority of the institutional change that had occurred in the 1960s-1970s
was cemented by the Reagan Administration in the 1980s.49 This was exemplified by
cuts in the Division’s budget which resulted in the number of economists almost
doubling the number of lawyers employed at the Division, as the reliance on
economic expertise continued to grow.50 It seemed by the time of the Reagan
Administration, and the appointment of William Baxter, the Chicago School had
reached its peak of influence over the Antitrust Division’s enforcement agenda.
It was within this context that the United States leniency policy was born.
From this prevailing historical account, it is clear that at the time of the policy’s
announcement in 1978, there had been a dramatic shift in the status of economics in
the Division, and with it the rise of the Chicago School of neo-classical economics.
Therefore, there is clear indication that the immunity policy is a creature of neoclassical economic thought and is based on the presumption that humans are rational
profit maximisers. The policy is essentially an embodiment of the economic ideals
within the Division that existed at the time of its inception.
On a broader level, the shift towards deregulation within this period and a
laissez-faire approach to market regulation during this period is evidenced within the
policy itself. At its most basic level, the immunity policy is not interventionist nor is
it a product of proactive investigation or regulation, rather it is a system whereby the
market participants are able to come forward and reveal their anticompetitive
misconduct, if they believe it to be in their best interest. This is not to say that it is
not an effective policy, but instead, it sheds light on the fact that the policy is
extremely conducive to the non-interventionist deregulation position that
characterised the Division during that period. ‘Organisation, not division leadership,
came to play the central role in the definition of priorities – policy became an
47
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institutional artifact.’51
It was not until 1993 that the Division introduced its revised policy. The then,
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division was said to have ‘woken the
DOJ from its 12 year nap’52 by moving away from the Republican Administration’s
laissez-faire approach to market regulation and taking on larger-concentration issues.
It is no surprise then that this more aggressive approach to antitrust regulation saw
the introduction of the current incarnation of the leniency policy, which theoretically
makes it economically appealing for companies to come forward and cooperate with
the DOJ. Bingham lauded the revised policy as an immediate success.53 This
aggressive attitude towards the prosecution of cartel activity in the United States is
prevalent and endures to the present day.

The United States Culture of Enforcement

One prominent feature of the United States cartel enforcement record is that it
is supported by a strong culture of cartel condemnation. Although the Sherman Act
was enacted in 1890, according to the previous Chairman of the United States
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Professor Donald Baker, the moral
wrongfulness of antitrust conduct did not gain public traction under the 1950s,
largely due to the egregious conduct by corporate executives in the Electrical
Equipment cases.54 This momentum was built over his time as the Chairman, which
placed an increasing emphasis on seeking gaol sentences for cartel conduct in the
mid-1970s. As a result, the Sentencing Guidelines were passed in 1987. These made
imprisonment a readily available remedy for the sentencing court.55
These measures reinforced the perception of the moral wrongfulness of
antitrust violations in the United States judiciary and legal community, despite the
51
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mandatory use of the Sentencing Guidelines being found to be unconstitutional in
United States v Booker.56 From 1981 through to 1988, the United States DOJ
initiated more criminal prosecutions than during the period 1890 to 1980.57
According to Baker, this increase in criminal prosecutions may have contributed to
the public perception that cartel violations were akin to covert theft, and thus were
perceived by the United States public as immoral and wrong.58
In Baker’s view, this moral condemnation of cartel conduct has permeated
American culture, whereby regular prosecutions and imprisonments are deemed
necessary to deter a serious proportion of the potential antitrust wrongdoers and are
generally favoured and accepted practices.59 William Kovacic, a former
Commissioner of the United States Federal Trade Commission, notes that the
strategic enforcement of industry areas that the public finds most morally
reprehensible, such as public procurement cases, which dominated cases in the 1980s
and early 1990s, was and continues to be a key factor for increasing public support
for criminalisation and prosecution of antitrust violations.60 The United States DOJ is
proud of its aggressive enforcement efforts in securing imprisonment for cartel
members, with 78 per cent of individuals sentenced in 2012 for cartel related
offences. The average prison term has increased since that time from just less than
two years to 25 months.61 This is a stark increase from the period between 1990 and
1999, where only 37 per cent of sentenced individuals went to gaol and the average
prison term was only eight months.62
The DOJ has consistently emphasised the importance of harsh penalties and
increased individual gaol sentences, as one of the crucial measures in achieving
cartel deterrence in anti-cartel enforcement, and advocates that this is one of the
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cornerstones of an effective immunity policy.63 Many countries have criminalised
cartel conduct in recent years,64 often at the behest of DOJ advocates. But the
significant increases in fines and imprisonment terms for cartel offenders has not
escaped criticism65 and this criticism has resonated with many who question the
appropriateness of the criminalisation of cartel conduct.66
Aggressive enforcement of cartel conduct in the United States is thus deeply
engrained within United States enforcement culture and norms, creating an
environment where enforcement policies, such as the immunity policy, are seen as a
crucial component of the overall enforcement regime. However, it is questionable
whether Australia is an appropriate fit for an immunity policy given that very
different enforcement norms and culture exists.
It is not the purpose of this chapter to outline a comprehensive account of all of
the institutional and cultural differences between the DOJ Antitrust Division and the
ACCC but to make mention of the key differences that have a significant bearing on
the way the immunity policy is administered and enforced.
Firstly, the ACCC, as opposed to the DOJ, is an independent statutory authority
charged with the administration of the Competition and Consumer Act 2011 (Cth)
(formerly the Trade Practices Act 1975 (Cth)) on the 1st of January 2011. The
ACCC’s functions are not as wide as those of the DOJ, in that the ACCC cannot
order grand jury investigations.67 The grand jury has been described as in Blair v.
United States, 250 United States. 273 (1919): ‘...a grand inquest, a body with powers
of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited
narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the
63
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investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly
subject to an accusation of crime.’
A grand jury has extensive powers to compel witnesses to attend the grand jury
to give evidence, to issue subpoenas and to pursue other investigatory leads.
Moreover, the grand jury does not need to have a strong basis for pursuing a
particular investigatory lead and the grand jury’s deliberations are conducted in
secrecy.68 Whilst the ACCC has wide investigatory powers,69 it has much less
experience in conducting criminal investigations, which could have significant
implications for its first criminally contested cartel case.
Furthermore, the legislation dealing with the cartel provisions in Australia are
more lengthy and complex than the Sherman Act cartel provision.70 The Australian
provisions have been criticised on this basis, with calls for greater clarity and
simplification of the provisions to aid understanding of their operation and effect.71
Secondly, in Australia, the criminalisation of cartel conduct did not occur until
2009, whilst it has been in operation in the United States since the enactment of the
Sherman Act in 1890. In contrast to the United States, the ACCC system of civil and
criminal cartel enforcement is bifurcated, meaning that any granting of criminal
cartel immunity must be decided by the CDPP:72 a body that has yet to prosecute a
criminal cartel case.73
Of particular importance is the way that cartel conduct is viewed generally in the
United States. As mentioned previously in this chapter, the DOJ has had a long
history of criminal cartel enforcement, which has reinforced the public’s moral
condemnation of the conduct and increased support for the DOJ’s vigorous
enforcement over a significant period of time. By contrast, in Australia, there is yet
to be a criminal cartel trial and many qualitative and quantitative studies have
revealed that there is no such unequivocal condemnation of cartel conduct in the
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business community or within the public body more generally.74 This may be partly
explained by the relative infancy of the criminal cartel provisions. However, the
absence of the same degree of condemnation does call into question whether the
Immunity Policy is an appropriate cultural fit for Australia.
This is not necessarily to say that the Immunity Policy should or will be revoked
by the ACCC, but to cast light on the limitations of the Policy’s operation in
Australia, given its very different enforcement environment from that of the United
States.
C

A Theoretical Breakdown of the Immunity Policy

In addition to a cultural and historical discussion of the immunity policy, it is
important to analyse the theory upon which the policy was founded. Christopher
Leslie provides one of the most comprehensive breakdowns of the theoretical
components of the immunity policy, by investigating how game theory informs the
policy’s design through an application of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma.’75
Game theory is a tool used for predicting the possible reactions to the actor’s
own decisions of other actors.76 It is a model of human decision-making where there
are several decision-makers (called players) who each have different goals that are
interdependent: the decision of each affects the outcome for all of the decision
makers.77 Essentially, Leslie observes that the prisoner’s dilemma in the context of
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immunity is misses a crucial ingredient – leverage. In the basic prisoner’s dilemma
model, the prosecutors have sufficient evidence to convict both prisoners of a minor
crime, meaning that both prisoners will serve some gaol time even if neither
confesses to the major crime.78 However, in the context of immunity, prosecutors
generally do not have a provable minor crime to hold over the decision-maker. Leslie
proposes there are three ways in which price-fixers can overcome or solve the
prisoner’s dilemma; through contract, force and/or trust.79
In relation to contracts, Leslie points out that contracts of an illegal nature are
unenforceable.80 Whilst this is true, outside the realm of legally binding contracts,
Leslie’s analysis does not consider that industry practice or custom may be a factor
that has equally compelling force as an agreement in a legally binding contract.
There is common law support for the notion that cultural norms and practices can be
as equally forceful as a contractual agreement.81 If a norm or custom is so prevalent
in a particular industry for a long period of time, it can in fact be held to have a
legally binding nature, where the custom is ‘well known and acquiesced in’ that
‘everyone making a contract in that situation can reasonably be presumed to have
imported that term into the contract.’82
It is significant that Leslie has overlooked the possibility that custom could
serve a similar purpose as ‘enforceable contracts’ in perpetuating the trust amongst
the cartelists. Japan is a prime example of this, where businesses often have colluded
in order to price-fix, despite the introduction of penalties for price-fixing.83 In Japan,
a cartel is known as a keiretsu that means ‘grouping’ or ‘affiliation’. These cartels
have been justified as a reflection of Japan's group-oriented culture and business
system. The cartel activity was not seen by these businessmen as a ‘contract’ as such,
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but simply ‘a way of doing things’ in business, which was deeply embedded in their
cultural norms and customs to have contract-like force.84
Secondly, Leslie is quick to discount force, such as a threat to kill someone
unless they conform to the cartel’s activities, as a criterion that may help solve the
prisoner’s dilemma, simply stating that ‘it is probably not relevant to price-fixing
conspiracies.’85 However there are still instances where duress short of a threat to kill
may force cartel participants to cooperate where confession should be their dominant
strategy.
This is particularly the case where duress does not necessarily involve ‘mob
hits’ but where the circumstances are more significant than Leslie’s description of
‘public shaming devices.’86 The possibility of duress is reflected in the use of
‘ringleader’ or ‘coercion’ tests of exclusion, such as the coercion test that exists in
Australia and many other jurisdictions.87 The existence of these tests indicates that
circumstances of duress or coercion are possible ways in which members may feel
compelled to join and remain in a cartel when their dominant strategy should be
confession. This possibility of duress casts further doubt on Leslie’s arguments that
attempt to solve the prisoner’s dilemma within the immunity context.
Furthermore, empirical evidence conducted by researchers from the
University of Melbourne suggests that small businesses are often coerced to enter
into cartels or risk being driven out of business: a form of economic duress that
might otherwise compel a cartel member to participate in and continue a cartel.88
This research also revealed that many small businesses operating in a cartel are
unaware that the conduct is illegal, that it is criminal and that an immunity policy
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exists.89 Being unaware of the existence of the immunity policy would affect the
essence of the ‘game,’ as Leslie describes it.90
Leslie also neglects consideration of the tools of punishment often used by
cartelists against other members of the cartel. Competition regulatory authorities
around the world have acknowledged that cartels, as sophisticated organisations, will
often incorporate methods to punish cartelists who cheat on the cartel and this
method is used to ensure the cartel’s intended operation.91 Therefore, if cartelists
incorporate their own methods of ensuring consensus amongst cartel individuals, this
will also affect the nature of Leslie’s game of trust and the cartel’s operation.
Furthermore, Leslie’s analysis is not helpful in revealing how the treatment of
the second and consequent participants who come forward to the authorities under
leniency or cooperation policies (eg the ACCC’s cooperation policy) can affect the
nature of the game.92
In general, Leslie’s arguments supporting and analysing the tenets of the
theoretical underpinnings of the immunity policy through the prism of neo-classical
economics is largely speculative and unconvincing. Many of his assertions are highly
questionable, including his assertion that a cartel ‘is essentially a game of trust.’93
Given that many different factors impact on the operation of cartels in addition to
trust, it would appear that Leslie’s analysis is incomplete.
Moreover, Leslie frames the options available to cartel participants in his
analysis as being two-fold: either confess to the authorities or maintain the cartel.94
These are not the only two options available. Silence may also be another strategy
employed by a cartelist in the event the cartel is discontinued or dismantled. The
credibility of this as a strategy is apparent from the fact that without the immunity
policy there is little chance of the authorities being able to detect the cartel. For
instance, the ACCC stated that, as at 30 September 2013, that there were 20 in-depth
cartel investigations underway, and out of that number only 6 were discovered
without an immunity application. Thus, absent the immunity policy, the ACCC’s rate
89
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of detection would be around 30 per cent.95 Given the low risk of detection, there is a
real possibility that, in the event a cartel ceases to exist, all parties to the cartel may
choose to remain silent and not apply for immunity.96
Leslie’s analysis does not consider the possibility that discontinuing the cartel
(or dismantling the cartel altogether) may be a viable option. This is especially the
case when considered in conjunction with the potential follow-on damages an
immunity applicant may be required to pay in all jurisdictions that the cartel may
have affected or operated within.97 This argument runs counter to Leslie’s analysis
where he argues that ‘a cartel member may simply become more risk averse and
wish to end its participation in a criminal enterprise in the most cost-effective manner
possible, which is confession.’98 Therefore, the very premise on which Leslie bases
his prisoner’s dilemma arguments fails to take account of a potentially more costeffective third strategy.99
Another factor that Leslie fails to consider in his theoretical analysis is that
cartelists may intentionally ‘game’ the policy, meaning there is potential for
cartelists, being sophisticated organisations, to set up cartels with the very intention
of applying for immunity and evading liability.100 Given that there is no condition of
immunity, at least in Australia, that prevents a cartel recidivist from making
successive applications of immunity, there is a real possibility that gaming the policy
can happen, and on a continuing basis.101
The very notion of ‘gaming’ the policy was acknowledged by the ACCC in
the October release of the discussion paper and the prospect informed a number of
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recommendations the ACCC considered for review.102 A key economic study
conducted by John Connor in 2010 also suggested that cartel recidivism on an
international scale is increasing.103 The potential for cartelists to intentionally exploit
the immunity policy in this way is another consideration absent from Leslie’s
analysis of the theory underpinning the immunity policy. Therefore his analysis
provides a very limited view of the policy’s operation.
If Leslie’s analysis of cartels as essentially a ‘game of trust’ were viewed in a
vacuum, it would seem to present a compelling analysis of how an immunity policy
is intended to operate through the application of the prisoner’s dilemma. However, as
this chapter has demonstrated, there are a number of other important considerations
that perpetuate the ‘trust’ amongst cartelists, or complicate the decision-makers
choice to apply for immunity. Moreover, a cartelist is presented with a third viable
alternative in addition to continuing the cartel or confessing, where they may
discontinue the cartel and remain silent.
There are a number of other theorists, in addition to Leslie, who have used
game-theoretical analysis in relation to the immunity policy.104 These papers give
only a brief descriptive account of how game-theoretical analysis applies to
immunity policies and in much less detail than Leslie. In many of the papers, the use
of the game-theoretical model and the assumptions underpinned by the prisoner’s
dilemma are not explicitly explained but are implicit from the economic models
employed by the theorists in their analysis of leniency programs.105
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In defence of the game-theoretical model, Spagnolo suggests that ‘rational
choice analysis is particularly well-suited to analyse cartels and policies against
them, as wrongdoers are well-educated, calculating firm managers, used to
evaluating costs and benefits and to react to incentives, rather than to rage, passions
or instinct.’106 However, there are numerous psychological studies in cognitive
behaviour that contradict the notion that humans are in control of their emotions or
that human decision-making is as simple as the rational actor model predicts and as
Spagnolo suggests.107
This chapter has demonstrated that the theoretical basis upon which the
immunity policy has been modelled provides a narrow and limited means of
assessing the immunity policy’s operation. In particular, it provides no cogent means
for assessing the policy’s effectiveness as a tool of cartel enforcement. Exposing the
limitations of the rational actor model as a means to predict human behaviour and
developing criteria that can be used to more comprehensively assess the immunity
policy’s effectiveness will be the task of the following chapter.
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III

THE IMPACT OF RATIONALITY ON IMMUNITY POLICY
DEVELOPMENT

The purpose of this chapter is to historically trace the concept of rationality to
contextualise the meaning of the concept within the field of economics and
competition law before discussing the ‘rational actor model’, recent theoretical
developments in relation to human behaviour and the implications for the immunity
policy.
This chapter will be divided into three parts. The first part will discuss the
concept of rationality, its application to law and economics, including the Chicago
School’s development of the rational actor model. This section will also touch upon
other theoretical developments that also draw upon the assumptions underlying the
rational actor model. It is not the purpose of this section to provide a comprehensive
historical account of the concept of rationality, as this has been achieved in other
works.1 Nor does there seem to be any unity amongst economists as how to define
the rationality, given there are many prevailing views.2
It is also not the intention of this section to provide an extensive historical
account of the developments of the Chicago School of neo-classical economic
theory, as this work has been canvassed in other research.3 Rather the focus will be
on providing a contextual understanding of the origins of the rational actor model
and how they ultimately fostered the development of an immunity policy. This part
will also review the primary criticisms levelled at the rational actor model to shed
light on its limitations as a theory of human behaviour. The aim will be to cast doubt
on the model’s ability to provide a sufficient basis upon which public policy should
be designed and assessed.
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The second part of this chapter will analyse the theoretical developments that
refute the rational actor assumptions, focusing on the Behavioural Economics
Approach (thereafter ‘BE Approach’). It will question whether the BE Approach has
emerged as a more appropriate model to adopt in public policy design and
assessment in an attempt to more adequately reflect human behaviour and decisionmaking, compared to the rational actor model. This part will conclude that despite
elements of usefulness within the BE approach, the theory is still limited in its ability
to provide guiding criteria that can be used to assess the Immunity Policy’s
effectiveness.
The final part of this chapter will then develop a new approach to assessing
the immunity policy. Recognising the drawbacks of the United States DOJ criteria
currently used to assess the immunity policy’s effectiveness, derived from neoclassical economic theory, this part will outline an enhanced method and set of
criteria to more comprehensively assess the design and operation of the policy in
light of the limitations of the rational actor model.

A

An Exploration of the Development of the Rational Actor Model

One prevailing view of rationality is that it entails the ability to be logical, to
reason or to draw conclusions properly, to be reasonable, sensible and judicious.4
The concept dates back to Aristotle’s notion of rationality, who deems the defining
characteristic of the human species as the ‘rational animal.’5 In his view, rationality
is a man’s ability to think about the world and his role in it in terms of scientific or
other propositions, who can recognise that pairs of propositions having a term in
common sometimes allows a conclusion to be drawn in the form of another
proposition that follows logically from them as premises.6
Jeremy Bentham’s work was influential on the field of economics through his
‘Principle of Utility.’7 This principle dictates that pleasure and pain lie at the heart of
all actions of sentient creatures. According to Bentham, motives consist in a desire
4
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for pleasure and an aversion to pain, meaning that actions are motivated by the
prospect of obtaining some pleasure or of averting some pain. In Bentham’s view, a
right and proper action is one that promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest
number.8 This theory is more commonly referred to as Utilitarian Theory and the
assumptions that underpin this theory have been incorporated into criminal and
enforcement policies for decades.9 The critics of Bentham’s notion of utilitarianism
assert that the concept is unduly narrow, as it requires that an individual acts in the
‘right way’ when he attempts to maximise his own happiness, without regard to the
happiness of others. In other words, the theory is criticised for being too simple and
generalised to adequately reflect human behaviour.10 Furthermore, it is said that the
theory does not adequately reflect other non-utilitarian values, such as the concept of
‘just dessert.’11
Gary Becker is another leading pioneer in the field of economics and rational
action. His early work postulated that all human behaviour is economising in nature
and amenable to analysis through economic modelling.12 Becker liberally applied his
rational actor model in his economic analysis of human behaviour to areas as varied
and diverse as: how many children one would have; the decision to marry or divorce;
criminal activity; altruism; suicide; social interaction; and the allocation of time.13
Becker extended his analysis to criminal behaviour in further work and outlines an
economic model he proposes is useful in determining how to combat crime in an
‘optimal’ fashion through the consideration of a number of factors, namely:
‘(1) the number of crimes, called "offenses" in this essay, and the cost of offenses, (2) the
number of offenses and the punishments meted out, (3) the number of offenses, arrests, and
convictions and the public expenditures on police and courts, (4) the number of convictions
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and the costs of imprisonments or other kinds of punishments, and (5) the number of offenses
and the private expenditures on protection and apprehension.’14

Becker’s use of neo-classical economic analysis and the ‘rational man’ had a
significant impact on the view of many sociologists; many of whom were affronted
by the notion that many dearly held normative factors central to studies in sociology
should be replaced by utilitarian concepts introduced by Bentham, and reinforced by
Becker’s work in the field of economics.15 As a result, at least in the field of crime
and criminology, the focus of research went from being based on normative and
moral terms to a rational choice frame of reference within the field of positive
science.16
This was represented by a change in focus by criminologists from
rehabilitative studies to research directed towards the deterrent effect of punishment
and the effect of incentives on crime.17 Bentham and Becker’s prevailing impact on
the study of human behaviour is exemplified by the vast number of economic based
studies in the field of cartel conduct that seek assess the effectiveness of the
immunity/leniency programs across the world by using rational choice methods.18
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The Economic Approach to Law - Competition Law and Economics: An
Introduction

The basis of an economic approach to law, as advocated by Richard Posner,
is the assumption that people act as rational maximisers of their satisfactions.19 As
there have been many conceptions of rationality over the course of history, the focus
in this chapter will be on the concept of rationality as derived from normative
decision theory, which is rooted in economic game theory. As previously described,
this concept of rationality presupposes that people make choices based on
maximising their utility or minimising the cost to themselves.20
At a basic level, a decision maker is faced with a number of alternatives with each
choice being given a certain probability, which therefore equates to a utility for the
decision maker. The equation that computes the highest expected utility is the one
chosen.21
Posner, whilst describing the benefits that an economic mind, with economic
tools can bring to the analysis of the law, stated that quantitative analysis and
statistical compilation would prove to be extremely useful in identifying patterns and
causes of legal and administrative issues.22 Generally, his economic theory of law
follows on from Bentham’s and Becker’s work of the application of economics in the
context of non-market legal regulation.
In applying the economic approach to criminal behaviour, Posner adopts the
utilitarian concepts developed by Bentham and Becker, stating that when assessing
whether criminal penalties are optimal to deter criminal behaviour, he assumes that
most potential criminals are sufficiently rational to be deterred. He states that such an
assumption has the support of extensive literature.23 Similarly to Becker, Posner
believes that there can be an ‘optimal’ level of deterrence, whereby after the
appropriate punishment has been set; it is adjusted with the appropriate level of
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probability and severity ‘to bring that cost home to the would-be offender.’24 He
published a number of articles with William Landes, writing primarily about
economics and law including issues relating to private enforcement,25 the notion of
an independent judiciary,26 and the use of legal precedent;27 all of which have been
said to be the most productive and important contributions to law and economics.28
Specifically related to this research, Posner believes that the assumption of
rationality can be applied in the analysis of law, and that ‘lawyers can apply the
theory perfectly well without the help of specialists.’29 He finds that his economic
analysis can be applied to law through the economic representations of ‘goods’ and
‘price,’ even though the law is traditionally viewed as a non-market setting. The
‘goods’ for example represent the ‘crimes’ to the criminal and the ‘price’ represents
the term of imprisonment, discounted by the probability of conviction.30
In Posner’s model, the legal system is treated as a given and therefore the
question is directed towards how individuals or firms within the system react to the
incentives they are presented. He refers to the possibility that many academic
lawyers may be ‘repulsed’ by the prospect that economists are attempting to ‘wrest
their field from them.’31
Generally, the work of Posner and those from the Chicago School enjoyed its
heyday in the late 1970s, which was categorised by a shift of interventionist policies
in the Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s to a more laissez faire set of permissive
rules.32 The influence of the Chicago School on antitrust policy was essentially twofold: (1) it advocated that the best tool available to maximise economic efficiency
was by way of the neoclassical price theory model (2) the primary goal of antitrust
enforcement policy should be economic efficiency.33
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The ‘victories’ of the Chicago School of economics that are widely viewed as
successful include fixing economic welfare as the primary objective of antitrust;
‘rejecting no-fault deconcentration as a plausible policy option and giving positive
regard to productive efficiency’ – meaning that despite many of its criticisms –
overall economic efficiency have benefited significantly from these changes in
antitrust policy stemming from Chicagoan analysis.34 This was a significant change
from the normative analysis of the 1950s and 1960s in which government agencies
were aggressively interventionist.35
There have been a number of other ‘waves’ of economic thought since the
Chicago neo-classical economic paradigm – most notably the Post-Chicago and NeoChicago schools. Both Post-Chicago and Neo-Chicago utilise economics as a form of
analysis. However, there are a number of differences between the three schools of
thought. The Post-Chicago school is said to be based on newer and more
sophisticated forms of economic analysis than the Chicago school of neo-classical
economic thought, and places a much heavier emphasis on game theoretic models of
firm behaviour that help to identify anticompetitive behaviour.36
Advocates of the Post-Chicago analysis claim that the theory is based on
specific testable hypothesis and empirical testing of these models.37 However, many
question the usefulness of Post-Chicago theory and whether it does indeed go beyond
a pure Chicago analysis, particularly given that many of the underlying assertions of
the school are untestable38 or fail to rule out viable alternative theories.39 It has been
suggested that the real value of Post-Chicago is reflected in its recognition that
markets are actually far more complex and varied than the Chicago school advocates
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are willing to admit. However, the benefits of Post-Chicago theory, like Chicago,
may be oversold.40
In contrast, the Neo-Chicago school is in its infancy as a theoretical school of
thought and is likely to be a narrower and more cautious approach than its
predecessor.41 This is demonstrated in the Neo-Chicago approach to predatory
pricing, where in contrast to the Chicago school, Neo-Chicago would acknowledge
that predatory pricing may occasionally happen but claim that the vast majority of
predatory price claims are overstated, particularly by competitors.42 The NeoChicago school insists upon basing its antitrust interventions on evidence-based
justifications, which will focus on the operation of the market in a real-world
context.43
The Neo-Chicago school also claims to be more diplomatic in its approach to
the role of institutions in antitrust policy. Whilst the Chicago school insisted upon a
non-interventionist role by the State, in the belief that markets will self-correct, the
Neo-Chicago school recognises the positive role that institutions can play in order to
intervene to correct competitive market failures.44
Although this is a very brief description of the schools of thought that have
dominated antitrust policy since the 1970s, the most important aspect in relation to
the analysis of the immunity policy is that the rational actor model underpins all of
these theories. As demonstrated by the previous chapter, the rational actor model, as
derived from the Chicago School of Economics, was central to the development of
the immunity policy and currently informs its intended operation. However, the
rational actor model is limited in its ability to accurately predict human behaviour.
To demonstrate this, it is necessary to outline the key empirical findings that refute
the assumptions underlying the rational actor model with a view to exposing its
inadequacies as a model of human behaviour and therefore an insufficient basis upon
which the immunity policy should be assessed. Many of these empirical studies have
been conducted by advocates of the BE Approach.
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B The Evolving Concept of Rationality and the Behavioural Law and
Economics Approach – A Limited Theoretical Approach to Regulatory Policy
and Design
One of the most significant theoretical developments in relation to the
concept of rationality was the introduction of the concept of ‘Bounded Rationality’
by Herbert Simon.45 Simon contends that people reason and choose rationally, but
only within the constraints imposed by their limited search and computational
capacities.46 He uses the analogy of a computer to illustrate the concept of Bounded
Rationality, whereby the human mind is compared with that of a computer with
limited processing capacity. In this analogy, the human mind will engage in effortsaving subroutines that sometimes provide reasonable but imperfect solutions which
can seem particularly appealing and compelling.47 Simon was awarded a Nobel Prize
in 1978 for his work on the rational decision-making in business organisations.48 He
recognises the attraction of the rational actor model but argues that Bounded
Rationality does not possess that kind of simplicity and that the ‘assumptions about
human capabilities are far weaker than those of the classical theory.’49
Simon’s work acknowledges that one of the central failures of classical
theory is that it was never designed to examine situations involving decision-making
under uncertainty and imperfect competition. He asserts that the neo-classical
rational actor model requires an individual to be aware of or have full knowledge of
the choices available to him and also the full knowledge and/or ability to compute
the consequences that will follow from each different choice.50 The rational choice
model also requires that the decision-maker will be able to evaluate these
consequences with certainty and have the ability to compare consequences that flow
from different choices, no matter how diverse they may be. In contrast, Bounded
Rationality assumes that the consequences of choosing particular alternatives will
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only be imperfectly known to the individual decision-maker ‘both because of limited
computational power and because of uncertainty in the external world, and the
decision maker did not possess a general and consistent utility function for
comparing heterogeneous alternatives.’51
Simon’s draws upon psychological research into ‘information processing
psychology,’ which explains the process of human decision-making as involving a
very selective search in the human mind based on ‘rules of thumb.’52 These ‘rules of
thumb’ guide the search into promising regions, where solutions will generally be
found, even though all possibilities may not be fully explored or imputed.53 During
this search process, there is much latitude for the decision maker to form a solution,
which is far different from the process of searching for the ‘optimum’ solution that
the rational actor model mandates.
Another important implication for the purposes of the immunity policy is that
Simon believes that firms or business corporations do not act consistently with the
predictions of the rational actor model. Despite the fact that one of the primary
purposes of a corporation is profit-maximisation, a firm may suffer from what is
called ‘organisational slack,’ which Simon claims will result in decision-making
capabilities that are far from optimal.54 This organisational slack may be the result of
a magnitude of motivational and environmental variables, which ‘serves as a buffer
between the environment and the firm’s decisions.’55
Simon’s research is widely cited in numerous fields and research projects.56
Many have come to accept that Bounded Rationality may provide a more accurate
account of the process of human decision-making then the neo-classical model. This
has been validated by empirical evidence.57 For instance, Kunreuther and his
colleagues conducted a qualitative study into the insurance industry, where they
surveyed 2055 homeowners living in flood prone areas throughout the United States
51
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and 1006 homeowners in eighteen earthquake areas in California.58 The aim of the
study was to determine the key factors that influence the voluntary purchase of
insurance against the consequences of low-probability events, such as floods or
earthquakes.
The advocates of rational actor theory assume that risk-averse individuals
would favour a strategy to protect them against rare catastrophic losses that they
would not be able to cope with on their own, however the study indicated that
‘people preferred to insure against relatively high-probability, low-loss hazards and
tended to reject insurance in situations where the probability of loss was low and the
potential losses were high.’59 Kunreather attributed this to the fact that people have a
‘finite reservoir of concern,’ meaning that generally people do not have the time or
energy to worry about low-probability hazards because if they did they would be
overburdened by the number of decisions they would need to consider and this would
adversely affect productive life.60
In an attempt to overcome some of the limitations said to be inherent in the
rational actor model, a new scientific method has been developed that builds upon
and incorporates Simon’s concept of Bounded Rationality and seeks to enhance the
rational actor model. This field is known and referred to in this research as the BE
Approach. No consensus has been reached regarding the definition of behavioural
economics. This may be due to the fact that the task of explaining human behaviour
requires attention to many intellectual disciplines including psychology, cognitive
psychology, neuroscience, sociology, philosophy and marketing science. Economics
is only one relevant field of research that assists in understanding human behaviour,
which is a highly interdisciplinary field of inquiry.
One view of BE states that it is an approach that incorporates psychological
insights into the study of economic problems, whilst another defines the concept in
relation to psychological phenomena that targets the assumptions underpinning the
rational choice model.61 It has also been said that humans exhibit systematic biases in
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the way both the world and the market are perceived.62 Due to this lack of consensus,
in lieu of providing a refined definition, this chapter will outline a number of key
findings that categorise the BE approach.63
Leading pioneers of this field include Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
who received the Nobel Prize for their work on BE. However, the seeds of the BE
movement can be traced as far back as to Adam Smith’s ‘Theory of Moral
Sentiments.’64 In addition to Herbert Simon’s widely cited theory of Bounded
Rationality, Kahneman and Tversky have developed an alternative theory to
expected utility theory, called ‘Prospect theory.’65 Prospect theory states that neoclassical economics bases many of its assumptions on the fact that the individual is
acutely aware of all of the options available to him at the time in which a decision
needs to be made. But as the research by Kahneman & Tversky suggests, humans are
not generally in a position to know of all of the options that are available to them at
the time of making a decision and therefore base decisions on incomplete
information.66 In contrast, the neoclassical model is generally based on the
assumption that an individual has access to complete or ‘perfect’ information.
The first violation of expected utility theory, or the rational actor model, that
Kahneman & Tversky discuss relates to certainty, probability and possibility and
indicates that people place a greater amount of weight on outcomes that are
considered certain, in comparison to those outcomes that are merely probable. This
they call the ‘certainty effect.’67 When asked to choose between a sure gain over a
larger gain that is merely probable, the research indicates that people were more
likely to choose the sure gain, and are therefore risk averse when it comes to gains.
However, the opposite phenomenon is witnessed in the realm of losses, meaning that
people are generally risk seeking for a loss that is merely probably over a smaller
loss that is certain. This Kahneman and Tversky call the ‘The Reflection Effect.’68
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Kahneman and Tversky have developed an alternate theory to the rational
actor model that posits individual decision making as a two-stage process. The first
stage is the editing phase, where an individual conducts a preliminary analysis of the
prospects on offer and the second is an evaluation phase, where the individual
evaluates the prospects and chooses the one with the highest value.69
Prospect theory also suggests that many prospects or decisions may be made
in combination or segregation or through a process of cancellation, whereby an
individual will effectively ‘cancel out’ prospects, such as outcome-probability
pairs.70 It is asserted that within this editing phase, the process by which the editing
occurs may be different amongst different individuals, which therefore creates
anomalies in choice and this could be dependent and influenced by the context in
which the decision is made. These factors are also prevalent in the evaluation phase
where many individuals will evaluate the value of the prospect in different ways.71
Kahneman and Tversky’s findings have consistently been used to refute the
assumptions that underpin the rational actor model and have been used widely as
support for the BE Approach.72 Most notably, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 has
led many economists to question the assumption that the market is self-correcting
and that humans and firms are perfect maximisers.73 It is asserted that the recent
crisis has raised important issues of market failure, regulation of markets, moral
hazard and a lack of understanding of how markets actually operate and therefore
now, more than ever, it is important to analyse how the BE Approach might help
overcome the limitations of the rational actor model by asking questions about
whether the neoclassical assumptions are still valid, if they ever were.74
Richard Posner appears to have retracted some of his earlier arguments about
the utility of neo-classical paradigms and has questioned some of his earlier held
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beliefs about the nature of the free-market.75 Posner has recognised the role that
individual greed may have played in the global financial crisis of 2008. He criticises
the economic profession as being ‘asleep at the switch’ with an overreliance on
‘mathematical models’ that blinded them to the ensuing crisis. He also acknowledges
the role that institutions such as the government should have played in helping avoid
market failures.76 These positions fly in the face of his traditional Chicago neoclassical ideologies that markets are self-correcting. Gary Becker, on the other hand,
has remained wedded to the rational choice model. In an interview in 2009, he
argued that incorporating ‘more realistic assumptions’ about human behaviour would
not have helped to avoid the global financial crisis, and will not solve the problem.77
It is important at this stage to emphasise that the rational actor model has
served, and continues to serve, an important purpose in analysing human decisionmaking but that this purpose is very limited, and mostly confined to simple decisions.
Increasingly, however, governments, economic organisations, academics and various
stakeholders around the world have begun to recognise the value of the BE Approach
by starting to take account of BE findings in policy making.78

1

Behavioural Economics Research – Key Findings

There is a vast array of empirical data related to the BE movement which
applies to many different fields. This chapter will focus on a selection of BE research
findings, specifically on those that are likely to have implications for the immunity
policy, namely:
-

Complex Decision-Making

-

The Availability and Representativeness Heuristics

-

Overconfidence Bias

-

Context of Decision Making
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-

(a)

Habit and Traditions

Complex Decision Making

The first finding relates the complexity of a problem and its ability to affect
an individual’s ability to maximise their utility. This aspect of the BE Approach is
closely related to Simon’s notion of bounded rationality, discussed above.
Essentially, when a decision-maker is faced with a complex problem, it
requires a significant amount of cognitive effort to comply with the predictions of
rational choice theory; so instead, studies have shown that a decision maker will
employ simplified strategies in order to minimise effort to make selections.79 The
notion that decision makers simplify complex scenarios in order to make decisions
contradicts the rational actor model, as this does not necessarily maximise their
utility. In particular, as choices become difficult, consumers naturally tend to defer
decisions, often indefinitely.80 For example, one study found that individuals were
less likely to select a house that maximised their utility (defined by questions the
subjects were earlier asked about their preferences) from among five alternatives, as
the number of attributes presented to the subjects was increased beyond ten.81
If this idea is accepted, then it would seem that complexity affects an
individual’s ability to maximise their utility. If this concept is applied to the context
of a decision maker in the process of deciding whether or not to apply for immunity,
a rational actor model would predict that the decision maker would compute all the
possibilities available, with the assumption that the decision maker is in fact aware
of all of these possibilities and then will systemically undertake a cost-benefit
analysis to find the solution with the greatest utility.
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However, immunity related decisions are not a straight forward exercise and
the decision to apply often involves competing and complex considerations.82 For
example, if a cartel participant is involved in an international cartel across a number
of jurisdictions, then the decision to apply for immunity becomes multijurisdictional. Not only will an immunity applicant need to identify each jurisdiction
that the cartel may have affected, but also there is no guarantee that if the applicant is
successful in one jurisdiction it will be granted immunity in any other jurisdiction.
This could mean that the evidence provided by the immunity applicant in one
jurisdiction where they are granted immunity could be used against the immunity
applicant in another jurisdiction, in which the cartel participant did not seek or was
not successfully granted immunity. This could also lead to a number of civil claims
lodged by third parties who have also been affected by the operation of the cartel in
all of the affected jurisdictions.83 Therefore, as this example shows, the options
available to the cartel participant are significantly more complex and varied than the
rational actor assumptions predict.

(b)

Availability and Representativeness

Representativeness refers to the situation in which probabilities are evaluated
by the degree to which A is representative of B by the degree to which A resembles
B.84 An example can be derived from the research of Cornell psychologist Tom
Gilovich, who in 1991 conducted research on the experience of London residents
during the German bombing campaigns of World War II. When newspapers released
pictures on where the bombs had landed, they evidently appeared to depict ‘clusters’
around the River Thames and also the northwest sector of the map.85
This generated great concern among London residents who believed that this
cluster pattern indicated that the Germans were able to aim their bombs with great
82
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precision. However, a detailed statistical analysis revealed that the distribution of the
bomb strikes was indeed random.86 Kahneman and Tversky assert that this approach
to the judgment of probability can lead to serious errors, because similarity, or
representativeness, is not influenced by several factors that should affect judgments
of probability, according to the rational actor model.87
The Availability Heuristic refers to the way in which people assess the
likelihood of risks by asking how readily examples come to mind. The more readily
these relevant examples are to the individual, they are far more likely to be
concerned then if they cannot recall such examples. For instances, an individual may
assess the risk of heart attack among middle aged people by recalling the number of
heart attacks that have occurred in people they know.88
Closely related to this heuristic are the concepts of Accessibility and
Salience, meaning that if you have personally experienced a heart attack then you are
more than likely to believe it will happen then if you saw a story on the news about a
person having a heart attack, and the likelihood of this happening again would be
affected by how recently the heart attack occurred. Therefore, the Availability
heuristic in risk assessment can have a substantial impact on the way the public
perceives and reacts to risk and taking precautions. For instance, a person is more
likely to purchase flood insurance when they know someone who has experienced a
flood.89
In the context of criminal enforcement, according to the rational actor model,
and the predictions of Gary Becker, criminals will maximise their utility by
committing crimes only if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.
According to this theory, in order to deter crime, society must raise the expected
costs above the expected benefits of the crime.90 This is usually achieved by
increasing the severity of the punishment, such as lengthening gaol terms or
imposing higher monetary fines.91
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However, if the Availability heuristic is applied, when calculating the
anticipated costs of crime, the types of events that are more salient to these potential
criminals could significantly impact the analysis conducted by these criminals.92
Therefore, in order to determine which deterrence mechanism will be the most
effective, it must be understood whether the criminals are likely to over or
underestimate the frequency and the severity of punishment that is actually imposed.
In Australia, there is yet to be a criminal cartel case but the potential gaol
sentence for cartel conduct is a maximum of 10 years.93 Therefore, at least at the time
of writing, cartel participants are likely to underestimate the severity of punishment,
due to the lack of criminal prosecutions in Australia. The situation could be much
different in the United States, where individual imprisonment sentences have been
increasing over the past decade, and along with it, the length of the gaol sentences.94
Because the severity of the punishment for cartel conduct is not yet a
significant factor in Australia, at least for criminal cartel activity, increasing the
frequency of punishment is likely to be more effective, ‘under the assumption that if
a criminal knows or knows of someone who has been imprisoned for a particular
crime, this information is likely to be available and to cause him to overestimate the
likelihood that he will be arrested and convicted if he commits the same crime.’95 As
mentioned, this cannot yet be assessed in Australia, but in the civil context at least,
increasing the frequency of punishment, ie the number of cartels that are discovered
and prosecuted is likely to cause potential cartel participants to overestimate the
likelihood that they will be detected and held liable.
However, the discovery of cartels rests very heavily on the use of the
immunity policy; hence the perception of the immunity policy and its use is likely to
have a significant bearing on a potential cartel participant’s estimation of the
likelihood of conviction. This consideration becomes even more critical when there
is speculation that the authorities are placing too much reliance on the immunity
policy as its sole source of cartel detection. That could suggest to potential cartel
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participants that if you do not come forward on your own accord, then there is a
strong likelihood that the cartel will not be detected at all.96

(c)

Over Confidence Bias

Even when people may be aware of the actual probability distribution of a
particular event occurring, their predictions as to the likelihood of that particular
event happening to them are subject to what is called ‘Over Confidence’ bias. This
encompasses the belief that good things are more than average likely to happen to us
and consequently, bad things are less likely than average to happen to us.97
Related to the Over Confidence bias is the ‘confirmatory’ or ‘self-serving’
bias; the term used to describe the observation that actors often interpret information
in ways that serve their interests or preconceived notions.98 For instance, studies have
shown that within the corporate context, managers exhibit ‘undue confidence in their
firms’ ability to overcome obstacles and a self-serving perception of information that
might objectively signal future problems’ which could potentially mislead those who
would invest in their firms’ securities.99
In applying this research to the position of a cartel participant, it is likely that
an individual involved in a cartel will exhibit Over Confidence bias in relation to the
success or predicted success of the operation of the cartel, and therefore this would
adversely affect their decision to apply for immunity. Closely related to this
argument is the prospect that even if a cartel member is aware that other cartels have
failed, the Over Confidence bias will lead them to believe that the cartel they are
involved in will not fail. This is also supported by evidence that many cartel
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members do not apply for immunity unless the cartel has already failed.100 Although
it has been acknowledged by those conducting the studies of BE that the Over
Confidence bias is not a universal phenomenon, it is argued that the bias is prevalent,
often massive and difficult to eliminate. This is particularly challenging because
confidence controls action.101

(d)

Context of Decision Making
As discussed previously,102 advocates of the rational actor model base their

assumptions on a decision-maker maximising their utility in a lacuna, devoid of any
context that may affect their decisions. In contrast, BE studies acknowledge that
decisions are often inextricably bound to the context in which they are made, and can
affect the decision that the decision-maker ultimately makes.103
One of the most important findings to emerge from the BE Approach relates
to the way in which individuals view gains and losses. These concepts fall within the
category of ‘Framing’ and ‘Reference Points.’ As mentioned previously, the studies
conducted by Kahneman & Tversky have shown that when a decision is framed in
terms of ‘losses’ then an individual is more likely to exhibit ‘risk seeking’ behaviour,
whilst if a decision is framed in terms of ‘gains’ then an individual is more likely to
be ‘risk averse.’104
Applying these findings to the immunity policy, it would seem that the way
in which the immunity decision is framed is crucial in influencing decision-making
behaviour. If the decision to apply for immunity is seen as a ‘gains’ decision,
presumably in the form that the applicant will ‘gain’ immunity and thus are not
prosecuted, then cartel participants are likely to be risk-averse, meaning that they are
more likely to decide to apply for immunity then risk being exposed and prosecuted.
However, if the decision to apply for immunity is seen as ‘loss,’ due to the possibility
100
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of diminished cartel profits or potential civil or criminal liability, including possible
follow-on damages actions, then the immunity applicant is more likely to exhibit
‘risk-seeking’ behaviour. It has been argued by some commentators, such as Jeffry
Rachlinski, that plaintiffs are likely to perceive litigation options as ‘gains’ since they
stand to receive money, whereas defendants are likely to perceive their options as
‘losses.’105
Therefore, it is possible that cartel participants are likely to view the decision
to apply for immunity as a loss decision, which is likely to make them more riskseeking, ie ‘take their chances.’ This finding contradicts the rational actor model,
which would predict a decision maker’s decision as being independent of the framing
and reference effects propounded by the BE Approach.
Studies have shown that mood and emotion can also affect individual
decision-making. According to Schwarz, our feelings ‘may influence which
information comes to mind and is considered in forming a judgment, or serve as a
source of information in their own right.’106 The impact that thoughts, feelings or
moods can have on human decision-making is yet another consideration that is
absent from the rational actor model. As mood can change the way an individual
processes information, either positively or negatively, it can be argued that a cartel
participant seeking immunity, is likely to not be acting within the assumptions of
rational actor theory, and this could significantly impair their capacity to make a
decision that maximises their utility.107

(e)

Habits & Traditions

According to the predictions of rational choice theory, individual decisionmakers base their decisions on a complete set of information, which is independent
of behaviours, meaning that it is based on the assumption that the way an individual
has acted in the past will not affect their current preference structure.108 However, BE
advocates argue against this and claim that the way an actor has performed in a
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certain way in the past can increase the likelihood that they will act in a similar way
in the future.
This is most effectively illustrated by the notion of ‘sunk costs’ and how it
affects an individual’s decision-making process, despite the fact that it does not
accord with the rational actor model. Many BE studies have shown how people
regularly cite ‘sunk costs’ as a reason that they are pursuing a certain type of action,
for instance in the decision to undertake an activity that they would prefer not to, on
the basis that they had already bought a ticket to the particular sporting event or
theatrical performance.109 In the context of a cartel, it is obvious that a cartel
participant would have ‘sunk’ time, energy and presumably capital (at least at the
outset) throughout the duration of the cartel and this could be another relevant factor
in determining whether or not to seek immunity and potentially affect their
willingness to give up on the cartel.
In addition, the ‘power of tradition’ is cited as having a powerful effect on
human decision-making.110 The concept is derived from the notion that the utility
individuals gain from conforming to a shared family, group or community practice,
can outweigh the inherent value of the behaviour.111 In the context of cartels, there is
the existence of group behaviour or mentality that is more likely to influence the
decision making process, such as the decision to join a cartel, remain in a cartel or
apply for immunity. According to behavioural economists, habits, traditions and
addictions are much more difficult to manipulate than the rational actor model
predicts.
This would help to explain scenarios where people engage in forms of selfblackmail, such as writing incriminating letters that may be sent in the event that
something happens, in order to force them to make a particular decision and stick
with it. This could explain why cartel participants tend to keep pieces of
incriminating evidence of the cartels operation – almost like leverage or blackmail to
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ensure compliance- that cannot otherwise be explained by rational choice theorists.112

2

Implications Of BE Research Findings

The selected BE findings discussed above have a significant bearing on the
way the immunity policy is intended to operate, and does in fact, operate. These
empirical results have been replicated in multiple contexts using different subjects to
produce a convincing body of evidence. The BE Approach should therefore be
seriously considered by the ACCC and competition authorities worldwide to reassess
common assumptions of the immunity policy’s operation. As this chapter has shown,
there are many circumstances where individuals are unlikely to act in accordance
with the rational actor model on which the policy is currently based.
There is a growing recognition of the significance of the BE Approach and
particularly how it will help shape competition policy in the future. Calls for
recognition of the BE Approach have been made by influential figures, such as the
Former Head of the United States Fair Trade Commission, William Kovacic;
members of the Competition and Markets Authority in the United Kingdom, and
various commentators including Maurice Stucke, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler.113
Recently, a report published by the OECD114 recognised the utility of the BE
Approach. Behavioural principles have been used in the design of the Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act,115 which was signed into
United States law by President Obama in May 2009 and was targeted at regulating
credit cards; the Affordable Care Act,116 which reformed United States health care; a
number

of

‘MyData’ initiatives that seek to supply consumers with information to help inform
their decisions; the promotion of behaviourally informed occupational pension
schemes and the replacement of the Food and Drug Administration’s ‘food pyramid’
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for communicating nutritional balance with a simple ‘food plate.’117
A report issued by the former United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading in 2010
detailed a number of instances where behavioural findings have had an important
impact on competition policy.118 The report recognised both the significance and
limitations of implementing these findings into anti-cartel enforcement policy.119 The
report did not discuss the impact that BE findings may have on the United Kingdom
leniency policy but concluded that the BE movement can impact on the way the
market behaviour is perceived. It noted that BE findings may not represent the
fundamental shift in economic thinking that some advocates assert it to be, but
recognised that the BE movement ‘is an incremental advance in our
understanding.’120
The recognition of the behavioural findings and their significance for antitrust
was mirrored by the remarks of J. Thomas Rosch, as the Commissioner of the United
States Federal Trade Commission in 2010.121 These comments recognise that our
reliance on neo-classical assumptions of rationality as the basis for antitrust
enforcement, ‘may be costing us too much in the form of aggressive antitrust law
enforcement.’122
The BE Approach thus has a strong foothold in policymaking around the
world, and this influence continues to grow.123 However, the approach is limited in
its ability to provide established principles in which the effectiveness of the
immunity policy can be assessed, which is exemplified in many of the criticisms
directed at the BE Approach. We now turn to these criticisms.
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3

Criticisms of the Behavioural Economics Approach

The prime criticism of the BE Approach is that, in contrast to the rational
actor model, there is no unified theory of BE findings that can help policymakers
formulate policy in any predictable or potentially useful way.124 These criticisms
stem from the assertion that the increasing proliferation of BE findings have led to an
inconclusive and broadly inconsistent model of human behaviour, and that even if
some of the findings hold true, these are not sufficient to constitute an alternate
theory of human behaviour.125 These criticisms have some force as the BE findings
are much more complex and diverse than the simple assumption that underpins the
rational actor theory (that humans are profit maximisers of their utility). The BE
Approach claims ‘to greater realism in their behavioural models and more accuracy
in their behavioural predictions will be empirically dubious and incomplete at best
and empirically false and misleading at worst.’126 In this way, the BE Approach does
not proscribe where their predictions will occur and where they will not127 and thus
fails to offer any clear policy implications for competition law.128
However, as mentioned previously, this has not stopped policymakers around
the world from heeding the B.E findings to varying degrees when formulating policy.
The reason that a universal theory of human behaviour has not yet been formulated is
likely to be attributed to the fact that human behaviour is inherently complex; a fact
that tends to be overlooked by many rational actor proponents. It may be that such an
alternate theory may never be developed. This is not a sufficient reason to disregard
the BE Approach, particularly when these findings have consistently refuted the
basic assumptions underpinning the rational actor model.
Secondly, critics of the BE Approach argue that the behaviour of individuals
varies widely, depending on particular differences in education, training, cognitive
capacity, sex and cultural background, and thus these cognitive biases do not affect
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humans consistently.129 This criticism is directed at the fact that BE theorists fail to
comprehend that human behaviour is neither constant nor uniform ‘but rather
variable and heterogeneous’ and relies on an assumption of a set of deviations from
the rational actor model that does not exist.130 Furthermore, it is contended that the
incorporation of the BE Approach will add to the complexity of policy regulation as
‘the state of the literature is such that there appears to be too many ways in which
consumers stray from the rational actor model, often in ways that conflict with each
other.’131
The fallacy in this argument is that it assumes that the BE approach attempts
to provide a ‘meaningful overall characterisation of the quality of human judgment
which is neither possible nor sought after.’132 This is not to say that this approach is
the only credible view of human decision making capabilities but it is one that
provides a more accurate reflection of reality and presently can play a role in certain
fact specific contexts, such as merger review.133 This criticism of the BE approach is
thus unpersuasive.
However, these claims have been disputed by many economists and
proponents of the rational actor model, who assert that the BE findings are equally
empirically flawed as those conducted by economists employing the rational actor
assumption.134 In this respect, the proponents of the rational actor model assert that
the BE findings are conducted using similar methods and therefore BE advocates
cannot criticise them on this basis.135 Moreover, there are claims that the BE findings
are a product of misleading questions where people believe that they are giving the
right answer to a different question than the one the experimenter believes they are
answering.136 Critics of the BE Approach thus claim that the findings of BE are as
unreliable and inconsistent with human decision making as the rational actor model.
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These criticisms have not been accepted by those who endorse the BE
Approach who respond that their findings have been consistently replicated in reallife situations and are thus more accurate than the generalised assumptions
underpinning the rational actor model.137 For example, much BE research is based on
actual market transactions, including field experiments and data.138
A more credible criticism relates to the way that the BE findings are currently
published, as there is no established means of careful peer review nor are the BE
findings subject to a well-recognised standard of measurement, such as the
psychological standard.139 On this basis, it is difficult to investigate and assess the
credibility of each of the BE findings as they continue to emerge. Like any new area
of research, there is a need for each new finding to be carefully reviewed, and the BE
approach is no exception. The reason that this chapter focuses on the findings that are
well known and generally accepted is to help overcome these credibility issues. The
way in which the BE research should be standardised is beyond the scope of this
thesis, but it is nevertheless important that any research in its infancy is approached
carefully.
A third criticism is that even if behaviour appears to be irrational facially,
more often than not, there is a rational explanation for the behaviour.140 Christopher
Leslie gives the example of predatory pricing in the market to show that behaviour
that would seemingly appear irrational may be in fact directed towards a more
rational long-term business strategy.141 Where one firm engages in dangerous
predatory pricing, it is not necessarily because the firm wants to, but by acting
irrationally, that firm may be able to drive out the other competitors in the monopoly,
in a similar way to the game of ‘chicken.’142 Leslie provides many other examples
that illustrate this point.143

137

See, eg, Reeves and Stucke, above n 124, 1539.
Stefano DellaVigna, 'Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field' (2009) 47 Journal of
Economic Literature 315, 320- 365.
139
Mitchell, above n 126, 125.
140
See, eg, Amital Etzioni, 'Behavioural Economics: Toward a New Paradigm' (2011) 55 American
Behavioral Scientist 1099, 1104; R Andreano and J Suiegfried, The Economics of Crime (John Wiley,
1980); Becker, above n X; Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980
(BasicBooks, 1st ed, 1984).
141
Christopher R Leslie, 'Rationality Analysis in Antitrust' (2010) 158 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 261, 295-297.
142
Ibid 296.
143
Ibid 273.
138

70

For those who endorse the BE approach, Leslie’s argument may be true for
some aspects of human behaviour, but it does not justify the general assertion that all
irrational behaviour is rational. Leslie in many ways contradicts himself by calling
upon some of the findings from the BE approach to justify the rational actor model.
He speaks of judicial bias as having a significant bearing on the way that rationality
is constructed.144 Unbewittingly, it seems, he is trying to explain that irrational
behaviour is rational by drawing upon concepts of the BE approach.
Another criticism directed at the BE approach is that it acts as a restriction on
individual liberty and is paternalistic in nature.145 This aspect has been extensively
debated and discussed in forums such as the OECD146 and the Australian
Productivity Report into behavioural economics and policy,147 which centres upon
the issue of the potential negative impacts of incorporating BE findings into policy.
Liberty is one of the key values in our society as ‘the capacity to live one’s
life in an autonomous way is one of the most central of all social values in modern,
democratic societies.’148 The concepts of liberty and autonomy rest on the notion that
everyone in our society is free to make their own choices, and to also make their own
mistakes, and to learn from them. Paternalism, particularly in its most extreme form,
poses a direct threat to our notions of liberty and autonomy of decision-making
through State intervention into individual choices, oft referred to as the ‘Nanny
State.’149
It is claimed that by incorporating BE findings into policy-making,
particularly consumer policy, which directly influences individual decision-making,
the state is removing the autonomy of individuals, and in most cases, without their
awareness or consent.150 If it is accepted that liberty and autonomy of the individual
is an important value of our democratic society, then any infringement of this value
should be treated very carefully.
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One of the most prominent responses to this criticism has been the development
of the theory of ‘Nudge’ by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein.151 This approach
seeks to influence the choices of individuals without constraining these choices. The
acronym NUDGE stands for the following:
-

iNcentives – does not at any point try to discredit supply and demand theory
of traditional economic theory – looks at key questions such as: Who uses?
Who chooses? Who pays? Who profits?

-

Understand mappings – ‘A good system of choice architecture helps people
to improve their ability to map and hence to select options that will make
them better off.’

-

Defaults – based on the premise that humans will often chose the path of least
resistance152

-

Give feedback – ‘the best way to help Humans improve their performance is
to provide feedback.’ Examples include warning labels etc

-

Expect error – humans are susceptible to making errors.

-

Structure complex choices – ‘People adopt different strategies for making
choices depending on the size and complexity of the available options.’

Sustein and Thaler dub this form of policy making as ‘libertarian paternalism,’
which strikes at the core of the assumptions that underpin classical economic theory
that people always make decisions in their best interest.153 They argue that in most
forms of policymaking, paternalism is unavoidable and as long as it is libertarian
paternalistic, then individuals still have the freedom of choice in decision making and
this is therefore acceptable.
As a theory in its infancy, the BE approach does provide useful insights into
human decision-making in an attempt to more accurately reflect a model of human
behaviour. The theory is subject to wide criticism and debate, despite its foothold in
policy-making circles around the world. One view is that the approach relies on
outdated psychological testing that was appropriate for the time in which it was
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developed, yet it does not account for the significant developments in neurological
science that have occurred since the 1980s.154
Professor Jones advocates for a convergence of fields to broaden and enrich
the BE analysis, such as the incorporation of research involving disciplines such as
evolutionary biology that will ‘blend the many virtues of BE with virtues of other
disciplines.’155 There are others who also recognise the value of the BE approach but
remain cautious of the way it should be incorporated into public policy and adopt the
view that the BE approach should ‘supplement not substitute’ the existing rationality
model, given its current limitations.156
As this section has demonstrated, there is much further development needed
within the BE approach in order for it to provide a cogent model or set of criteria that
can be used in policy making. This research is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Instead, what can be gained from this discussion is the recognition of the flaws
inherent within the rational actor model. Whilst no alternative theory exists to replace
this theory, the focus must be on supplementing and enhancing the existing model.
The next part will outline a model that attempts to achieve this within the context of
the immunity policy.

C

A New Approach to Assessing Cartel Immunity

This chapter has demonstrated that the neo-classical rational actor model is limited in
its ability to predict human behaviour. There have been a number of alternative
theoretical developments, most notably the BE Approach, which seek to overcome
these limitations. Whilst some of the main findings of the BE Approach potentially
impact the immunity policy’s operation, the most significant limitation with this
approach is that it does not provide an overarching theory or a cogent set of criteria
that can be used to assess the policy. As demonstrated in Chapter II,157 the immunity
policy was designed within the neo-classical framework as part of the DOJ’s anticartel enforcement agenda. The criterion most commonly used to assess the policy’s
154
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‘effectiveness’ was also designed by the DOJ using this classical deterrence
framework.158 According to the former Director of Criminal Enforcement at the
DOJ, Scott Hammond, the three ‘cornerstones’ of an effective immunity policy are:
1. Threat of Severe Sanctions
2. High Risk of Detection
3. Transparency and Predictability of Enforcement

1

Threat of Severe Sanctions

It has been accepted in a number of jurisdictions that the threat of criminal
sanctions provides the most effective deterrence of serious cartel conduct, making
the incentive to apply for immunity even greater.159 These assumptions are based on
the classical deterrence theory that presumes that the ‘rational actor’ will be deterred
from committing crimes when the risk of detection is high and the sanctions are
severe.160 According to Hammond, the threat of severe sanctions is premised on two
considerations:
(a)

The perceived risks must outweigh the potential rewards: In a simple costbenefit analysis, the perceived benefits must outweigh the perceived costs.

(b)

Criminal sanctions provide the greatest inducement to cooperation: The
DOJ believes that the threat of criminal sanctions is the greatest threat to
an individual and this is the primary reason that many companies will not
engage in cartel conduct in the United States.161

2

High Risk of Detection

According to Hammond, a high risk of detection from regulatory enforcement
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agencies is another crucial element of a successful immunity regime and it is
important that sufficient resources are allocated to these agencies to assist in
achieving this end.162 Without a high risk of detection, cartel members will not be
inclined to come forward to report their misconduct in exchange for immunity. In
order to induce cartel participants to come forward, Hammond states that there is a
need to create a culture that condemns white-collar crime. He also believes it is
necessary to introduce individual immunity to create distrust between corporations
and their employees. Additionally, regulatory agencies must be given robust
investigatory powers to ensure that there is a real perceived risk of action being taken
by the authorities for those who engage in cartel conduct.163

3

Transparency and Predictability in Enforcement

The third hallmark of an effective immunity program, according to Hammond, is
transparency and predictability. An immunity applicant needs to be able to assess,
with a sufficient level of certainty, that their application will be successful. To
achieve this, the DOJ has published its standards and policies in relation to leniency
and also provides an explanation as to how the DOJ will exercise its prosecutorial
discretion in its application of these standards and policies:
The Division has sought to provide transparency in the following enforcement areas: (1)
transparent standards for opening investigations; (2) transparent standards for deciding whether to
file criminal charges; (3) transparent prosecutorial priorities; (4) transparent policies on the
negotiation of plea agreements; (5) transparent policies on sentencing and calculating fines; and
(6) transparent application of our Leniency Program.164

The DOJ has also published a number of model conditional immunity
templates that are publicly available for potential applicants to review.165 Hammond
believes that the sacrifice of prosecutorial discretion through the granting of upfront
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immunity is necessary to create the high level of certainty necessary for potential
applicants to come forward.166
The above three criteria have been widely endorsed in the competition
community as the primary method to assess the effectiveness of an Immunity
Policy.167 It is clear that these criteria are premised on the neo-classical assumptions
that humans are rational actors, based on classical deterrence theory. They are based
on the rational actor model, which has been shown in this chapter to be severely
limited in its ability to predict human behaviour. By employing the rational actor
model to assess the effectiveness of the Immunity Policy, the policy is viewed in a
vacuum, isolated from the wider enforcement context in which it operates, including
its interactions or impact on other areas of the law.168
Professor Caron Beaton-Wells recognises the limitations of the current
effectiveness criteria to assess cartel immunity.169 Beaton-Wells points to recent
figures released by the ACCC that indicate that the initial signs of the introduction of
criminal sanctions for cartel conduct appear to contradict the impact that severe
sanctions would have on immunity applications.170 In fact, Beaton-Wells states that
the introduction of criminal sanctions may have had the opposite effect than the
ACCC intended, with a reduction in the overall number of immunity applications.171
This could be attributed to a number of factors, such as the newly forged relationship
between the ACCC and the CDPP, where the processing of immunity applications in
a bifurcated system may not be as timely and consistent as initially anticipated.172
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Despite these factors, the decline in overall immunity applications directly contrasts
with the predictions of the rational actor model.
In relation to the ‘fear of detection’ criterion, Beaton-Wells outlines empirical
work that suggests that fear of detection is not necessarily a highly material factor in
seeking immunity.173 In this vein, she suggests that corporate culture and the flow-on
effects of immunity applications made overseas in respect of conduct potentially
affecting Australian markets may be factors that lead to applications, as opposed to
simply a fear of detection.174
Finally, Beaton-Wells states that the ACCC and immunity practitioners do
not perceive the abdication of prosecutorial discretion as beneficial. This is
particularly in the case of determining the penalty for ‘second-in’ immunity
applicants, where the ‘ACCC relies heavily on the non-transparent, highly
discretionary nature of the (Cooperation Policy) to provide cooperating parties that
are ineligible under the AIPCC with the same degree of immunity as is available
under that policy.’175
In light of her analysis, Beaton-Wells suggests that the current criteria
employed to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy are of limited utility in
real-world application. She suggests there is a more nuanced, qualitative approach
needed to assess how such policies work in practice in specific jurisdictions. This is
reflected most notably in the context of private cartel enforcement, where the
ACCC’s focus is primarily on the threat that disclosure might pose to future
immunity applications, rather than on providing any opportunity to facilitate redress
for cartel victims.176
Beaton-Wells analysis has two important implications: the first relates to the
recognition that the immunity policy operates within a wider administrative and
enforcement context then the current criterion accounts for. Therefore, the DOJ
effectiveness criterion needs to be extended to accommodate the limitations of the
neo-classical model and assess it according to wider public policy principles. The
second implication relates to the method employed to assess these criteria and how
the adoption of a qualitative empirical approach can help produce more nuanced
173
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understandings of the operation of the immunity policy, then purely quantitative or
numerical studies.177
As a result, the current criteria used to assess the effectiveness of the immunity
policy need further development. Therefore, in accordance with wider public policy
principles, the current criteria would be extended to include an assessment of the
following factors in relation to the immunity policy:
-

Threat of sanctions

-

Fear of detection

-

Transparency

-

Accountability

-

Consistency

-

Proportionality

This section will briefly outline the meaning of each criterion with the aim of
formulating key questions that can be used to assess the immunity policy. The first
three of these criteria have been described above as they form the DOJ’s criteria
most commonly used to assess the policy’s effectiveness. The purpose of this section
is to introduce the most important considerations related to each of the criteria rather
than to provide an extensive historical analysis of each of the terms. The above
criteria were chosen because of their extensive use in many areas of the law to assess
policy, including criminal law, constitutional law, administrative law and
international law.178 Similar criteria are often used by law reform bodies, such as the
Australian Law Reform Commission, to guide their assessment of a particular area of
the law and to establish standards that can be measured.179 A number of these
177
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principles are also enshrined in legislation or form part of legislative principles.180
These examples illustrate that these principles are widely accepted in Australia as
guiding and informative in the design and administration of public policy. For this
reason, it is not necessary to provide a comprehensive historical account of each of
the principles, but rather to provide an overview of each of the concepts and pose key
questions that can be used to assess the immunity policy.
Through the employment of wider principles of public policy, it is possible to
assess the immunity policy with reference to its interaction with other aspects of the
law and the enforcement context, such as private enforcement181 or the international
anti-cartel enforcement context.182 Although the examples used to support the new
criteria will be primarily Australian, many of these principles are internationally
significant and are therefore capable of wider application.183

4

Transparency

In addition to the threat of sanctions and fear of detection (described above), the
concepts of transparency and predictability already form part of the criteria currently
used to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy.184 However, the DOJ does
not provide a clear definition of ‘transparency’. According to the ACCC’s
Compliance and Enforcement Policy, transparency involves two primary
considerations:185
•

the ACCC’s decision-making takes place within rigorous corporate
governance processes and is able to be reviewed by a range of agencies,
including the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the courts
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•

the ACCC does not do private deals—every enforcement matter that is dealt
with through litigation or formal resolution is made public

These considerations do not constitute a definition of ‘transparency’ that can be
used to assess the Immunity Policy. The OECD outlines a number of relevant
definitions that have been used in the international community that demonstrate the
broad nature of the term.186 PriceWaterhouseCoopers defines transparency as ‘the
existence of clear, accurate, formal, easily discernible and widely accepted
practices’187 whereas the World Trade Organisation believes the terms involves three
core requirements:
1) to make information on relevant laws, regulations and other policies
publicly available;
2) to notify interested parties of relevant laws and regulations and changes to
them; and
3) to ensure that laws and regulations are administered in a uniform, impartial
and reasonable manner.188
Whilst there is no universally accepted definition of ‘transparency’ there are three
key considerations that are central to its definition that can be employed to assess the
immunity policy, that serve the basic democratic principle of openness.189 These are:
(a)

Publication of relevant information
This entails the availability of a clear, detailed and user-friendly
description

of

the

implementation process.

immunity
190

policy’s

requirements

and

The DOJ criterion supports this by stating

the importance of publishing relevant policy documents is crucial to
the consistent and predictable operation of the policy.191
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Key Question/s: Is there clear, detailed and user-friendly
publication of the immunity policy requirements and
implementation processes by both the ACCC and the CDPP?
(b)

Prior Notification and Consultation
A report published by the OECD on regulatory reform stated that
‘prior notification and consultation of regulatory proposals to the
public could enhance both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of
regulatory measures.’192 In this vein, the design and operation of the
immunity policy should be subject to public consultation that should
be comprehensive, timely, transparent and accessible. When
determining which public recommendations to take on board, the
regulatory body should be accountable for their decisions by
disclosing the comments received and react to or publish the reasons
for taking them into account or not.193 The report published by the
OECD warns that regulatory agencies should be acutely aware of
becoming ‘captive’ to special interests and avoid consultation
fatigue.194
Key Question/s: Has there been a comprehensive, transparent,
timely and accessible public consultation in relation to the
immunity policy? Are these consultations publicly available?
Has the regulatory authority provided reasons for the
inclusion/exclusion of the recommendations?

(c)

Procedural Transparency
The regulatory authority must administer its policy in a uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner.195 This concept is intrinsically tied
to the accountability of the regulatory authority and therefore this
consideration is likely to overlap with the discussion of reviewability.
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However, procedural transparency also relates to the inclusion of
‘review rights’ such as the ‘right to appeal.’196
Key Question/s: Does the ACCC and the CDPP administer its
policy in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner? Does
the policy list any procedures for review or ‘review rights’?

5

Accountability

The concept of accountability broadly refers to the notion that elected officials are
accountable to citizens for governmental performance which forms a key component
of democratic governance.197 In the context of regulatory authorities, these agencies
should be accountable to their principals for the manner in which they exercise the
powers and discretions given to them.198 The principle of accountability is
intrinsically linked to the concept of legitimacy, where democratic ideals mandate
that the regulators who exercise government or public powers that are not directly
elected should be held accountable for their decisions in other ways.199
Professor Nicolaides from the European Institute for Public Administration in
the Netherlands believes that accountability involves two dimensions: the first is
democratic, and the other more procedural, relating to the justifications of a
regulator’s decisions.200 The focus here will be on the second dimension of
accountability, as this research is not concerned with the overall democratic
accountability of regulators, but primarily with how the regulator can be held
accountable for their decision in relation to the Immunity Policy.
A number of measures have been identified that ensure accountability. These
include: consultation, access to information and due process rules when making
individual decisions or sanctions.201 The first two factors have been discussed in the
context of transparency and therefore demonstrate the overlapping nature of the
proposed criteria.
196
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The due process rules largely refer to the reviewability of regulatory
decisions. Administrative review refers to the opportunity for a complaint to be heard
by an independent administrative body or judicial body.202 The reviewability of
administrative decisions ‘can be seen as the ultimate guarantor of transparency and
accountability.’203Administrative

law

accountability,

such

as

through

the

Administrative Appeals Tribunal, provides a strong form of accountability, as it
involves a response to the regulator’s failure to the meet the required standard.204 On
the other hand, the opportunity for judicial review is generally limited on the basis of
ultra vires or lack of procedural fairness. The ACCC recognises the importance of
accountability in the administration of its policies and sets out a comprehensive list
of mechanisms in its aim to ensure its fair and transparent operation.205
Key Question/s: What are the accountability mechanisms that assure
the effective implementation of the Immunity Policy? Do these
accountability mechanisms apply to both the ACCC and the CDPP?
More specifically, are decisions made in respect of the Immunity
Policy subject to administrative or judicial review?

6

Consistency

The concept of consistency is rooted in the English law tradition through the doctrine
of precedent.206 The proposition that laws are to be applied equally, without
‘unjustifiable differentiation’ is cemented in the rule of law.207 The principle requires
that the justice system should be consistent in the application of laws and in
practice.208 The term has often been used in the criminal law context in relation to
sentencing:
Just as consistency in punishment – a reflection of the notion of equal justice – is a
fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice, so inconsistency in
punishment, because it is regarded as a badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the
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law, is calculated to lead to an erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the
administration of justice.209

The CDPP also states that consistency is one of the principles upon which the
Prosecution Policy is based, where one of the main aims of the policy is to ‘promote
consistency in the making of the various decisions which arise in the institution and
conduct of prosecutions.’210
Inherent

within

the

principle

of

consistency

are

two

competing

considerations: the fettering of discretion given to public bodies and the requirement
that they act consistently in the interests of fair administration.211 It is important that
decision-makers retain a degree of discretion so that they can depart from their own
policies where the circumstances require it.212 However, the policy needs to be
‘consistent with the statute under which the relevant power is conferred.’ In this vein,
the decision-maker should not be precluded from ‘taking into account relevant
considerations’ but should also not take account of irrelevant considerations.213
Related to consistency is the principle of certainty in that issues of
uncertainty may lead to inconsistency.214 This is reflected to some extent in the
criteria currently used to assess the immunity policy, where the DOJ believes that a
high degree of certainty is necessary to ensure that potential applicants know how
they will be treated in accordance with the policy and the consequences if they fail to
do so.215
The publication of policies, reporting of outcomes and the requirement to
disclose the reasons for the decision are key ways to measure consistency.216 These
methods can help guard against ‘arbitrary decisions and reliance on erroneous
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notions’ and ensure that decisions are determined on a case-by-case basis.217 In this
way, there is significant overlap with the principles of transparency and
accountability.
It must be noted that the Immunity Policy operates in a multi-dimensional
capacity. In Australia, the policy is administered in a bifurcated system, meaning that
there is a need for consistency in the processes and decision-making across both the
ACCC and the CDPP.218 The policy also operates in an international context, where
various regulators across the world have enacted similar policies into their anti-cartel
enforcement regimes.219 Therefore, the issue of consistency is relevant to multijurisdictional immunity applications.
Key Question/s: Are there currently sufficient ways to assess whether
the Immunity Policy is being applied consistently? Are the ACCC and
CDPP consistent in their administration and operation of the
Immunity Policy? Does the policy operate consistently in the context
of multi-jurisdictional applications at an international level?

7

Proportionality
The meaning of proportionality is largely tempered by the context in which it

is used. Historically, the concept can be traced back to German constitutional and
administrative jurisprudence.220 The use of the principle spread to the European
Community, where it is widely used in relation to human rights discourse and
judicial decisions.221 An example is the freedom of speech rights under Articles 10
and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.222
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The principle is now endorsed on many levels in the international
community, particularly in relation to the law of armed conflict223 human rights
treaties and constitutions and international documents around the world.224 On a
domestic level, the principle is often referred to in the context of criminal law,
administrative law and constitutional law.225 For instance, the High Court has
affirmed the use of proportionality as a basic principle of criminal sentencing, as ‘a
sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court should never exceed that which can be
justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in light
of its objective circumstances.’226
Furthermore, the concept has been widely used in the context of
administrative law; as Justice Kirby has observed:
Under European law it is now well-established that a public authority (including the
Executive Government) may not impose legal obligations except to the extent that they are
strictly necessary in the public interest to attain the purpose of the measure authorised by the
legislature. If the burdens imposed are clearly out of proportion to the authorised object, the
measure will be annulled. There must therefore exist a reasonable relationship likely to bring
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about the apparent objective of the law. The detriment to those adversely affected must not
be disproportionate to the benefit to the public envisaged by the legislation.227

In light of its widespread use as a guiding principle, proportionality can be
seen as a ‘trade-off’ device that aids in resolving conflicts between norms, principles
and values by acting as a legal standard by which individual or state actions can be
assessed.228 The modern conception of the principle in administrative law emphasises
that ‘proportionality requires the administration to balance all relevant interests at
issue and then to use its discretionary powers in light of this balancing exercise.’229
More specifically, the assessment of proportionality generally involves a three-stage
test: (1) Suitability; (2) Necessity; and (3) Proportionality stricto sensu, meaning
proportionality in the narrow sense.230 These factors are assessed cumulatively but
more emphasis is placed on the factors in ascending order:
(a)

Suitability
With respect to the measure at question, the means adopted by the government

need to be rationally related to the stated policy objectives.231 On this basis it is
necessary to ascertain whether the adopted measure is suitable or appropriate to
achieve the objective it pursues.232
(b)

Necessity
This step entails the use of a ‘least-restrictive’ means test to ensure that the

measure does not curtail individual rights any more than is necessary to achieve
stated public policy goals.233 This test requires two important considerations. The
first relates to whether there are less restrictive or milder measures that could be
utilised, and secondly, whether the alternative measures are equally effective in
227
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achieving the pursued objective. The basic objective of this test is that ‘the measure
adopted by the state should do minimal harm to citizens or the public interest.’234
(c)

Proportionality stricto sensu
This final step is the most complex and requires an analysis as to whether the

effects of a measure are disproportionate or excessive in relation to the interests
affected.235 This is the stage that requires the true balancing of the competing
objectives.
The Australian Law Reform Commission cautions against placing too much
emphasis on the proportionality principle, as the importance and complexity of the
issues under consideration is likely to involve value judgments and subjectivity.236 In
light of these remarks, and other limitations of the principle237 the principle of
proportionality will be used as an overall guiding principle. This use of
proportionality as a guiding principle has been legislatively adopted in Australia. For
example the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) stipulates in section
37M(2)(e) that: ‘the resolution of disputes (must be) at a cost that is proportionate to
the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.’ Moreover, the ACCC itself
incorporates proportionality as a guiding principle by emphasising that the ACCC’s
enforcement response must be ‘proportionate to the conduct and resulting harm.’238
Key Question/s: In conjunction with the assessment of the other
guiding criteria, do the measures taken in relation to the Immunity
Policy satisfy the three-stage proportionality test? If not, what other
alternatives exist that may better satisfy this test?
These criteria do not seek to replace the current criteria used to assess the
Immunity Policy but are aimed at enhancing the existing model. The use of this
enhanced criterion allows the policy to be assessed within the enforcement context in
which it operates, where its interaction with other areas of the law can be critically
analysed. It carries with it the importance of recognising that the Immunity Policy
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cannot continue to be assessed in accordance with traditional neo-classical economic
assumptions, as the policy does not operate in a vacuum. The assessment of the
Immunity Policy’s operation has largely been conducted with reference to numerical
or quantitative economic studies that seek to assess the policy’s effectiveness.239
Examples of methods employed to assess the policy’s effectiveness in this
respect have included numerical examinations of immunity applications and
outcomes; the number of proceedings brought versus the number of those
proceedings that have resulted in a finding or liability and the quantum of penalties
that have been imposed.240 The use of such quantitative methods provides an
extremely narrow view of the immunity policy’s operation and is limited in what it
can reveal about the policy’s effectiveness. This is due to the fact that these
assessments heavily rely on the information provided by the competition authorities,
which is often not forthcoming.241 The limited means of assessing the proportion of
cartel activity that may be taking place at any given time is another significant factor
that distorts the quantitative assessment of the policy’s effectiveness.
It is for these reasons that this thesis will adopt a qualitative, empirical
assessment of the Immunity Policy as an alternative method to assess its
effectiveness, in conjunction with the enhanced guiding criteria. The next chapter
will outline the methodology that will be employed to execute this empirical
assessment.
This chapter has illustrated that the Immunity Policy was born within the
context of US cartel enforcement under the influence of neo-classical economics. At
its core lies the assumption of the rational actor model. Whilst the assumption of
rationality has strong support, particularly in the Chicago economics school of
thought, this chapter has analysed more recent theoretical developments that cast
light on the limitations of the rational actor model.
Empirical research and advancements in studies such as psychology,
sociology and neuroscience have shown that humans do not often conform to the
predictions of the rational actor model. This has important implications for the way
that the Immunity Policy was designed, given that there are limitations in the theory
upon which the policy was originally based. Therefore, there are strong indicators
239

See, eg, the economic studies referenced at above n 18.
Beaton-Wells, above n 169, s IV; Ibid.
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that the rational actor model does not provide a sufficient theoretical model for the
Immunity Policy.
In this vein, this chapter argued that the Immunity Policy should be subject to
the same public policy principles that inform other areas of the law, particularly in
the international law context. It is the aim of this thesis to apply these public policy
principles in relation to the Immunity Policy, to strength, enhance and reconcile the
aims of the Immunity Policy with those of public and private cartel enforcement law
and the other areas of law with which it intersects.
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IV

RESEARCH DESIGN

This Chapter will outline the research design used to gather, analyse and interpret the
empirical data obtained from the conducting of semi-structured qualitative interviews
in relation to the Immunity Policy. The results of this data analysis will be used to
supplement the main research findings obtained from secondary research and
generate the final recommendations aimed at strengthening the existing Immunity
Policy.
It was decided that the most appropriate qualitative research tool to gain an
in-depth insight into the design and operation of the Immunity Policy was to conduct
semi-structured qualitative interviews. There were several reasons for this decision.
Firstly, quantitative data is inherently unreliable in the field of cartels, as it is
significantly difficult to tell how many cartels are operating at any time or what the
nature of the cartel conduct is. The difficulty faced by researchers in this area is well
documented.1 When the research was first conceived in 2012, there was very limited
statistical information available as to the number of cartel immunity applications
made to the ACCC since the policy was revised in 2005.2 Furthermore, the
information that was available was highly generalised. For example, the ACCC made
a bold assertion that it has received over 100 ‘approaches’ in relation to immunity
since 2005.3 However, the word ‘approaches’ did not indicate how many of these
approaches actually resulted in immunity applications, and how many actually
progressed into civil proceedings or settlement. These statistics also did not reveal
whether these immunity ‘approaches’ were generated by domestic or international
cartels.
However, more detailed immunity information was later provided by the
ACCC in 2013, presumably due to criticism in relation to the lack of transparency

1

See eg, John Connor, 'Cartels Portrayed: Detection' (2011) AAI Working Paper No. 11-05 23;
Gregory Werden, Scott Hammond and Belinda Barnett, 'Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: Using
all the Tools and Sanctions' (2011) 56 The Antitrust Bulletin 207; OECD, Cartels and AntiCompetitive Agreements Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
<www.oecd.org/competition/cartels>; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 'Updated
Immunity Policy to Uncover Cartel Conduct' (Media Release, MR 225/14, 10 September 2014).
2
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 'Revised 'first in' Immunity Policy for Cartel
Conduct' (Media Release, MR 210/05, 29th August 2005).
3
Rod Sims, 'Opening Address: IBA Competition Conference' (Paper presented at the International Bar
Association 9th Competition Mid-Year Conference, Sydney, 21 March 2013).
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surrounding this information.4 Even with the publication of more statistical
information in relation to the Immunity Policy, the ACCC acknowledges that it is
still difficult to ascertain the percentage of immunity ‘approaches’ out of all the
cartels currently operating. These factors make it very difficult for researchers to use
quantitative data as a tool in this field of research. This is compounded by the fact
that the use of statistical data provides a very limited and generalised description in
relation to the immunity policy’s current operation.
Secondly, the use of surveys was seriously considered as another possible
option which could be used to gather information relating to the immunity policy.5 It
was thought that an online short response questionnaire could be sent to individuals
who directly deal with the Immunity Policy, which could potentially allow for a
greater sample of individuals to be captured, as opposed to the number of people who
could be interviewed.
It was ultimately decided that the use of qualitative surveys would be too
limited for the scope of research that was necessary for a comprehensive analysis of
the design and operation of the Immunity Policy. This is due to the fact that the
breadth of the research questions could only be sufficiently answered through very
sophisticated and comprehensive responses that could not be accommodated by
qualitative surveys.6 Even if the surveys were to be conducted with an option for
long-response questions, the value of the information provided in an interview is not
only derived from what has been said, but how it has been said.7
In line with the framework analysis methodological approach, which will be
explained below, it was necessary to conduct interviews to construct and develop
knowledge surrounding the Immunity Policy, which was a crucial component of
learning the themes and patterns that underpin the discussions within the interview

4

Marcus Bezzi, 'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review?' (Paper presented
at the Competition Law Conference, Shangri-La Hotel, Sydney, 4 May 2013); Caron Beaton-Wells,
'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review' (2013) 41 Australian Business Law
Review 171.
5
See eg, Harrie Jansen, 'The Logic of Qualitiative Survey and Its Position in the Field of Social
Research Methods' (2010) 11 Qualitative Social Research 11; Research Sage Publications,
'Introduction to Survey Methods' (1998) 46 Current Sociology 1, 1-6; James W Chesebro and
Deborah J Borisoff, 'What Makes Qualitative Research Qualitative?' (1997) 8 Qualitative Research
Reports in Communication 3.
6
Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (Sage Publications, 3 ed, 2002)
341.
7
Ibid; Tony Greenfield, Research Methods for Postgraduates (Arnold, 1996) 169.
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data.8 This approach provided the opportunity to understand the Immunity Policy and
its associated issues, without being foreclosed by the strict confines of an
unresponsive set of data. It was also important to clarify some of the more complex
and controversial questions in relation to issues that generated strong moral
responses. Many examples of these responses were found in the discussions relating
to whether cartel informants should be paid to provide information to the regulators.9
Many of the opinions and emotions tied to these issues cannot be captured by a 100
words or less response of the kind commonly found in survey studies.
Finally, the use of semi-structured interviews as a research tool is a flexible
research method and this is generally aided by the use of open-ended questions. It is
an effective way of ‘finding out from them things we cannot directly observe.’10 The
use of open-ended questions was most suited to answering the research questions, as
it provided the opportunity to learn from the most primary source of information, that
being those who directly deal with the immunity policy, as opposed to deriving
information from the overgeneralised and limited published information.
At the time of commencement of this research in 2012 there were no other
published empirical studies related to the Immunity Policy that had been conducted
through semi-structured interviews. However, during the time of this research, Dr
Caron Beaton-Wells commenced a similar project in relation to the Immunity Policy,
titled ‘The Immunity Project.’ In conjunction with the recent review of the Immunity
Policy, Beaton-Wells conducted a similar study of stakeholder opinion using semistructured qualitative interviews. While Beaton-Wells has not published all of the
findings in relation to her research, many of her findings have informed recent
academic papers in relation to the immunity policy.11 Her findings enrich the debate
in this field, as her research is both recent and relevant to this thesis. Thus, the
existence of other empirical work in relation to the immunity policy has strengthened
the relevance of the research undertaken in this thesis.

8

Mary C Lacity and Marius A Janson, 'Understanding Qualitative Data: A Framework of Text
Analysis Methods' (1994) 11 Journal of Management Information Systems 137, 139.
9
See also Chapter V, Cartel Informant System, 161.
10
Patton, above n 6, 341-342.
11
Beaton-Wells, above n 4; Caron Beaton-Wells, 'Immunity Policy: Revolution or Religion? An
Australian Case-Study' (2013) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 126.
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A

The Interviews

The primary study involved semi-structured qualitative interviews with a total of 16
individuals. These interviews were conducted for between one and two hours each.
Each interviewee was asked questions relating the design and operation of the
immunity policy derived from a set of pre-determined questions to ensure an
adequate level of consistency.12 These open-ended questions allowed for greater
flexibility with responses, and opportunities to follow a tangent or new idea that may
have not have been initially anticipated. It also allowed for the tailoring of certain
aspects of the questions to the particular interviewees’ interests or experience. These
interviews were conducted primarily in Sydney, with others conducted in Melbourne.

B

1

The Logistics of the Project

Recruitment

The participants were selected on the basis of their current professional position.
Contact details were accessed through publicly available records. The interviewees
were either:
•

identified through contact details of individuals in publicly
available records, or alternatively;

•

Identified through contact details of employers from publicly
available records and then the employer was asked for access
to the person in the appropriate professional role.

The individuals identified were initially contacted, primarily via email,
depending on whether my supervisors had prior contact with the person. Prior
contact between a person and my supervisor/s existed in some cases, for instance,
because of professional associations, such as involvement in special interest groups
connected with competition law or legal practice. Where there was an existing
relationship between the person and my supervisor/s, I was required to make

12

See eg, Clive Seale, 'Quality in Qualitative Research' (1999) 5 Qualitative Inquiry 465.

94

personal contact with the person to provide initial information about the research and
request an interview.
A draft email template was devised that outlined a brief description of the
thesis, the aims of the research and sought an opportunity to meet with the
participant at a time that was suitable to them. Within this email, it was also
important to emphasise how the interviewees’ knowledge would be useful to the
project and how the researcher had come to know of their knowledge and/or
experience in working with the Immunity Policy. In some cases, where the
researcher had been referred to contact a particular participant, the name of the
person who recommended them would be included in the email, in order to create
authenticity and increase the likelihood of the interviewee’s acceptance in taking part
in the interview. A total of 36 potential participants were contacted, with a total of 16
taking place. Many of the interviewees who declined did so on the basis of busy
schedules. There was also an extensive process of follow-up via email for those who
indicated they wished to participate but either had to cancel or never responded.
After the initial contact, potential participants who wished to proceed to the
next step were sent the Participant Information Sheet and were provided with
information about confidentiality. Confidentiality was discussed and agreed upon
with each potential participant on an individual basis, as confidentiality requirements
varied slightly between the interviewees. All potential participants were invited to
ask any questions and discuss the research at any time. For participants who agreed
to an interview, the time and place was discussed and agreed upon. Before each
interview was conducted, the agreed confidentiality details were recorded in the
consent form and signed by the participant and researcher conducting the interview.
2

Sample Selection
In order to select and recruit a number of individuals, the advice of my

supervisors, colleagues within the competition law sector and extensive research into
those individuals was relied upon to determine those individuals who were at the
forefront of dealing with the Immunity Policy and thus had extensive knowledge and
expertise. This process was therefore highly selective and was not intended as a
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random sample.13 In order to improve the quality of the research, it was necessary
that each interviewee had been personally involved with the immunity policy. This
access is restricted to high-level legal personnel within a law-firm, as these are the
individuals who most commonly interact with the Immunity Policy and are therefore
best placed to describe the design and operation of the policy from a first-hand
perspective.
In addition to this factor, it was also important to consider representativeness
in the research.14 After considerable research, it was found that those individuals who
most commonly deal with the Immunity Policy are generally partners in law firms
from large corporate firms. As a result, the perspective of a smaller law firm is likely
to be neglected. This is one limitation of this research, as this factor could potentially
skew the research results. The reason for this is because large corporate law firms
often advise large business in relation to the Immunity Policy and are thus likely to
be in favour of the policy, as it potentially allows their client to be immune to civil
and criminal proceedings. Therefore, in order to overcome this lack of
representativeness, it was imperative to include interviewees from academia, the Bar
and members of the ACCC itself.
However, one of the perspectives that is clearly missing from this research is
the perspective of class action law firms. These are the firms that generally represent
third party claimants who have been adversely affected by cartel conduct who wish
to initiate court proceedings against the cartel members. Despite many attempts to
contact various individuals with this particular experience, it was not possible to
secure an interview. This was also hindered by the fact that there is currently only
one active class action firm acting for third parties adversely affected by cartels,
which made it more difficult to secure an interview with members of this firm. For
the purposes of this thesis, this limitation has been overcome by undertaking further
research published by class action firms and individuals to ensure this perspective is
properly considered in this research.
The number of interviews conducted was not a primary concern, given that,
as explained above, the empirical data is intended to be used as a supplement to the
research of secondary sources. Nonetheless, the amount of data generated by these
13

Nicholos Mays and Catherine Pope, 'Rigour and Qualitative Research' (1995) 311 BMJ 109, 110111.
14
Ibid.
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interviews was extensive. An officially accredited transcriber employed by the
University of Wollongong transcribed each of the interviews. Over 100 pages of
transcribed data, totalling over 70 000 words resulted. Therefore, the number of
interviews that were conducted was appropriate for the time and resources available
for this research.

3

Setting
In order to accommodate the interviewees and to ensure that as many

interviews were secured as possible, it was necessary to travel to the various
locations in which the interviewees were employed. A majority of these interviews
were conducted in the Sydney CBD, but it was also necessary to travel to Melbourne
to conduct three interviews. The amount of travel and availability of the interviewees
influenced the number of interviewees that were selected, as it would have been too
burdensome to continue recruiting and interviewing participants, when extensive
data had already been collected.
Travelling to the offices of the interviewees was the most ideal way to accommodate
the very busy workload of all of the interviewees. This also helped to ensure that
they were comfortable and willing to be able to discuss the matters in relation to the
Immunity Policy.

4

Outline of the Interview
At the commencement of each interview, each interviewee was provided a

general introduction and a brief outline of my thesis. Each interviewee was then
provided with an overview of the aims and purpose of the interview, by
acknowledging their intimacy with and knowledge of the immunity policy. The
interviewees

were

informed

that

their

knowledge

could

help

formulate

recommendations for the Immunity Policy, which was a key component of this
thesis.
Each interviewee was asked whether they consented to an audio recording of
the conversation to allow the interviewer to concentrate on the interview and elicit as
much information as possible. All but three of the interviewees consented to the
audio recording. Handwritten notes were also taken in addition to the audio
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recordings. It was also explained to the interviewees that, if they wished to provide
any comments ‘off the record,’ that information would be handled discreetly and in
confidence. The interviewer would then be able to research these additional and
unofficial comments independently. This ensured that the interviewer was able to
gain as much information as possible from the interviewees.
It was explained to the interviewees that the approach to the interview was
objective and neutral, which meant that the interviewer was open to learning as much
about the immunity policy as possible. It was also mentioned that the research had
not received any funding, apart from the University of Wollongong itself, and
therefore the research was undertaken in an independent capacity.
In line with Michael Quinn Patton’s qualitative interviewing style, it was
decided that an open-ended semi-structured interview scaffold would be the most
appropriate model to structure the interview.15 Those who requested that a copy of
the interview questions be sent to them prior to the interview-taking place were sent
this scaffold.16 The questions were deliberately designed to be broad and general at
the beginning before more specific points were explored.
Generally, the discussion would diverge into other areas, previously
unknown, and this style of interview allowed for this type of divergent discussion to
develop. This meant that any new ideas and concepts that were discussed with one
interviewee could be later added to the interview scaffold and discussed in
subsequent interviews with other interviewees. A core set of scaffold questions were
used in each interview to ensure consistency throughout the interviews. Additionally,
if an interviewee had experience and knowledge in one particular area, then the
scaffold questions were modified to accommodate this so that a greater amount of
time could be spent on that particular area.

5

Informed Participants
With any research that involves human subjects, it is necessary that the

ethical risks are recognised and addressed and that informed consent is granted. As
part of this responsibility, Human Research and Ethics Approval was required before

15
16

Patton, above n 6, 344-380.
See Appendix A: Interview Questions.
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the commencement of my empirical research to ensure that the research complied
with University policy; that the researcher was well-aware of the risks involved in
the project and that the steps had been taken to ensure these risks were minimised or
eliminated.

(a)

Risks

Confidentiality and anonymity were the primary ethical considerations relevant to
conducting qualitative interviews and these issues were managed effectively. On an
individual level, each potential interviewee was contacted in advance and provided
with a consent form, and their confidentiality was assured, both in writing and
verbally, prior to the interview taking place. This also applied where the participant
requested to remain anonymous, although anonymity was not requested by any of the
interviewees. On a collective level, data was kept in the researcher’s custody; the
exception being during the transcription of audio recordings where the transcription
service was bound by contractual obligations of confidence.

(b)

Informed Consent

As mentioned above, the broad nature of this research was outlined to potential
participants when first approached, and more complete details of the aims of the
project and expectations of participants were provided (both verbally and via the
Participant Information Sheet) when they agreed to participate in the interview or
upon request. Once the project had been fully explained, all of the interviewees had
the opportunity to ask questions to clarify their involvement, and capacity to consent
was acknowledged formally by way of a signed consent form. This form provided
written information about the project, and an assurance of confidentiality. The
consent form was signed and dated by the participant and stated that the participant
had received full explanation.17

17

See Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet; Appendix C: Interviewee Consent form.
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(c)

Withdrawal of Consent

Participants were advised verbally and in writing on the consent form that they could
discontinue participation at any time and that there would be no adverse effects on
any participant who chose to withdraw their consent. Participants were advised that if
they chose to withdraw their consent during the course of the interview they would
be able to have their data withdrawn by requesting that the data be deleted or by
instructing the transcriber to omit that participant’s contributions in the transcription.
(d)

Confidentiality

Confidentiality was one of the primary ethical considerations relevant to conducting
qualitative interviews and this issue was managed carefully. On an individual level,
each potential interviewee was contacted in advance and provided with a consent
form, and their confidentiality was assured, both in writing and verbally, prior to the
interview taking place.
In light of the fact that the data from this research project is published in a
thesis and potentially will be used in journals and presented at conferences; the
identity of the participant was kept confidential and published only with permission.
All participants provided consent. There were no special requests to maintain
anonymity by any of the interviewees. As part of reporting this research, direct
quotations from the interview were utilised. However, each interviewee was given
the option of being given a pseudonym, and all identifying information (including
relevant possibilities such as the name of the institution, the participant’s position,
etc.) could be removed from the published material. No interviewees requested the
use of a pseudonym.
On a collective level, the student investigator undertook the conducting of the
interviews and analysis of the data only. Data is and will always be in the custody of
the student investigator with the only exception being during the transcription of
audio recordings when the transcription service was under contractual obligations of
confidence.
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C

Method
The method used to analyse the interview data is referred to as ‘Framework

analysis’ or the ‘Framework approach.’18 Given the diverse range of qualitative
methods available to analyse participant interviews, it was important to select a
methodology appropriate to the research style and questions. This research is a type
of applied policy research and framework analysis is a tool often used with this type
of research, as it involves a coherent and systemic approach.19
This process involves an examination of ‘constant comparison’ whereby each
item in the data is checked or compared with the rest of the data in order to establish
analytical categories.20 After the interviews are transcribed, researchers using this
method are required to immerse themselves in the data with the aim of gaining a
thorough and in-depth understanding of the phenomena in question.21 Through this
process, the data is analysed with the aim of developing a categorical system to
reflect the many nuances of the data, instead of reducing the data to a few numerical
codes, as is the aim of many quantitative studies.22
This method is aptly suited for the analysis of semi-structured interviews and
policy relevant qualitative research, particularly where the objectives of the
investigation are set in advance and the timescale of the research tends to be
relatively short.23 Although the research is deduced from pre-set aims and objectives,
the framework approach also reflects the observations of the people studied and in
that way is ‘grounded’ and inductive.24
The deductive elements of the method distinguished it from a purely
inductive approach, such as grounded theory, where the research develops in
response to the data obtained through an ongoing analysis and iterative process.25 In
contrast to many inductive methods, the primary aim is not to generate a theory,
18

This approach was first developed by Ritchie & Lewis, see: J Ritchie and J Lewis, Qualitative
Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (Sage Publishers, 2003).
19
Catherine Pope, Sue Ziebland and Nicholas Mays, 'Analysing Qualitative Data' (2000) 320 BMJ
114.
20
Ibid.
21
Bruce L Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Allyn and Bacon, 4th ed,
2001) 7.
22
Pope, Ziebland and Mays, above n 19.
23
Ibid 116.
24
Ibid.
25
Joanna Smith and Jill Firth, 'Qualitative Data Analysis: The Framework Approach' (2011) 18 Nurse
Researcher 52, 52-53.
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rather it is to describe and interpret what is occurring in a particular setting, in
accordance with a set of pre-determined research questions.26

The Process
(a)

Stage 1 - Transcription of Interviews
Due to the overwhelming amount of data generated by the interviews, it was

appropriate to outsource the transcription of this data. The risk involved with
outsourcing this process is that a researcher will not be as familiar with the data then
if it were self-transcribed, which is an integral component of the process of
understanding the phenomena in question. To minimise this risk, the audio from each
of the interviews were listened to against the transcripts to ensure its accuracy and
validity. The interviews were also transcribed verbatim to ensure that the original
meaning was not altered by the transcriber. The transcription resulted in over 70 000
words of raw data.
(b)

Stage 2 – Familiarisation with the Interview Material
This process required complete immersion in the interview data, through the

act of reading and re-reading the transcripts to gather an in-depth understanding of
the research. This is also referred to as understanding the ‘narrative’ of the data, by
searching for the ‘story’ that the interviews reveal.27 During this process, note taking
was extremely important. Large margins were deliberately created to allow for
analytical thoughts, feelings and impressions about the data to flow freely.28 A
separate document was created to note patterns and themes that were generated by a
reading of the data, which allowed for the development of and creative engagement
with the material. The important of ‘memo-taking’ is a well-documented tool for the
development of theories and ideas.29

26

A Srivastava and S Thomson, 'Framework Analysis: A Qualitative Methodology for Applied Policy
Research' (2009) 4 Journal of Administration and Governance 72, 76.
27
See eg, Terry Locke, Critical Discourse Analysis (Bloomsbury Academic, 1st ed, 2004); Bryan
Jennar, Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis (SAGE Publications, 1st ed, 2000); Berg, above n 21.
28
Nicola Gale et al, 'Using the Framework Method for the Analysis of Qualitative Data in MultiDisciplinary Health Research' (2013) 13 BMC Medical Research Methodology 117, 120.
29
Memo-taking is particularly well-documented in the methodological approach of Grounded Theory,
where a crucial component of the analytical process is the development of new ideas and theories, and
this is achieved on an on-going basis by writing down thoughts as the analysis progresses. See eg,
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(c)

Stage 3 – Coding
A line-by-line analysis was carried out on the interview material, and a

paraphrase or label (otherwise known as a ‘code’) was attached to the sections that
were deemed to be of particular importance. These codes can refer to substantive
aspects of the data, such as particular behaviours or structures; values, such as those
that underpin certain statements, such as a belief in the criminalisation of cartel
conduct; emotions (or lack thereof), such as happiness or frustration, or more
methodological elements, such as where interviewees became agitated or
uncomfortable with certain areas of discussion.30
The identification of these codes was then inputted into a ‘coding matrix,’
where the data was assigned to different themes and categories in the coding
matrix.31 The primary aim of coding is to allow for the systematic comparison of the
data sets, also known as the method of ‘constant comparison.’32
One of the most significant aspects of this step was that it allowed for the
development of a full and comprehensive understanding of the material. More
importantly however, this type of analysis revealed aspects of the data that were
originally hidden, in the sense that some issues did not seem to be meaningful when
a cursory analysis the data was conducted. It was only after the in-depth line-by-line
analysis was conducted upon the completion of the interviews that many valuable
underlying themes emerged. It was by analysing and reconciling these anomalies that
the analysis was made stronger.33

(d)

Stage 4: Developing and Applying a Working Analytical Framework
During this process, the codes were finalised to form the working analytical

framework, which was added to and changed until the last transcript was coded. The
first stage of summarising and synthesising the range and diversity of coded data
took place, as the initial themes and categories began to be refined. Each of the
subsequent transcripts were then applied to the analytical framework through the
Melanie Burks and Jane Mills, Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide (SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011);
Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis
(SAGE Publications, 2006) Chapter 4.
30
Gale et al, above n 28.
31
Smith and Firth, above n 25, 4-5.
32
Gale et al, above n 28, 119.
33
Ibid 4.
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assigning of each code, which was abbreviated for ease of identification, and each
code was noted directly on the transcripts.

(e)

Stage 5: Charting Data into the Framework Matrix
A table was designed to create a matrix where the data could be inputted,

which involved the process of summarising the data by category from each
transcript. During this process, it was paramount that there was an appropriate
balance between retaining the original significance and meaning of the data, as well
as reducing it to a manageable level.34 It was important to also include key references
and illustrative quotations in the framework matrix, which could then be used in the
published findings.

1st and 2nd Level Coding - Table 1
1st Level Coding

2nd Level Coding

Restitution to third parties

Roles/Purpose of Public/Private Enforcement

Derivative

immunity

for Vicarious immunity

employees

Carve-out policy

On-going disclosure/cooperation

Mentions recidivism

Multi-jurisdictional issues

Immunity as negotiation (power imbalance)
Sovereignty

Cartel Whistle-blower Proposal

Necessity (or lackthereof)
Good Samaritan
False/vexatious claims

Alternatives
(“Bounty”)

to

immunity Cross-over with whistleblower
Morality/ethical considerations
Cross-over with credibility

34

Ibid 5.
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Opinion on cartel project survey

Moral/Ethical considerations
Culture clash
Concept of “justice”
Lack of knowledge/public perception

Credibility in criminal cartel trials

“Too early to tell” (criminal)

General views of the immunity Impact of criminalisation
policy

Necessity/effectiveness
U.S influence
Cross-over with motivations for seeking immunity
Off-setting immorality
ACCC transparency
Cross-over with overreliance
Recording of oral proffers
Knowledge of law/ cartel provisions
Silence as a strategy
Immunity as negotiation v confession
Criteria to refer if criminal

Overreliance on immunity policy

Cross-over with motivations for seeking immunity
Loss of skill of detection
Effectiveness/necessity
Alternative

methods

of

detection

(s155/Dawn

Raids/Education/Market analysis)
BA CASE
ACCC as criminal investigators
The ACCC Cooperation Policy

Responsive regulation
Certainty v Flexibility (Principles and substance v black and
white rules)
“Playing the game” (lawyers)
Certainty & wait and see approach
Silence as strategy

Relationship
ACCC/CDPP

between

the “Too early to tell”
Transparency
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Sufficiency of proffer/information for criminal immunity/
Criteria to refer as criminal
Difference in process versus difference in culture
Time lag
Certainty
Confidentiality – PCI – Scheme

PCI in Criminal context
Roles/Purpose of Public/Private Enforcement
Certainty/Effectiveness/ Impact on immunity applications
Transparency
Third party “victims”
Administration of justice
Morality (MD)
Too early to tell

Revocation of immunity

Certainty
Legal character of policy – reviewability of ACCC decision
“Trust/confidence in regulator” (GF)
Pragmatic approach (NM)

Enforcement culture (as compared Influence & power of United States
to U.S)

Cross-over with ACCC/CDPP relationship
Perception of cartel conduct (cross-over with criminalisation)
Dibber dobber culture of Australia
Criteria to refer as criminal
Public lack knowledge

Ringleader Exclusion

Practically/necessity
Slight cross-over with recidivism
“Above the law” mentality

Cartel Recidivism

Gaming immunity policy
Moral/Ethical considerations
Crossover with ringleader
Organisational structure
Amnesty Plus crossover
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Certainty
Off-setting immorality
Theory v Practice
Definitional disputes (certainty v flexibility)
Omnibus question
Crossover with restitution/revocation (GS)
Theory underpinning policy

‘Rationality’
‘Certainty’ – crossover with restitution
Corporations as rational actors – company structure

Utilitarian

notions

justice/morality

of Restorative/responsive regulation versus utilitarianism
Cross over with bounty (CBW)
“Effectiveness”/”Necessity” outweighs immoral aspects
Lack of public knowledge
Use for other areas –such as insider trading

Small business experience

Large companies ‘using’/”playing” the system
ACCC as unskilled criminal investigators
Lack of knowledge
Cross-over with criminalisation
Recording of oral proffers

Miscellaneous issues

Company structure in immunity applications
“Shifting the blame to rogue employee”
Policy use for insider trading
BA CASE/criminalisation
Legal character of the immunity policy
Vicarious immunity
Silence as an alternative to immunity
Cross-over with restitution (Michael Gray)
“Gaming policy”
Cross over with recidivism (ACCC)
ACCC as unskilled criminal investigators
Criteria to refer as criminal
Amnesty Plus/Cooperation
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The 1st level codes were colour-coded to reflect the importance of the issue
based on the level of consensus reached in relation to that particular issue. The red
highlighted sections indicate the most controversial issues; the yellow indicates
pertinent issues; and the green indicates non-pertinent information.

(f)

Stage 6: Interpreting the Data
This stage of the analysis is designed to allow for the development of

associations and patterns within concepts and themes; interpreting meaning in the
concepts and themes that emerge from the data and generally garnering a holistic
impression of the meaning of the interviews.35 This was the stage where each of the
categories and codes were reflected upon and links were formed between the
categories to formulate the key findings emerging from the data. This required a
rearranging of the matrix in some places to pull the most controversial and important
ideas into groups, and arrange them by theme and importance to the research
questions. At all stages, the data was cross-checked with the original source to ensure
that

the

participant

accounts

were

accurately

presented

and

to

avoid

misrepresentation. Each of the key empirical findings is outlined in the next chapter.

35

Smith and Firth, above n 25.
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V

EMPIRICAL INSIGHT INTO THE IMMUNITY POLICY: KEY
FINDINGS

This chapter is intended to provide a descriptive account of the responses from
the interviewees in relation to four key areas outlined below. The proceeding
chapters will then provide a critical analysis of these responses, and the issues that
arise, in conjunction with further research, to formulate final recommendations in
relation to these important areas of the immunity policy’s design and operation.
The key findings derived from the analysis of qualitative data can be divided into
four primary categories. These are:
-

Perceptions of & Attitudes towards the Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct

-

Eligibility & Cooperation Requirements of Immunity

-

The Tension between Public & Private Enforcement – Confidentiality and
Third Parties

-

A
1

Alternatives to the Immunity Policy

Perceptions of & Attitudes Towards the Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct
The Concept of ‘Effectiveness’

When interviewees were asked about any particular issue in relation to the Immunity
Policy, they generally responded in reference to the ‘effectiveness’ of the program:
Interviewee: So, let me first address the effectiveness question. Has the policy allowed better
detection and prosecution of cartels? I think it probably has. Ours is quite early in its
deployment and so maybe too early to say, but from my observation of the last 7 years that
we’ve had a policy there’s a much higher level of reporting then there otherwise would be.
So therefore certainly as far as detection is concerned it has been effective, more effective
than not having it.1

The way that the term ‘effectiveness’ was described throughout a majority of
the interviews, and most notably from the lawyers and partners of larger law firms,
was through a ‘cost-benefit’ analysis, expressed in utilitarian terms, in terms of the

1

Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 4.
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Immunity Policy serving a ‘greater good’ for society.2 When questioned about any
issues that might involve assessments of ‘morality’ in relation to Immunity, many
interviewees quickly deferred to these utilitarian precepts of effectiveness as a means
of justifying any moral ambiguity or controversy. This I have termed ‘off-setting
morality.’
According to the interviewee responses, the ‘effectiveness’ of the Immunity
Policy is primarily assessed in terms of its ability to achieve cartel detection and
deterrence. This consideration is given precedence over all other more nuanced or
normative factors that may arise within the policy’s design and operation or its
interaction with other areas of the law. In this way, many of the interviewees framed
the concept of ‘effectiveness’ in purely neo-classical economic ‘cost-benefit’ terms,
without reference or regard to other relevant or normative factors, such as
transparency, accountability, consistency and proportionality.
There were some interviewees, namely academics, who recognised this
emphasis on utilitarianism but disagreed with its value, advocating instead for a more
restorative, responsive type of regulation:
Interviewee: That’s basically what I think you have; well…see… that idea, that was more of
a restorative, responsive sort of idea. That was more from the earlier philosophy, the sort of
Allan Fels philosophy of how to do regulatory enforcement, I think, whereas the current one
is much more utilitarian.3

One of the questions put to the interviewees was in relation to the survey
results generated by the Cartel Project from the University of Melbourne, which
indicated that over half of the general public surveyed disagreed with the concept of
an immunity policy. These negative views of the Immunity Policy existed even
though the survey described to them that the purpose of the policy was for the overall
detection of illicit conduct that may not have otherwise been detected.4 The reason
behind the public’s response to the policy may be attributed to the fact that one
person in the cartel is escaping ‘scot-free’ from prosecution when they have admitted
2

See also, Matthew Haist, 'Deterrence in a Sea of Just Desserts: Are Utilitarian Goals Achievable in a
World of Limiting Retibutivism' (2009) 99 Journal Criminal Law & Criminology 789.
3
Interviewee 1 (Sydney, 9th July 2013) 8.
4
Christine Parker, 'Report on Interviews with Civil Respondents in Cartel Cases' (Centre for
Regulatory
Studies
and
Law
Faculty,
Monash
University,
2011)
<http://cartel.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/project-news/project-outputs>.
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to participating in a crime. The idea of ‘full’ immunity is unique, in contrast to other
prosecution policies around the world, as cartel immunity is guaranteed ‘upfront’ and
is often given to a person/or company who is likely to be viewed as equally culpable
to the other participants.5
When questioned as to why the public may not necessarily agree with an
Immunity Policy, many of the interviewees could not understand how the policy
could possibly be seen as ‘immoral’ in the eyes of the public, in the sense described
above. It was not until the interviewees were prompted or an explanation was
provided that this point was fully understood. One interviewee went as far as to
suggest that companies are sophisticated organisations, which may therefore exclude
them from the morality question altogether:
PM: …that it’s immoral to let somebody who was the ring leader to stay in the cartel.
Interviewee: But these are companies. I mean these are global companies. I mean this isn’t
like the situation where you’ve got a gangs of kids and the 16 year kids getting the 14 year
olds to throw rocks at the bus. This is like multi-national corporations with boards and
governance structures. 6

Other interviewees’ first reaction was to laugh at the fact that some people
perceive the policy as immoral, whilst others targeted the reliability of the
methodology employed to conduct the Cartel Project survey. Some were opposed to
engaging with the essence of the question, comparing the Cartel Project study to a
‘Herald sun type activity.’7
Thus, a clear theme emerged from the interviewees that separated the
‘effectiveness’ of the policy with its potential ‘immoral’ characteristics. Most
interviewees claimed that the former factor was of more importance in their
assessment of the policy’s current operation. To this end, many interviewees quickly
dismissed any question relating to the moral aspects of immunity.
In stark contrast however, when the interviewees were asked about other
more controversial developments relating to immunity, they tended to drawn upon
the same ‘morality arguments’ they initially opposed or could not understand to
support their arguments. One scenario in which this arose was within the discussions

5

Chapter VI, The Credibility Of Accomplice Evidence, pg 203.
Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 11.
7
Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 18.
6
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relating to the introduction of a cartel informant system. This system refers to the
concept of financially rewarding those who are not directly involved in the cartel to
come forward and provide cartel information to the competition authority. When
questioned about the possibility of introducing a financial rewards system in
Australia, many interviewees found this proposition morally ‘uncomfortable’ or a
‘bit distasteful’8:
Interviewee: I don’t really like the idea of it just instinctively; it’s not something that appeals.
PM: On sort of a moral level?
Interviewee: On a moral basis, yeah.9

Most notably, when the interviewees were questioned about the morality of
the Immunity Policy, which is essentially a policy rewarding people who have
admitted to cartel conduct, these moral elements were often disregarded or not fully
understood by the interviewees. But when asked about a cartel informant policy,
which is essentially a policy rewarding those not involved (or ‘innocent’) in relation
to cartel conduct, many of the interviewees were against this policy on the basis that
it goes ‘against gut instinct.’10
This inconsistent treatment of morality was also illustrated within the
discussions relating to the introduction of whistle-blower provisions. These
provisions serve to protect third parties who were not directly involved in cartel
conduct from employer retaliation upon revealing pertinent information to the
authorities. There was a strong sense from some of the interviewees that there is no
need for these additional provisions, ‘It’s just a further level of irksomeness that I’d
prefer to avoid. You know, it’s bad enough as it is’11 (emphasis added). There was
another suggestion that instead of those not involved in the cartel being protected
through whistle-blower provisions, that these individuals should simply ‘do the right
thing’ by coming forward to the regulators, without reward or protection:
Interviewee: No, I don’t believe in paying whistle blowers even in tax. My gut reaction is
against it in any field.

8

Interviewee 13 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 22.
Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 23.
10
Interviewee 10 (Sydney, 29th July 2013) 21.
11
Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 20.
9
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PM: Why is that?
Interviewee: A bit like your comment on the United Kingdom case that failed. Encourages
exaggerated and overblown claims, allegations and I suppose I think people should be more
abiding anyway when it happens.
PM: Yeah, the idea of a Good Samaritan?
Interviewee: Mmm.12

However, in the discussions relating to the actual Immunity Policy there was
no indication that immunity applicants should come forward to the authorities and
‘do the right thing.’ From the language used in these discussions, there was also no
indication that the interviewees believed that their clients had committed any ‘wrongdoing.’ There was certainly no suggestion that seeking immunity is akin to a
confession, or any language of that nature.
These inconsistencies were also found in other areas of discussion. For
instance, when discussing the credibility issues potentially faced by immunity
applicants, this seemed to be a ‘manageable’ issue for many of the interviewees,
particularly because the immunity applicant’s evidence is so imperative to the
ACCC’s case. In contrast however, when questioned about the cartel informant
system, many interviews were quick to state that paying people to come forward and
reveal cartel information would essentially lead to false claims. These interviewees
claimed that whistle-blowers are likely to have ulterior motives and be unreliable
witnesses as a result.13
Therefore, whilst it appeared that credibility is not a significant issue for the
interviewees in the context of immunity, it was a central theme in the discussions
about the alternatives to immunity. Many of the arguments levied against these
alternative propositions, such as whistle-blower protections or a cartel informant
system, were directed to the credibility of those revealing cartel conduct outside of
an immunity application. The use of negative terms used in these contexts further
compounded these observations, where the term ‘bounty hunters’ was used to
describe ‘innocent’ whistle-blowers but no such negative terms were used to describe
the immunity applicants by a majority of interviewees.
12
13

Interviewee 10 (Sydney, 29th July 2013) 21.
Ibid; Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 41.
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These inconsistencies in the discussions were also evident in relation to the
ringleader requirement. Prior to the recent review of the policy, a cartelist would be
ineligible for immunity if they were deemed to be the key instigator of the cartel
activity.14 This requirement was designed to prevent a cartel member who instigated
or coerced other members to join or continue in the cartel from receiving immunity.
These ‘ringleaders’ are thought to be more culpable than other cartel members, and
thus should be precluded on this moral basis. However, many interviewees did not
understand why the ringleader provision may have existed to serve this moral
purpose. Instead, many interviewees preferred to focus on the pragmatic aspects of
the ringleader requirement or lack thereof, believing ‘it is not a sensible concept.’15

2
(a)

General Opinions about the Current Operation of the Policy
‘Overreliance on the Immunity Policy’

Given that the immunity policy is often lauded as the ‘single most effective cartel
detection tool in the world’, it is pertinent to question whether such a heavy emphasis
being placed on one tool of enforcement has led to an overreliance on the policy by
competition authorities worldwide. The interviewees were divided on this issue.
Those who agreed that too much reliance is placed on the Immunity Policy believed
that this has resulted in a loss of skill on the part of competition authorities:
Interviewee: Yeah, I would agree with that for sure. I think that one of the casualities of the
immunity policy has been a loss of skill amongst the regulators in detection as cartels used to be
detected in a variety of ways. There’s always been whistle-blowers and disgruntled participants
that have come forward, even without immunity, but, and there’s anonymous tip-off’s and stuff
for generations, but what’s tended to happen is now almost all enforcement activity is generated
by immunity applicants. Certainly that’s been my experience, and the Commission very rarely,
not in the this Commission (meaning the ACCC), but DOJ and the European Commission, the
other anti-trust authorities very rarely have to actually uncover one for themselves through market
surveys or price monitoring or other forms of policing, it’s mostly brought to them. It’s not only
brought to them, it’s brought to them in a box by the applicant with a proffer, a suite of
14

The ringleader requirement has been modified in the most recent draft release of the immunity
policy, and replaced with a coercion requirement. The coercion requirement essentially serves the
same purpose as the ringleader requirement, in that it is designed to prevent a member of the cartel
who instigated or ‘coerced’ other members to join or continue in the cartel to be eligible for
Immunity: See Chapter VI, Cartel Coercion, pg 186.
15
Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 17.
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documents, a statement, it’s almost pre-packaged, so I think it’s good in a sense that it’s led to
enforcement but it’s bad in a sense that it’s reduced the level of non-participant generated
activity. I think there’s been a loss of skill amongst some of the regulators.16

Another argument raised in this context tended towards the suggestion that the
immunity policy is not as ‘effective’ at detection as the regulators currently claim.17
According to these interviewees, there are a number of reasons why cartel conduct
may have come to light, which may not necessarily be attributed to the Immunity
Policy.18 These situations could include, where ‘somebody who has been pushed out
of the group or somebody’s has an affair with somebody’s secretary,’ or there may
have been ‘some sort of hotline where people can be reported.’19 There were other
interviewees that agreed with the proposition that regulators may over-rely on the
immunity policy as an enforcement tool, but felt this does not mean that they do not
also use other enforcement tools.20
On the other hand, there were some strong assertions against the overreliance
question, believing that the ‘effectiveness’ of the policy, in terms of the benefits it
provides for greater detection of cartel conduct, outweighs any potential claims of
overreliance:
PM: … you know, looking for lessons there and perhaps there was sort of widespread
discussion about perhaps because of the secrecy of cartels that we are over relying on the
immunity policy.
Interviewee: No, no.
PM: You don’t agree with that?
Interviewee: Absolutely not. And you know, because of their secrecy you need the immunity
policy to be able to break the secrecy. You know, it leaves… the cartel operators in a position
where they go to sleep at night wondering are they going to be too late if they ring the ACCC
in the morning at 7 o’clock and so why not ring them now at 9 o’clock this night before, then
I can sleep easier.21

16

Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 6.
Ibid; Interviewee 1 (Sydney, 9th July 2013) 12.
18
Ibid.
19
Interviewee 1 (Sydney, 9th July 2013) 12; Interviewee 3 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 27.
20
Interviewee 6 (Not recorded, Sydney, 23rd July 2013).
21
Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 15.
17
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There were also arguments in support of the notion that we should not ‘fix
what is not broken,’ given that the ACCC has finite resources. These interviewees
felt that if the policy is supposedly ‘working,’ ‘then that seems to me to put an
efficient use of their resources.’22 A majority of the interviewees who were against
the proposition of overreliance generally relied on these types of effectiveness
arguments to support their views, or were quick to indicate that there lacks an
alternative method of cartel detection:
Interviewee: Well then how do you measure it (LAUGHS) whether they’re over relying? I
mean what other detection tools do they have?23

Many of the interviewees spoke about the lack of alternative methods for
detecting cartel conduct, due to its inherently secret and deliberate nature. There was
a suggestion that even if the ACCC does use other methods of cartel detection, there
is a lack of disclosure by the regulator as to what these methods may be.24 When
asked about these alternate methods, it was interesting that many interviewees,
including the ACCC itself, were quick to indicate that they are ‘proactive’ with the
Immunity Policy.25 By ‘proactive’ it was suggested that one of the alternate methods
of detection of cartel conduct, was to ‘raise awareness’ and ‘educate’ people about
the existence and purpose of the Immunity Policy:
Interviewee: So I think, you know, when you look at the term ‘over reliance’ you sort of
sometimes think that you’re just sort of sitting back and waiting for people to come to you
but it’s not like that. There’s an element of proactive in there.26

When questioned further about other methods that regulators can use for the
detection of cartel conduct, many interviewees could not provide clear or definitive
answers. There was reference made to the fact that the ACCC Cooperation Policy
exists,27 although this is a policy designed for those who are not ‘first in’ and still

22

Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 5.
Interviewee 13 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 7.
24
Interviewee 3 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 27.
25
Interviewees 12 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 15, 17.
26
Ibid 15.
27
Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 15; The ACCC Cooperation Policy has now been
combined with the ACCC Immunity Policy as part of the recent revision: Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for Cartel Conduct ' (2014) s H.
23
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requires the applicant to come forward to the regulator if they feel this is in their best
interest.
There were divided opinions about the use of dawn raids for greater cartel
enforcement. Dawn raids refer to the situation where competition authorities globally
coordinate raids of company headquarters to seize pertinent cartel information.
Whilst some interviewees felt that the number of dawn raids the regulator conducts
could be increased, others held strong opposition to this on the basis that they are
inordinately expensive to the regulator and intrusive to the company, whose entire
internal documents and processes are subject to the raid:
Interviewee: And I wouldn’t want our Federal regulator to be rushing around the economy,
you know, on the smell of a suspicious rag, you know, undertaking dawn raids here and
there, they’re massively intrusive, they really disrupt the economy, you know, if taken too
far…28

As per the general theme throughout the interviews, the discourse was again
heavily concentrated on the ‘effectiveness’ of the policy; with a sense that if the
Immunity Policy is truly an effective method of cartel detection, then there is no real
need for other methods of detection to be used. This perspective though, does not
account for the s 155 powers of investigation that the ACCC regularly uses to gather
evidence to prove its cartel cases.29 When asked what would be the second most
effective tool for cartel detection, the ACCC could not indicate ‘off the top of my
head’ what this method may be, as the immunity policy is ‘by far the one.’30

(b)

Motivations for Seeking Immunity
(i)

Corporate Structure

It was important to garner a sense of the motivations surrounding immunity
applications to analyse whether the motivations exhibited a straightforward costbenefit analysis, as the rational actor model would predict, or whether there were
more nuanced considerations that influenced the decision to apply for immunity.

28

Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 6.
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 155.
30
Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 17.
29
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Interestingly, when questioned about these motivations, a number of the lawyers
immediately indicated that those who were directly involved in the cartel are not
generally involved in the application for immunity:
Interviewee: Yeah. Well I think, I mean it also comes down to, you know, just as a lawyer
and your professional responsibilities, in these sorts of cases you should not be taking
instructions from the person who’s engaged in the conduct. There needs to be someone at a
very senior level.31

In line with these suggestions were assertions by some interviewees that
senior management had no knowledge of the cartel’s operation and that most
instances of cartel conduct occur at the ‘middle management’ level. One of the
interviewees believed that there were two key reasons that middle management cartel
members would keep the cartel ‘strictly confidential’ and therefore not apply for
immunity (1) they do not want to be seen to be participating in a cartel and (2) they
want to receive the praise, reward and recognition for having a stellar sales
performance.32
Other interviewees believed the knowledge of the board members would vary
depending on the size of the corporation and the type of management system in
place. When questioned further about this lack of knowledge at a senior level and
how this is possible, many interviewees tended to qualify their statements, indicating
that it would depend on the circumstances of the particular corporation and whether
there were any ‘red flags’ to indicate cartel activity to senior management.33
There was also strong dissenting opinion in relation to this discussion. One
interviewee in particular thought that the suggestion that ‘middle management’ being
involved in cartel activity without the knowledge or consent of the board was part of
a larger corporate strategy to blame ‘rogue employees.’34 Within this was the
suggestion that as long as the company is ‘making all this money’ then there is a
sense of ‘wilful ignorance’ on behalf of the company:
31

Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15.07.2013) 10.
Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15.07.2013) 13.
33
These opinions neglect the fact that directors owe a duty of care to the company to ensure that
adequate mechanisms are in place to properly monitor management: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s
180. See, eg, Re One.Tel Ltd (in liq); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2003)
44 ACSR 682; Sheahan (as liquidator of SA Service Stations) (in liq) v Verco (2001) 79 SASR 109;
Cashflow Finance Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1999) NSWSC 671.
34
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Interviewee: Yeah. It was in their interest to have this person making all this money and
bringing in all these contracts and they just don’t want to know how they’re doing it and then
when they find out its illegal then they go, oh you’re a rogue and we’re going to sack you,
but before that they weren’t doing that.35

(ii) Immunity as a Negotiation

When analysing the discourse surrounding the immunity application, it became
evident that coming forward to make an immunity application to the ACCC was
treated by a majority of the interviewees as a ‘negotiation’ as opposed to a
‘confession’ with the ACCC. This was reflected in the language used when
describing the interviewee’s general views surrounding the Immunity Policy. Many
interviewees described the decision to make an application as being based on a
number of relevant factors, primarily in relation to the risks to the applicant and the
costs involved.
The language used during the interviews was clear, concise and portrayed in a
way that suggested that an immunity application is made as of right or entitlement, as
opposed to a situation of revealing unlawful conduct. When questioned about the
motivations that cartel members have when applying for immunity, there was no
suggestion that applicants were coming forward to ‘confess’ their crime, or
expressing any element of contrition, or acknowledging any wrong-doing, as ‘it’s a
pretty hard sell to say you’ll only spend a few weeks in goal… you need to get
people comfortable.’36 Instead, the language tended to focus on the burdens and
‘risks’ surrounding cooperation and the immunity ‘prize’:
Interviewee: It involves years of cooperation. It involves huge expense to cooperate and so
it’s not done lightly and there are down sides because you‘re also exposing yourself to
customers in a class action liability. So in making your decision to come forward in
Australia, as an advisor to companies who have done so, it’s not just a straight forward
matter of saying, well you know, there’s the prize, go in.37

35

Ibid.
Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 5.
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The interviewees were also well aware of the fact that without the immunity
application and therefore the immunity applicant’s evidence, the ACCC would
potentially have a very weak case for enforcement action or even no case at all.
There was even some suggestion that the ACCC will ‘water-down’ the policy
requirements to ensure that the immunity application is secured as ‘the ACCC…are
very loathe to let go of their immunity applicant.’38
The ACCC itself recognised that immunity applicants may treat an immunity
application as a negotiation but attributed it to cases where applicants do not fully
understand the Immunity Policy: ‘but the down side is there are particularly first time
applicants who may not fully understand the process or the requirements of the
policy itself, particularly the criteria for immunity. So sometimes, for example, when
they come in a proper meeting they may see it almost like a negotiation…’39
(iii) Silence as a Strategy
Some interviewees indicated that remaining ‘silent,’ in lieu of applying for
immunity, may be a strategy used by cartel participants that the ACCC has not
considered. As discussed in Chapter 2, the decision to apply for immunity is
generally presented as a two-pronged strategy.40 This is reflected in the discussions
surrounding the supposed operation of the policy, through the application of game
theory and the prisoner’s dilemma.41 In the context of cartel conduct, decisionmaking is generally posited as (1) remain in the cartel and not seek immunity or (2)
apply for immunity. However, there were interviewees who suggested a third
possible scenario: (3) Cease all involvement in the cartel and adopt a ‘wait and see’
approach:
Interviewee: Well, you’ve got three choices right. Well sorry; there are three forks in the
road. One is you blow the whistle, OK, no penalty but depending on the nature of the
industry and so on, follow-on class action, damages, all the publicity, all the distraction and a
lot of legal expense but you avoid the penalty. Option two is you sit back, see what happens

38

Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 17.
Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 2: This counters the assumption that the ACCC would
hold all of the bargaining power in relation to the granting of Immunity. Presumably, if the applicant
does not want to agree to cooperate in way specified in ACCC cooperation agreement then the ACCC
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standard cooperation agreement.
40
See Chapter II, A Theoretical Breakdown of the Immunity Policy, pg 47.
41
Ibid.
39

120

and then there’ll be two forks in the road. One is it does come to the light. You immediately
cooperate and you get half the penalty. You get a discount for cooperation.
PM: But they’re only two of the perspectives.
Interviewee: Third option is it never comes to light.
PM: And then nothing happens.
Interviewee: And then nothing happens. So it seems to me the size of the discount for
cooperation is the price between blowing the whistle and a chance that it never comes to
light.42

If this were another option that cartelists are choosing to make in the context
of a cartel, then this would change the way the Immunity Policy is intended to
operate, in the sense that it deviates from the current prisoner’s dilemma model.
There were interviewees who believed that this third scenario is unlikely to occur due
to the fact that there is the risk that the other cartel members or ‘competitors’ may
change their mind and apply for immunity. More importantly, however, one
interviewee mentioned that there is no statute of limitations in relation to criminal
liability, thus you would have to ‘go to your grave on it’ and this would mean that
the ‘wait and see’ approach still leaves cartelists ‘fully exposed.’43

(c)

Factors Influencing Perception
(i) ‘Us and them’
There were many different perceptions that the various stakeholders exhibited

toward each other when discussing issues related to the Immunity Policy, including
the relationship between the ACCC and members of the legal profession on the one
hand and the perception of the interviewees towards the general public on the other.
The most obvious was the relationship between the ACCC and the members of
the legal profession who were interviewed. Generally the interviewees were
supportive of the ACCC, and expressed ‘confidence’ and ‘trust’ in the regulator. This
was reflected in the positive dialogue between the regulators and members of the
legal profession. When the interviewees criticised the ACCC, they were often quick
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to qualify their statements or to offer explanations as to why the issue may be
occurring.
For instance, the interviewees were directed to the recent case example in the
United Kingdom44 where the CMA was criticised for its overreliance on the
immunity applicant’s evidence, which resulted in the collapse of its first criminal
cartel case. When questioned whether this scenario might occur in Australia, due to
the similarities with the bifurcated system of enforcement, many of the interviewees
felt that there was no significant risk that this will occur in Australia’s first criminal
case, as they attributed the CMA’s failure to ‘negligence’.45 There was a strong belief
by some of the interviewees that the ACCC and CDPP will ‘get it right’, because it
will be crucial that they do so, in the wake of the CMA’s handling of their first
criminal cartel case.46
A clearer level of division throughout the discussions existed between the
perceived knowledge levels of the general public in comparison to the interviewees
themselves. Generally there was a sense that, in the eyes of the interviewees, the
‘public does not know what is good for them.’ This was most evidently reflected in
the discussions surrounding the Cartel Project Survey conducted by the University of
Melbourne, outlined above, where the question of morality seemed to be correlated
with the level of knowledge of the individual in question. When asked about the
survey results, and why over 50 per cent of the people surveyed may have disagreed
with the Immunity Policy, many of the interviewees attributed this result to the
public’s general lack of knowledge of the policy’s operation or of its importance to
the overall anti-cartel enforcement scheme:
Interviewee: Well there were only 50 per cent who were in favour of the immunity policy,
I’ve got to tell you, I suspect that of the 50 per cent that were not in favour, 95 per cent had
no idea what is was that was being discussed.47

Many of the interviewees expressed concern in relation to the methodology of
the survey, and were of the belief that if the nature and operation of the immunity
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policy had been accurately described to the members participating in the survey, this
knowledge would result in them agreeing with the concept of an immunity policy.
Other interviewees were simply surprised or confused as to why members of the
public would not agree with it, given the policy’s overall benefits to cartel detection
and the fact that ‘they’re sort of a very well sort of established set of policies
because, you know, they’re used here and around the world so I’m surprised that
people don’t approve of it so to speak.’48 There were some who went as far as to
imply that public opinion regarding this matter is of little significance in the overall
scheme of things, and the fact that ‘general people’ may not agree with it should not
affect the Immunity Policy or that the fact that it exists:
PM: … it wasn’t interviews, it was a survey, like a random survey and basically…
Interviewee: Oh, just people?49 (emphasis added)

When these observations were put to the one of the authors of the survey, it
was suggested that people answer questions from a moral rather than an economic or
pragmatic perspective and tend to base their answers on ‘gut instincts’ and
conceptions of ‘right and wrong.’50 Moreover, the interviewee defended the design of
the questions in the survey stating that the respondents ‘were given scenarios that I
think were probably sufficient for them to understand what the conduct was that we
were asking about and what might be its effects on them as consumers.’51

(ii) A Difference in Culture
Another important factor influencing the perceptions of the Immunity Policy
was the perceived cultural differences in Australia, as compared to the United States.
Many of the interviewees commented on the influence that the United States had in
compelling other jurisdictions, namely Australia, to adopt the Immunity Policy and
that it was ultimately adopted unquestionably and unequivocally, as ‘No, no
question, I think, that we tended to follow what the United States had done. They
paved the way. Scott (Hammond) was a strong advisor to us as to how we’d adapt
48
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it.’52 A number of interviewees felt that despite the adoption of the leniency policy in
the United States, Australians may not have the same moral condemnation towards
cartel conduct, and are not as inclined to see white collar crime as criminal.53
The dominant influence of the United States is seemingly reflected in global
cartel enforcement, where the DOJ holds significant power and sway over the cartel
enforcement agenda. In contrast, the ACCC does not have the same level of
influence:
Interviewee: I don’t think that Australia occupies that level of prominence and influence and
so if it was suggested that the sort of, sanctioned consequence for a foreign offender was that
they wouldn’t be allowed to travel to Australia again in their lives, well, I don’t think they
would care.54

A more significant theme to emerge from these discussions was the fact that
the Immunity Policy may not be an appropriate cultural fit in Australia. A number of
interviewees commented on the fact that in Australia there is a cultural norm that
dictates that ‘one does not dob in one’s mate, so to speak.’55 This cultural norm
would then seemingly be in direct conflict with the prospect of a cartel member
coming forward to the regulator at the expense of all the other members of the cartel.
One interviewee in particular acknowledged this ‘cultural resistance’ to the
Immunity Policy but felt this resistance could be overcome over time, particularly
when people realise the ‘effectiveness’ of the Policy:
Interviewee: To me, I mean Australians are a bit resistant to it because culturally it is, it is
unusual. Australians pride themselves on not giving up a mate and all that kind of, it’s part of
the sort of ethos of, it’s pretty hard-grained into the Australian psyche that you don’t dob
people in, so I think it did take some getting used to and but when you look at what’s at stake
and you know, keeping suppressed illegal activity is, I think these days people have
overcome those kind of, that cultural resistance to it.56

Another interviewee felt that this cultural resistance could never be overcome, as
it signifies a fundamental divide between people who have different ethical
52
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principles, where ‘some people think that it’s OK to do something for a greater good,
which would be it’s OK to let some people get off free because they give the
evidence about the other people, whereas other people think it’s always wrong to do
the wrong thing regardless of whether there’s a greater good, which would be it’s
always wrong to let somebody get off Scot Free if they’ve done something wrong.’57
There were others who thought the question was one of balance.58

B
1

Eligibility & Cooperation

Cartel Recidivism
The interviewees were asked a hypothetical question in order to gauge how

they felt about cartel recidivists. A scenario was put to them that involved: a cartelist,
namely a corporation, who had been involved in cartel conduct and was granted
immunity by cooperating with the regulator. The case went ahead, the private
litigation ensued, and then the case was ‘done and dusted.’ That same corporation,
with the same individuals, later decides to seek immunity again. The interviewees
were asked whether these recidivists should be entitled to immunity for a second, or
subsequent, time.
Cartel recidivism was the most significantly divided issue discussed in the
interviews. There was no general consensus as to whether cartel recidivists should or
should not be entitled to seek immunity for a second time, or anytime thereafter.
Many interviewees commented on how interesting this question was, as it was one
that many had not put their minds to, and believed that much more time and effort
needed to go into formulating their final opinion on the matter.59
Those interviewees against the position that recidivists should be entitled to
immunity for a second time, indicated that cartel recidivism is a ‘significant
problem’60 and there is ‘no way they should get immunity’ for the second time.61 On
the other hand, there were many interviewees who could see the issue from a more
diplomatic perspective, acknowledging that the concept of recidivism operates as an
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‘aggravating’ factor in other criminal contexts and that the idea that recidivists
should be excluded from subsequent immunity applications is ‘good in theory but
difficult in practice.’62 There were others who believed that recidivism does not
occur often enough for the Immunity Policy to be prescriptive about it.63
The concept of ‘moral consciousness’ featured prominently in this discussion,
with interviewees being divided as to what role morality should play in policy
development:
Interviewee: It’s an interesting question. It depends on whether you approach it from a
perspective of what you consider is morally right or what you consider is pragmatically
justifiable and you can see the arguments on both sides.64

There were those who felt that ‘we have already walked over that line’ in
terms of the question of morality, and others who felt that ‘recidivists don’t deserve
immunity.’ 65 (Emphasis added). During these discussions, the interviewees were told
of the possibility that cartelists, as primarily sophisticated corporations, may learn to
‘play’ the Immunity Policy once they realise it is possible to apply for immunity a
number of times, for different cartels, without being prevented.
The ACCC recognised this possibility and indicated that there have been
scenarios where corporations, who have been savvy to the policy’s operation, have
deliberately set up cartels with the purpose of driving out their competitors from the
market.66 However, there were those who opposed this contention, stating that other
cartelists would start to become wary of a ‘serial offender’:
Interviewee: I think again like you know, I don’t think you can sort of be a serial offender
and immunity applicants can just sort of move from one cartel to the next and cash your
chips. I think the other cartels are going to start to get a little bit wary. I mean would you join
a club with someone who dobs you in? I don’t know. I don’t know.67

62

Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 17.
Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 27; Interviewee 12 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 27; See
Chapter VI, Recidivism, pg 170.
64
Interviewee 3 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 12.
65
Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 16-17: The most obvious argument against allowing a
recidivist to get immunity twice or more is the utilitarian argument that such an approach encourages
cartel conduct by corporations that are adept at playing the game “Enter cartel, get immunity”.
66
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 'Review of the ACCC Immunity Policy for
Cartel Conduct' (Discussion Paper, ACCC, 2013) 7.
67
Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 12.
63

126

There was much discussion surrounding the difficulties associated with the
definition of recidivism. Many interviewees were concerned as to how recidivism
would be defined if it were ever to form part of the Immunity Policy.68 Their concern
had clear ties to the notion of ‘certainty,’ as it was observed that lawyers, in
particular, would have difficulty advising their client as to whether they would be
ineligible for immunity if the concept of recidivism was poorly drafted or overly
ambiguous in the policy. However, many of these concerns can be alleviated through
careful drafting and the proper exercise of discretion from the ACCC.69
There were also concerns as to how recidivism would be determined by the
ACCC in a large multi-national corporation, where there exists the possibility that a
parent company could be excluded from immunity based on a subsidiary’s
involvement in a cartel in another part of the world.70 There was also the possibility
that a corporation could be excluded from immunity based on recidivism where there
were different individuals controlling the cartel at the time in which the first cartel
offence was committed.71
Most of these concerns were levelled towards the suggestion that excluding a
cartel recidivist from receiving immunity for a second or subsequent time will reduce
the rates of cartel detection, as these recidivists would lose the incentive to report to
the regulator.72 There were also those that believed that other aspects of the policy,
such as the Amnesty Plus regime, would be adversely affected: ‘so if you said, well,
you’re not eligible for immunity for a second cartel if you’ve been in a first cartel,
that would really cramp the style of the Amnesty Plus program.’73
Therefore, whilst there was not an overall consensus as to how the issue of
recidivism should be dealt with, many of the interviewees agreed that recidivists
should have ‘limited options,’ in the sense that their prior involvement should be part
of the assessment of immunity but were against it becoming an automatic
68
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exclusionary provision.74 These interviewees could not elaborate on how this would
be achieved. There was one suggestion that if recidivism were to be implemented
into the policy, then there should not be ‘black and white rules’ but the concept
should be defined fairly generally, leaving the concept open to flexible interpretation.
The precision about the meaning, according to one interviewee, should be developed
through precedent.75
Another observation in the context of this discussion was the cross-over
between cartel recidivism and the ringleader requirement. The ringleader
requirement refers to the exclusion of a cartel member from immunity, who is
believed to have instigated the cartel or operated as the clear leader of the cartel.76
Some interviewees suggested that a recidivist would likely already be excluded from
the Immunity Policy by virtue of the former ringleader requirement.77 There was one
interviewee in particular who asserted that the ‘most simple’ way to deal with the
issue of recidivism would be to expand the definition of the clear leader requirement
to include recidivists:
Interviewee: Now there’s a lot of debate about who’s the clear leader in a cartel but the very
simple solution, and I wouldn’t make a big deal of it in your thesis, I’d just say, you know,
the concept of clear leader should be expanded to include recidivists.78

Another possible solution put forward by one of the interviewees was to
exclude recidivists from immunity but to allow them to be assessed in accordance
with the ACCC’s cooperation policy.79
When the ACCC was questioned about recidivism, it was suggested that the
ACCC is generally reluctant to put up ‘barriers’ for immunity, especially any
proposals that involve automatic exclusion.80 As to whether the ACCC had
experienced cases of recidivism before, there was a suggestion that they have ‘never
seen anything like that.’ However, as discussion progressed, it was also indicated by
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the ACCC that ‘the same applicants have had more than one go.’81 The ACCC’s
current position, according to the representatives, is consistent with the suggestion
that if a cartel recidivist does come forward for immunity, the ACCC ‘wouldn’t say
no.’82

2

Ringleader Exclusion
Prior to the ACCC’s recent review of the Immunity Policy, an immunity

applicant could be excluded from immunity if it could be shown that the applicant
was the ‘clear leader’ of the cartel.83 A majority of the interviewees supported the
removal of the ringleader requirement. For those in favour of removing the
requirement, the most common argument made in support of this was the difficulty
associated with determining who the cartel ringleader is, particularly in a two-party
cartel:
Interviewee: I’d get rid of it. I don’t think it adds anything. Personally I’d get rid of it. I’ve
been in two party cartels but you know it’s pretty hard to sort of work out who the ring leader
is when there’s only two. Even when there is, it’s sort of not real world. People aren’t, there
might be somebody who writes more emails or someone that’s more active but you’re all in
it... Like I just think it’s an unnecessary requirement and in practice that doesn’t work.
Someone might start off as the ringleader and then someone else may assume the captain’s
armband and then it moves through a continuum. I just don’t see it being a useful aspect.84

Consistent with the concept of ‘effectiveness’, many of the interviewees who
supported the removal of the requirement claimed that it was ‘impractical and
unnecessary’85 or that there was no ‘utility’ in keeping it.86 There were those who felt
that they had never been asked in practice about whether their client was, or could
potentially be, the ringleader when applying for immunity or at least it was never
formally investigated.87 Due to the fact that the ringleader question is often never
asked or properly investigated, some interviewees felt that there was no need for it,
81

Ibid 27.
Ibid 28.
83
This requirement has been replaced by the coercion requirement: Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission, above n 27, ss 16(a)(iv), 22 (a)(iv).
84
Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 10.
85
Ibid; Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17.06.2013) 17.
86
Interviewee 5 (Sydney, 25th July 2013) 4.
87
Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17.06.2013) 17; Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 16th April 2013) 10; Interviewee
5 (Sydney, 25th July 2013) 4.
82

129

as it does not serve a function or purpose. This did not hold true for all the
interviewees, as one interviewee in particular indicated that they had been asked the
ringleader question in a two-party cartel and had ‘to give the ACCC satisfaction that
our client wasn’t the ringleader.’88
When questioned about whether the ringleader requirement may serve a
‘moral’ purpose, in terms of excluding a particularly culpable cartel member from
being granted immunity, there was one interviewee who felt that they all cartel
members are ‘essentially equally culpable’89 and therefore maintaining the
requirement will not be serving any ‘moral’ purpose. Another interviewee felt that
even if the requirement does serve a moral purpose, the requirement can also lead to
the maintenance of cartels:
Interviewee: Going back to that moral culpability perspective, there’s a real push back on
maintaining it, I think. I tend to think that hanging onto it can actually keep cartels going
because everybody in the cartel that’s a ringleader will know that they won’t necessarily get
immunity if they go through the door so there’s more trust…
PM: … that’s very true.
Interviewee: Whereas if you didn’t have that scenario then the ring leader could go through
the door at any time and do great harm to its competitors.90

Overall, the general support for the removal of the requirement is consistent
with the fact that the ACCC is reluctant to put up any barriers that may prevent an
applicant applying for immunity.91 As one interviewee suggested, this may be at the
expense of cartel recidivism rates rising.92
For those who opposed the removal of the ringleader requirement, it was felt
that as long as it is not acting as a disincentive to immunity applicants, then there is
no harm in keeping it. There was also one interviewee who opposed the removal of
the requirement on moral grounds:
Interviewee: … if you go back to sort of all the underlying moral issues about someone being
able to escape liability for this sort of conduct, if you’re dealing with a situation where one
participant has sort of bullied or coerced other participants into this illegal arrangement then I
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think morally I would say it’s wrong for that person to be able to obtain full immunity for
what they’ve done.93

One of the interviewees also indicated that even though the ringleader
requirement may not seem to be enforced seriously by the ACCC, there is a
likelihood that the CDPP will take the issue of a ringleader involved in the cartel
applying for immunity more seriously, which could potentially affect the CDPP’s
decision to grant immunity.94
The interviewees were also asked whether a ‘coercion-style’ test, such as that
adopted by the Canadian Competition Bureau or the United Kingdom CMA, would
provide a more suitable alternative to the ringleader requirement.95 From the
responses, there were those who felt that the element of ‘coercion’ was not a
distinguishing element, as cartels are by their very nature consensual.96 Therefore, it
was stated that the coercion test could potentially encounter the same difficulties as
the ringleader requirement and thus is not a suitable alternative.
On the other hand, there were interviewees who felt that the coercion test
would be more useful as long as it identifies the coercer as the ‘driving force in
relation to the conduct.’97 Another interviewee felt that the Canadian influence in this
regard would be positive, and that the ACCC should consider the coercion test in lieu
of the ringleader requirement.98 Overall, there was no general consensus as to
whether coercion is a viable alternative to the ringleader requirement. Despite this
lack of consensus, the coercion test replaced the ringleader requirement in the revised
Immunity Policy.99
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3

Relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP
With the introduction of criminal penalties for cartel conduct at the end of

2009, it become apparent that the cartel enforcement regime in Australia would be
bifurcated: with the ACCC being required to refer to the CDPP in the event of
criminal cartel conduct for the granting of criminal immunity.100 In light of this, the
interviewees were asked about their experience with this new relationship, and the
challenges associated with this bifurcated system.
This issue generated an extensive amount of discussion, and the responses
were diverse and comprehensive. There was a general sense amongst the
interviewees that we must ‘wait and see’ what will happen with this new
relationship, as there is yet to be a criminal cartel trial. It was pointed out that the
relationship between the two agencies is only relatively new and needs adequate time
to develop. The ACCC felt that the relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP
was an important part of their recent review of the Immunity Policy but not the most
important.101
There was a mixture of positive and negative views of this new relationship.
For those who felt positive about the current bifurcated system, one interviewee
stated that they were aware of the major criticisms associated with the current
process of referring criminal immunity to the CDPP. However, the interviewee felt
that in one or two years it will all ‘start to settle down,’ at least when the timing
differences are sorted. The interviewee felt confident in the ‘structural design’ of the
system, and would prefer this current design over the idea of a ‘one-stop’ shop.102
There were others who agreed with this perception, believing the bifurcated system
to be an ‘efficient allocation of resources.’103
The former Chairman of the ACCC, Graeme Samuel, felt that the relationship
between the two organisations has always been ‘really good’ from his experience as
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Chairman. According to Samuel, the different enforcement culture of the CDPP had
‘never been a problem’ and that it would be a ‘rare case where the (CDPP) would act
contrary to the ACCC in relation to immunity.’104 He also believes that the ACCC
has had sufficient time to prepare for the introduction of criminal immunity and to
start working with the CDPP in relation to criminal evidence gathering and
investigation. According to Samuel, by the time the legislation was implemented ‘we
were ready to go.’105 Despite these comments, over five years has passed without a
criminal cartel case.
There were also compelling negative views of the current relationship, one of
the key issues related to the ‘sufficiency of information’ required for the granting of
criminal immunity. One of the strongest arguments in this context was that the CDPP
requires more information than the ACCC in order to assess and grant a proffer, as
the CDPP is ‘coming from an enforcement perspective.’106 The CDPP may not be
satisfied with the information outlined in the proffer and generally requires more
specific information than the ACCC in this respect.
One interviewee provided an example in support, where it was stated that for
a proffer to be granted by the ACCC, the ACCC generally requests the names of
individuals involved in the company, including current and former employees.
However, where the CDPP is required to assess this information in order to grant
criminal immunity, this initial general information is not sufficiently comprehensive
or specific for the CDPP to carry out their assessment. For instance, the CDPP would
additionally need to know ‘who they are, over what period and what did they do.’107
The ACCC also acknowledged that the CDPP may require more information in this
context.
Many of the interviewees had also experienced significant delays of ‘many
months’108 whilst awaiting the CDPP’s decision regarding criminal immunity, with
back and forth discussions taking place between the ACCC and the CDPP during this
deliberation process. Some of the interviewees believed this delay was the direct
result of the ‘sufficiency of information’ issue.
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The interviewees acknowledged the inherent difficulties associated with the
bifurcated design, where on the one hand the CDPP requires more information
initially in order to grant criminal immunity, and on the other, the immunity
applicant being reluctant to cooperate and provide that information until such time as
criminal immunity is granted, as the CDPP ‘is protective of its discretion.’109
During this time, some of the interviewees were concerned that the delay may
adversely impact upon the investigation:
Interviewee: So in that period, if there’s a delay of a month, 2 months, 6 months, a year, that
investigation is basically stalled for that period. Meanwhile, in other countries, it’s
proceeding at different paces, things are becoming public, targets of the investigation are
becoming aware, people are leaving employment, natural processes of email hygiene are
occurring, all that’s happening, so it’s bad for the investigation to be stalled.110

When questioned about this difficulty, the ACCC acknowledged that this
delay does create a considerable degree of uncertainty.111 Some of the interviewees
also pointed to the risk that the CDPP may not accept the ACCC’s recommendation
for immunity, which can create an additional level of uncertainty for potential
immunity applicants.112 Another interviewee confirmed that sufficiency of
information was a ‘significant’ issue but believed that the issue of more importance
was the lack of information surrounding the criteria used by the ACCC in order to
determine whether they will seek criminal immunity with the CDPP.113
When prompted for an explanation to explain the delay, there was one
suggestion that CDPP personnel may not have the ‘experience to really understand
cartel matters.’114 This would be due to the fact that the CDPP has never prosecuted
cartel conduct before, and therefore does not have the requisite experience to
understand the nature of a proffer, and the role of upfront immunity in this context.
Differences in the enforcement agenda and priorities between the ACCC and
the CDPP were thought by some interviewees to contribute to the delay. On the one
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hand, the ACCC views cartel conduct as a very serious crime, as opposed to the
CDPP, who has extensive and varied priorities, along with stretched resources and
man power that results in a ‘we’ll get around to it attitude.’115 Other interviewees
agreed that the notion of granting criminal immunity ‘upfront’ is antithetical to the
traditional enforcement strategies of the CDPP, as the granting of immunity has
traditionally been used by the CDPP as a ‘last card’ strategy. At the time of
interview, the ACCC itself could not provide an explanation regarding the delay.116
There was a general consensus amongst the interviewees that the process of
granting criminal immunity needs to be carried out by the CDPP in a more timely
fashion in order to reduce the uncertainty associated with the delay. Many of the
interviewees were not able to offer constructive solutions as to how this delay could
be reduced, except to put it down to the CDPP’s current lack of experience.
A unique solution put forward by one interviewee was the suggestion that an
immunity applicant should be able to directly liaise with the CDPP in the
determination of granting criminal immunity. The interviewee was concerned that
the information exchanged between the immunity applicants, the ACCC and the
CDPP could otherwise become ‘lost in translation.’117 The interviewee felt that it was
in the interests of ‘natural justice’ that the immunity applicant be able to make
representations to the decision maker (the CDPP), particularly because this is a
common practice in all other areas in which a decision maker has the ability to affect
an individual’s interest:
Interviewee: If you look at any other area of decision-making on the part of a State or
Commonwealth authority, if the decision maker has the ability to affect your interest as an
individual, as a citizen, you have the ability to make representations to that decision maker
before they make a decision or if a decision has been made which is adverse to your interests,
you have a right of appeal.118

The interviewee believes that if the CDPP has the capacity to sue the
immunity applicant directly, then this should be met with the opportunity for the
immunity applicant to make representations to the CDPP directly. Moreover, the
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interviewee was critical of the fact that there is currently no right of appeal for an
immunity applicant if an adverse criminal immunity decision is made. The
interviewee did not wish the bifurcated system to be changed, in that the ACCC
should still refer the granting of criminal immunity to the CDPP, however, it was
asserted that as soon as the decision is referred, this should open a direct line of
communication between the CDPP and the immunity applicant.119
4

Revocation of Immunity
Pursuant to the Immunity Policy, if an immunity holder breaches one of the

conditions stipulated in the policy, the ACCC or the CDPP have the right to revoke
immunity.120 It is not indicated in the policy what process of review an immunity
applicant should take in the event the applicant wishes to appeal the ACCC’s or
CDPP’s final revocation decision.121 Presumably, an applicant would seek judicial
review of the ACCC’s and/or the CDPP’s decision in the first instance, through the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’), or seek an
action for breach of contract, or merits review through the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal.122 The interviewees were questioned about this issue of revocation and the
possible avenues for appeal.
Many of the interviewees had experienced instances in which revocation had
been threatened.123 One interviewee could envisage a number of situations where the
issue of revocation may be prevalent:
Interviewee: One is that the immunity holder just becomes fatigued by the process, so I think
the regulator has to be mindful that they can approach this pragmatically to ensure they get
what they need. The second is that the immunity holder likely, they could be sold, they could
be taken over and there’s not the appetite on the enquirer to carry on with it. You know these
things come up in due diligence processes before a manager. That’s a possibility.124
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Although a number of interviewees may have been aware of or experienced
instances of threatened revocation, it is important to note that revocation has never
occurred in the experience of the interviewees.125 One of the interviewees found it
particularly difficult to comment on this issue, as they had trust and confidence in the
regulator to not make hasty or irrational decisions. It was the interviewees’ belief that
the client should be aware of all of their rights and obligations under the policy and it
would need to be particularly egregious conduct to warrant revocation.126
Whilst many of the interviewees recognised the potential for revocation to
occur, the main concern was that there was no clear process stipulated in the policy
with regards to dispute resolution or a formal appeal process.127 As one interviewee
stated: ‘I think the broader question is not whether or not it allows for dispute
resolution but the question of whether there’s any scope for an immunity applicant to
seek reviewed decisions by way of judicial review, which there doesn’t appear to
be.’128
Many of the interviewees speculated as to what may occur in the event that
an immunity applicant sought to appeal an immunity decision made by the ACCC
but none were able to provide a definite or clear response, particularly as to whether
the decision could be reviewed by a court.129 One interviewee believed it would be
‘interesting’ to see what would come from a review pursuant to the ADJR Act.130 In
light of these vague and varied speculations, there was a general consensus that if a
provision were inserted into the policy that outlined the process of dispute resolution
or appeal in the event of revocation, that this would increase certainty for potential
immunity applicants.131
Given that revocation of immunity has not yet occurred in Australia, the legal
character of the policy has not been formally tested in the Australian court system:
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Interviewee: No, I don’t think so. It is discretionary. It’s an administrative policy; it has no force
of law. It’s a prosecution discretion whether to grant or not grant and it’s a prosecution discretion
whether to withdraw it or not, so it’s not really enforceable in a sense, it’s just a policy,
prosecution policy. So it’s not a contract. It’s not a legislative instrument so what its character is
has never been tested in Australia actually.132

This does much to explain why there is such uncertainty about the dispute
resolution process and the reviewability of ACCC decisions within this context. This
issue brought into question whether the Immunity Policy should be legislated during
discussions with one interviewee.133 Although legislating the policy in itself would
not resolve the question of what rights or processes of appeal are available, it may
strengthen the possibility of review pursuant to the ADJR Act or provide a platform
for a designated dispute resolution body to be stipulated. The interviewee thought
that legislating the Policy would be ‘very difficult’ politically, as such proposals have
been suggested in other areas of competition law, for example merger review, and
have not been successful.134

C
1

The Tension between Public and Private Enforcement – Confidentiality and
Third Parties
Confidentiality
As part of the process of applying for immunity, an immunity applicant will

provide evidence, in the form of written statements, witness accounts and various
forms of documentation of the conduct to the ACCC, in order to fulfil their ongoing
disclosure requirements under the policy and to aid in the prosecution of the other
cartel members. As a result of these proceedings, the immunity applicant is exposed
to third party litigation, as the applicant has admitted to being involved in cartel
activity. In order to commence proceedings against the immunity applicant, a person
or corporation who has been adversely affected by the cartel’s operation will need
evidence to support their case for civil damages.
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Given the covert nature of cartels, the primary source of evidence to support
the third party litigant’s claim is the immunity applicant’s evidence. The third party
litigant will need access to this evidence and will seek to obtain it from the ACCC. In
2010, the legislature enacted specific provisions that deal with the confidentiality of
cartel information, in s 157 and related provisions of the Competition and Consumer
Act 2010 (Cth) (The ‘Protected Cartel Information’ or ‘PCI’ regime). The PCI
regime invests the ACCC with broad discretionary powers to prevent the disclosure
of immunity information. It outlines a system by which third parties can seek
information from an immunity applicant through the ACCC. The interviewees were
questioned about their opinions in relation to the current system of granting access to
immunity evidence and related confidentiality issues.135
Some of the interviewees believed that confidentiality, in the context of cartel
immunity, was a particularly interesting and significant issue that strikes at the core
of

almost
136

policy.

all

of

the

issues

associated

with

the

This opinion was not shared by all, as one interviewee felt that the

emphasis placed on the importance of confidentiality was overstated, and that other
considerations, such as transparency of the ACCC, should trump it.137 There was a
general consensus that the disclosure of immunised information was a very delicate
issue and requires a careful balancing exercise.138
Those who were against the disclosure of immunised information to third
parties felt that the roles of public and private enforcement should be kept separate;
and that the aims of public enforcement should not ‘deliberately frustrate the
availability of private enforcement.’139 There was a sense that a public regulator
should not facilitate private enforcement claims because it will act as a disincentive
to future immunity applicants. As one interviewee described the issue, ‘you’re happy
to stick your head in one noose but not two.’140
In stark contrast to this opinion was the view that whilst the ACCC has the
power to initiate proceedings on behalf of a whole range of people who have suffered
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loss, it will not initiate these proceedings in the context of cartel conduct. One
interviewee expressed this view: ‘I actually find it quite offensive that basically the
regulator is being used as a cloak in the sense that this confidentiality regime, of
which the regulator is an intrinsic part, is assisting a cartel from being sued
subsequently.’141 Even if the ACCC does not initiate proceedings on behalf of those
who have suffered loss as a result of the cartel, this interviewee strongly felt it was
‘repugnant that the ACCC might have a folder of critical information in its
possession that a private litigant can’t use.’142 When the ACCC was questioned about
this response and the fact that their role as the ACCC is also for the protection of
consumers, the ACCC felt that the policy’s effectiveness outweighed the concerns
about access to immunised information for affected third parties:
PM: As the ACCC though, you’re walking a very fine line because your role, your aim as an
organisation is for the protection of consumers and then essentially it’s you guys that block
the information as well to the so-called, you know, consumers you’re supposed to protect.
ACCC 1: So, I as an officer of the ACCC…I think, you know, the immunity policy is
effective because of certain things and applicants need to have confidence in the policy so
that they can come in and disclose things with us and I think our view is…
ACCC 2: They need certainty.
ACCC 1: Yeah.143

Many of the interviewees agreed with these arguments about certainty, stating
that certainty should take precedence over access to information for third party
litigants. One interviewee declared that they did not have much sympathy for private
litigants in this context; that the private litigants, and presumably those acting for
them, should ‘work just as hard as any other litigator’ and that they don’t need a ‘free
leg up.’144 In response to this comment, the interviewee was asked whether the
ACCC ‘got a free leg up’ and the interviewee replied that they did, but the immunity
regime is a ‘different scheme’ with ‘different objectives.’145
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Some interviewees felt that third parties will have access to the information
that is made publicly available as a result of the proceedings initiated on the basis of
the immunised information, such as ‘the benefit of the findings and the agreed
statement of facts.’146 The interviewee asserted that this publicly available
information would be enough to initiate proceedings against cartel members, and on
this basis the current system strikes the appropriate balance. It was also suggested
that there are other ‘practical, forensic ways of getting information’ to aid third party
actions, although these methods were never elaborated upon.147
Other interviewees were concerned that greater access to immunised
information by third parties would act as a disincentive to future immunity applicants
and result in an overall reduction of immunity applications, ‘if they can’t move on
because they’re having to do all these other things I think it’s just another thing to
say, oh we might just take our chances.’148 This disincentive is much greater where
the damages paid in third party actions far exceed the penalty imposed, which is
‘probably the biggest disincentive for people to go in.’149
When asked about the current operation of the PCI scheme, the ACCC stated
that the disclosure of immunised information is a decision that ultimately rests with
the court, where the court will carry out a careful balancing exercise. The provision
relating to the ‘interests of justice’ was discussed, and it was felt that this factor is
likely to be interpreted quite broadly by the courts, which would result in the
granting of disclosure in more cases.150 The ACCC was unable to provide a definite
view on this point.
The former Chairman of the ACCC, Graeme Samuel, reflected upon the time
where the ACCC had to take an ‘extraordinary position’ in siding with Visy151 in the
resulting third party proceedings, in opposing the disclosure of immunised evidence.
The former Chairman was personally uncomfortable with this decision, as his
philosophical view was that ‘I would bend over backwards to facilitate a third party
action’ but he had to be mindful about setting a precedent for future cartel cases, ‘if
146
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we’d given up that quickly it would have then been a sign in future cartel
prosecutions to witnesses, be very careful of what you say because the evidence will
be given up by the ACCC to third parties.’152
On the other hand, there were many interviewees who felt positively towards
allowing third parties access to immunised information but acknowledged that this
was a ‘very significant challenge.’153 There was one interviewee that felt that these
challenges were attributed to the fact that the ACCC is not a ‘leader’ in this area, in
terms of being open to critical discussion about the issues associated with disclosure,
in contrast to the United States and the European Union.154 In the interviewee’s view
these challenges were exacerbated by the fact that in Australia there is no active
plaintiff bar, only ‘one law firm’ that can potentially initiate proceedings on behalf of
those who have suffered loss as a result of the cartel.155 Other interviewees felt that
the private enforcement landscape was changing and that in the next 10 years or so,
there will be a greater and more active plaintiff bar in Australia.156
When questioned about the current operation of the PCI scheme, there were
many interviewees who felt that the scheme tips in favour of non-disclosure of
immunised information and that it had ‘gone too far in protecting the cartel
member.’157 One interesting observation in this context was the suggestion that those
who are in favour of non-disclosure should be mindful that the ‘shoe may be on the
other foot someday’ and that they may one day find themselves attempting to gain
access to immunised information.158
One of the strongest arguments used by those who support non-disclosure
was that it will create a significant disincentive for future immunity applicants, which
will result in reduced detection of cartel conduct by means of reduced immunity
applications. However, there were many interviewees who plainly did not agree with
this argument and felt that the disclosure of immunised information is not likely to
adversely affect immunity applications at all. The primary reason for this is that the
information is likely to become accessible anyway:
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Interviewee: I think the whole argument about exposure to private enforcement and its
capacity to deter or disincentify immunity applications is vastly overstated. There is no
evidence to support it in the United States because, well there may be several reasons for that
but one would be that the severity of the public sanctions are such that there’s just very little
prospect of an immunity applicant deciding to face the spectre of criminal fines and goal time
in order to limit exposure to private follow on actions.159

Further to this, was the belief that the cartel participants are likely to be aware
that the information they provide to the ACCC will eventually surface and thus this
factor ‘does not weigh heavily in the balance’ when deciding whether to come
forward for immunity.160 As one interviewee put it, the follow-on actions are the
‘price you pay for the immunity prize.’161
The interviewees were also questioned about the criminal discovery
provisions in the Federal Court Act of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Part III, Subdivision
C. These provisions allow a court to override the PCI scheme in a criminal
proceeding through the granting of criminal discovery.162 One interviewee
acknowledged that the PCI scheme has no effect in criminal proceedings but
indicated that we must have faith and confidence in the judiciary to make the right
decision regarding disclosure, particularly because ‘the stakes are much higher.’163 In
this way, it was implied that the interviewee had full confidence that the court will
make the appropriate decision regarding disclosure in the context of criminal
proceedings.
When asked about the potential impact these criminal discovery provisions
could have on the Immunity Policy, the ACCC were not able to provide an answer at
the time of interview. Instead it was suggested that the criminal discovery provisions
should form part of a written submission in response to the ACCC’s call to revise the
policy.164 Instead, the ACCC emphasised its commitment to ensuring the
effectiveness of the Policy with the aim of encouraging people to ‘run through the
door’ for immunity; ‘it’s not like we are rewarding someone because they’ve been
159
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caught. We’re trading off their immunity for being able to take action and to detect
and to deter.’165

2

Restitution to Third Parties
A provision requiring that cartel immunity applicants make restitution to

parties affected by the cartel previously existed in the Immunity Policy. The first
version of the ACCC Immunity Policy in 2003 required that 'where possible' [the
corporation] will make restitution to injured parties.'166 In August 2005, the ACCC
removed this requirement for restitution and set out its reasons for its removal in its
discussion paper.167 There is no requirement for corporations to pay restitution under
the current Policy. The interviewees were questioned as to whether the requirement
for restitution should be re-introduced, meaning that immunity applicants would need
to compensate those who were affected by the cartel as a condition of their
immunity.
Although many of the interviewees classed the issue of reintroducing
restitution as an ‘interesting question’, there was an overall majority opinion that the
provision should not be reintroduced, and these opinions were generally shared by
those who act in favour of immunity applicants. In particular, there was one
passionate interviewee who responded to the proposition with a straight out ‘No!’
and simply requested the next interview question.168 These discussions surrounding
restitution called into question the role of public and private enforcement, as one
interviewee put it: ‘Is the role of the public enforcer to compensate victims or cause
the compensation to victims or is it to promote specific and general deterrents? And
so what is the purpose of public enforcement?’169
Some of the interviewees were of the strong belief that the aims of public and
private enforcement should be kept separate, as ‘we do not need a regulator meddling
in private rights of compensation.’170 Instead, these interviewees felt that the ACCC
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should focus on prosecuting offenders and recovering fines instead of ‘bothering’
with compensation, as there is no need to ‘muddy the waters’.171 In the interviewees
opinion, if maximising the prospects of public enforcement comes at a cost to private
enforcement then it is a ‘fair trade in the overall balance.’172
The primary argument against the reintroduction of the restitution
requirement related to the difficulty in calculating the restitution amount. Given the
complexities involved in determining resultant economic loss, many of the
interviewees felt that it would be extremely difficult to determine key questions, such
as where the loss lies and who will distribute it.173 The former Chairman of the
ACCC, Graeme Samuel, stated that these difficulties were one of the main reasons
the ACCC decided to abolish the requirement.174
Many interviewees thus felt that the reintroduction of restitution would act as
a significant disincentive to future immunity applications. In the words of one
interviewee:
Interviewee: I think where I sort of land on… is it would be a significant disincentive to use
the policy if it had a restitution element which as insisted upon rather than, you know, one
that’s there but never used. It would be hard for, quite hard for our clients to sort of make an
upfront determination of a damages amount and agree to pay that. It might be regarded as a
dollars and cents matter, you know, what’s the fine going to be? What’s the restitution going
to be? Calculate. OK. Calculate. No.175

In response to these arguments, the interviewees were asked whether they
believed it was possible for restitution to be calculated in the same way that damages
are in complex scenarios. One interviewee believed that this was not possible due to
the inexact nature of the conduct stating that ‘you could not draw any immediate
equals between penalties and damages… damages are purely there, I mean
punishment obviously is deterrence but the regime is very different to the civil
regime which is to compensate people.’176
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In contrast, a minority of interviewees felt that these arguments against the
restitution requirement were tenuous and that framing the issue in terms of whether
or not the ACCC should have a condition of restitution in the immunity is too
simplistic an approach.177 It was suggested that there are other ways that the ACCC
could facilitate private enforcement without the introduction of the restitution
requirement.
One of the primary ways this could be achieved would be through the
introduction of a condition in the Immunity Policy that requires applicants to provide
affected third parties with information to help with quantifying their loss.178 The
interviewee felt that any claims that this information condition would create a
disincentive to future immunity applicants would need to be tested. Other
interviewees believed that introducing a condition that required the immunity
applicant’s cooperation with third parties would be ‘very difficult in practice.’179

3

Derivative Immunity for Employees
Pursuant to the Immunity Policy, if a corporation qualifies for conditional

immunity, it may seek derivative immunity for related corporate entities and/or for
current and former directors, officers and employees of the corporation who were
involved in the cartel conduct, if the corporation provides a list of those who require
protection to the ACCC.180 In this context, the interviewees were asked whether
employees, who may not have any knowledge of the cartel’s operation, are advised
of their rights and obligations in relation to the ACCC’s investigation and who has
the responsibility to advise them. Secondly, the interviewees were asked about the
protections afforded to the employees, or former employees, who may have been
deliberately omitted from the derivative immunity application by the corporation.
Some of the interviewees felt that the issue of derivative immunity was a ‘complex
issue’181 that was not well understood in the community.182
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In response to the first question, there was a general consensus amongst the
interviewees that employees should be advised of their rights and obligations, but
there were mixed responses as to who should advise them of this.183 One interviewee
stated that all employees should get individual legal representation at their own
expense in order to understand the nature of their rights and obligations under
derivative immunity.184
Another suggested that the corporation should be required to pay for the
employee’s representation. The interviewee believed that the cooperation of
employees is paramount to the corporate immunity applicant because the employees
may possess crucial information related to the ACCC’s investigation. The
interviewee felt that only if an employee was just ‘so rotten’ that you would ‘send
them off to get independent legal advice.’185 However, another interviewee was of
the opinion that legislation186 prevents a company from indemnifying an employee
from costs in this scenario.187 This interviewee also agreed that employees should be
immediately informed of their rights and obligations but indicated that the fact that
employees may require separate legal representation needed to be ‘observed in the
policy.’188
Representatives of the ACCC indicated that it was not the ACCC’s
responsibility to ensure that employees were advised accordingly and that there was
also no requirement or obligation on the corporation’s behalf to ensure it happens; it
is ‘left to the company to deal with.’189
In relation to the second issue, many of the interviewees acknowledged that
there was a possibility that employees, particularly former employees, could be
deliberately left off the immunity application and therefore not covered by derivative
immunity. However, there was a general sense that in practice this does not often
happen and at the very least, the Immunity Policy could be articulated with a ‘bit
more precision’ as to what the ACCC would do in this situation.190
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There were other interviewees who could not envisage a situation where a
company would deliberately omit someone from derivative immunity but believed
this situation is more likely to occur in relation to former employees.191 In fact, the
interviewee was aware of cases where former employees had been left off the
immunity application but have been extended derivative immunity by the ACCC and
felt this scenario was an ‘appropriate’ response.192
When questioned about the possibility of companies deliberately omitting
individuals from applications, the ACCC responded by emphasising the inherent
flexibility of the policy.193 In practice if someone is omitted from the Policy, and the
company realises this, they have the opportunity to rectify the immunity application
and include those employee/s initially omitted. The ACCC believes that an important
part of the policy is that it is designed to create tension between corporations and
individuals, as well as corporation against corporations, and the current policy
accommodates these aims. If an employee is deliberately omitted from the immunity
application, the ACCC stated that it would determine each situation on a case by case
basis and potentially inform that individual of the cooperation policy, where it was
said that it was possible for that individual to be granted full immunity.194
However, many of the interviewees found it difficult to comment on the more
complicated situation where a particularly culpable individual could be ‘carved out’
of an immunity policy, as is the practice in the United States:
Interviewee: … it’s a tough one because you then get into a question about who is, you
know, a particularly, you know, heinous employee and it really, it complicates and I don’t
think we’ve ever gone to that. We don’t go to that level of sophistication in the policy itself
but it might well occur as a matter of practice.195

Therefore, it was clear that the cooperation policy could be extended by the
ACCC to an employee who was deliberately left off the immunity application. In this
case it is unlikely that the employee would be granted immunity. It was not clear
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whether the CDPP could extend immunity to an employee who had been deliberately
omitted from the application or whether immunity or leniency could be granted
pursuant to the Prosecution Policy in this situation.196 The ACCC were unable to
offer any further comment on this issue at the time of interview.
One interviewee felt that the concept of derivative immunity should be taken
further and that it should run both ways, in the form of ‘vicarious immunity.’197 On
this suggestion, if an employee goes forward to the ACCC to apply for immunity, the
corporation should also be granted immunity. The interviewee believed that it is
inconsistent that currently an employee can ‘sort of break ranks’ with the company
and go forward to the ACCC for immunity and that individual can be granted
immunity but the company will be prosecuted.198
In support of this idea, the interviewee stated: ‘It seems to me an odd result
because if the company were to engage in a cartel it might use that same person and
that’s it only involvement with the cartel is that one employee.’199 According to the
interviewee, a company is vicariously liable for an employee’s action when they
have breached the law, but this is inconsistent with the situation where an employee
confesses its participation in a cartel and ‘somehow its precarious relationship with
the employee’s severed and the company doesn’t benefit from vicarious
[immunity].’200
When this idea was put to other interviewees, one interviewee in particular was
against it. It was the interviewee’s belief that if an employee ‘goes running’ to the
ACCC without the cooperation or awareness of the company then this reflects poorly
on the corporation and its culture and that is just ‘tough for the corporation.’201
Instead it would be in everyone’s best interest for the employee to go and liaise with
the company before applying for immunity as an individual but if not, and then the
corporation should have sought immunity first.202
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D

1

Alternatives to the Immunity Policy

Cartel Whistleblower Protection
This issue was one of the most significant and controversial areas of

discussion within the interviews. The interviewees were asked whether cartel
whistleblower protections should be introduced for those individuals who may have
been unfairly treated or dismissed as a result of revealing unlawful cartel conduct to
the ACCC, similar to that proposed in the United States.203 The interviewees opinions
were divided on this issue and various reasons were offered in support of their
positions.
For those who supported the introduction of cartel specific whistleblower
provisions, these interviewees believed that encouraging employees to reveal
unlawful conduct to the authorities is an important component of an enforcement
strategy, and is an inherently more reliable strategy than the Immunity Policy,
according to one interviewee.204 When prompted for a reason as to why these
whistle-blower provisions have not yet been introduced, the interviewee was of the
opinion that the provisions are not in the interests of large corporations, thus there is
a lack of support for these types of protections. The interviewee felt this was
attributed to the larger issue of lack of organisational transparency.205
There were others that agreed with the important role that whistleblower
protections could play in Australia, as individuals ‘shouldn’t be penalised as an
employee if you did go forward and report a crime if it’s a crime.’206 However, there
were some interviewees who believed that there is a cultural resistance to the notion
of a whistleblower, as it is another form of ‘dobbing on one’s mate’. In spite of this,
one interviewee felt that this cultural resistance could be overcome in time, as these
protections ‘are necessary and will progressively be accepted because now we’re
talking about crimes I don’t think there’s any alternative available to a
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corporation.’207 Another interviewee felt that the introduction of cartel specific
whistleblowing protections ‘makes sense’ but such provisions need to be
‘appropriately balanced’ to avoid vexatious or false claims.208
Some interviewees made the distinction between two types of whistleblowers: those who have been involved in the cartel conduct and those who have not.
It was generally accepted that individuals who have not been involved in the cartel
but have simply come across the conduct need to be ‘protected and looked after and
the court needs to make sure that they’re not vilified and their employment
terminated and so forth.’209 On the other hand, for those who have been involved in
the conduct, it would be a much ‘more difficult question’ as to whether the court
would reinstate that particular individual. It would be highly dependent upon the
circumstances of each case and the degree of harm that has occurred and one
interviewee believed that the court would not sanction that.210
The ACCC representatives were asked whether they would consider
supporting cartel specific whistleblower protections. They responded that they were
open to the possibility of ‘increasing different ways that we can uncover cartels’ and
‘it’s definitely something that we’d look at.’211 Again, the ACCC invited this issue to
be submitted in a discussion paper for consideration by the ACCC in its revision of
the Immunity Policy and indicated that this issue could not be discussed any further.
Despite the ACCC’s indication of interest in these provisions, there was no
discussion of whistleblower protections in the ACCC’s recent review of the Policy,
including the discussion paper, draft policies or the most recent revision of the
Immunity Policy.212
One of the primary arguments made against the introduction of
whistleblower protections was that the current system available for unfair dismissal
and unfair treatment are already sufficient at providing redress, as there is a
‘perfectly adequate current system that provides opportunities for individuals to
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come forward.’213 Those who shared this view were sceptical that there would in fact
be any individuals who were aware and had knowledge of the conduct without being
involved. There was further scepticism of the actual need for additional protections
above that of ‘witness and citizen’s’ protections and ‘our human resource laws.’214
One interviewee went as far as to suggest that it is not ‘like dobbing in the Hell’s
angels’ and in the context of cartel conduct, the interviewee did not think that
whistleblowers need much in the way of protection.215
Those against the introduction of whistleblower protection provisions felt that
it would simply complicate the current system where the anti-discrimination laws are
operating adequately.216 Some interviewees felt that these provisions would need to
be carefully drafted to ensure that the scope of complaint is limited if they were ever
introduced.217 One interviewee was of the opinion that the only available remedy for
these whistleblowers should be reinstatement, as the provision for damages may lead
to false and vexatious claims by employees who have been dismissed for other
reasons, aside from their knowledge of the cartel.218
Due to the risk of false and vexatious claims, one interviewee felt that the
potential for abuse of these provisions was so high that it should prevent the
introduction of cartel specific whistleblower protections altogether.219 This
interviewee felt that the Immunity Policy is currently effective at encouraging people
to reveal cartel conduct and that individuals, especially former employees, should not
be allowed to ‘have a crack’ at the former employer in any event.220

2

Cartel Informant System

In addition to whistleblower protection provisions, interviewees were asked whether
a cartel informant system should be introduced in Australia. This system offers
monetary rewards for those who have cartel information to come forward and reveal
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that information to the competition authority. This idea is currently being
experimented in the United Kingdom, South Korea and Hungary.221 Along with
cartel recidivism and the whistleblower protections, the discussion surrounding a
cartel informant system ranked as one of the most significant and divisive issues.
Those in favour of the introduction of such a system believed that positive
rewards should be given for pertinent information. This idea, according to one
interviewee, made ‘a lot more sense’ then ‘than just relying on people to figure that
they might get in trouble and that squealing on themselves and their colleagues will
prevent them from getting into trouble.’222 Many interviewees in favour of the
informant system believed this should only be extended to those who were not
directly involved in the cartel and this was primarily for ‘moral reasons’.223
One interviewee acknowledged that the concept of a paid informant system
was derived from American approaches and was supported in the literature.224
However, there was concern that this system may not ‘sit well’ with Australian
culture, in the same way that the Immunity Policy does not. In response to this, one
interviewee did make the point of stating that a cartel informant system would be
more ethical then the granting of immunity to ‘somebody who could have been really
seriously involved (who) gets off Scot free.’225 The interviewee felt that any cultural
resistance to this idea is likely to be gradually accepted and that a cartel informant
system may be a necessary component of an anti-cartel enforcement regime. The
interviewee believed this even though they personally felt that such a system should
not be necessary.226
One of the strongest arguments made in this context was that cartel informant
systems are a commonly accepted practice in other forms of police work and
criminal activity and that there is no clear reason that cartels should be treated any
differently:
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Interviewee: Well, look, the police give rewards in all sorts of situations, as you know,
missing persons or murders, the police offer rewards and rewards have been around for as
long as I can remember, hundreds, maybe not hundreds of years but certainly a long time and
it’s been a very common practice in many jurisdictions to offer rewards for information and I
don’t see really why this should be treated any differently. And in America they have,
whistleblowers are paid 10 per cent of the compensation, which is recovered. There was an
extraordinary case just by the by I think a couple of years ago where I think an individual
came forward to the Department of Justice in the United States and gave them enough
information whereby they were able to uncover a serious fraud involving hundreds and
hundreds of millions of dollars, in fact it may have been in the billions, and this person who
was, to some extent, involved and had knowledge of it received 10 per cent of the total. So he
walked away with about $150 million this fellow.227

The interviewee acknowledged the potential for misuse of such a system through
false or exaggerated claims but felt that appropriate caveats could be placed within
the system to ensure that these are complied with before any money is paid. It was
stated that such potential misuse was no different to the problems associated with the
Immunity Policy.228 There was a general feeling shared by those in favour of such a
system, that now that cartel conduct is a crime, then it is more acceptable to
introduce policies, such as a cartel informant system.229
The ACCC was questioned about the possibility of introducing such a system,
and again it was requested that this issue be written in a submission and submitted to
the ACCC. Once again this issue did not appear in any of the subsequent discussion
papers or the revised Immunity Policy.230 The ACCC did say that the idea of a cartel
informant system was something that had been ‘thrown about’ in discussion but
nothing has been finalised.231
Many of the interviewees, who were against introducing a cartel informant
system, had first reactions relating to their ‘gut instincts’ and appeared to be against
the idea on the basis of moral or ethical reasons. One interviewee stated: ‘I don’t
believe in paying whistleblowers even in tax. My gut reaction is against it in any
field.’232 Many interviewees even felt these ‘instinctive’ feelings towards to notion of
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paying people who have not been involved in the cartel, as they believed there was a
risk of ‘distorting motivations’ as ‘I think you start to distort motivations and you
know, positive rewarding rather than not punishing I think you start to qualitatively
get into a different arena there….’233 There was a sense that the introduction of a
cartel informant system is overstepping the mark and that is ‘not where we should
go.’234
The strongest argument put forward by those who were against the system was
concerned with credibility. There was a suggestion that there is already sufficient
incentive provided for people to come forward and reveal their misconduct, such as
the prospect of gaol, and that those who are not involved should simply be ‘good
Samaritans’:
Interviewee: (It) encourages exaggerated and overblown claims, allegations and I suppose
people should be more abiding anyway when it happens.
PM: … the idea of a Good Samaritan?
Interviewee: Mmm.235

There was much scepticism about the quality of evidence that a person will give
in exchange for payment, given the unlikeliness that someone with valuable
information in relation to a cartel’s operation would not have actually been involved
in the cartel themselves.236 Furthermore, some interviewees argued that there is no
demonstrated need for such a system to be introduced, as there have already been a
number of cases where people, such as suppliers, have come forward and revealed
cartel conduct because they have felt aggrieved. In these situations, there has been no
need to pay these people to come forward and thus there is no real need for an
additional system to be put in place:
Interviewee: We’ve never had a problem, again it’s this whole problem of 1 out of 7, but we
never had a problem with suppliers who felt that they’ve been ripped off coming in when
they thought they had some evidence, coming and telling us about it because they felt
aggrieved. We didn’t have to pay them. I think it just introduces sort of a notion of, I don’t
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know how to describe it but look, you know, you can hear my instinctive reaction which is
that it’s going too far and if you say that giving immunity some people think it’s gone too far
because it is freeing people from prosecution who engaged in the activity, then paying people
to do it goes even further.237

3

The ACCC Cooperation Policy

As part of the anti-cartel enforcement regime, applicants who do not qualify for
immunity will be dealt with by the ACCC pursuant to the Cooperation Policy.238 This
policy sets out the conditions that will need to be fulfilled in order to secure a
cooperation agreement, which can result in reduced penalties for those who
cooperate with the ACCC. This policy only applies for civil breaches.239 Criminal
cooperation is dealt with by the CDPP separately, pursuant to the Prosecution
Policy.240 The Cooperation Policy received more attention by the interviewees then
was anticipated. The responses were varied but centred upon the notions of certainty
versus flexibility in the ACCC’s calculation of the penalty. The ACCC cannot
ultimately decide the penalty, as this is a decision made by the court.241 Recent court
decisions have overturned this position, which will impact upon the way the penalty
was previously assessed.242 The interviewees were asked of their opinions in relation
to cooperation prior to these cases and therefore their opinions reflect the position at
the time of the interviews.
As a result of the policy’s operation, one interviewee stated that there can be
a number of different outcomes for any given scenario in relation to cooperation and
this largely depends upon the quality of evidence provided.243 The interviewee had
experienced situations where an applicant has made it difficult for the ACCC to
obtain information because they were not the first or second in. However, it was felt
that the ACCC was ‘generally good’ at determining what they are willing to offer in
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exchange for cooperation. One interviewee reflected upon a positive experience in
dealing with the ACCC: ‘[the] ACCC’s pretty good at giving recognition to
cooperation and the court’s pretty good at accepting it, so I think the system’s
working pretty well in terms of second order cooperation and discount on penalty.’244
Among those positive comments regarding the cooperation policy, many
believed that the flexibility, by way of the ACCC’s discretion in determining the
reduced penalty for cooperation, was an understandable part of the ACCC’s
enforcement regime and that generally it was a ‘good system.’245 It was felt that there
was a sufficient amount of negotiation that needed to take place in order to achieve
this workability. Another strong point made by the interviewees was that there is a
large amount of precedent relating to the Cooperation Policy and therefore this helps
to reduce much of the uncertainty associated with the ACCC’s determination of
penalty.246 It was conceded that in this situation, generally the clients of the
interviewees do prefer certainty in terms of being able to know the potential penalty,
before they apply for immunity.247 However, related to this was the
acknowledgement that some degree of flexibility can be beneficial in these
circumstances:
Interviewee: I suppose one of the issues with us, it could only ever be guidance as to what the
ACCC would recommend because obviously in a lot of places overseas the regulator itself
actually sets the penalty where here obviously the court does, so it’s up to the court to
determine whether it’s appropriate in the circumstances, so it can only be guidance as to what
the ACCC would be prepared to recommend to the court. But I think, you know, what you
potentially lose from getting that certainty is the benefit of flexibility where in the particular
circumstance of the case, you know, that level of discount may not be appropriate; it may be
appropriate to go higher or it may be appropriate to go lower.248

Despite the positive comments made in relation to the inherent flexibility of
the cooperation policy, many interviewees still believed that the policy could benefit
from some ‘firming up’ in terms of listing a range of deductions and being more
specific about the types of factors the ACCC will take into consideration and how
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this will affect the ACCC’s recommendation of penalty to the court, prior to the
recent court decisions.249
When asked about the cooperation policy’s current operation, the ACCC
indicated that prior to the Barbaro decision, they could only make a recommendation
to the court and that it was at the court’s discretion as to the final determination of
the penalty. The ACCC indicated that it cannot be tied to a certain percentage
discount for cooperation, as is the case in some overseas jurisdictions.250 The ACCC
felt that the spirit of the cooperation policy is ‘more principle based than law based’
and acknowledged that this lack of clarity may lead to uncertainty for future
immunity applicants.251
However, the ACCC also recognised the possibility of applicants ‘playing the
policy’ if they were able to determine upfront what their potential discount would
be.252 It was said that in this context, flexibility is of paramount importance and that
they wished to uphold the current structure of the cooperation policy, in terms of not
setting out penalty discount percentages.253
There was also a more radical suggestion by one interviewee that the cooperation
policy should replace the Immunity Policy.254 The interviewee felt that the certainty
that is associated with the upfront guarantee of the first-in immunity application
leads to people ‘playing the policy’ and that this is an undesirable consequence.255
Instead, by adopting a cooperation policy as the primary enforcement tool, the
interviewee believed this would be more akin to ‘responsive regulation’ as ‘you want
it to be a system where it’s the spirit and substance of the rules that are important, not
the black and white of the rules.’256 The interviewee acknowledged that this view
may be against those currently held by the legal profession but felt that the status quo
was preferred by many lawyers as they can more easily manipulate the outcome for
their client as a result:
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Interviewee: It’s all about the rules. I mean that’s what lawyers are interested in, the more
rules there are, you know, and they’ll talk about it as certainty but really it’s about having
more rule to play with so that they can bend them to do what their clients wants, it’s very
rude, but that’s what I think, yeah. Whereas if you want to be interested in the substance then
you worry about principles and you become less predictable but you have to bring your heart
and soul to it…257

The interviewee was of the strong opinion that having a cooperation policy
instead of an immunity policy would encourage the regulatory enforcement agency
to ‘do more work’ rather than simply putting out an immunity policy and ‘thinking
everybody’s going to come running to them with the evidence.’258
Several interviewees expressed the view that certainty is paramount in the
context of the cooperation policy, and the current design of the policy was ‘not
working very well.’259 Given the general nature of the cooperation policy, some
interviewees felt that this increases the likelihood that potential immunity applicants
will take a ‘wait and see’ approach, which would reduce the very race that the ACCC
is seeking to create:
Interviewee: So one of the huge advertised benefits of the immunity policy is up front
certainty, right, so when I’m advising a client and the client says to me, should I go in? Then
you weigh up the pros and cons of doing so. The pros and cons of immunity first in
calculation are easier because the certainty is higher. Pros and cons on a second or later
application are very hard because the certainty is much lower and so that lack of certainty
acts as a disincentive and you’re much more likely to say well - we’ll just wait and see what
happens, see if anyone else goes in, see how much the evidence is, see if we’re implicated,
see how bad it gets.260

Those who believed that the current cooperation policy does not offer ‘any’ level
of certainty asserted that there was a strong need for more transparency about its
operation. Whilst some interviewees acknowledged it would be too difficult to
implement a system that is as accurate as those in other jurisdictions, such as the
European Union and Japan, there was a call for more guidance surrounding the
257
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calculation of the penalty to be recommended to the court.261 According to one
interviewee, this is particularly important ‘because it is a dramatically different
experience if you’re second in to what it is if you’re first in terms of the clarity of
outcome.’262 These comments are largely redundant following the recent court
decisions that will be discussed in Chapter VIII.
In summary, a majority of the interviewees exhibited a positive view of the
Immunity Policy and its role in cartel enforcement detection. Many expressed serious
doubts as to whether cartel conduct could be detected without the use of an Immunity
Policy. From these discussions, it was apparent that most of the interviewees were
strongly in favour of the aims and objectives of the Immunity Policy.
However, there was more divisive opinion when it came to discussion of the
eligibility and cooperation requirements of the Immunity Policy. Whilst a majority of
the interviewees were in favour of the removal of the ringleader exclusion, and many
held a positive view of the new relationship between the ACCC and CDPP, there
were stark differences in opinion in relation to whether a cartel recidivist should be
eligible for immunity and how this would be achieved.
These divisions in opinion were also reflected in the discussions in relation to
confidentiality, where opinion was split on whether the ACCC should refuse to
disclose pertinent immunity information to third parties in their pursuit of cartel
litigation as victims of the cartel. There was also strong opinion on both sides as to
whether restitution should be reintroduced as a condition of Immunity.
The most controversial discussions were directed at whether cartel specific
whistleblower protection should be introduced in Australia and whether a financial
cartel informant system is a viable option to enhance cartel enforcement worldwide.
There was also positive discussion in relation to the changes that need to be made to
the ACCC Cooperation Policy.
Although no consensus was reached in relation to many issues, the interviews
provided valuable empirical data and insight for further development, which was
used to scaffold the remaining chapters in the thesis.
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The remaining chapters will critically analyse the most controversial and important
issues to emerge from the qualitative data in relation to eligibility and cooperation;
issues of confidentiality and the impact on third parties; and alternatives to
immunity.263
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VI

ELIGIBILITY AND COOPERATION IN CARTEL IMMUNITY

This chapter will critically analyse the empirical findings of the eligibility and
cooperation requirements of the Immunity Policy through a cross-comparative
analysis of these aspects across the Canadian, United Kingdom and United States
policies. It will conclude with a recommendation as to how the Immunity Policy
should be adapted to these findings in accordance with the enhanced criteria of
transparency, accountability, consistency and proportionality.

A

Recidivism

As outlined in Chapter IV, the concept of introducing recidivism as an
exclusionary provision in the Immunity Policy was the most controversial and
divisive issue within the interviewee discussions.1 There were many arguments put
forward in support of its introduction to the policy, but also discussion in relation to
the challenges associated with the inclusion of recidivism as an automatic exclusion.
This section will first explore the concept of recidivism generally, the difficulties
associated with defining recidivism, and how recidivists are currently treated in
criminal law before turning to how recidivists are treated within the context of cartel
immunity, specifically in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and
Canada.
This section will then critically analyse the prospect of introducing recidivism
as an automatic exclusion for immunity, drawing on the experience of the European
Union sentencing of recidivists in cartel matters and the South Korean policy relating
to recidivism, giving due consideration to issues of transparency, accountability,
consistency and proportionality. Based on this assessment, this section will conclude
that recidivism is an important matter that should be included in the criteria for cartel
immunity and, if not, what alternative measures should be taken instead.

1

See Chapter V, Cartel Recidivism, pg 134.
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1

What is Recidivism and Why It Is Significant?

One of the key points made by all interviewees during the discussions related to the
concern as to how recidivism would be defined if it were to be implemented in the
policy. This point is reflected most broadly in the literature, where criminologists,
policy-makers and commentators have found it difficult to define the concept with
any level of precision.2 In terms of the research in relation to recidivism, there is no
consistent methodology employed in the literature to measure recidivism or the
means by which to reduce the rates of such.
The word recidivism is derived from the Latin term, recidere, which means to
fall back. Although there are many technical variations of the definition of
recidivism, the common element is ‘repetitious criminal activity.’3 The historical
treatment of recidivists in criminal law is ideologically tied to the notion that repeat
offenders deserve greater or more severe punishment because they have already
broken the law, and have not rehabilitated themselves by ‘learning their lesson.’4
Thus the concept of recidivism is intrinsically tied to the presumed greater
culpability of an offender as a result of their repeated criminal behaviour, compared
to an offender who has not previously breached the law.
Although a complete or precise definition of recidivism has not been
achieved universally, there are several key factors related to the concept. The first is
the similarity between two or more offences; if an offender has committed several
offences of a similar nature then it will likely be considered recidivism.5 Secondly,
the time during which the offences were committed is relevant. The question is
whether there should be a limitation on the time period that has connected the
offences in question, and also a consideration of the minimal period between the
commission of two offences, which will distinguish it as a recidivist offence, as

2

See eg, Alexis Durham, 'Criminology: Justice in Sentencing: The Role of Prior Record of Criminal
Involvement' (1987) 78 Journal Criminal Law & Criminology 614; Julian Roberts, 'Punishing
Persistence ' (2008) 48 British Journal of Criminology 468.
3
Jason Payne, 'Recidivism in Australia: Finding and Future Research' (Australian Institute of
Criminology, Research and Public Policy Series, 2007) 4.
4
Michael O'Neill, Linda Maxfield and Miles Harer, 'Past as Prologue: Reconciling Recidivism and
Culpability' (2004) 73 Fordham Law Review 245, 247.
5
Gabriel Hallevy, 'The Recidivist Wants to Be Punished: Punishment as an Incentive to Reoffend'
(2009) 5 International Journal of Punishment and Sentencing 120, 122.
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opposed to a distinct and separate offence.6 There are many issues that flow from
each of these factors and they will be discussed in greater detail below.
This perception of recidivists, and how they have been treated in criminal
law, is reflective of the forward-looking, utilitarian strategies that seek to prevent and
deter crime through the use of ‘carefully designed techniques for the selective
incapacitation of high-risk offenders.’7 This is opposed to the alternative retributive
model of crime known as the ‘justice model,’ which focuses primarily on the
seriousness of the offending conduct, rather than the antecedent criminal history of
the offender.
There are a number of studies that attempt to measure the level of recidivism
in general, across all aspects of crime.8 Despite the nuances that exist in the
recidivism statistics across countries in the Western world, a cursory view of the
research reveals that recidivism does in fact occur, and it is significant. A
fundamental principle in nearly every common-law jurisdiction is that an offender’s
prior record is central to sentencing.9 The prevalence of recidivism does not appear
to be debated to a great extent in the literature, as much of the focus tends to be on
specific areas of recidivism, and how to reduce the level of recidivism for certain
crimes. However, there does not appear to be any consensus reached in relation to
which methods are the most effective at reducing the rate of recidivism. That
question is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is concerned with recidivism only
to the limited extent of examining whether recidivists should be excluded from cartel
immunity.
The treatment of recidivists in the criminal justice system has typically been
associated with the granting of harsher sentences for repeat offenders. The United

6

Ibid.
Durham, above n 2, 617.
8
See, eg, Payne, above n 3; Edward Latessa and Christopher Lowenkamp, 'What Works in Reducing
Recidivism?' (2006) 3 University of St Thomas Law Journal 521; Kelly Richards, 'Technical and
Background Paper: Measuring Juvenile Recidivism in Australia' (Australian Government - Australian
Institute of Criminology, 2011); Linda Maxfield, 'Measuring Recidivism under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' (2005) 17 Federal Sentencing Reporter 166; United States Sentencing Commission,
'Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History Computation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'
(United States Sentencing Commission, 2004); Clare Ringland, 'Measuring Recidivism: Police versus
Court Data' (2013) 175 Crime and Justice Bulletin .
9
See eg, Darryl Plecas et al, 'Do Judges Take Prior Record into Consideration? An Analysis of the
Sentencing of Repeat Offenders in British Columbia' (University of Fraserm Valley, 2012)
<http://www.ufv.ca/media/assets/criminology/do+judges+consider+prior+record.pdf> : ‘The
importance of previous criminal history should only be surpassed by the seriousness of offence
committed.’
7
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States has consistently demonstrated that it will not tolerate recidivism in criminal
behaviour. Since the 1970s, there has been a steady move towards mandatory
sentencing and presumptive guidelines.10
The Sentencing Commission in the United States utilises criminal history as a
means to measure offender culpability, deter criminal conduct and protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant.11 Although these guidelines are not mandatory,
in relation to most offences, a defendant’s criminal history can approximately double
the presumptive sentence, and potentially add on fourteen years to a gaol term.12
Considerable weight towards criminal history in sentencing is reflected in the ‘three
strike laws,’ which have been adopted in almost 20 states in the United States. These
three strike laws in their original form were directed at offenders who have been
convicted of any felony and had two or more relevant previous convictions, and as a
result, were required to be sentenced to between twenty-five years and life
imprisonment, regardless of how minor the third offence was. These laws have since
been modified so that the third offence must be a serious or violent offence, although
minor offences can still attract a large increase in prison sentences.13
The treatment of recidivists in Australia, compared to the United States, is
similar but not as harsh. Most jurisdictions in Australia now have statutory
provisions that substantially increase the importance of prior convictions in
sentencing, where ‘the offender has a record of previous convictions,’ particularly if
the offender is being sentenced for a serious personal violence offence.14 According
to one study, approximately 60 per cent of offenders in Australia are repeat
offenders.15
The United Kingdom adopts a similar approach to Australia in its treatment
of recidivists, where nearly 50 per cent of offenders who are released from prison
reoffend within a year and almost three quarter of those who were released from

10

Mirko Bagaric, 'The Punishment Should Fit the Crime - Not the Prior Convictions of the Person
That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in
Sentencing' (2014) 51 San Diego Law Review 343, 346.
11
Maxfield, above n 4, 166.
12
Bagaric, above n 10, 348.
13
Ibid 349.
14
See eg, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s21A (d) ‘the offender has a record of
previous convictions (particularly if the offender is being sentenced for a serious personal violence
offence and has a record of previous convictions for serious personal violence offences).
15
Talina Drabsch, 'Reducing the Risk of Recidivism' (NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service
2006) 9.
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custody or began a community service order in the first quarter of 2000 were
reconvicted of another offence within nine years.16 The United Kingdom has its own
version of the United States’ three strikes laws and mandatory sentencing guidelines,
particularly for third convictions of domestic burglary and Class A drug trafficking.17
In a similar vein to Australia, the United Kingdom has specific provisions that are
aimed at imposing enhanced imprisonment terms for serious sexual and violent
offenders whose prior conviction for serious offences can be taken into account.18
In contrast, the treatment of repeat offenders in Canada is somewhat less clear
than the positions in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia, despite the
recidivism rates being similar. According to one study, the reconviction rate in the
first year out of prison was 44 per cent, with most of these reconvictions for nonviolence offences.19 Under section 727 (1), (2) and (3) of the Canadian Criminal
Code,20 the role that prior criminal record plays in sentencing is extremely vague.
Essentially, the position is that a more severe sentence may be imposed on the basis
of prior record but the details relating to the conditions and the degree to which prior
record should affect the severity of a sentence is absent from the legislation.21
However, similar dangerous offender provisions exist which increase prison
sentences on the basis of a third conviction.22
The purpose of outlining the treatment of offenders with a prior record in the
United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Canada is to show how seriously
recidivism is viewed in criminal law in these countries, and how this is reflected in
their criminal legislation and sentencing practices. As a general theme, a criminal
recidivist is likely to receive a harsher sentence as a result of their prior record then if

16

Ministry of Justice, 'Breaking the Cycle: Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of
Offenders' (UK Ministry of Justice, 2010)
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120119200607/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/
docs/breaking-the-cycle.pdf> Section 7.
17
Bagaric, above n 10, 351.
18
Ibid.
19
J Bonta, T Rugge and M Dauvergne, 'The Reconviction Rate of Federal Offenders' (Corrections
Research - Solicitor General of Canada, 2003) <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rcvdfdffndr/rcvd-fdffndr-eng.pdf> The reconviction rate for all the releases in the first year was 44 per
cent with the reconviction rate for violence considerably lower (14 per cent). The non-violent
reconviction rate was 30 per cent accounting for the majority of reconvictions.
20
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
21
Plecas et al, above n 9, 4.
22
See eg, Government of Canada, 'Dangerous Offender Legislation' (Government of Canada, 2014)
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crrctns/protctn-gnst-hgh-rsk-ffndrs/dngrs-ffndrdsgntn-eng.aspx>.
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they were a first time offender. This may seem an obvious conclusion, but in the
context of criminal cartel conduct, it seems that regardless of an offender’s prior
record, they may still be eligible for a full grant of immunity. This seems incongruent
with the general treatment of criminal recidivists in these countries.
Repeat cartel offenders are not treated as recidivists under the Immunity
Policy. This may be due to the fact that cartelists are not deemed to be general
criminals, but corporations or ‘white collar criminals.’ However, researchers have
demonstrated a consistent trend amongst corporations or ‘white collar criminals’ to
commit similar offences repeatedly.23

2

Cartel Recidivism

In relation to cartel conduct specifically, there is empirical research that
supports the existence of recidivists amongst corporate cartelists. John Connor, a
United States economist, has generated some of the primary data relating to cartel
recidivism. Connor’s study comprises of a market sample of 648 hard-core cartels
over a period of 20 years; confined to cartels that have already been discovered by
competition authorities.24
Connor acknowledges that his results may be negatively skewed, as his
conclusions are derived from data obtained from discovered cartels, which he
believes only accounts for 10 to 30 percent of all cartel conspiracies.25 Connor’s
research is comprised of instances of recidivism based on the number of times a
company has participated in and been convicted for a unique cartel.26 Connor does
not elaborate on this definition. Convictions for cartel offences in multiple
jurisdictions, or where a company was granted immunity in one or more jurisdictions

23

See, eg, Robert Wagner, 'Criminal Corporate Character' (2013) 65 Florida Law Review 1293, 1324;
David Weisburd, Ellen Chayet and Elin Waring, 'White-Collar Crime and Criminal Careers: Some
Preliminary Findings' (1990) 36 Crime & Delinquency 342; Dan Dalton and Idalene Kesner, 'On the
Dynamics of Corporate Size and Illegal Activity: An Empirical Assessment' (1988) 7 Journal of
Business Ethics 861; Andrew Hopkins, 'Controlling Corporate Deviance' (1980) 18 Criminology 198.
24
John Connor, 'A Symposium on Cartel Sanctions: Recidivism Revealed: Private International
Cartels 1990-2009' (2010) 6 Competition Policy International 101, 108-109: The data set covered
information derived from competition authorities in jurisdictions across the globe, including North
America, Europe, Asia, Latin America, Oceania & Africa.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
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for a particular offence were counted as one offence for the purposes of Connor’s
research.27
Furthermore, in the case of large multinational corporations that have a
number of subsidiaries, Connor attempted to trace the controlling parent group of the
sanctioned company on the belief that ‘punished cartelists are frequently affiliates of
larger corporate groups’.28 Thus, in Connor’s view, tracing the ownership of these
firms provided a more accurate account of rates of corporate recidivism. Connor also
acknowledged a number of circumstances that may have affected the sample of this
research. These include where competition regulators kept immunity applications
confidential or the anonymity of convicted corporations.29
Despite the aforementioned limitations, Connor’s research indicates that
cartel recidivism is rising. By the end of 2009, the number of cartels detected had
risen by 124 percent and leading recidivists tended to be highly diversified
multinational corporations.30 One interesting observation by Connor was that ‘if
sanctions have the power to dissuade companies to engage in repeated violations, one
would expect to see a reduction, if not elimination, of such conduct in subsequent
periods.’31 But instead the data showed that out of the leading recidivists that were
sanctioned in 1990-99, not one of those corporations learned to avoid participating in
cartel conduct in the 2000s, after being sanctioned for the same conduct discovered
by competition-law authorities before 2000. Furthermore, for most of the top
recidivist corporations, there is a general trend of accelerated recidivism after 1999.32
Connor’s research has been criticised, particularly by the United States
DOJ.33 The DOJ argued that the definition of recidivism employed by Connor in his
research was overly broad; a flaw they claim skewed the research results and
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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produced misleading results.34 Furthermore, the DOJ asserted that Connor’s sample,
dating back to 1990, is irrelevant, as they claim much had since changed in the
enforcement practices of the DOJ, including the revision of the leniency policy, and
increased prison sentences for culpable non-United States citizens. The DOJ states
that after reviewing the ‘pertinent’ records:
No company and no individual convicted in the United States of a cartel offense after July
23, 1999 subsequently joined a cartel prosecuted in the United States. Moreover, no company
and no individual granted conditional leniency after July 23, 1999 subsequently joined a
cartel prosecuted in the United States.35

Therefore, the DOJ claims that the United States is impervious to the general
rates of rising recidivism amongst corporations for cartel conduct, as they assert that
cartel recidivism has been eliminated from the United States due to ‘meaningful
prison terms.’36 There are a number of other studies that acknowledge the existence
of cartel recidivism despite the DOJ’s claims.37 Recent cases have also put the media
focus on the prevalence of white collar recidivism, most notably the USB case, which
has called into question the effectiveness of deferred prosecution or leniency
agreements as enforcement tools.38
If we accept as a general position that recidivism is a feature of human
behaviour, and exists to some extent in the context of cartel conduct, then we must
see what implications flow from this premise. While much attention has been
focused on how recidivists should be sentenced, there is a lack of analysis
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surrounding whether or not recidivists should be entitled to immunity for cartel
behaviour.
The immunity policies in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and
Australia do not address the concept of recidivism and allow recidivists to be granted
immunity for repeated cartel conduct.39 The ACCC has acknowledged that they
would not currently refuse an immunity application on the basis of recidivism.40
By contrast, under the 2006 leniency program of the Greek Competition Authority,
recidivists could not receive immunity from fines.41 However, this provision was
removed in 2011.42
The South Korean Corporate Leniency Policy is currently the only
jurisdiction that prohibits a corporation from receiving immunity more than once in
five years.43 According to this policy, a cartel participant will be excluded from
leniency where:
1. A person who was ordered to take corrective measures and to pay a penalty surcharge for a
violation of Article 19 (1) of the Act conducts any unfair cartel activity again in
contravention of the relevant corrective measures within five years from the date on which
the person was ordered to take the corrective measures;
2. A person in whose case corrective measures or a penalty surcharge imposed under Article
22-2 for unfair cartel activities conducted in violation of Article 19 (1) of the Act was
mitigated or exempted conducts another unfair cartel activity in violation of Article 19 (1) of
the Act within five years from the date on which corrective measures or a penalty surcharge
was mitigated or exempted.
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According to these provisions, a cartel participant who has received immunity
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to seek leniency. The purpose of introducing these exclusionary provisions was to
discourage habitual offenders from engaging in cartel conduct repeatedly, by making
it much more costly to do so.45
In contrast, there were concerns that the provisions may drive undetected
cartels underground where they will continue to thrive and thus undermine the
deterrence and detection goals of the policy.46 This concern was reflected in the
interviews, where some interviewees believed that the introduction of recidivism as
an automatic exclusion would decrease the ‘effectiveness’ of the Immunity Policy.47
The basis given for this concern was that such exclusion would result in fewer
cartelists coming forward to seek immunity, due to the uncertainty of the concept and
how it would be applied.48 These arguments are largely overstated. Whilst deterrence
and detection are the main aims of the Immunity Policy, allowing a repeat cartel
offender to receive immunity repeatedly does not deter that particular corporation
from re-offending; on one view, it may even facilitate the misconduct. Thus,
allowing recidivists to repeatedly apply for immunity arguably does not achieve
specific deterrence.
In terms of its impact on general deterrence, similar provisions currently exist
in the policy that exclude cartelists on the basis of coercion or their role as the
ringleader.49 These conditions exist to prevent particularly unscrupulous cartel
members from receiving immunity. The competition regulators have not sought to
remove these exclusionary provisions on the basis that they will undermine the
detection and deterrence aims of the Immunity Policy.50
Moreover, the DOJ will seek to ‘carve-out’ culpable employees from its
corporate leniency policy, where these employees will potentially be subject to
prosecution and punishment. However, this practice is not perceived by the DOJ as
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adversely affecting the aims of the policy.51 Therefore, on this basis, if the
introduction of recidivism as an automatic exclusionary condition would not be
dissimilar to the existing provisions in the policy, then it is unlikely to have a
significant impact on the detection and deterrence aims of the policy. This is
particular the case where there are other considerations that are important to this
assessment, aside from its impact on detection and deterrence, such as the argument
that recidivists need to be excluded on the basis of moral reasons, given that ‘the
visible fact of repeat offending risks weakening the moral commitment to the law of
the spontaneous law-abiding.’52
In light of this analysis, the focus instead should be on the way the recidivism
condition should be implemented. There was general support amongst the
interviewees in principle that cartel recidivists should not be entitled to immunity,
but many were divided as to how this is could be achieved in practice.53 One concern
was the difficulty of defining a ‘recidivist,’ particularly in the context of large, multinational cartels. For example:
Interviewee: If you have an organisation which has two different business divisions which
operate in separate markets, one division may have been involved in cartel conduct and
resolved the matter. The other division, which is not in even a related market, why should
they not get the benefit of the immunity policy and why should the authorities not get the
54

benefit of the detection of it.

3

Cartel Recidivism – A Workable Model

This chapter will now turn to formulating an appropriate model for the
purposes of inclusion in immunity policies. As discussed above, there is extensive
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literature in relation to how recidivism should be defined, but no consensus on the
issue.55 In addition to the Korean leniency policy, another model that can provide
some limited insight into the way recidivism could be defined in the ACCC
Immunity Policy is the European Union Commission’s sentencing of repeat cartel
offenders.
According to the 2006 Fining Guidelines,56 where an undertaking continues
or repeats the same or similar infringements after the Commission or a national
Competition authority has made a finding that the undertaking infringed Article 101
or 102 TFEU, the basic amount of the fine will be increase up to 100per cent for each
such infringement established.57 This general definition has been extensively
discussed in European Union case law, where ‘recidivism, as understood in a number
of national legal systems, implies that a person has committed fresh infringements
after having been penalised for similar infringements.’58
Therefore, on this basis, the Commission must satisfy three cumulative
requirements in order to impose higher fines on the finding of recidivism: (1) the
same undertaking (2) must have repeated the same or a similar competition law
infringement (3) after a prior infringement decision was adopted.59 However, the
European Union model is limited in its usefulness as a definition for cartel immunity,
as a previous immunity applicant would not have been subject to an infringement
decision for its role in the cartel.
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(a)

Key Considerations In Formulating A Workable Model For Recidivism

The first question relates to defining the corporation as a recidivist. This can
be a complex question. The reason for this is that corporations can merge with other
corporations; individuals who controlled a corporation during an initial cartel may
not be the same individuals who control the same corporation in a subsequent cartel;
and finally, whether subsidiaries of a parent company could be found to be a
recidivist when it was another subsidiary or the parent company itself that committed
the prior cartel offence. A competition regulator would be faced with these questions
when determining whether the corporation applying for immunity is the same
corporation who had previously received immunity for a cartel offence.
The European Union courts have discussed some of these issues, particularly relating
to the liability of parent companies in relation to their subsidiaries, although they
have not be required to make a decision on this basis, specifically in relation to
recidivism.60
To address these issues, the general rule that a corporation is an entity with
separate legal personality should be applied.61 It is a fundamental principle of
corporations’ law that a company is a legal entity separate and distinct from its
shareholders with its own separate legal rights and obligations. The Australian courts
have long held the view that the corporate veil should only be pierced in exceptional
cases.62 Many leading scholars have written extensively on piercing the corporate
veil and the reasons for piercing it.63 It is clear that the circumstances in which the
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court has pierced the veil have produced fragmented and inconsistent results.64 There
are also limited circumstances under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that allow for
the corporate veil to be pierced.65
Given the reluctance of courts to pierce the corporate veil, there is no
compelling case for piercing the corporate veil in the context of immunity
applications. Thus, in the situation where a corporation applies for immunity and that
same corporation has previously received immunity, it should not be eligible
regardless of the circumstances surrounding the initial application. For example, if a
group of employees orchestrated a cartel within a corporation and the corporation
received immunity for that conduct, subsequently if a different group of employees
from the same corporation engaged in cartel conduct, the corporation would not be
eligible for full immunity once again.
Secondly, the corporation must have previously received immunity in
accordance with the ACCC Immunity Policy, which applies to cartel conduct in
contravention of:
1. (a) Division 1 of Part IV of the CCA which prohibits a corporation from
making or giving effect to contracts, arrangements or understandings that
contain a cartel provision, and/or
2. (b) Section 45(2) of the CCA.66

A corporation that has previously received a penalty discount in exchange for
cooperation pursuant to the policy will therefore not be excluded on this basis. 67 It is
important that the exclusionary provisions are not drafted so wide as to significantly
diminish the Immunity Policy’s operation. Corporate recidivists should be excluded
from receiving full immunity multiple times, but applicants who received lenient
treatment for past offenses should still be eligible for full immunity.
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In cases where the cartel participant has previously received immunity, and is
therefore excluded on the basis of recidivism, it would be possible for the immunity
applicant to receive lenient treatment in accordance with the cooperation section of
the Immunity Policy.68 As previously stated, there are concerns that this may
adversely impact on the detection and deterrence aims of the policy. These concerns
need to be reconciled with the fact that similar exclusionary provisions, such as the
coercion condition, currently exist in the policy. The ACCC has not indicated that
these provisions reduce the detection or deterrence capability of the policy, which is
reflected in their decision to retain these provisions in its most recent review of the
policy.69
The third consideration relates to the limitation period that should apply when
determining whether there is recidivist conduct. This is one of the most controversial
issues in the sentencing of cartel recidivists in the European Union. The only
guidance offered by the Commission is that recidivism may be taken into
consideration if ‘a relatively limited period of time separates one infringement from
the next.’70 This is determined on a case-by-case basis. 10 years has been treated as a
‘relatively short period of time.’71 Some Member States specify a limitation period
for recidivism in competition law cases.72 For example, in Spain the period between
the first finding of an infringement to the start of the second infringement is ten years
and in France it is fifteen years.73
On the other hand, the Korean Corporate Leniency program stipulates that
recidivists may not be eligible for leniency if they have received leniency in the
previous five years.74
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In Australia, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sets a limitation
period of 6 years for an action for damages.75 If this factor is combined with the
estimation that the average cartel lasts between 5-7 years,76 then this could be a
flexible figure that the ACCC could adopt in its assessment of recidivist behaviour.
The ACCC should exercise its discretion in determining whether the corporation
should be excluded on the basis of recidivism given the facts of each particular
application.77 In its determination, the ACCC could have regard to the nature of the
firm’s previous cartel offences, whether the firm has a history of recidivist
behaviour, the conduct to which immunity is being sought once again and the time in
which the corporation came forward.78 The more serious and frequent the recidivistic
behaviour, the more likely the ACCC should refuse to grant an application for
immunity.
Finally, there was much concern that if recidivism were implemented, as an
automatic exclusion, then the definition of recidivism should be clear so that
immunity applicants could readily determine their legal position in relation to the
Immunity Policy with greater clarity. This is based on the presumption that if an
immunity applicant has a greater awareness and ability to determine whether they
will be granted full immunity prior to actually making the application, then the more
likely the applicant will be to come forward and disclose their misconduct.79
However, as this section has demonstrated, it is possible to develop a clear and
workable model of recidivism.

4

Recommendation
The purpose of this section was to demonstrate the need for excluding cartel

recidivists from repeatedly receiving immunity and to propose a workable model to
achieve this. It can be seen from the economic literature and empirical studies that
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cartel recidivism is an issue that warrants serious consideration, even if the actual
number of cartel recidivists remains uncertain.
The arguments against the imposition of cartel recidivism as an automatic
exclusion are overstated. There is little, if any evidence, aside from the anecdotal
evidence offered by the regulator that suggests this would seriously impact on the
‘effectiveness’ of the Policy. There are currently exclusionary provisions in the
Immunity Policy, such as the coercion requirement, that are similarly broad in nature
and exist to prevent highly culpable individuals from receiving immunity. Likewise,
the recidivism requirement would be aimed at denying immunity to those whose
culpability is especially high.
If an individual or a corporation was found to be excluded due to recidivist
behaviour, they nonetheless have the opportunity to rely on ACCC Cooperation
Policy, and the relevant cooperation policies in the United States, United Kingdom
and Canada.

B

Cartel Coercion

According to s16 (iv) of the Immunity Policy, a corporation will be eligible
for conditional immunity from ACCC-initiated proceedings where ‘the corporation
has not coerced others to participate in the cartel.’ The coercion test also applies to
individuals who have coerced others to participate in the cartel.80 This coercion test
replaced the previous ringleader requirement where an immunity applicant could be
automatically excluded from immunity on the basis that they were the ‘clear leader
of the cartel.’81
The removal of the ringleader requirement was a result of the 2014 ACCC
review of the Policy. According to the revised FAQ, there must be ‘clear evidence’
that the party has coerced other members to participate in the cartel and this is
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determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the respective roles and positions of
each of the cartel members.82 The ACCC ‘may’ in some cases require the ‘applicant
to demonstrate it has not coerced others’ but does not clearly stipulate that the
immunity applicant will have the burden of proof in this respect.83
Furthermore, it is implied that the ACCC would require a high level of
information in order to determine that there is ‘clear evidence’ of coercion. This is
compounded by the fact that the ACCC is ‘unlikely’ to disqualify an application on
the basis of coercion.84 The FAQ also outlines a number of scenarios that may
illustrate the effect of the coercion requirement.85 By providing these examples, the
ACCC has attempted to provide further guidance and clarity regarding the operation
of the coercion requirement and has gone beyond the information previously
provided in relation to the ringleader requirement.
As outlined in Chapter V, there was a general consensus amongst the
interviewees for the removal of the ringleader requirement.86 The most common
arguments in support of this proposition related to the uncertainty surrounding the
definition of a ‘ringleader’ as ‘someone may start off as the ringleader and then
someone else may assume the captain’s armband and then it moves through a
continuum.’87
Many of the interviewees pointed to the difficulties the ACCC would face in
ascertaining who the ‘clear’ leader of the cartel was, given that cartels are essentially
consensual in nature. Caron Beaton-Wells has strongly criticised the ringleader
requirement of the Immunity Policy and advocated its removal.88 Beaton Wells
argued that it is very difficult to envisage a situation where one participant did not
coerce another as part of the cartel. Moreover, the ACCC’s decision in relation to
whether the applicant is a ringleader is made at the time in which the applicant comes
forward for immunity and therefore solely relies on the immunity applicant’s
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evidence that it was not the cartel ringleader. This becomes increasingly difficult in a
two party cartel setting, and the Visy/Amcor89 dispute has been cited in this respect.90
Some interviewees indicated that the ACCC generally did not seriously
investigate whether or not the applicant is the cartel ringleader and as a result, the
interviewees believed that the criterion was unnecessary, as ‘in practice I don’t think
there’s any time spent at all beyond a very short time trying to tell who the ring
leader is. It’s just not a factor in practice.’91 Furthermore, there is academic support
for the claim by one of the interviewees that the ringleader exclusion requirement can
lead to the maintenance of cartels, due to the fact that if the cartel ringleader is
excluded, then the other cartel members will have more trust in that leader knowing
that the leader is ineligible for immunity. As a result, the cartel may be perpetuated.92
As a result of a number of consultative discussion papers, the ACCC has
removed the ringleader requirement and replaced it with the coercion test. The
underlying rationale is that a particularly unscrupulous cartel member who coerced
others to join a cartel against their will should not be awarded the benefit of
immunity.
However, it was also argued within the submissions made to the ACCC in
relation to its review of the policy that the difficulties associated with the ringleader
requirement also apply to the coercion test. The revised policy does not provide a
clear definition of ‘coercion,’ despite providing examples of scenarios that may give
rise to coercion.93 Therefore, if the primary criticism levelled at the ringleader
requirement is that it is unclear and ambiguous and thus unnecessary, this is difficult
to reconcile with the adoption of the coercion test. This is one of the main reasons
why the coercion test needs greater clarity.
One interviewee expressed the more extreme belief that the coercion test
serves a ‘moral’ purpose, in that it would be against ‘good conscience’ to allow a
particularly unscrupulous cartel member to be eligible for immunity:
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Interviewee: I think so…if you go back to sort of all the underlying moral issues about
someone being able to escape liability for this sort of conduct, if you’re dealing with a
situation where one participant has sort of bullied or coerced other participants into this
illegal arrangement then I think morally I would say it’s wrong for that person to be able to
obtain full immunity for what they’ve done.94

It was clear that a majority of the interviewees supported the introduction of
the coercion test to replace the ringleader requirement. This support for the coercion
test is reflected in other jurisdictions, most notably in Canada, the United Kingdom
and the United States, which will be analysed below.
According to s15 of the Canadian Competition Bureau Immunity Policy, ‘a
party must not have coerced others to be party to the illegal activity.’95 Similarly,
according to Section 3.8 (e) of the CMA policy, ‘if the applicant has taken steps to
coerce another business to take part in the cartel activity it will be eligible only for a
reduction in fine of up to 50 per cent (Type C leniency), even if it is the first to report
(although non-coercing employees will still be eligible for criminal immunity).’96
In a supporting FAQ document, the Canadian Competition Bureau outlines
that a party may be disqualified from immunity where there is clear evidence of
coercive behaviour.97 It further states that this test may be satisfied where the party
pressured unwilling participants to be involved in the offence. This evidence of
coercive conduct may be express or implied. When the ‘instigator’ test was replaced
by the coercion test in 2007, the Competition Bureau claimed that this test would
provide a ‘clearer standard and increased predictability for potential immunity
applicants,’98 although it did not elaborate as to how or why this is so. This coercion
test is therefore very similar to the current revised coercion test found in the ACCC
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policy, except that the ACCC has outlined a number of scenarios that may constitute
coercion.
The United States DOJ policy is slightly different to the above policies, in
that it has retained both the coercion test and the ‘clear leader’ test. According to
section A (6), a corporation will be eligible for immunity if it ‘did not coerce another
party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the leader in, or
originator of the activity.’ This requirement also applies to individuals who seek
leniency.99 This policy goes even further than the other comparable jurisdictions, and
states pursuant to Section B (7): ‘The Division determines that granting leniency
would not be unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal activity, the
confessing corporation’s role in it, and when the corporation comes forward.’100 It
also makes clear that the immunity applicant bears the onus of proof in proving the
accuracy of the representation.101 This requirement is not apparent in the Canadian,
Australian or United Kingdom policies.
On the basis on this provision, the DOJ has discretion to exclude an applicant
from leniency on the basis that it would be ‘unfair,’ given the circumstances. This
closely resembles a proportionality assessment, where a number of factors are
weighed in determining the grant of leniency. The incorporation of ‘fairness’ as a
relevant factor allows for a more normative, holistic assessment in the determination
of leniency, which moves away from the strict emphasis on the detection and
deterrence capabilities of the policy.
The United Kingdom CMA policy is the most comprehensive policy in
relation to the coercion test. In contrast to the policies in Australia, Canada and the
United States, the CMA policy states that there must have been clear, positive and
ultimately successful steps to pressurise an unwilling participant to take part in the
cartel.102 However, unlike the other policies, the CMA policy specifically states the
kind of behaviour that may constitute coercive conduct such as actual physical
violence, proven threats of violence, blackmail and strong economic pressure and
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also clearly states what type of conduct will not constitute coercion.103 It also
outlines how the test applies to individuals.104
Each of the aforementioned policies clearly stipulates that the competition
authority will construe or interpret the coercion requirement in favour of the
immunity applicant and states that no immunity application has been refused on the
basis of coercion. This statement likely exists as an enticement to future immunity
applicants to help ensure that they are not dissuaded from applying for immunity on
the basis that they may have played a coercive role in the cartel.
Australian case law does not provide a settled definition of coercion or duress.
The most commonly cited formulation of duress in the context of contract is
enunciated by Lord Scarman in Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International
Transport Workers Federation:
The authorities …reveal two elements in the wrong of duress:
(1) pressure amounting to compulsion of the will (impaired consent); and

(2) the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted.105
Originally at common law it was thought that duress or coercion would
usually require actual or threatened violence.106 The concept of duress also extends to
the threatened detection or seizure of goods, or threatened damage to goods.107 In
recent times, the courts have recognised cases of economic duress, where the
defendant threatens to breach a contract unless the plaintiff enters into a modified or
new contract on terms more favourable to the defendant.108

Recommendation
It is apparent from the recent revision of the ACCC Immunity Policy that the
introduction of the coercion test in place of the former ringleader requirement is a
commendable decision and will lead to greater clarity in this area of the operation of
the policy. However, the coercion test is undefined and still creates undue
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uncertainty. The ACCC have attempted to overcome this by including three
hypothetical examples to illustrate how the coercion test may be applied.109
However, when read carefully, these examples are vague and overgeneralised
to the point that they offer no real assistance in determining what amounts to
coercion. Therefore, the ACCC Immunity Policy should be revised to reflect the
approach taken in the CMA policy. That policy provides a more meaningful list of
the factors that may lead to a finding of coercion.
Whilst a degree of discretion is necessary in order to determine whether the
conduct amounts to coercion, it is important that a clear and workable definition is
formulated. As a result of the cross-comparative analysis conducted in this section, it
is apparent that the two most common features of coercion are (1) illegitimate
pressure; and (2) an unwillingness of the cartel participant to enter into the cartel (or
impaired consent). Given the abstract nature of these terms, the ACCC should
translate them into more concrete factors by adopting those factors considered by the
CMA. These include:
-

actual physical violence or proven threats of violence which have a realistic prospect of being
carried out, or blackmail (these would apply equally to cases of horizontal as well as vertical
collusion)

-

such strong economic pressure as to make market exit a real risk, where, for example, a large
player organises a collective boycott of a small player or refuses to supply key inputs to such
a small player – these scenarios are more likely to apply in cases where there is at least a
significant vertical element and are less likely to be relevant where an arrangement is purely
horizontal and there are no significant cross-supplies between competitors.110

The ACCC could then demonstrate how these factors apply in the
hypothetical examples they provide in the policy. For example, the first hypothetical
example the ACCC provides is:
Example 1: Company A is a retailer of goods and services supplied by producers B,
C and D. Company A holds a near monopoly market share in the retail market. Companies B,
C and D also retail goods and services through other retail channels including ones that they
own. Company A negotiates agreements between itself, B, C and D that they will not offer
goods and services below the price that is offered by A. A threatens to no longer acquire
goods and services from the company that does not agree. A, B, C and D enter into this price
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fixing arrangement. Company A is likely to be disqualified in this scenario on the basis that it
has coerced others to participate in the cartel.111

In this scenario, the ACCC needs to indicate which factors it considers would
amount to coercion. It is likely to include the fact that Company A holds a greater
market share and is the dominant player in that market, meaning that the smaller
business is likely to suffer economic loss or be forced to leave the market if they do
not join the cartel. By listing the relevant factors that may amount to coercion and
then demonstrating how these factors could be identified in a hypothetical example
gives a much clearer indication of the way the ACCC will interpret coercive conduct.
Likewise, the ACCC should state the factors that are unlikely to amount to
coercion such as:
-

harmful market pressure which falls short of risking market exit but may reduce profit
margins

-

mere agreed enforcement or punishment mechanisms to enforce the operation of a cartel, and

-

standard term contracts in a resale price maintenance case, even where there is a significant
inequality of bargaining power.112

Therefore, in Example 2, the ACCC should list why the conduct in that scenario does
not amount to coercion:
Example 2: Retailers A, B and C enter into a cartel arrangement. Retailer A, the market
leader, proposed the cartel arrangement and is the most proactive participant. For example, it
organises meetings and is the party that is the most aggressive and vocal in the cartel when it
comes to raising prices. The ACCC is unlikely to consider Retailer A to have engaged in
coercion in this scenario.113

It should clearly state that conduct that is indicative of an active and vocal cartel
participant who orchestrates cartel meetings does not amount to coercion as there is
no evidence that the other cartel participants have unwillingly been forced into the
cartel or face economic duress if they do not join the cartel.

111

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 68, Q 36.
Competition and Markets Authority, above n 96, s 2.54.
113
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 68, Q36.
112

185

C

The Relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP

Structure of The Regulatory Bodies

A key factor governing the eligibility and cooperation of immunity applicants is the
way that the applications are processed and by which regulatory body. With the
introduction of criminal penalties for cartel conduct in 2009, it was necessary that
criminal immunity was available for cartel offenders. The current regulatory
structure in Australia is bifurcated. According to the Revised Memorandum of
Understanding between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC) and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) (‘Revised
MOU’) the respective roles of the regulatory bodies are as described below:
The CDPP is responsible for:
•

prosecuting offences against Commonwealth law, including serious cartel offences

under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and State and Territory Competition Codes,
in accordance with the Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth; and
•

seeking associated remedies, including by taking certain proceedings under the

Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 and Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
The ACCC is responsible for:
•

investigating cartel conduct and gathering evidence;

•

managing the immunity process, in consultation with the CDPP; and

•

referral of serious cartel conduct to the CDPP for consideration for prosecution.114

Therefore, an immunity applicant will first seek an immunity marker from the
ACCC. The applicant will then be required to disclose the relevant cartel information
to the ACCC in order to obtain a proffer.115 The ACCC will then determine whether
the applicant is eligible for conditional civil immunity based on the criteria outlined
in the policy. Where there is ‘serious cartel conduct’, the ACCC will refer the
application for conditional criminal immunity to the CDPP for determination of
eligibility.
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In determining what constitutes ‘serious cartel conduct,’ the ACCC will have
regard to a number of factors outlined in Section 4.2 of the Revised MOU:
The ACCC is more likely to consider conduct it is investigating to be serious cartel
conduct if one or more of the following factors apply:
•

the conduct was covert;

•

the conduct caused, or could have caused, large scale or serious economic

harm;
•

the conduct was longstanding or had, or could have had, a significant

impact on the market in which the conduct occurred;
•

the conduct caused, or could have caused, significant detriment to the

public, or a class of the public, or caused, or could have caused, significant loss
or damage to one or more customers of the alleged participants;
•

one or more of the alleged participants has previously been found by a

court to have participated in, or has admitted to participating in, cartel conduct
either criminal or civil;
•

senior representatives within the relevant corporation(s) were involved in

authorising or participating in the conduct;
•

the Government and thus, taxpayers, were victims of the conduct -even

where the value of affected commerce is relatively low; and
•

the conduct involved the obstruction of justice or other collateral crimes

committed in connection with the cartel activity.116

According to Section 7 of the Immunity Policy, the CDPP will exercise an
independent discretion when considering a recommendation by the ACCC. If the
CDPP finds that the applicant meets the criteria outlined in the Prosecution Policy of
the Commonwealth,117 as a result of the Immunity Policy review, it will ‘ordinarily’
provide a ‘letter of comfort’ to the applicant. Moreover, before a criminal
prosecution commences, the Director will issue a written undertaking pursuant to
section 9(6D) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) (‘DPP Act’)
granting conditional criminal immunity.
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In Canada, the system of cartel enforcement is also bifurcated between the
Competition Bureau and the Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada. Similarly to
Australia, the Competition Bureau is the sole investigator of the cartel allegations
and will be the point of contact for all cartel immunity applications.118 The DPP will
also have the sole authority to grant conditional criminal immunity ‘on the basis of
its own independent assessment of the public interest.’119 The DPP’s decision to grant
immunity is made pursuant to Section 5.2 (5) of the Public Prosecution Service of
Canada Deskbook.120
The Bureau and the DPP have also entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (‘Canadian MOU’), however the information outlined in this
agreement is far more comprehensive than the Australian version.121 The Canadian
MOU clearly outlines in separate sections the roles and responsibilities of the Bureau
and the Prosecutors at the investigative and prosecution stages, respectively.122 It
further indicates the importance of confidentiality and security in the context of
immunity and expressly recognises the need for a dispute resolution provision.123
This aspect will be explored further in the next section.124
A key difference between the regulatory relationships in Australia and
Canada is that in Australia the CDPP will make a decision regarding immunity
according to the same considerations as the ACCC, as outlined in Annexure B to the
Prosecution Policy.125 In Canada, on the other hand, there is no such clarification as
to what factors the DPP will have regard to in determining criminal immunity, only
that it will be made in accordance with the principles encompassed within the
Prosecution Service Deskbook.126 Furthermore, there is no express provision for the
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issuing of ‘letters of comfort’ or a formal written undertaking for the granting of
conditional criminal immunity in Canada.
In contrast, the cartel regulatory system in the United Kingdom and the
United States is not bifurcated: the CMA and the DOJ respectively determine both
conditional civil and criminal immunity. This is the well-established practice of the
DOJ where the Division’s Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal
Enforcement (‘Criminal DAAG’) reviews all leniency requests.127 In the same way,
the CMA determines all applications for civil and criminal leniency. Therefore,
because there is a sole regulatory body in the United States and United Kingdom for
the granting of both civil and criminal immunity, there are no issues associated with
the relationship in a bifurcated system of the kind that exists in Australia and Canada.

(a)

The Relationship In Practice

The relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP received significant attention in
the interviews conducted and was identified as a key area of concern. The operation
of the relationship also featured in the recent review of the Immunity Policy.128 As a
result of these discussions, there were three main areas of concern:
1. Timing of the determination of criminal immunity
2. Sufficiency of information for criminal immunity
3. The credibility of accomplice evidence
As a product of the recent review by the ACCC, the Immunity Policy now
stipulates that the CDPP will ‘ordinarily’ issue a Letter of Comfort (‘LOC’) where
the CDPP considers that the applicant meets the criteria set out in Annexure B to the
Prosecution Policy.129 According to Q35 of the ACCC Immunity FAQ:
The letter of comfort will recognise that the applicant has a marker from the ACCC as the first
to apply for immunity for the cartel conduct. The letter will also state that the Director intends
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to grant an undertaking pursuant to section 9(6D) of the DPP Act to the applicant prior to any
prosecution being instituted against a cartel participant provided that the applicant:
(a) maintain eligibility criteria for conditional immunity (as outlined in the Policy in paragraph
16 for corporations and paragraph 28 for individuals)
(b) provide full, frank and truthful disclosure, and cooperate fully and expeditiously on a
continuing basis throughout the ACCC’s investigation and any ensuing litigation, and
(c) maintain confidentiality regarding its status as an immunity applicant and de tails of the
investigation and any ensuing litigation unless otherwise required by law or with the
written consent of the ACCC.
The letter of comfort from the CDPP will generally be provided to the immunity applicant at
the same time as the ACCC grants conditional immunity in relation to civil proceedings.
Prior to the commencement of any prosecution, the Director will grant an undertaking pursuant
to section 9(6D) of the DPP Act that, subject to fulfilment of on-going obligations and
conditions, the applicant will not be prosecuted for the cartel offence for which immunity is
sought.130

As part of the review, the ACCC and CDPP also released a Revised
Memorandum of Understanding (‘Revised MOU’), which outlines how the ACCC
and CDPP will facilitate a working relationship through ‘regular meetings’ with
established ‘relationship managers.’131 More importantly however, there is no
mention of the LOC or undertakings provided by the CDPP within the Revised
MOU. Thus, according to Q35 above, the only indication as to what may be within
the LOC provided to the applicant, is (1) that the CDPP recognises that the applicant
has secured the ‘first marker’ status with the ACCC in its application for immunity
and (2) stipulates that the Director of the CDPP ‘intends to grant an undertaking.’
This does not resolve the major question of whether or not the LOC will provide the
applicant with sufficient certainty to be able to fully cooperate with the CDPP in
providing incriminating evidence before an undertaking is granted. In its current
form, it is unclear what rights and responsibilities an applicant would have in the
event that the CDPP decides not to grant an undertaking after it concludes its
deliberations.
In contrast, the United States DOJ does not offer ‘letters of comfort’ to a
leniency applicant. The DOJ recognises that an immunity applicant may ‘want

130

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 68.
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission, above n 114, s 9: Liaison.
131

190

assurances up front’ but believes that ‘conditional leniency letters address that
need.’132 The DOJ FAQ points to the fact that many other voluntary disclosure
regimes of other prosecuting agencies do not provide an upfront guarantee of nonprosecution. The DOJ’s position is that if conditional leniency letters did not exist
then the applicant would have no assurances of leniency until the conclusion of the
investigation and prosecution of co-conspirators. Therefore, in the DOJ’s view, the
conditional leniency letter itself should provide sufficient certainty and transparency
to the applicant. This approach is said by the DOJ to have been ‘very effective’.133
The CMA on the other hand, does provide either letters of comfort or noaction letters regarding criminal prosecution. No-action letters or comfort letters are
generally issued ‘where the CMA decides only to undertake an investigation under
the CA98 or chooses not to investigate at all.’134 However, the CMA recognises that
a proper determination of whether a no-action letter or comfort letter will be issued is
usually at the end or nearing the end of an investigation. At the very minimum, the
CMA would need to examine the ‘substantial and most probative elements’ of the
immunity application and each substantial witness would need to be interviewed at
least once.135 In contrast to the ACCC policy, the CMA provides more guidance as to
the contents of the comfort letter and provides a template of a standard form ‘Noaction letter’.136 Although the CMA recognises that comfort letters may not avoid
uncertainty regarding criminal prosecution, it considers that the issuing of LOC’s
‘has proven to be effective in achieving its objectives.’137
On one view, the LOC provided by the ACCC can be seen as a step towards
addressing the uncertainty surrounding the granting of conditional criminal
immunity. The Immunity Policy states that the LOC will generally be provided at the
same time as the ACCC grants civil conditional immunity.138 However, it remains to
be seen whether or not this will overcome the significant delay that has been
experienced by those awaiting the CDPP to make a decision in relation to conditional
criminal immunity.
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One of the strongest concerns by the interviewees was the impact that this
delay can have on their clients when seeking immunity, on both their emotional state
of being and the long period of uncertainty that befalls them whilst awaiting the
CDPP’s decision. During this time, particularly for large corporations, business may
be halted or stalled in order to comply with the immunity requirements, which can
incur significant financial costs.
When probed for the reasons that might explain this delay, many different
answers were provided. Some believed that the delay was attributed to the alien
nature of conditional full immunity to the CDPP, who usually treats accomplices
harshly in accordance with its Prosecution Policy.139 Other explanations suggest that
there is a cultural enforcement clash between the ACCC and the CDPP. The
significantly divergent enforcement priorities to that of the ACCC may be a cause for
delay:
Interviewee: Well, again I suspect that the DPP's agenda is somewhat different to that of the
Commission. Like the Commission, as you know, is charged with the protection of the
consumer and cartel is a serious problem as far as the Commission is concerned and that's
justifiable. One can't really readily imagine a more egregious type of conduct to wreak
havoc on the welfare of consumers in the country, especially if it's a major cartel. The DPP, I
think, doesn't view that type of conduct as serious compared with some of its other major
criminal activities which may be serious crime of which I suspect there is quite a significant
amount that the DPP has to deal with given its risk resources and man power. So my belief is
that the DPP tends to put that type of conduct not in the serious basket and is more concerned
with other conduct and we'll get round to it when it can and I think that results in a significant
time lag.140

It is hoped that the implementation of a letter of comfort may help to
overcome the uncertainty associated with the delay in granting conditional criminal
immunity, although there is reason to doubt that this hope will be realised. In section
32 of the Immunity Policy, it states that ‘the CDPP and the ACCC have agreed to
procedures that will facilitate the granting of immunity in relation to cartel offences
at the same time as immunity in relation to civil proceedings.’141 It is not clear from
this paragraph whether these procedures are new and yet to be published in light of
the review, or whether they are referring to the new procedures that are outlined in
139
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the Revised MOU, relating to the establishment of relationship managers and regular
meetings between the ACCC and CDPP.142
Another key point of concern is that it is unclear from the Immunity Policy
and FAQ what legal rights an immunity applicant would have if the CDPP were to
revoke the letter of comfort. The ACCC needs to publish templates of the LOC, in
addition to publishing immunity agreement templates, in order to give applicants and
their advisors a clear idea of the nature of the letter, including the rights and
obligations incurred within it. This should be published on the ACCC Website.
The DOJ Model Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter provides an
appropriate foundational model. It states that compliance with the condition to
provide full, continuing, and complete cooperation is subject, but not limited to, a
range of obligations, such as providing a full exposition of facts; voluntarily
providing all documents in its possession; ensuring the full cooperation of its current
(and former) employees, including interviews or testimony; ensuring best efforts are
made to ensure that employees are truthful and candid in performing their
cooperation obligations; and providing restitution where appropriate.143 Most
notably, the leniency letter expressly recognises that former directors, officers and
employees are not covered by the Leniency Policy, but may be included in the
coverage of the conditional leniency letter. However, this is dependent upon a
number of factors, including whether the applicant company is ‘interested in
protecting them.’144
The Model Corporate Leniency Letter also clearly indicates the position of
applicants where immunity is revoked:
If at any time before Applicant is granted unconditional leniency the Antitrust
Division determines that Applicant (1) contrary to its representations in paragraph 1 of this
Agreement, is not eligible for leniency or (2) has not provided the cooperation required by
paragraph 2 of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be void, and the Antitrust Division may
revoke the conditional acceptance of Applicant into the Corporate Leniency Program. Before
the Antitrust Division makes a final determination to revoke Applicant's conditional
leniency, the Division will notify counsel for Applicant in writing of the recommendation of
Division staff to revoke the conditional acceptance of Applicant into the Corporate Leniency
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Program and will provide counsel an opportunity to meet with the Division regarding the
potential revocation. Should the Antitrust Division revoke the conditional acceptance of
Applicant into the Corporate Leniency Program, the Antitrust Division may thereafter initiate
a criminal prosecution against Applicant, without limitation. Should such a prosecution be
initiated, the Antitrust Division may use against Applicant in any such prosecution any
documents, statements, or other information provided to the Division at any time pursuant to
this Agreement by Applicant or by any of its current [or former] directors, officers, or
employees. Applicant understands that the Antitrust Division's Leniency Program is an
exercise of the Division's prosecutorial discretion, and Applicant agrees that it may not, and
will not, seek judicial review of any Division decision to revoke its conditional leniency
unless and until it has been charged by indictment or information for engaging in
the anticompetitive activity being reported.145

This paragraph states clearly the process by which the leniency applicant
would need to take in order to address the DOJ’s decision to revoke. By signing the
leniency letter, the applicant acknowledges that in the event the DOJ decides to
revoke the agreement, the DOJ may initiate a criminal prosecution. This will be
discussed further in the following section.
The introduction of the LOCs does not directly address the underlying issues
associated with the sufficiency of information needed for criminal immunity or the
significant cultural differences that exist between the ACCC and the CDPP. These
issues were prominent in the discussions with the interviewees who deemed them to
be very important to Australia’s anti-cartel enforcement regime.146
In terms of predicting the success of the relationship between the ACCC and
CDPP, it is often helpful to analyse relationships of a similar nature. The closest
bifurcated model in Australia would be the relationship between the CDPP and the
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). ASIC is an independent
Commonwealth Body responsible for the regulation of Australia’s corporate, markets
and financial services. ASIC and the CDPP entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding in 1992 that was updated in 1996.147
In a similar vein to the ACCC, ASIC will refer criminal prosecution to the
CDPP if ASIC deems there to be sufficient evidence to prosecute. In this way, ASIC
is the investigatory body and the CDPP is the prosecuting body. The key difference
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is that ASIC does not offer immunity to those who come forward and disclose
offences; indemnity can be sought in relation to criminal offences, but indemnity is
available in relatively narrow circumstances under Section 6 of the Prosecution
Policy.
Despite the relationship between the CDPP and ASIC having existed over the
past 22 years, ASIC has come under severe scrutiny for its perceived lack of criminal
enforcement. The former Chairman of ASIC has been quoted as saying ‘Australia is
a paradise for corporate criminals.’148 However, a number of high profile cases have
been prosecuted successfully, for example the HIH case.149 There also exists an
important difference between the enforcement regimes of the ACCC and ASIC, as
ASIC does not currently have an immunity policy. This may partly explain why
ASIC has had difficulties in bringing criminal proceedings. On the other hand, ASIC
and the CDPP have had over 20 years to perfect their working relationship, which
casts doubt on the presumption by some interviewees that the relationship between
the ACCC and the CDPP simply needs time to develop. Thus far, the ACCC and
CDPP have had five years to bring a criminal cartel case, but no prosecution has yet
resulted.

(b)

The Credibility Of Accomplice Evidence

One central concern for the ACCC and CDPP gearing up for the first
contested criminal trial is the likelihood that the immunity applicant’s evidence will
be challenged on the ground of lack of credibility. It is a long held tradition that the
prosecution will seek the testimony of an accomplice to prove its criminal case and
this practice is widely accepted.150 Generally this involves the prosecution offering a
148
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‘reward’ in the form of lenient treatment or immunity for a crime, in exchange for
the accomplice agreeing to cooperate and testify for the prosecution in a criminal
trial.
Although the courts may recognise that the accomplice may have the
incentive to perjure or embellish its role in the offence, they deem that the value of
the information obtained through such agreements outweighs the danger of its
potential unreliability.151 Moreover, the prosecutor will argue that the accomplice
should be believed because they will lose the benefits of the agreement should they
fail to tell the truth.152
On the other hand, the defence is likely to argue that the accomplice will say
anything in order to reap the benefits of the agreement. In this way, the defence will
seek to discredit the accomplice in order to persuade the jury that the evidence
provided by the accomplice is self-interested and unreliable. Given that cartel
conduct is now an offence in Australia, it is anticipated that there may be a contested
criminal case in the future. If Australia adopts the United States approach, the
instances of a contested criminal case are likely to be rare, given that 90per cent of
criminal convictions in the United States are obtained by guilty plea.153 Moreover,
the United States DOJ rarely goes to trial for corporate price-fixing, especially where
there are large corporate defendants involved.154
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However, the ACCC and CDPP need to prepare for the possibility that the
immunity applicant’s evidence is likely to be challenged on the ground of lack of
credibility, leading to possible acquittal of the defendant. Many defence lawyers in
the United States have used this strategy in criminal cartel trials, which has resulted
in acquittals of the defendant based on the unreliability of the immunised witness.155
The Australian Courts have found many accomplice witnesses to be unreliable,
which has resulted in judges instructing the jury to deem to evidence as a category
that is inherently unreliable.156 In the United States, there are specific jury warnings
that the court must provide the jury in cases of criminal cartel trials.157 In Australia,
the court must instruct the jury to deem the evidence of an accomplice as unreliable:
(2) If there is a jury and a party so requests, the judge is to:
(a) warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable; and
(b) inform the jury of matters that may cause it to be unreliable; and
(c) warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the
evidence and the weight to be given to it.158

The court is not required to give this instruction if ‘there are good reasons for
not doing it.’159 This contrasts to the position in the United States, where there are
specific rules in criminal cartel cases that require a separate jury instruction for
witnesses who have received immunity and testify pursuant to the DOJ leniency
policy. The instruction states: ‘[y]ou should bear in mind that testimony from such a
witness is always to be received with caution and weighed with great care.’160
Given the strong possibility that the immunised testimony is likely to be
attacked for its lack of credibility, the ACCC and CDPP should consider the potential
consequences of this, and ensure that the evidence is sufficiently corroborated with
information independent of the accomplice.
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D

Revocation of Cartel Immunity

If the situation were to arise where the ACCC or CDPP revoked immunity,
the consequences for the immunity applicant would be serious. This is due to the fact
that the immunity applicant would have provided incriminating evidence in relation
to its involvement in the cartel conduct as a result of fulfilling its obligations
pursuant to the policy. If the circumstances and consequences of revocation are not
clearly outlined, this dilutes the transparency of the policy and could potentially
hinder future immunity applications, which rely on the certainty of guaranteed
upfront immunity. Most importantly, if immunity were revoked, the ACCC or CDPP
may take legal action against the former applicant using the incriminating evidence
the applicant provided in their immunity application.161
According to one interviewee, there have been some instances where an
immunity applicant was allegedly not complying with its immunity obligations and
the ACCC contemplated revocation of the applicant’s immunity.162 Aside from this
situation, there has never been a formal revocation of immunity in Australia. Nor has
there been an instance of revocation of immunity in the United Kingdom and
Canada. The respective policies make it clear that revocation is an option of last
resort and that the decision to revoke is taken very seriously.163
In contrast, the United States DOJ has revoked its leniency policy in one
instance, resulting in the Stolt-Nielsen case.164 The consequences of this case
potentially undermine the operation of the immunity policy, as it vests sole discretion
in the DOJ relating to its leniency decisions, leaving no room for judicial review.165
Even if the case itself did not adversely impact the operation of the DOJ’s leniency
policy, it provides some useful lessons for the ACCC. The consequences of this
decision will be explored further in this section. Although the instances of revocation
may be rare, the serious consequences of revocation warrant that this issue be given
careful attention and clarification.
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1

The ACCC’s Position
Prior to the review of the policy, the process by which the ACCC would

undertake in the event of revocation was not stated in any detail.166 Thus, it was not
clear what would occur in the event that one of the requirements of the Immunity
Policy was not met, or what would happen in the event there were issues of noncompliance with the Immunity Policy criteria. It was sufficiently certain that the
ACCC had a right to revoke immunity, but it was not clear whether the applicant
would be entitled to seek reasons from the ACCC regarding its decision to revoke, or
what process of review would likely be available to an applicant seeking to appeal
the ACCC’s decision to revoke.167
Pursuant to the ACCC review, the ACCC asked for comments in relation to
its decision to ‘withdraw’ immunity.168 In these consultations, it was submitted that
the current process was unclear and that further detail was needed surrounding the
process of appealing an ACCC decision to revoke immunity and the reasons for such
a decision.
In response to these consultations, the Draft Immunity Policy issued by the
ACCC stated in Section F that if the ACCC had concerns about the applicant’s
compliance with the Immunity Policy then it would issue a written caution; if the
dispute could not be resolved informally.169 If the ACCC was not satisfied with the
applicant’s response, it would then request the applicant provide an explanation as to
why their conditional immunity should not be revoked.170 If the ACCC was not
satisfied with the applicant’s response, then it would advise them in writing that
‘they no longer qualify for immunity.’ The only mention of the revocation of
conditional criminal immunity was in the last line of Section F that stated: that in the
event the ACCC revokes conditional civil immunity, it will also recommend to the
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CDPP that conditional criminal immunity be revoked. This position in relation to
revocation did not change in the final release of the Immunity Policy.
In the interviews, the former Chairman of the ACCC stated that it simply
sought to clarify in the policy what was already the well-established process for
resolving non-compliance disputes and that an explicit revocation provision was not
necessary.171 However, it was also submitted in the response to the Draft Policy that
the reviewability of the ACCC’s decision to revoke was also a serious issue that
needed clarification. Once again, this issue was not addressed in the final release of
the Immunity Policy. The reviewability of ACCC’s decisions has featured in many of
the discussions with the interviewees, particularly the legal character of the immunity
policy. One interviewee questioned whether a court could review the policy:
Interviewee: It is discretionary. It’s an administrative policy, it has no force of law. It’s a
prosecution discretion whether to grant or not grant and it’s a prosecution discretion whether
to withdraw it or not, so it’s not really enforceable in a sense, it’s just a policy, prosecution
policy. So it’s not a contract. It’s not a legislative instrument so what its character is has
never been tested in Australia actually.172

Despite the submission, the reviewability of an ACCC immunity-related
decision was not incorporated into the final Immunity Policy, which remains unclear
in this respect. If an immunity applicant wishes to appeal a final revocation decision
by the ACCC, there is no prescribed process of appeal in the policy nor is there a
body of review specified to review the decision by the ACCC. Thus, the ACCC
cannot be held accountable for any of its decisions relating to the Immunity Policy.
This infringes upon one of the fundamental precepts of public policy of ensuring that
government decisions are accountable.173 The applicant would have provided
incriminating evidence of their involvement in the cartel conduct to the ACCC and
CDPP174 pursuant to their immunity cooperation and disclosure obligations175 and
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would have no clear indication of the appeal process nor does the ACCC have any
obligation to provide reasons for its decisions.
The potential consequences of a decision to revoke immunity are even more
serious in the context of conditional criminal immunity. It was submitted to the
ACCC that the position regarding the decision to revoke by the CDPP is even more
uncertain than that of the ACCC. This uncertainty may be justified provided that the
CDPP’s discretion is exercised consistently and fairly and is accountable to some
extent. On the other hand, a regulator having a wide discretion to initiate proceedings
also serves the public interest. Thus, judicial review of prosecutorial discretion could
potentially result in multiple review claims, which could place strain on the court’s
resources. To strike the appropriate balance, it is important that clarification is
provided in the Immunity Policy, or in a revised Memorandum of Understanding
between the ACCC and the CDPP, stating that the revocation of criminal immunity
is not subject to judicial review, if that is the position the CDPP wishes to adopt. At
present, the CDPP Prosecution Policy states that the DPP may withdraw a letter of
comfort or revoke a written undertaking provided under section 9(6D) of the DPP
Act:
‘at any time during the investigation and prior to the conclusion of criminal proceedings if:
5.1.2 the ACCC makes a recommendation to withdraw the letter of comfort or revoke the
undertaking, and the DPP or Director, exercising an independent discretion, agrees with that
recommendation; or 5.1.3 the DPP or Director believes on reasonable grounds that: (i) the
recipient of the letter of comfort or undertaking has provided information to the DPP that is
false or misleading in a relevant matter; and/or (ii) the recipient of the letter of comfort or
undertaking has not fulfilled any condition(s) of the letter of comfort or undertaking.
5.2 The DPP will notify the recipient in writing if a letter of comfort is to be withdrawn or an
undertaking is to be revoked, and the recipient will be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
make representations.176

Essentially, the CDPP’s process of revocation mirrors that of the ACCC and does
not prescribe a method of dispute resolution in the event an applicant seeks to appeal

information against the immunity applicant (and any related corporate entities and any
directors, officers or employees of the applicant whose immunity has also been revoked) in
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the final decision to revoke by the CPPP. The Revised MOU does not offer any
guidance in relation to the issue; it does not even mention the possibility of
revocation.177 The revocation of conditional criminal immunity carries with it the
potential for imprisonment and is therefore an area that needs to be transparent.
Two important related questions arise in this context:
(1) What is the process for review of an ACCC decision to revoke once a final
decision has been made?
(2) Is there a process for review of a CDPP decision to revoke once a final
decision has been made?
In order to answer these two questions, it is necessary to examine the legal
character of the Immunity Policy by reference to: (a) Legislation (b) Administrative
Review (c) Contract.
This section will provide a brief analysis of the different intersections of the
policy in relation to its legal character to highlight how unsatisfactory the current
position is and reinforce the need for further development and transparency in this
area.178 This section will conclude with a call for further clarification as to the legal
character and reviewability of an ACCC and CDPP decision to revoke immunity, as
well as an argument for the best avenue of redress.

(a)

Legislation

Whilst the ACCC and the CDPP form part of the Executive branch of the
government, the legal basis of the Immunity Policy is currently derived from public
policy statements. The policy is not currently legislated. The policy itself simply
states that it is a ‘policy document.’179 It was suggested by some of the interviewees
that if the policy were legislated it would clarify the legal character of the policy and
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set out the rights and obligations of an immunity applicant in the event of
revocation.180
There is some support for the proposal that the policy should be legislated.
This approach could be achieved in a few ways. For instance, the firm Arnold Bloch
Lieber, in its submission to the ACCC’s review of the policy, put forward that the
conditions for immunity should be set out in legislation and this could be achieved in
the following ways:
- a statutory defence to cartel proceedings of having made an immunity application that
satisfied the relevant conditions; or
- a statutory power given to the ACCC to grant immunity from cartel proceedings (similar to
the ACCC's power to authorise anticompetitive conduct prospectively).181

In relation to these two options, the second option is preferable because it
directly invests the ACCC with the power to grant immunity and makes it clear that
the ACCC has this authority.
There are two main reasons why the Immunity Policy should be legislated.
The first is that, despite being a policy document, the decisions related to the
granting or revocation of immunity affects the legal rights and obligations of the
immunity applicants and therefore it should be clear where the power to affect these
legal rights and obligations is derived from. Secondly, if the policy were to be
legislated, it could make clear that the decision to revoke immunity is subject to
independent judicial or merits review. This would overcome the difficulties
associated with the current position where an applicant is left without any formal
direction as to how to proceed with an appeal of an ACCC’s final decision to revoke
immunity. More importantly, the ACCC could make it clear that the applicant may
have no such right of review.
However, as with any call for legislation there needs to be political support for its
introduction. Despite the calls for clarification of the appeal process of ACCC
decisions in submissions to the ACCC, the regulator has not currently shown any
interest in legislating the policy. Instead, the ACCC chose to set out the revocation
procedures outlined above and remained silent in relation to any right or process of
appeal of its revocation decisions.
180
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Therefore it is unlikely that there will be sufficient political support to lead to the
introduction of a legislated Immunity Policy. This doubt was also expressed by some
of the interviewees.182 Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have also
not implemented the policy into legislation.

(b)

Administrative Review

Judicial review of an administrative decision in Australia is made pursuant to the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’). Section 3
states that a decision will be capable of judicial review pursuant to the act where the
decision was made:
(a) under an enactment referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) of the definition of enactment
;or
(b) by a Commonwealth authority or an officer of the Commonwealth under an enactment
referred to in paragraph (ca) or (cb) of the definition of enactment ; other than:
(c) a decision by the Governor-General; or
(d) a decision included in any of the classes of decisions set out in Schedule 1.

An “enactment” according to this section is defined as:
(a) an Act, other than:
(i) the Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970 ; or
(ii) the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 ; or
(iii) an Act or part of an Act that is not an enactment because of section 3A (certain
legislation relating to the ACT); or
(b) an Ordinance of a Territory other than the Australian Capital Territory or the Northern
Territory; or]
(c) an instrument (including rules, regulations or by-laws) made under such an Act or under such
an Ordinance, other than any such instrument that is not an enactment because of section 3A;
or
(ab) an Act of a State, the Australian Capital Territory or the Northern Territory, or
a part of such an Act, described in Schedule 3; or
(ac) an instrument (including rules, regulations or by-laws) made under an Act or
part of an Act covered by paragraph (ca); or
(d) any other law, or a part of a law, of the Northern Territory declared by the regulations, in
accordance with section 19A, to be an enactment for the purposes of this Act; and, for the
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purposes of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (ca) or (cb), includes a part of an enactment.183

Whether the decision by the ACCC to revoke the Immunity Policy is open to
judicial review turns on the definition of a ‘decision made under an enactment.’ This
definition appears to be broad and all encompassing, but its interpretation is complex
and vexed and the Australian courts are yet to reach a definitive view.184 This section
will briefly analyse the case-law that has had the most significant impact on the
interpretation of what constitutes a ‘decision made under an enactment’ to determine
whether the Immunity Policy would fall under this interpretation and thus be capable
of review pursuant to the ADJR Act.
The case of Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) concerned the
fitness of license-holders to hold broadcasting licenses, which required a
determination as to whether that license holder was a fit and proper person to hold
the license. This was a preliminary determination prior to the decision as to whether
to revoke or suspend the licenses.185 This called into question the definition of what
constitutes a ‘decision’ for the purposes of review under the ADJR Act.
Chief Justice Mason decided that a decision must be of a ‘final or operative
and determinative’ quality and that it must be a decision ‘authorised or required’ by
statute in order to be subject to review pursuant to the ADJR Act.186 This
interpretation significantly narrowed the scope of review pursuant to the Act.187
Applying this decision to the ACCC’s decision to revoke, the question would be
whether the decision could be deemed to be ‘final and determinative.’ The court has
been required to interpret the meaning of ‘final, operative or determinative’, in
relation to the reviewability of decisions to initiate proceedings in Re Toll and
Australian Securities Commission.188 The court held that a series of administrative
steps could not be regarded as a decision that is capable of review:
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Until guilt or innocence is determined, all acts done leading up to the court's
findings, cannot be regarded as anything other than acts done preparatory to the making of a
decision which will be reviewable in accordance with appropriate law at an appropriate
time.189

On this interpretation, the decision to revoke immunity may also be seen as
an ‘administrative step’ that is preparatory to the making of the ACCC’s decision to
initiate proceedings and is therefore not ‘final or determinative.’ The Administrative
Review Council has also held that decisions to initiate proceedings are inappropriate
for merits review.190
Thus, on the basis of the Bond decision, it is unlikely that the ACCC’s
decision to revoke immunity would be capable of review pursuant to the ADJR Act.
This is compounded by the fact that it is unlikely that a decision to revoke immunity
could be ‘authorised or required’ by statute, as the Immunity Policy is not a
legislated policy.
In NEAT Domestic v Australian Wheat Board (AWBI)191 the definition was
again called into question when AWBI, a company that occupied a legislative
monopoly as the sole exporter of bulk quantities of wheat, denied consent to the
NEAT company of an exemption to that monopoly. NEAT appealed this decision by
seeking judicial review. The majority of the High Court analysed the respective
statutory roles of the claimants in the relevant provisions, and found that AWBI drew
power to grant or refuse consent by its incorporation rather than its wider statutory
framework within which wheat export decisions were made.192
Therefore the refusal to give consent by AWBI was not made ‘under an
enactment’ within the meaning of the Act. The argument could be made that the
ACCC occupies a similar position to that of the AWBI in that the ACCC does not
draw its power to make revocation decisions from any specific statutory power. The
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) establishes the ACCC but does not
prescribe any specific powers or functions of the ACCC, except broadly to enforce
the Act itself.193 Furthermore, there was wide criticism of the NEAT decision,
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asserting that it further restricted the scope of the ADJR Act since the Bond decision
and impacted on public accountability of administrative decisions more generally.194
However, the most recent significant decision relating to the definition of a
‘decision made under an enactment’ was Griffith University v Tang.195 This case
concerned a PhD student enrolled at Griffith University, whose candidature was
revoked as a result of academic misconduct. The student sought to appeal the
decision pursuant to the ADJR Act. The University argued that the decision to expel
the student was made pursuant to an administrative code, and therefore did not come
within the ambit of a ‘decision made under an enactment.’ The majority of the court
endorsed a two-pronged test for the determination of whether a decision is made
under an enactment:
The determination of whether a decision is ‘made … under an enactment’ involves two
criteria: first, the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the
enactment; and, secondly, the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights
or obligations, and in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment.196

The student’s claim satisfied the first limb but failed on the second as it was
found by the court that the relationship between the student and the University was
based on ‘mutual consent’ and therefore did not affect legal rights and obligations.197
As a result of this case, there has been academic comment surrounding the position
of decisions made under ‘soft law,’ such as guidelines, policies and manuals that are
commonly utilised in the public sector.198 According to Groves, this is due to the
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distinction that the majority drew in Tang between the statute that established the
University and the administrative rules under which the expulsion decision was
made.199
The Immunity Policy is also a ‘soft law’ decision, as it is a public policy
document that has not been legislated. It could be argued that it is implied under the
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) that the ACCC has the power to make
decisions in relation to the enforcement of the Act, which could include the
development of enforcement policies that assist in achieving the aims of the Act.
This would potentially satisfy the first limb on the Tang test. A decision to revoke
immunity could likely be seen as affecting legal rights and obligations, pursuant to
the second limb in Tang. However, arguably there is a distinction between the
Competition Act establishing the ACCC and the enforcement tools that the ACCC
chooses to utilise in enforcing its powers. This distinction is not as clear as that in the
Tang case, thus there is likely to be a stronger case for ADJR review of the Immunity
Policy then the administrative code in Tang.
Of particular importance to the analysis of the Immunity Policy is the longstanding exemption of judicial review for decisions made as a result of ‘prosecutorial
discretion.’ According to the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC),
‘prosecutorial discretion’ refers to the choice, by the regulator or the DPP, whether or
not to impose an administrative penalty, to commence penalty proceedings or to
target a particular person for investigation that may ultimately lead to the imposition
of penalties. The exercise of this discretion may be guided by formal or informal
agency guidelines.’200 The decisions of both the ACCC and the CDPP relating to
immunity would be a result of an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and hence
within the exemption of prosecutorial discretion from judicial review.
The common law position states that decisions made pursuant to prosecutorial
discretion are not subject to judicial review:
It ought now be accepted, in our view, that certain decisions involved in the prosecution
process are, of their nature, insusceptible of judicial review. They include decisions whether
or not to prosecute, to enter a nolle prosequi, to proceed ex officio, whether or not to present
evidence and, which is usually an aspect of one or other of those decisions, decisions as to
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the particular charge to be laid or prosecuted. The integrity of the judicial process —
particularly, its independence and impartiality and the public perception thereof — would be
compromised if the courts were to decide or were to be in any way concerned with decisions
as to who is to be prosecuted and for what.201

Whether decisions made as a result of prosecutorial discretion will be subject to
judicial review under the ADJR Act is not certain. There is some precedent that
supports judicial review of prosecutorial decisions relating to civil penalties but the
court has held that these must satisfy the test enunciated in Bond where the Act will
only apply to decisions that are ultimate or operative determinations and not
expressions of opinion.202 As indicated above, the Bond decision provides a very
narrow interpretation of ‘under an enactment.’ Given that the Immunity Policy is not
expressly stated in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) nor it is expressly
or even indirectly referenced as a function or power of the ACCC then it is unlikely
to satisfy the Bond test.
In a report by the ALRC into the scope of judicial review in Australia, there were
a number of submissions relating to whether decisions made in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion should be subject to judicial review.203 According to the
report, there were mixed responses in relation to this question. ASIC in particular
was against the position that the decision to initiate criminal, civil and administrative
action should be subject to judicial review as ASIC believes it is not a ‘substantive
decision because it was not final, operative and determinative’ and that allowing
judicial review in this respect ‘might encourage a proliferation of actions that could
delay or frustrate the process of justice.’204
Therefore, the key argument that would need to be made by an immunity
applicant seeking judicial review of a decision to revoke by the ACCC would be to
show that the decision regarding revocation is ‘final, operative and determinative’ in
accordance with the relevant case law tests. As evidenced by this discussion, it is
unlikely that the ACCC’s decision to revoke immunity would satisfy this test, as it is
an administrative step that could lead to the commencement of legal proceedings.
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The path to proving the decision is ‘final or determinative’ is thus very complex and
it is uncertain which view the courts will adopt. The situation is even more
precarious in the context of the decision to revoke immunity by the CDPP as
decisions relating to the criminal process are specifically excluded from the purview
of the ADJR Act and also the Judiciary Act.205 On this basis, an immunity applicant
would unlikely be able to seek judicial review of a decision to revoke by the CDPP.
If this is the position that the ACCC and CDPP wish to adopt, then this should be
expressly incorporated in the Immunity Policy, for the sake of clarity and
transparency.

(c)

Contract
(i) Is There A Binding Contract Between The ACCC/CDPP And The Immunity
Applicant?
The question of whether the ACCC enters into a contractual relationship with

an immunity applicant was not addressed in the ACCC’s recent review of the policy.
If the immunity agreement is a contract in law then a breach of that contract would
be actionable in the Federal Court.
In contrast to the other comparable regulators, the ACCC does not publish
Model Immunity Agreements that list the standard terms of the agreement with an
immunity applicant.206 Therefore it is likely that the ACCC’s Immunity Policy would
be seen as an invitation to the whole world, in which the offeree accepts the offer by
performing his or her side of the bargain.207 In the context of immunity, this means
the ACCC and/or the CDPP is bound to perform the obligations pursuant to the
Immunity Policy at the point that the immunity applicant undertakes its performance
of its immunity obligations. The acceptance of this agreement will occur where the
acts required for acceptance are performed on the basis of the offer.208
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The consideration in this context would be an exchange of promises, whereby
the immunity applicant agrees to fulfil the terms of the agreement, by providing
information and assistance to the ACCC/CDPP in relation to the cartel investigation,
and in return, the ACCC/CDPP promises to immunise the applicant from civil or
criminal proceedings.209 On this basis, the ACCC’s immunity agreement would likely
create a binding contractual agreement with the first applicant who performs the
obligations listed in the policy on the basis of that offer. There is academic and
judicial support for the view that plea agreements and non-prosecution agreements
constitute contractual agreements.210
If the ACCC enters into an agreement that is similar to those published by regulators
in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, this agreement would be a
bilateral contract.211

(ii) If The Immunity Policy Does Create a Contract, What Conduct Would
Constitute A Breach?

In order to establish whether there has been a breach of contract, it is
important to look at the terms of the agreement to ascertain whether they create the
right to terminate (or revoke) the policy. Essential conditions, or conditions that
strike at the heart of a contract, give rise to an automatic right to terminate, even for a
minor breach of these terms.212 The key question in ascertaining an essential
condition would be: have the parties only entered into the contract on the
understanding that there would be a strict compliance with the particular term.213 This
question is determined objectively, having regard to the terms of the contract and the
surrounding circumstances.214
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The criteria stipulated in the ACCC policy indicate that strict compliance
with those terms will lead to the granting of civil conditional immunity. Given the
importance of the offer, in terms of offering upfront, complete immunity from
prosecution, each of the criteria listed is likely to be viewed objectively by both
parties as being essential terms of the contract.215 Therefore, a breach of any of these
terms could give rise to the right to terminate (or revoke) the immunity agreement.
Alternatively, the actions by the ACCC or CDPP could be seen as a
repudiation of the immunity contract. Repudiation refers to the situation where one
party manifests an unwillingness or inability to perform his or her obligations under
the contract, in which event; the other party will have the right to terminate.216
Repudiatory conduct must be fundamental to the contract.217 It can be found by a
prosecutor’s express statement that they will revoke immunity or their conduct
showing an inability or unwillingness to perform.218
In the context of immunity, if the ACCC or the CDPP decide to revoke
immunity, this could constitute repudiatory conduct. For example, consider the
situation where the ACCC or CDPP write to the applicant stating that the applicant is
in breach of an immunity obligation because there is evidence to suggest that an
employee of the applicant is still in contact with the former cartel participants. If the
immunity applicant addresses this issue, by reprimanding the employee or by
producing proof that it is a false allegation, the applicant would then contact the
ACCC to inform them of this. If the ACCC did not respond to the applicant within a
reasonable timeframe, despite the applicant’s numerous attempts to contact the
ACCC, then this may show an unwillingness to perform on the ACCC’s behalf.
If the ACCC or CDPP take steps toward prosecuting the immunity applicant,
by issuing a letter indicating that the applicant’s immunity has been revoked, then
this conduct could also constitute repudiation.

(iii) Remedy for Breach
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In the context of immunity, breach of contract by the ACCC or CDPP would lead to
the revocation of the policy and the prosecution of the applicant civilly or criminally,
depending on the case against the applicant. The most common remedy for a breach
of contract is a claim for damages: ‘Where a party sustains a loss by reason of a
breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation
with respect to damages as if the contract had been performed.’219
In the context of the revocation of immunity, it is the threat or actual
prosecution of the corporation that will cause the most damage to the applicant. It is
well documented that the threat of civil or criminal proceedings can cause significant
economic loss to a company in terms of the time and resources necessary to defend a
case but also the publicity associated with a potential finding of guilt, which can also
lead to significant financial loss.220 Moreover, relationships with suppliers and
business partners may be adversely impacted where people are dissociating
themselves from a corporation, particularly if the prosecution results in a criminal
conviction.221 Arguably, these consequences cannot be accurately or sufficiently
quantified, as in some cases, damage to reputation is irreparable. Nonetheless, the
courts will strive to quantify these losses, even where the calculations are complex.222
If an award of damages is deemed to be inadequate, an aggrieved applicant
may wish to appeal to the Courts discretion for an equitable award of specific
performance or an injunction. An award of specific performance would essentially
compel the ACCC/CDPP to continue with the immunity agreement by not
prosecuting the applicant.223 Alternatively, an injunction would prevent the
ACCC/CDPP from initiating proceedings against the former immunity applicant.
The former immunity applicant would need to show the Court that an award
of damages would be inadequate to prevent the irreparable harm caused by civil or
criminal prosecution and that an award of specific performance or an injunction
would be the more equitable and just remedy in the circumstances.224
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The remedy of specific performance is not granted readily and is subject to a
number of discretionary factors, especially where the decision may involve the
continued supervision by the court.225 Given the serious consequences associated
with the threat of prosecution, the court may find that this is enough to warrant a
grant of specific performance or alternatively an injunction. However, this decision
would be made in the exercise of the court’s discretion.

2
(a)

Recommendation
Alternative Solution: Insert Provision into Immunity Policy
As discussed above, construing the immunity agreement in accordance with

contractual principles provides the clearest and most easily attainable method of
review of a decision to revoke compared to the unlikelihood that the policy will be
legislated or the difficulties associated with seeking review via the ADJR Act.
However, the simplest and most effective way to make a revocation decision
reviewable would be to insert an express provision into the Immunity Policy that
clearly stipulates who the arbitrator or mediator of an immunity dispute is to be. If
not the court, then the ACCC/CDPP could stipulate an independent and impartial
body or person to review the decision.
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’) could serve as an appropriate
avenue for ACCC’s decisions made pursuant to the Immunity Policy to be reviewed
on its merits. The question in merits review is whether the decision is substantively
correct.226 Should the AAT disagree with the decision that was reached, it can
ordinarily substitute a new decision.227 Section 63 of the Administrative Decisions
Review Act 1997 (NSW) sets out the powers of the Tribunal:
63 Determination of administrative review by Tribunal
(1) In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an
administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable
decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:
(a) any relevant factual material,
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(b) any applicable written or unwritten law.
(2) For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed
by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision.
(3) In determining an application for the administrative review of an administratively reviewable
decision, the Tribunal may decide:
(a) to affirm the administratively reviewable decision, or
(b) to vary the administratively reviewable decision, or
(c) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for
the administratively reviewable decision it set aside, or
(d) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration
by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.

Alternatively, the decision could be remitted to the original decision maker
(the ACCC) for reconsideration of the decision, subject to the directions or
recommendations made by the AAT or another appropriate arbitrator.
The AAT is vested with the same powers and discretions as the original
decision-maker, the ACCC, so that the tribunal can ‘stand in the shoes’ of the ACCC
when determining what was the correct or preferable decision based on a thorough
consideration of the evidence.228 The ACCC currently utilises a similar process of
review for its authorisation decisions through the Australian Competition Tribunal
(‘ACT’).229 Similarly to the AAT, the ACT is tasked with a re-hearing of the
application where the ACT is vested with the same functions and powers as the
ACCC.230 Given that the ACCC is familiar with this process of review, the
jurisdiction of the ACT could be extended to include ACCC decisions made pursuant
to the Immunity Policy.
Alternatively, it has been suggested that a retired judge could perform this
function.231 Inserting an express dispute resolution provision into the Immunity
Policy would provide for the most efficient use of time and resources in the event of
revocation, especially when compared to the alternative avenues discussed in this
section. Therefore, it would not only be for the benefit of the applicants but also for
the ACCC and CDPP that they clarify the avenue for review in the Immunity Policy,
if one does exist at all.
228
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3

The Position Overseas

The guidance offered by the CMA and the Competition Bureau in relation to a
decision to revoke immunity is similar to that of the ACCC. Essentially, the regulator
will provide the applicant with notice that they may be in breach of the Immunity
Policy and the applicant is given time to respond to this notice.232 In the case of
criminal immunity, the CMA may revoke leniency subject to the following
conditions:
•

the recipient of a letter ceases to satisfy in whole or in part any of the relevant

conditions …or
•

the recipient of a letter has knowingly or recklessly provided information that is

false or misleading in a material particular.233

The Competition Bureau refers to the Federal Prosecution Handbook in relation
to the DPP’s decision to revoke conditional criminal immunity. Under s 35.8:
It may become necessary to seek a remedy against a person previously granted immunity
where that person:
•

withdraws promised co-operation with the Crown;

•

fails to be truthful when testifying;

•

has wilfully or recklessly misled the investigating agency or Crown counsel about
material facts concerning the case including factors relevant to that person's
reliability and credibility as a witness; or

•

has sought immunity by conduct amounting to a fraud or an obstruction of justice.

Whether the person should be indicted if this occurs, either for the offence for which he or
she sought immunity or for some other offence, will depend on the circumstances of each
case. However, the terms of the agreement with the person and the manner in which it was
breached will be important considerations.234

Whilst the criteria relating to the revocation of conditional criminal immunity
are more detailed than those in the ACCC policy, both of these policies do not
stipulate an appeal process in the case where immunity is revoked and an applicant
seeks to appeal the final decision. The position in the United States prior to the Stolt232
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Nielsen decision was similar to that currently stipulated in the immunity policies of
the ACCC, CMA and Competition Bureau. The United States policy previously
stated that in the event that immunity was revoked, the applicant would be afforded
the opportunity to make representations in relation to the potential decision to
revoke.235

(a)

The Consequences Of Stolt Nielsen

This section will provide a brief overview of the case that resulted from the
DOJ’s first revocation of its leniency policy: The Stolt Neilson case. It will then
analyse the consequences of the decision with a view to formulating lessons for the
Australian context. The case involved an immunity applicant, Samuel Cooperman, an
executive of SNTG (Stolt-Neilson Transportation Group), requesting an immunity
marker based on limited information about the company’s involvement in cartel
conduct. Counsel for the applicant immediately contacted the Division (DOJ) to
establish a marker before an internal investigation was conducted. SNTG was
granted a marker despite the fact that the company’s internal investigation had not
yet commenced but at that time the DOJ’s own investigation failed to turn up any
misrepresentations by SNTG.236 However, the DOJ then sought to revoke the marker
and leniency based on an alleged misrepresentation made at a meeting before the
internal investigation had commenced.237 SNTG argued that the decision to revoke
immunity should be subject to pre-indictment review.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with SNTG’s argument but this
decision was overturned in the Appellate courts. The consequence of this was that
those who enter into an immunity agreement with the DOJ are not entitled to a preindictment review, meaning that the DOJ can indict an immunity applicant without
first establishing that the applicant is actually in breach of the agreement.238 As a
result of the decision, the DOJ inserted the following provision into the standard
immunity agreements in order to preclude immunity decisions from judicial review:
235
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28. When can an applicant or its employees judicially challenge a Division decision to
revoke conditional leniency?
Paragraph #3 of the model corporate and individual conditional leniency letters states that the
applicant "understands that the Antitrust Division's Leniency Program is an exercise of the
Division's prosecutorial discretion, and [it/he/she] agrees that [it/he/she] may not, and will
not, seek judicial review of any Division decision to revoke [its/his/her] conditional leniency
unless and until [it/he/she] has been charged by indictment or information for engaging in the
anticompetitive activity being reported." Paragraph #4 of the model corporate conditional
leniency letter also notes that "[j]udicial review of any Antitrust Division decision to revoke
[an individual's] conditional non-prosecution protection granted [under the corporate
conditional leniency letter] is not available unless and until the individual has been charged
by indictment or information." The Division's leniency program is an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion generally not subject to judicial review. Accordingly, the proper
avenue to challenge a revocation of a leniency letter is to raise the letter as a defense postindictment. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 183-187 (3d Cir. 2006).239

The DOJ has clearly expressed within the FAQ and the model leniency
letters that decision to revoke is not subject to judicial review. This stands in contrast
to the ACCC, Competition Bureau and CMA policies that do not contain such a
provision. Therefore, the DOJ has the unilateral discretion to revoke its Immunity
Policy and indict an applicant previously protected by the agreement’s terms.240 This
approach has been criticised for failing to provide a check on the prosecutorial
discretion of the DOJ: immunity can now be revoked at any time without an avenue
of appeal or review process available to the previous immunity holder.241 Those
applicants who have already provided incriminating information in relation to their
involvement in the cartel conduct will be in a particularly precarious situation if the
decision is revoked.242
As a result of this case, the DOJ FAQ now states that the ‘proper avenue’ to
challenge a revocation of a leniency letter is to raise the letter as a defense postindictment.243 The FAQ does not provide any further detail in relation to this. On the
one hand, this could be seen to provide an adequate safeguard for an unjustified
revocation of the DOJ leniency policy. On the other hand though, if the revocation
was unjustified then the corporation would need to incur significant time and
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resources defending a criminal case that may have been avoided if there was another
process of independent review of the DOJ’s initial revocation decision.
Regardless of this issue, the position in the United States in relation to
revocation is at least clear that it is not subject to judicial review. This provides much
needed clarity that is currently absent from the ACCC, Competition Bureau and
CMA policies. There has been further suggestion that the Stolt Nielsen case has
improved other aspects of the United States leniency policy in terms of placing
stricter requirements on the marker process.244 Instead of granting the leniency
marker based on incomplete information, post Stolt Nielsen, the DOJ will require a
comprehensive investigation of the alleged cartel conduct by the company seeking a
marker.245 This is likely to prevent the situation that led to the Stolt Nielsen case, and
ensure that the DOJ is able to grant conditional leniency based on more thorough and
full information.246
Despite the potential adverse consequences highlighted by the Stolt-Nielsen
decision and the DOJ’s leniency letters, the ACCC has yet to clarify or explain in its
own policy whether its immunity decisions should be or can be subject to judicial
review. The ACCC should heed the Stolt Nielsen decision and pay close attention to
the information provided in the marker process to ensure that the company has
undertaken a proper investigation into the corporate misconduct prior to the grant of
conditional immunity.

E

Concluding Remarks on the Eligibility and Cooperation Elements of the
Immunity Policy – Applying the Enhanced Criteria

The eligibility and cooperation requirements analysed in this chapter are fundamental
to the design and operation of the Immunity Policy. The recommendations outlined
in this chapter are aimed at providing greater clarity and coherence in the Immunity
Policy and shifting the focus from the orthodox neo-classical framework view of
‘effectiveness’ to wider considerations.
In terms of transparency, this chapter has identified a number of areas that are
currently lacking clear and detailed information in relation to the Policy’s operation.
244
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Most notably, the Immunity Policy is not clear on whether recidivists should be
eligible for Immunity for a second or subsequent time or the process of appeal that an
Immunity applicant would seek for judicial or merits review of an ACCC’s decision
to revoke Immunity. Furthermore, there is no indicative criterion that clarifies how
the coercion test is to be applied. These issues were submitted to the ACCC in its
recent review of the policy; they are not addressed in the final revised Policy. In
accordance with general principles of transparency,247 the ACCC needs to provide
reasons for its decisions regarding the inclusion/exclusion of the recommendations
but it has failed to do so. The recommendations in this chapter are aimed at
enhancing the transparency of the Immunity Policy’s operation and, it is submitted,
should be adopted by the ACCC.
This consideration overlaps with the need for accountability of government
decision-making. At present, it is not clear whether a decision made by the ACCC or
the CDPP in relation to revoking the Immunity Policy is reviewable. Therefore, the
ACCC cannot be held accountable for its decisions, which is a violation of a
fundamental precept of responsible government. It is recommended that the ACCC
insert a dispute resolution provision into the Immunity Policy to ensure that there is
an effective accountability mechanism for its decisions.
The principle of consistency requires that the justice system is consistent in
the application of laws and in practice.248 This chapter has demonstrated that there
are issues of consistency between the ACCC and CDPP’s administration of the
Immunity Policy, particularly in relation to the timing of the grant of conditional
criminal immunity and the sufficiency of information needed to grant such
immunity. Whilst the ACCC and CDPP are entrusted with discretion in the exercise
of their decision-making powers, the recommendations in this chapter need careful
consideration to ensure that the ACCC and CDPP act consistently in the interests of
fair administration. This includes reducing the levels of uncertainty surrounding the
different approaches the two agencies adopt in immunity related decisions.
In relation to the cooperation and eligibility requirements, the question is
whether the current Immunity Policy adopts the most reasonable and proportionate
means to achieving its aims of detection and deterrence. It is clear that the Immunity
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Policy is ‘rationally related’ to achieving cartel detection and deterrence, and
therefore satisfies the first test. The second question is directed at whether the
measures adopted are the ‘least-restrictive’ to achieve the aims of the Immunity
Policy. The recommendations formulated in this chapter are designed to ensure that
the Immunity Policy is still aimed at detection and deterrence, but ensures that the
measures taken to achieve this are weighed against competing considerations. For
instance, on one view the exclusion of recidivists from the Immunity Policy may
adversely impact on the deterrence capabilities of the Policy. However, this factor
needs to be weighed against the argument that allowing recidivists to continuously
apply for immunity may facilitate cartel conduct. The exclusion of recidivists would
thus bring the policy in line with other exclusion criteria within the policy, such as
the coercion test, which also prevents culpable corporations from manipulating the
policy.
The recommendations in this chapter are therefore arguably equally effective
in achieving the Immunity Policy’s aim, but bring the Policy in line with other
important public policy considerations of transparency, accountability and
consistency. In this way, the recommendations are proportionate means to achieving
the aims of the Immunity Policy in a more comprehensive and justified way.
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VII

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT –
CONFIDENTIALITY AND THIRD PARTIES

In the context of anti-cartel enforcement, there is an inherent tension between
the role of public and private enforcement. Public enforcement efforts are claimed to
be highly successful in the deterrence of cartel conduct by competition regulators
internationally. At the forefront of the public enforcement regime has been the
immunity policy, which has largely been proclaimed as the success story of public
enforcement, given its claims of achieving cartel detection and deterrence.
In contrast, the key aim of private enforcement is to seek compensation for
those who have been adversely affected by cartel conduct and who seek this
compensation through private actions for damages against the former cartel
members. In order to successfully pursue an action in damages, third party claimants
encounter the same evidentiary difficulties as competition regulators in attempting to
prove the existence of the cartel. However, unlike the regulators, the third party
claimants generally do not have access to the immunity documents that enabled the
regulators to successfully prosecute the cartel members nor do they have the same
investigative powers of the ACCC, such as those under s 155.1
At the heart of the intersection of public and private enforcement is the issue
of confidentiality. The issues associated with confidentiality emerge as two-fold:
A

Disclosure of Immunity Information to third party claimants;

B

Disclosure of Immunity Information to other regulators, pursuant to
international agreements and waivers of confidentiality.

At the most basic level, these issues require weighing the net benefits of
disclosure against the costs of non-disclosure. The disclosure of immunity
information, particularly to third party claimants, will assist them in generating a
case against the former cartel members in order to seek compensation for the harm
incurred as a result of the cartel.

1
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There is much support for the role that private enforcement plays in the anticartel enforcement regime, with some suggestion that private enforcement plays an
even greater role in deterrence than that of the public enforcement regime.2 In
contrast, one of the central tenets of the immunity policy is an upfront assurance of
confidentiality of all information provided to the regulator, in order to entice the
immunity applicants to come forward and cooperate with the competition
authorities.3 Confidentiality, in this context, is particularly important as the immunity
applicant is providing self-incriminating evidence of its involvement in the cartel,
which puts them in a vulnerable position in relation to third party actions vis-à-vis
the other cartel participants. If this confidential information is disclosed to third party
claimants or disclosed in a foreign jurisdiction where the cartel participant has not
yet sought or been granted immunity, this has the potential to undermine the very
operation of the immunity policy.
In essence, there is growing recognition of the importance of private
enforcement, and with it, the perception that the roles of private and public
enforcement should be seen as complementary, as opposed to conflicting.4 However,
there are delicate issues associated with this interaction, of which this chapter will
seek to analyse in order to determine where the balance should lie.
The first section of this chapter will analyse the position in Australia
regarding the disclosure of immunity information, before turning to the recent
developments in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, which have
significantly impacted upon the issue of disclosure of immunity information on a
global scale and pose a threat to the effective operation of immunity policies. The
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analysis will then focus on restitution as a potential solution to balance the competing
interests of public and private enforcement.
The second section of this chapter will focus on the information provided to
foreign regulatory agencies pursuant to international formal and informal
information-sharing mechanisms. The focal point of this section will be upon the
waiver of confidentiality agreements in Australia and the aforementioned
jurisdictions and its impact on the confidentiality assurances of an immunity policy.
The chapter will then advocate for a more streamlined approach to international
immunity applications and briefly analyse the proposed avenues for this to be
achieved.

A

Disclosure of Immunity Information to Third Parties – The Australian
Position

The ACCC has always maintained that they will use their ‘best endeavours’
to protect the confidentiality of immunity information; their stated position is against
the disclosure of immunity information to third party claimants, except as required
by law.5 The FAQ does not elaborate on this position. In particular, there is
insufficient guidance in respect of the criminal discovery provisions6 that may
compel the ACCC to disclose immunity information.7 The Policy only refers to the
‘Protected Cartel Information’ provisions set out in the Competition and Consumer
Act 2010 (Cth), as well as the common law arguments that the ACCC may use to
protect immunity information, namely legal professional privilege and public interest
immunity.8
This section will first analyse the previous case law arguments put forward by
the ACCC to protect the confidentiality of immunity information to demonstrate that
these arguments have produced inconsistent and unpredictable results. This analysis
will show how difficult it is to rely on common law arguments to guarantee to
potential immunity applicants that the information they provide to the ACCC will be
kept confidential and not used against them in ancillary proceedings. This creates a
5
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high level of uncertainty in relation to the operation of the ACCC Immunity Policy,
which according the ACCC, undermines the policy’s effectiveness in achieving
cartel detection and deterrence.
As a result of the inconsistency in judicial interpretation, the legislature has
attempted to address this uncertainty by introducing the ‘Protected Cartel
Information’ (‘PCI’) scheme that is designed to give the ACCC, as opposed to a
court, the power to determine whether immunity information should be disclosed.9
These provisions have not yet been judicially interpreted but an analysis of the
Prysmian10 case provides some insight into the way the court is likely to interpret
these provisions.

1

The Case Law

Prior to the implementation of the PCI regime, the ACCC sought to withhold
cartel information in judicial proceedings by claiming the information was protected
by primarily two privileges, (a) public interest immunity and; (b) legal professional
privilege.11 These legal arguments have been put forward by the ACCC in three
significant cases, with differing results.
(a)

Legal Professional Privilege
This common law privilege refers to the right of a client to the protection from

disclosure of confidential information and advice passing between lawyer and
client.12 Where information is confidential information contained in a verbal or
written communication made with the ‘dominant purpose’ of obtaining, or giving,
legal advice then it will be protected by legal professional privilege.13 The ACCC
bears the onus of proof in this respect and the purpose of the communication is
determined primarily from the document on a case-by-case basis.14

9
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In ACCC v Visy (No 2),15 concerning cartel conduct in the Australian cardboard
box industry, the ACCC successfully claimed professional legal privilege over a
number of documents created soon after the applicant had applied for immunity.16 It
was held that these documents had been received at a time where litigation had been
‘reasonably anticipated’, even though the actual commencement of legal proceedings
was not until a year later.17 Therefore, pursuant to this analysis, information provided
by the immunity applicant brought into existence by the ACCC for the ‘dominant
purpose’ of use in those proceedings will be protected by legal professional
privilege.18
However, in the situation where the ACCC does not ‘reasonably anticipate’
legal proceedings, the ACCC must prove that the documents were brought into
existence for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice, and not some other
purpose.19 This is a very important distinction, as documents brought into existence
by the ACCC for some other purpose, such as for the purpose of taking a record of
the statement in performance of an ACCC officer's duties, are at risk of not being
protected by legal professional privilege.20

(b)

Public Interest Immunity

Public interest immunity refers to the situation where a court will not order the
production of a document, even if it may be relevant or admissible, because it would
be injurious to the public interest to do so.21 The ACCC has sought to protect
immunity information on these grounds, with inconsistent results:
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(i) Cadbury Schweppes v Amcor22
The claim for both public interest immunity and legal professional privilege
failed in Cadbury Schweppes v Amcor. This case concerned an ancillary proceeding
to the Visy case in relation to allegations of similar cartel conduct, namely pricefixing. The central issue arose in the context of an interlocutory dispute within the
damages proceedings brought by Cadbury against Amcor; the issue concerned
specified documents created in connection with the ACCC proceeding that may be
produced to Cadbury.23
The ACCC argued that it was in the public interest to ensure that the greatest
incentive is afforded to immunity applicants, such as Amcor, by ensuring the
confidentiality of immunity information, as well as providing finality and certainty in
respect of cartel proceedings.24 The Court did not accept this argument. Justice
Gordon stated that it is both inevitable and self-evident that statements made by a
cooperating criminal conspirator will be used against the non-cooperating
conspirators and that these statements may be used in court proceedings.25 The claim
for public interest immunity therefore failed.

(ii) Korean Air Lines Co Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission26
Similar issues in relation to the confidentiality of immunity information arose in
the course of an ACCC investigation into allegations of price fixing by Korean Air
Lines ('KAL') and other international carriers that had occurred since mid-2006. The
central issue concerned a challenge by KAL in relation to the validity of the section
155 ACL notice, who sought internal ACCC documents to support its argument that
the notice had been issued for an improper purpose.27
In contrast to the decision in Cadbury, the court held that disclosure of internal
ACCC documents would be contrary to the public interest, given that it 'entailed a
serious risk of adversely affecting the Commission's ongoing investigation into

22
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conduct suspected to have been carried out by the applicant and other carriers,' as
well as adversely affecting 'the Commission's ability to investigate other past and
future suspected cartel activity.'28 The Court in Korean Airways acknowledged the
importance of immunity policies in creating incentives for participants to reveal
cartel information, and gave this factor significant weight in its assessment of public
interest immunity.

(iii) ACCC v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia SRL29
This case concerned an interlocutory application by the ACCC to protect the
identity of a cartel informer, Mr. ‘A,’ as well as affidavit evidence by Ms Jacquir.
The principle proceeding concerned an alleged cartel arrangement in relation to landbased and electrical cables and accessories supplied to customers in Australia and
throughout the world.30
The court held that the public interest in preventing disclosure in order to protect
informers and encourage future immunity applications must be weighed against the
public interest in ensuring that the Court has access to all relevant evidence; this
balancing exercise is therefore decided on a case by case basis.31 Ultimately, the
court found that the public interest was in favour of disclosure. Although the court
recognised the effect that disclosure could have on deterring future cartel participants
from coming forward and giving information about cartel conduct,32 it rejected the
fact that the disclosure of the identity of ‘Mr A’ may result in his prosecution in other
jurisdictions as a relevant factor in the Court's assessment:33
‘It is not the role of this Court ... to protect Mr A from lawful prosecution in other jurisdictions.
The adverse consequences that he might suffer in other jurisdictions for conduct that may be
unlawful in those jurisdictions are not matters of public interest in this jurisdiction.’

Therefore the claim for public interest immunity failed, with the court holding
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that a claim pursuant to s 50 had also failed for substantially similar reasons.34
There are significant implications that arise from this decision. The first
relates to the fact that this order of disclosure was upheld by the court before the full
proceedings had commenced. A second related factor is that the respondents had not
yet submitted to the court's jurisdiction. Although the court did recognise that the
respondent's agents may be bound by an implied undertaking to the court,35 this does
not alter the fact that disclosure of confidential information, such as the identity of an
informant, may be ordered by a court at a very early stage of proceedings.
This is likely to adversely impact on future cartel immunity applications
because, as a result of the Prysmian decision, the ACCC cannot guarantee with any
level of certainty that the information provided by an immunity applicant, or the
applicant’s identity, will be protected, even in preliminary proceedings. The PCI
regime was introduced to address this uncertainty. This chapter will now turn to
analysing the PCI regime in order to determine whether it will overcome the
uncertainty that permeates this area of the law.

2

The Legislation: Protected Cartel Information Scheme
In light of the uncertainty of the case law, the legislature enacted specific

provisions that deal with the confidentiality of cartel informers, encompassed within
s 157 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (The ‘PCI’ regime). The PCI
regime essentially invests the ACCC with broad discretionary powers to prevent the
disclosure of immunity information.
Section 157B requires that the Commission will not be bound to produce
protected cartel information to the Court, unless the Court grants leave. However, in
determining whether leave should be granted, the Court must have regard to the same
considerations as the Commission, and must not have regard to any other matters.
Moreover, if leave is granted by the court for disclosure of protected cartel
information in one proceeding, the use of that information in another proceeding is
strictly prohibited, except with the leave of the court.
Section 157C mandates that the Commission is not required to disclose
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protected cartel information to a party when the Commission itself is not a party to
the proceedings. However, the Commission can grant disclosure, after taking account
of each of the outlined factors.36 Essentially, the PCI regime invests wide powers in
the Commission to prevent disclosure of cartel information. These provisions have
not yet been interpreted by the courts.

(a)

How Will the PCI Regime be Interpreted: An Analysis of Prysmian
Many of the factors in s 157C were considered by the court in the case of

Prysmian, in the context of the public interest immunity arguments. However,
despite the fact that many similar factors were considered by Justice Lander, the
disclosure of protected cartel information was still granted. Although the court
recognised that the information was given to the ACCC in confidence37 and also
considered the effect that the disclosure of the identity of Mr. ‘A’ may have on
potential prosecutions overseas, namely in the United States and Brazil, it ultimately
held that the right to a fair trial outweighed these considerations. Moreover, the court
found that Mr. A himself would have known that his involvement with the
competition authorities may have meant that his identity would be disclosed in the
proceedings.38
The court recognised the potential harm that may be caused to cartel
informers, but distinguished this harm from the type of harm that may occur in the
case of a police informer.39 In the court’s opinion, the most likely ‘harm’ caused to
cartel informers as a result of the disclosure of one's identity would be the risk of
prosecution in another jurisdiction and this factor was not considered significant in
the court’s assessment.40
As this case analysis has demonstrated, despite the implementation of the PCI
regime, there is still significant uncertainty as to how these provisions will be
interpreted by the courts. In the case of ACCC v Prysmian, it is unlikely that the
application of the PCI provisions would have altered the decision, as the court
considered many of the same factors required by the PCI legislation but still found in
36
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favour of disclosure of the cartel information. Concerns regarding this uncertainty
have been reflected in submissions made to Treasury in its cartel consultation
process. In particular, the Business Council of Australia expressed concern that the
provisions were not wide enough and could result in the disclosure of commercially
sensitive information, which would then become available to competitors.41
In contrast, there has been strong criticism of the PCI regime by the firm
Maurice Blackburn in relation to the application of s 157C.42 The criticism is
primarily directed at the situation where the ACCC is not a party to a proceeding and
another party requests disclosure of any documents containing cartel protected
information. The firm is concerned that the ACCC has the final decision in relation
to this disclosure and that such a decision is not subject to the purview of the court.
Within this context, Maurice Blackburn asserts that the cartel protection provisions
essentially attempt to fetter judicial discretion and circumvent the public interest
immunity privilege, so that the factors to be considered are geared in favour of nondisclosure.43 Moreover, it is not clear whether the ACCC is required to disclose the
reasons for its decisions and whether these reasons must be disclosed publicly.44

3

Criminal Discovery of Immunity Information in Australia

Whilst the Immunity Policy acknowledges that information provided by an
immunity applicant will be confidential, it also states that 'disclosure obligations may
require the CDPP to disclose such information.'45 Thus, in criminal proceedings,
although the PCI46 scheme (above) is intended to protect confidential immunity
information, there is a strong likelihood that the ACCC will be required to disclose
this information pursuant to the Federal Court Act of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
It appears that the general powers of a court to control the conduct of criminal
or civil proceedings, in particular with respect to abuse of process, is not affected by
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ss 157B-157C ‘except so far as that section does not expressly or impliedly provide
otherwise’.47 Furthermore, a refusal to grant leave under s 157B of the PCI
legislation does not prevent a court from later ordering that a criminal proceeding be
stayed on the grounds that the refusal would have a substantial adverse effect on the
defendant’s right to receive a fair hearing.48
The Immunity Policy and the FAQ do not mention the potential interaction
between the PCI scheme and the criminal discovery provisions outlined in the
Federal Court Act or how this may adversely impact on the ACCC’s disclosure
obligations. The discovery requirements in a criminal proceeding are far more
onerous than that in a civil proceeding and this very significant risk of disclosure of
an applicant’s immunity information is not addressed in the Immunity Policy.
Section 23CE of the Federal Court of Australia Act outlines the broad nature of the
criminal discovery obligations that must be adhered to by the prosecution:
The notice of the prosecution's case must include the following:
(a) an outline of the prosecution's case that sets out the facts, matters and circumstances on
which the prosecution's case is based;
(b) for each witness the prosecutor proposes to call at the trial:
i.
a copy of a signed statement by the witness that sets out the evidence the witness is
to give at the trial; or
ii.
a written summary of the evidence the witness is to give at the trial;
(c) for each witness:
i.
the prosecutor does not propose to call at the trial; but
ii.
who has signed a statement that sets out the evidence the witness could give at the
trial;
iii.
a copy of the signed statement;
(d) copies of any documents the prosecutor proposes to tender at the trial;
(e) copies of, or an invitation to inspect, any other exhibits the prosecutor proposes to tender at
the trial;
(f) a copy of any report, relevant to the trial, that has been prepared by an expert witness whom
the prosecutor proposes to call at the trial;
(g) a copy or details of any information in the prosecutor's possession that might adversely affect
the reliability or credibility of a prosecution witness;
(h) a copy or details of any information, document or other thing in the prosecutor's possession
that the prosecutor reasonably believes contains evidence that may be relevant to the
accused's case;
(i) if the prosecutor reasonably believes information in the prosecutor's possession suggests the
existence of evidence that may be relevant to the accused's case--a copy or details of so much
of that information as is necessary to suggest that existence;
(j) a list identifying:
i.
any information, document or other thing not in the prosecutor's possession that the
prosecutor reasonably believes contains evidence that may be relevant to the
accused's case; and
ii.
for each item of information, and each document or other thing, a place where the
prosecutor reasonably believes the item, document or thing to be;
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(k) a copy or details of any information, document or other thing in the prosecutor's possession
that is adverse to the accused's credit or credibility; and may include other matters.

In particular, subsections (g) and (h) are wide-reaching provisions that may require
the prosecution to disclose immunity information, especially if that immunity
information may ‘adversely affect’ the prosecution witness’s reliability and
credibility. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, in the context of contested
cartel cases, the defence often attacks an immunity applicant’s credibility. This is due
to the fact that immunised witnesses are deemed to be equally culpable as the
defendant in the eyes of the jury. Furthermore, juries will often perceive informer
evidence as self-serving and prejudiced by bias as a result of obtaining immunity.49
The Law Council was also critical of these provisions and the meaning of
‘prosecutor’s possession.’ As this term is undefined, it is unclear whether this
provision extends to documents in the prosecuting agencies’ possession, such as the
ACCC or ASIC.50 Furthermore, the Law Council asserted that the requirement for the
prosecutor to disclose where the prosecutor ‘reasonably believes’ that such material
may be located does not meet duty of disclosure requirements if the prosecutor
indicates that the prosecuting authority (ACCC/ASIC) has relevant material but no
steps are taken to make it available to the defence.51
As there has not yet been a contested criminal trial in Australia, it is useful to
draw upon the experiences of comparable jurisdictions to analyse the cases that have
led to the disclosure of immunity information in criminal proceedings. This will be
discussed in the next section.

4

The Position Overseas
This section will analyse the general provisions relating to the protection of

confidential immunity information in the United States, United Kingdom and
Canada, before turning to the recent developments in each jurisdiction that have
significantly impacted upon the level of information that is being disclosed,
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specifically in the context of criminal discovery. This should serve as a sharp
warning to the ACCC as it approaches its first contested criminal cartel case.

(a)

The United States
The United States is generally lauded as the ‘success story’ of private cartel

enforcement, as private actions for damages are thriving and robust.52 It has been
argued that private cartel enforcement in the United States is more effective at
deterrence of cartel activity then public enforcement efforts,53 although this claim has
been disputed.54 Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows the recovery of damages by ‘any
person injured in his business or property by reason of anything prohibited in the
antitrust laws.’55 The Act allows a private claimant to recover treble damages and
costs, including reasonable legal fees.56 One of the main draw-cards of the leniency
policy in the United States is the provision that allows for the de-trebling of damages
for leniency applicants.57
Pursuant to this provision, leniency applicants are only required to pay ‘actual
damages’ in a follow-on damages claim.58 In addition to its obligations under the
leniency policy, to be eligible for the de-trebling of damages, applicants must also
provide ‘satisfactory cooperation’ to private plaintiffs in their civil damages claim.
This disclosure provision will be further discussed in the section relating to
Restitution.59
Within the context of active private enforcement, the DOJ has sought to
maintain the confidentiality of leniency information by holding ‘the identity of
leniency applicants and the information they provide in strict confidence, much like
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the treatment afforded to confidential informants.’60 Furthermore, the DOJ advocates
that it will not publically disclose such leniency information, unless in the case of
prior disclosure, by agreement with the applicant or by court order in connection
with court proceedings.61
According to the DOJ, the regulator has generally been successful in
upholding these assurances of confidentiality, with most leniency information
remaining outside the public domain.62 This is arguably due to the fact that most
cartel proceedings are settled by way of plea agreement, with limited information
being provided to pleading defendants or in an open court.63
In the context of contested criminal cartel cases, the DOJ regularly seeks
protective orders to ensure that criminal discovery is not publicly disclosed.
However, a significant amount of leniency information will be inevitably disclosed
in an open court setting during the course of a trial.64 These inherent risks of
disclosure are not explicitly mentioned in the DOJ’s leniency policy or FAQ
guidelines.
Discovery obligations in criminal cases are framed in the United States by
Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the United
States Attorneys Manual (USAM). According to United States case law, the general
principles of disclosure in a criminal case mandate that the government has a duty to
disclose all material evidence favourable to a criminal defendant.65 A violation of this
duty that results in a conviction deprives the defendant of his or her liberty without
due process of law.66 These principles were at the centre of a judicial discussion
relating to the disclosure requirements of the prosecution in United States of America
v Triumph Capital Group Inc.67 This high profile case, along with a number of
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others, led to a growing recognition of the failure of the prosecution to disclosure
certain exculpatory material in criminal proceedings.68
As a result, in January 2010, the Deputy Attorney General of the DOJ
announced the new Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery.69 This
memorandum was generated by a working group established by the DOJ to
investigate the various practices in each judicial district and to develop guidance for
prosecutors in relation to their discovery obligations and practices. The aim of the
memorandum was to harmonise the inconsistent discovery provisions in each district
and to establish a uniform code by which prosecutors would follow.70
One particular area of relevance to cartel cases is the requirement that DOJ
prosecutors review and produce ‘prior inconsistent statements’ which could possibly
include inconsistent attorney proffers.71 These provisions could adversely impact
upon the operation of the DOJ’s leniency policy, as the DOJ will no longer be able to
assure confidentiality to leniency applicants of statements made in the very early
stages of the investigation, potentially before the full extent of the cartel conduct is
even known to the applicant. For example, a witness’s initial statements to company
counsel may be incomplete at the early stages of the investigation and these
statements may be admitted as prior inconsistent statements if the witness’
statements have changed with the benefit of full information and review of the
relevant documentation.72
The DOJ will seek protective orders of the leniency information that it
provides pursuant to the discovery obligations to ensure that the information is not
disclosed in the public domain. However, in the case where there is a large amount of
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information that is generated for the purposes of discovery in an open court setting,
the risks of disclosure are inevitable.73
The tension between the rights of a defendant to a fair trial against that of
maintaining the confidentiality of leniency information is well demonstrated in this
situation and it appears the courts, at least in the Optronics case, have leant towards
the disclosure of leniency information in preference to confidentiality.74 On the one
hand, this may seem to undermine the incentive to come forward and apply for
leniency in the United States, but on the other, a leniency applicant needs to be aware
that it is inevitable that their information will be disclosed at some point during the
investigation or trial, despite the best efforts of the DOJ.

(b)

The United Kingdom
In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom has not been at the forefront

of private cartel enforcement, although recent legislative initiatives indicate that the
United Kingdom government is considering the issue more seriously.75 Pursuant to
section 47A of the Competition Act76 any person who has suffered loss or damage as
a result of an infringement of either a United Kingdom or European Union
competition law may bring a claim for damages before the Competition Appeals
Tribunal (CAT) in respect of that loss or damage.
The CMA policy in relation to the disclosure of leniency information is
significantly more elaborate and comprehensive than that of the DOJ. Although the
CMA recognises the importance of confidentiality for leniency applicants, it also
acknowledges the ‘risk that parties will conclude that the information has been
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supplied by a leniency applicant, which may in turn reveal the identity of the
applicant.’77 The CMA has dedicated a section of the policy to disclosure
considerations in relation to a statement of objections, infringement decision and as
part of the access to file process.78 This section acknowledges the disclosure risks
associated with discovery provisions, and notes that these obligations may still apply
even where proceedings are not initiated against the leniency applicant or where their
leniency application is withdrawn.79
As a consequence of the BA case,80 the CMA used to require that applicants
waive legal professional privilege as a condition of immunity.81 However, the 2013
guidance indicates that the CMA no longer requires waivers of legal professional
privilege over any relevant information in either civil or criminal investigations as a
condition of leniency.82 Instead, the CMA will ordinarily require a review of any
relevant information in respect of which privilege is claimed by independent counsel
(‘IC’).83 Where the IC deems the information to be covered by privilege then it will
not be disclosed as part of a condition of leniency, but if it is not covered by privilege
then it will be required to be disclosed.84 This vetting system is unique to the CMA
policy and this is probably due to the failure of the first contested criminal cartel case
in the United Kingdom. The reason for this is that the former OFT faced difficulties
in obtaining earlier accounts of witnesses that were prepared by Virgin’s lawyers and
thus privileged.85 There was also no requirement in the leniency policy that
compelled the applicant to waive privilege as a condition of leniency.86
In contrast to the ACCC and DOJ policies, the CMA policy specifically refers
to the disclosure obligations in criminal prosecutions and states that ‘full disclosure
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of ‘used’ and relevant ‘unused’ material must be made to defendants, to comply with
requirements under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 as amended
by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and the associated Code of Practice.’87 In this
respect, the CMA is open and transparent in relation to its limited ability to withhold
relevant material from a defendant in a criminal prosecution compared to that in civil
investigations.88
In relation to information disclosure to support private civil proceedings, the
position of the CMA is that it will ‘firmly resist’ requests for disclosure of leniency
material, except where compelled by court order.89 However, the court order of
disclosure of leniency information has been a point of contention in the European
Union, which has arguably led to the higher likelihood of disclosure of immunity
information in the European Union, and potentially the United Kingdom.
The key case in this respect is that of Pfleiderer90 which concerned a
customer (Pfleiderer) of the companies involved in a cartel found by the German
National Competition Authority in the décor paper industry, who sought disclosure
of leniency documentation pursuant to the German criminal procedural rules to
prepare a follow-on damages action.91 Access to the entire file was rejected and
Pfleiderer appealed to the Amtsgericht (Local Court) in Bonn who granted full
access to the file but sought a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice
(‘ECJ’) as to whether European Union law prevents parties adversely affected by a
cartel, and seeking damages, from being granted access to leniency applications and
associated documentation provided pursuant to a leniency agreement.92
The ECJ ultimately decided that the disclosure of such information requires a
balancing of the various competing factors on a case-by-case basis, including
weighing the impact of disclosure on the operation of leniency regimes against that
of the rights of private claimants to seek damages, to ensure that the rules governing
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the right to seek access are not unduly oppressive or excessively difficult.93
However, the ECJ did not elaborate on the criteria to be used in this ‘balancing
exercise.’ The Pfleiderer case confirmed that there is no over-arching rule in the
European Union that prevents the disclosure of leniency documents. Thus, leniency
applicants will not be able to predict with any degree of certainty whether the
information they disclose pursuant to the leniency agreement will be disclosed in the
context of private follow-on actions for damages. The case has generated much
discussion in relation to information disclosure and has been heavily criticised as
undermining the effectiveness of the leniency regime due to the case-by-case basis
nature of the assessment.94
The Pfleiderer precedent has recently been judicially applied in the National
Grid95 case in the United Kingdom, where the United Kingdom High Court sought to
limit the application of the Pfleiderer principle by introducing two factors to be
considered before disclosure is granted: (1) whether in the circumstances of the case,
disclosure of leniency evidence would expose the leniency applicants to greater
liability than those parties that have not sought leniency with the Commission and (2)
whether disclosure would be proportionate in light of its potential impact on the
leniency program by considering the relevancy of the documents to be disclosed and
whether there are other available sources of evidence that are equally effective.96
As a result of the unsatisfactory and inconsistent positions relating to the
disclosure of leniency documentation, the European Union Commission issued a
‘Directive on antitrust damages actions,’ which was signed into law on the 26th
November 2014.
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Articles 6-8 now govern the disclosure of leniency documents and prevent the
disclosure of a leniency or immunity statement or settlement agreement from being
disclosed to third parties, otherwise known as the ‘black-list.’99 The Directive
recognises the important role that leniency policies play in anti-cartel enforcement
and acknowledge that the disclosure of self-incriminating leniency statements may
create a disincentive to cooperate with competition authorities.100 However, the
Directive also recognises that the exemption from disclosure should not unduly
interfere with injured parties’ rights to compensation, and therefore certain categories
of evidence included in the file of a competition authority may be disclosed after the
competition authority has closed its proceedings.101 This includes documents such as
requests for information, statement of objectives or settlement submissions that have
been withdrawn. Any documents that fall outside the above categories, including preexisting documents that could be attached or referred to in a leniency submission,
can be disclosed by a court order at any time.102
It is clear that the intention of the Directive was to reverse the uncertain position
laid down by the ECJ in the Pfleiderer case, which is why the Directive now
provides for a total exemption of leniency or settlement statements. However, in an
attempt to balance the delicate needs of both private and public enforcement, any
other documents not covered under this exemption could potentially be disclosed.
It is likely that the impact of the Directive will differ across the European Union
Member States depending on the interpretation that each member state adopts before
implementing the provisions into domestic law. In adopting these Directives, the EU
Member States must give effect to the aims pursued by the rules of the Directive, or
risk infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice. However, there will still
remain differences in the context of EU competition law in each of the EU member
states in areas that the Directive does not seek to harmonise, such as causation and
collective action.
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On its face, the Directive strikes a more appropriate balance between the needs
of third parties obtaining access to information to pursue compensation on the one
hand and recognising the importance of maintaining confidentiality for leniency
applicants on the other. It does this by ensuring that disclosure is possible but subject
to certain safeguards. Whilst the Directive ensures that corporate leniency statement
and settlement submissions are not to be disclosed, it requires the court to assess
requests for other documents on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the scope,
cost and proportionality of the request. This is a more appropriate response to
address the tension between public and private enforcement then exists in Australia.
It now remains to be seen how the other European Union member states will
legislate this Directive and whether it will overcome the uncertainty that has
permeated this area of the law.
(c)

Canada
The history of private cartel enforcement in Canada is similar to that of the

United Kingdom where private enforcement has been plagued by legislative hurdles
that have made these actions more difficult.103 There is a limited statutory right to
private action pursuant to s36 of the Competition Act which states that any person
who has suffered loss or damage as a result of (1) conduct contrary to any of the
criminal offenses under the Act or (2) the failure of any person to comply with an
order made under the Act, may bring a civil action against the person who engaged
in the conduct or failed to comply with the order.104
The Competition Bureau clearly states that it will treat the identity of a party
requesting immunity as confidential, subject to the following exceptions:
(a) disclosure is required by law;
(b) disclosure is necessary to obtain or maintain the validity of a judicial authorisation for the
exercise of investigative powers;
(c) disclosure is for the purpose of securing the assistance of a Canadian law enforcement
agency in the exercise of investigative powers;
(d) the party has agreed to disclosure;
(e) there has been public disclosure by the party; or
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(f) disclosure is necessary to prevent the commission of a serious criminal offence.105

The policy states that it will only provide confidential information with respect to
private actions in response to a court order.106 In these situations, the Bureau will take
all reasonable steps to protect the confidentiality of the information, including by
seeking protective court orders.107 The FAQ document does not elaborate on this
provision. To date, there have not been any price-fixing cartel cases that have gone to
trial in Canada; instead most of the claims have been dealt with by way of
settlement.108
Whilst the Bureau will strive to protect the confidentiality of immunity
applicants, for instance by sealing the applicant’s identity, information provided to
the Bureau has been made publicly available in the court file once the Bureau has
executed the search or obtained the civil production order.109 Private litigants have
used this information to commence civil proceedings against cartel participants,
including the immunity applicant, including that from affidavits. The Bureau has
recently indicated that it will seek sealing orders to prevent the early disclosure of
this information in appropriate cases.110
Recent court decisions could also impact on the disclosure requirements of
wiretap information obtained by the Bureau as part of its investigations.111 While this
may not be a direct concern for immunity applicants, the decision did leave open the
possibility that non-wiretap evidence may also be subject to disclosure.112 This is
because the court relied on s29 of the Competition Act, which provides for an
exemption for disclosure where the disclosure is ‘for the purposes of the
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administration or enforcement of the Act,’ to permit the disclosure of the wiretap
evidence. Arguably, this exemption could be used to permit the disclosure of
voluntarily submitted information pursuant to the immunity policy and therefore
erode the confidentiality afforded by the Competition Bureau.
Issues of disclosure have also arisen in the context of criminal cartel
proceedings, where it was held by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice that relevant
factual information proffered to the Crown in order to qualify for immunity is not
protected from disclosure to accused persons by either solicitor-client or settlement
privilege.113
The case concerned chocolate manufacturer Canada-Cadbury (‘Cadbury’)
which entered into an immunity agreement with the Competition Bureau on October
19, 2007, as a result of admitting its involvement in the price-fixing of chocolate
confectionary. Another cartel participant, Hershey, came forward to cooperate with
the Bureau on a ‘second-in’ basis and received lenient treatment by way of a plea
agreement and was also granted an immunity agreement for its senior officers and
employees.
Pursuant to the Crown’s disclosure obligations to the accused, the Crown
sought to make disclosure of all required documentation. During this process, the
Crown provided information to the accused, which should have been protected by
settlement privilege, seeing as no waiver had been provided in relation to that
information.114 The Crown asked that the records that were subject to privilege be
destroyed or returned but the accused refused. The accused argued that they were
entitled to these privileged documents, and also other material held back by the
Crown on the basis of privilege.115
The central issue was whether settlement privilege applied to the information
in question. If settlement privilege did apply, then the secondary issues to be
addressed by the court were (i) had the settlement privilege been waived or (ii) was
there an exception to the settlement privilege such that the accused was entitled to
the otherwise privileged information.116
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The court reiterated the common law position in relation to disclosure in
Canada as set out in R. v. Stinchcombe117 that the Crown must disclose to an accused
person all information in its possession, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, unless
the information is ‘clearly irrelevant’ or is protected from disclosure by privilege.118
The court ultimately held that both arguments in relation to solicitor-client
privilege and settlement privilege failed. In relation to Hershey’s claim for solicitorclient privilege, the court considered that any such privilege would have been waived
when Hershey provided that information to the Bureau in order to obtain leniency. In
the court’s view:
Hershey knew that a fundamental purpose of the Leniency Program was to obtain
information from it that the Crown could use in prosecuting the accused. With that
knowledge, Hersey provided this information to the Crown. That act would suggest either
that Hershey did not view the information as privileged, or that it was content to waive the
privilege in order to achieve its goal of receiving lenient treatment.119

In relation to the arguments regarding settlement privilege, the court could
find no rationale for the protection of the information provided on this basis. The
court considered that the purpose of settlement privilege is to encourage parties to
enter into settlement discussions without fear that their communications could be
used against them in subsequent litigation. However, in the present case, the
information in question was sought in the context of criminal proceedings against
third parties, not Cadbury or Hershey themselves. Therefore, the court could not find
that the disclosure of such information would result in any prejudice to Cadbury or
Hershey.
The court again relied on its previous assertions regarding the aim of
immunity and leniency policies in general; stating that Cadbury and Hershey would
have knowledge that any information provided pursuant to their immunity/leniency
obligations would not be protected from disclosure. This, the court found, was
evident throughout the entire wording of the immunity and leniency policies and
therefore there could be no ‘reasonable expectation’ that such information would not
be disclosed.120
The court also relied on these arguments to find that even if settlement
117
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privilege were to be made out, the disclosure of this information pursuant to the
immunity and leniency policies would constitute a waiver of this privilege.121 The
court also considered a second exception to the claim of settlement privilege and
found that disclosure was necessary to accommodate the rights of the accused to
make full answer and defence, where such rights are protected under the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and must trump the interest in encouraging settlement.

5

Concluding Remarks on Confidentiality in Multi-jurisdictional Immunity
Applications

The above analysis in relation to the disclosure of confidential information has
revealed that the competition regulators in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom
and the United States will endeavour to keep information provided by immunity
applicants confidential. However, the ability of the regulators to protect immunity
information has recently been tested by the courts in a number of jurisdictions, which
has created a considerable amount of uncertainty in relation to this issue.
Most evidently, it appears that the rights of disclosure of an accused in a
criminal cartel trial take precedence over the potential impact that such disclosure
may have on the incentive to apply for immunity policies. It is important that the
courts do recognise these important rights and grant disclosure in these cases. As
demonstrated by the recent Canadian judgment, immunity and leniency applicants
are fully aware that the information they provide to the competition authorities is for
the purpose of assisting with the prosecution of those allegedly involved in the
conduct. By agreeing to the terms of immunity, these applicants cannot have any
reasonable expectation that the information they provide will not be disclosed at
some point during the proceedings.
Moreover, there are those individuals and corporations who have been
adversely affected by the conduct of the cartel participants and who face significant
challenges in accessing information to seek compensation for the harm caused to
them. At present, the ACCC PCI regime, whilst untested, does not seem to offer any
opportunity for third party access to this information and thus the balance is firmly
121
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planted in favour of the cartel participants. The next section will look at ways in
which the ACCC could seek to rectify the balance by introducing a provision into the
Immunity Policy that requires that the applicant must make some form of restitution
to injured parties.

(a)

Restitution

As has been demonstrated in the previous section, access of third parties to immunity
information at least in Australia is plagued with difficulties that ultimately rest with
the Court’s interpretation of the new PCI scheme. The ACCC have made it clear that
it will not disclose immunity documents to enable third parties to sue for
compensation, nor do they indicate any intention of initiating proceedings on behalf
of these third parties who have been adversely affected by cartel conduct. This is
compounded by the fact that the ACCC recently had an opportunity to publicly
discuss the merits of restitution in its most recent review of the policy, but the issue
was not presented, even within the discussion paper.122
Therefore, under the current system, immunity applicants will receive the
extraordinary benefits of immunity, without any requirement to compensate victims
for the harm they have caused them. This arguably runs counter to the philosophy
expected of the ACCC by Parliament when the criminal cartel legislation was
introduced to ‘disgorge’ cartel members of their ‘ill-gotten’ gains:
Ordinary consumers can't afford expensive lawyers to ensure that competition is working in
their interest. That's the job of the ACCC. When this legislation passes the Parliament, the
commission will have the tools it needs to stand up for consumers against this type of theft.123

The first version of the ACCC Immunity Policy in 2003 required that 'where
possible' [the corporation] will make restitution to injured parties.' In August 2005,
the ACCC set out its reasons for the removal for the requirement of restitution in its
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discussion paper.124 The interviewees were asked whether the requirement for
restitution should be reintroduced as a condition of Immunity. A majority of the
respondents were thoroughly against this proposition.125
It is important to note though, out of the participants who were against
reintroducing the provision, almost all of those generally act in favour of immunity
applicants and therefore the requirement to pay restitution would come at a cost to
their clients. This is arguably an important factor in the formulation of their opinion
on the matter.
The central arguments against the requirement of restitution as a condition of
immunity were as follows and each will be addressed in turn:
1. That the introduction of restitution would create a significant disincentive to
future immunity applicants and therefore undermine the Immunity Policy;
2. That is not the role of ACCC to impose restitution upon immunity applicants,
as civil actions serve that purpose;
3. That the calculation of restitution is too difficult to quantify.
Firstly, one of the primary concerns expressed by the interviewees was that
introducing the requirement of restitution would simply add to the cost-benefit
analysis of coming forward for immunity and essentially ‘tip the balance’ in favour
of cost:
Interviewee: We do have that in our system and we also have representative actions which
can be by the Commission or on a class action basis. I think where I sort of land on that is it
would be a significant disincentive to use the policy if it had a restitution element which was
insisted upon rather than, you know, one that’s there but never used. It would be hard for,
quite hard for our clients to sort of make an upfront determination of a damages amount and
agree to pay that. It might be regarded as a dollars and cents matter, you know, what’s the
fine going to be? What’s the restitution going to be? Calculate. OK. Calculate. No.126

This argument is based on the assumption that the added financial burden of
restitution would dissuade ‘would-be’ applicants from applying for Immunity and
instead these cartel participants would rather risk the prospect of an action being
brought against them. Aside from these statements that the immunity applicants
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‘might be’ deterred from applying, there is no empirical evidence to show that
immunity applicants ‘have been’ deterred from applying on this basis.
There currently exists a requirement for restitution in the DOJ's corporate
leniency program, whereby if it is 'possible, the corporation must make restitution to
third parties.’127 This requirement is elaborated upon in the FAQ, as it states that,
where practicable, restitution is required to be paid where conditional criminal
immunity is granted. According to the FAQ, the requirement for restitution does not
include foreign effects independent of and not proximately caused by any adverse
domestic effect.128
The DOJ has not expressed any concern that the requirement of restitution is
adversely affecting the operation of their leniency policy; rather the DOJ consistently
maintains that the leniency policy is ‘the most effective tool in anti-cartel
enforcement in the world’. It is important to note that the DOJ does not actively
enforce its restitution requirement; it will accept as a suitable alternative if the
applicant can show it has made restitution through private litigation.129 Therefore, the
DOJ does not actively supervise its restitutionary requirement; instead it will take it
on the faith of the applicant that they have met their obligations by providing that
affirmation to the DOJ prior to the granting of final immunity. There are no
publicised cases where the DOJ has refused or withdrawn immunity due to a lack of
restitution, although there have been instances in high profile cases where the
company has publicly disclosed its restitutionary amount.130 Clearly, the DOJ could
enforce this provision more aggressively; particularly because there is no substantial
evidence that its current requirement for restitution is deterring future leniency
applicants. This argument is strengthened by the fact that most competition
regulators in the world have publicly asserted that criminal sanctions are by far the
most effective deterrent of cartel activity, and is the most significant draw-card for
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Immunity Policies with an active cartel enforcement regime, where criminal
penalties form part of that regime.131 The ACCC heavily relied on this line of
argument to support the introduction of a criminal penalty regime for cartel conduct
in Australia.132
If these arguments were true, then the introduction of the requirement for
restitution would not deter immunity applicants from applying, as the predominant
risk and therefore motivation for seeking immunity is imprisonment. This was
confirmed by a number of the interviewees.133 These arguments may have been valid
at the time but arguably the position has since changed materially, given that there
has yet to be any prosecution for a cartel offence in Australia.
Secondly, another argument that extenuates the tension between public and
private enforcement, is that is not the role of the ACCC to facilitate restitution, when
those who have been adversely affected by cartel conduct can sue for compensation
by means of private civil actions for damages. This was one of the primary
arguments put forward by the Canadian Competition Bureau for its removal of the
requirement in 2006 and supported by the American Bar Association.134
However, as demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter, the private action
landscape in the United States and Canada is significantly different from that in
Australia and although the right to private action does exist, its usefulness is
currently undermined by the challenges associated with bringing those claims,
particularly in relation to disclosure.135 As there is no reasonable expectation that this
position will change in the short term, there is less force to the argument that civil
damages actions are a sufficient means of cartel compensation.
131
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Finally, the argument that holds the most significant weight relates to the
difficulties associated with the calculation of the restitution amount in terms of
identifying those adversely affected by cartel conduct and how their loss will be
calculated.136 Presumably, in Australia, the court would ultimately determine the
amount of restitution to be imposed. Courts have often been tasked with determining
definitive amounts of money for conduct of an indeterminate nature, particularly in
contract and tort law.137 If the loss is quantifiable, then an amount is able to be
calculated even if the process would be difficult.138 It has been asserted that assigning
this task to the ACCC would overburden an agency already subject to financial
restraints and finite resources; however the restitutionary requirement could be
qualified to only providing restitution only ‘where possible,’ as was done
previously.139
Alternatively, the ACCC could consider adopting an information sharing
condition in the Immunity Policy to overcome the difficulties associated with
calculating restitution and to give third parties a reasonable opportunity to recover
compensation through damages actions. This information could be in the form of
identifying or acknowledging any harm caused by the cartel and help with the
identification of those likely to have suffered loss as a result of the conduct.140 The
United States has adopted a similar policy in terms of making it a requirement of
leniency to cooperate with civil plaintiffs in order to have their liability limited to
‘actual damage’ caused, as opposed to treble damages. Pursuant to the Antitrust
Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004 leniency applicants must
provide a full account of the relevant facts and provide reasonable access to
documents and witnesses:
(b) Requirements.- Subject to subsection (c), an antitrust leniency applicant or cooperating
individual satisfies the requirements of this subsection with respect to a civil action described
in

subsection (a) if the court in which the civil action is brought
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considering any appropriate pleadings from the claimant, that the applicant or cooperating
individual, as the case may be, has provided satisfactory cooperation to the claimant with
respect to the civil action, which cooperation shall include-(1) providing a full account to the claimant of all facts known to the applicant or
cooperating individual, as the case may be, that are potentially relevant to the civil action;
(2) furnishing all documents or other items potentially relevant to the civil action that
are in the possession, custody, or control of the applicant or cooperating individual, as the
case may be, wherever they are located; and
(3)(A) in the case of a cooperating individual-(i) making himself or herself available for such interviews, depositions, or
testimony in connection with the civil action as the claimant may reasonably require;
and
(ii) responding completely and truthfully, without making any attempt either
falsely to protect or falsely to implicate any person or entity, and without intentionally
withholding any potentially relevant information, to all questions asked by the claimant in
interviews, depositions, trials, or any other court proceedings in connection with the civil
action; or
(B) in the case of an antitrust leniency applicant, using its best efforts to secure and
facilitate from cooperating individuals covered by the agreement the cooperation described in
clauses (i) and (ii) and subparagraph (A).141

This is an example of a comprehensive information sharing provision that
does place a significant burden on the immunity applicant to comply.142 However,
there are less onerous conditions that have been explored.143 The basic premise of the
proposition is to draft a requirement that would enable civil plaintiffs at least the key
information available to successfully initiate proceedings for cartel compensation.
The introduction of such a condition would then remove any obligation on behalf of
the ACCC to calculate restitution, provided the ACCC was satisfied that the
applicant had provided ‘satisfactory cooperation’ to civil plaintiffs.
Given that the ACCC has not expressed any desire to reintroduce monetary
restitution as a requirement for Immunity,144 the implementation of an information
sharing condition would overcome the difficulties associated with cartel victims
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gaining access to compensation and therefore strike a more appropriate balance in
the role of public and private enforcement. This is also due to the fact that the
introduction of such a condition could be seen as ‘morally significant’ in terms of
remedying the harm caused by cartel participants and demonstrating an acceptance of
responsibility.145 This is a consideration currently missing from the debate
surrounding restitution and the importance of offsetting the extraordinary benefit of
immunity by at least ensuring that victims have access to compensation. This is
especially the case where the ACCC has the power to seek damages for victims
pursuant to the Competition Act, but does not utilise this power often.146

B

Confidentiality Across Borders

In order to combat the global reach of cartel conduct there has been a need for
increased international cooperation in anti-cartel enforcement. This is wellrecognised in the international community and has been met with strategies to
harmonise the enforcement efforts across each jurisdiction, reflected in initiatives set
up by working groups such as the International Competition Network (ICN) and the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
An integral aspect of increased international enforcement is the importance of
information-sharing between competition regulatory bodies that can assist with cartel
investigations in the affected jurisdictions. Given the multi-national nature of most
cartels, this international cooperation is increasingly important and has seen with it
the proliferation of immunity policies worldwide. The sharing of information
provided by immunity applicants in the form of waivers has largely been deemed to
be an effective tool in allowing for the cooperation of the disclosure of information
between competition agencies.
However, there remains the risk that increased disclosure on an international
scale will also increase the risks associated with such disclosure and potentially
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adversely affect the incentives provided pursuant to immunity policies. There is a
real possibility that multi-jurisdictional information sharing could undermine the
confidentiality assurances provided to immunity applicants and reduce its overall
appeal for future applicants. The risks are even greater when considered alongside
the difficulties associated with multi-jurisdictional applications, potential third party
damages actions, and the differences in disclosure requirements that could increase
the liability of immunity applicants across a number of jurisdictions.
This section will first briefly analyse the primary information-sharing
arrangements for cartel investigations available on an international scale, namely: (1)
formal agreements, such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, Bilateral Competition
Agreements, and the waiver requirement in Immunity Policies and (2) informal
arrangements, such as OECD guidelines and ICN working groups.
This section will focus on the issue most closely related to immunity policies,
that being the requirement of a confidentiality waiver. The utility of waivers as an
information sharing mechanism will first be analysed before turning to the risks
associated with the increased use of waivers in international cooperation. This
section will conclude that while information-sharing is necessary for coordinated
global cartel enforcement, the current patchwork approach is exposing immunity
applicants to risks that may outweigh the current benefits and that the international
community should seriously consider a more harmonised system.

1
(a)

International Information Sharing Frameworks
Formal Mechanisms – Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MILATS)147

An example of a formal mechanism for international information sharing is
through the use of MILATS. MILATS are commonly used to compel parties to assist
others through the provision of obtaining evidence in the possession of the requested
jurisdiction’s territory for the purposes of assisting with an investigation of the
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requesting jurisdiction. Although MILATS are generally drafted individually
between the respective jurisdictions, there are some common features that include:
(a) taking testimony and statements in the requested jurisdiction;
(b) serving process;
(c) providing documents or records located in the requested jurisdiction;
(d) executing requests for searches and seizure;
(e) in some cases, giving any other form of assistance ‘not prohibited by the law of the requested
jurisdiction’ or ‘consistent with the objects of the treaty.’148

Although MILATS are an effective way of assisting with information sharing
given they essentially compel a jurisdiction to provide the assistance required, their
usefulness is subject to limitations. Most notably, MILATS can only be used in
criminal investigations, and therefore in the context of cartel investigations, can only
be used where cartel conduct is an offence. Moreover, MILATS are not specific to
competition law and therefore the information requests must go through formal
processes, rather than through the competition agencies themselves.149 This can lead
to significant time delays where information may be needed quickly, such as in the
situation where an immunity applicant is simultaneously applying for immunity in
several jurisdictions.
The OECD has recognised the usefulness of investigative assistance by way of
MILAT between the United States and Canada in the Plastic Dinnerware and
Thermal Fax Paper cases.150 In both cases, the agencies were able to coordinate
search warrants, share documents obtained by subpoenas, jointly interview witnesses
and analyse documents, which led to the successful prosecution of these cartels.151

(b)

Competition-Specific Bilateral Agreements Between Jurisdictions
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There are two types of bilateral agreements in this section, that being ‘first
generation’ bilateral agreements and ‘second-generation’ bilateral agreements.
Essentially, the key difference between the two is that first generation agreements are
those in which the parties agree to cooperate in relation to competition investigations,
however there will exist a provision that excludes the disclosure of confidential
information. Second-generation agreements, on the other hand, will allow for the
sharing of such confidential information. These agreements are binding at
international law and have become an established practice between agencies for the
sharing of non-confidential in relation to cartel investigations.152 Due to the nature of
international law however, the cooperation afforded by these agreements is largely at
the discretion of the regulatory agency, who can choose the level of information
sharing and cooperation they provide.
A more integrated approach has been adopted by Australia and the United States
who have entered into an Antitrust Mutual Assistance Agreement,153 which is
enabled by domestic law and permits information to be provided that would not
ordinarily be shared by regulatory agencies.154 This is one of the few agreements of
its kind and allows for the ‘broad assistance in criminal and civil non-merger
antitrust matters, including the exercise of compulsory power to obtain testimony and
documentary information.’155 The agreement allows for the sharing of confidential
information, provided that that information is not disclosed, particularly to third
parties for the purpose of private actions.156

(c)

Informal Information Sharing Frameworks

Although informal information sharing frameworks may not be binding, they
serve as a vital platform for the sharing of non-confidential information and the
development of strategies that can lead to more effective harmonisation of
information sharing processes in general. They offer the opportunity for regulatory
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agencies, government officials and competition law practitioners to discuss key
issues relating to cartel investigations and work closely to implement these ideas into
policy, otherwise known as ‘soft law.’
A number of international bodies serve this function, such as the OECD, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International
Competition Network (ICN), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). These types of platforms can help
foster trust between regulatory agencies and lead to better processes of informal
information sharing between jurisdictions, including providing an opportunity for
certain jurisdictions to overcome any challenges they may be experiencing.
One of the key developments in this area has been the drafting of the OECD’s
Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information between Competition
Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations157 in 2005. The aim of these
guidelines was to ‘simplify and expedite’ the process for exchanging information to
allow for the most effective and timely information exchange.158 Most significantly,
these guidelines recognise the importance of implementing safeguards into
information sharing frameworks to protect the integrity of these regimes.
Section B of the guidelines specifically relates to the provision of
confidentiality, use and disclosure in the requesting jurisdiction, and requires that a
requesting jurisdiction be aware of the capability of the requested jurisdiction to
maintain confidentiality in relation to the information.159 The requesting jurisdiction
must ensure that the privilege against self-incrimination is respected160 and that all
necessary measures are taken to ensure that unauthorised disclosure does not
occur.161 There is also a specific provision for the protection of legal professional
privilege.162 All of these safeguards are integral to ensuring the confidentiality of
information exchanged between regulatory agencies and as has been shown, is
particularly pertinent to the operation of immunity policies worldwide.
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2

The Requirement of Confidentiality Waivers

Over the past decade, the use of waivers of confidentiality in immunity policies has
largely been deemed a successful information sharing arrangement. In contrast to
other formal and informal information sharing frameworks discussed above, the
waiver is specifically used for the sharing of confidential information provided by
the immunity applicant to other investigating agencies, with the applicant’s express
consent.163 The scope of the information to be disclosed will depend upon the way
the waiver is drafted but generally allows for the sharing of confidential information
obtained from the parties following their immunity application and enables free
communication of this information between the competent authorities dealing with
the same cartel.164
According to the ACCC Immunity Policy, applicants will generally be
required to provide consent to allow for the sharing of confidential information in
international matters.165 The ACCC will require the applicant to grant a waiver to any
jurisdiction where it has or intends to seek immunity in that jurisdiction. Whilst a
refusal to grant a waiver will not affect the granting of immunity, failure to provide a
satisfactory explanation may constitute a breach of the cooperation condition of
immunity, presumably leading to a possible revocation of the Policy.166 The FAQ
elaborates on some possible situations where an immunity applicant’s refusal to grant
a waiver may be held to be ‘satisfactory’ which includes: where an immunity
applicant is not eligible for immunity in those particular jurisdictions;167 or where an
immunity applicant may be compelled by a law enforcement agency or court of law
to maintain confidentiality.168
The Competition Bureau’s requirement for waiver is similar to that of the
ACCC, by requiring the consent of the applicant before any information is provided
to a foreign law enforcement agency.169 The Bureau also requires that a refusal to
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grant a waiver must be met with ‘compelling reasons,’ which is seemingly a higher
threshold requirement than that of the ACCC.170 In contrast to the ACCC, the Bureau
outlines the scope of the waiver and expects it to ‘cover both substantive and
procedural information.’171 Moreover, there is an expectation that the waiver is to be
provided immediately.
In contrast to the ACCC and the Competition Bureau’s policies, the DOJ’s
waiver requirement is not outlined in the policy itself; rather it is described in greater
detail in the FAQ.172 The DOJ reconfirms its commitment to confidentiality in the
context of its leniency applications and acknowledges the potential disincentive that
would ensue if an applicant believed the information they provide could potentially
be used against them in foreign jurisdictions.173 The crux of the provision is
essentially the same as the ACCC and the Competition Bureau in that confidential
information will not be disclosed without the consent of the applicant, however it
does not expressly mention the consequences of an applicant’s refusal to grant a
waiver.174
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) does not expressly state that
it will seek the consent of a leniency applicant before disclosing information to
foreign enforcement agencies. Instead, it states that the (CMA) will ‘expect to be
given 'waivers' of confidentiality so as to be able to discuss appropriate matters with
those other jurisdiction(s).’175 Similarly to the DOJ, the CMA policy does not state
what will happen in the event of an applicant’s refusal to grant a waiver but it does
state that the waiver will generally be ‘limited’ to ‘information that is necessary to
coordinate planned concerted action such as on-site investigations.’176 There is no
further elaboration as to what kind of information is generally classified as necessary
in this scenario.
The international competition law community has praised the utility of
waivers of confidentiality in assisting with the timely coordination of cartel
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investigations between jurisdictions.177 This is particularly the case in the context of
increased multi-jurisdictional applications for immunity. This praise has been met
with the development of Waiver Templates by the ICN that serve as a best practice
model for jurisdictions wishing to introduce the waiver requirement or update their
existing requirement/s.178 It is believed that the introduction of these waivers has
saved competition agencies considerable time and resources and will continue to do
so.179 In a survey conducted by the ICN, one agency stated that the exchanged
information provided pursuant to the waiver requirement was used for reasons
including:
-

developing the background, theory and strategy for the case;

-

judging the value and credibility of witnesses;

-

preparing for witness interviews; and

-

support for a court order for a search or document production.180

Therefore, there is clear support for the use of waivers as a tool for international
cartel enforcement. However, the risks associated with the increased use of waivers
and the impact this may have on future immunity applications has received far less
attention. First and foremost, is the possibility that an immunity applicant may refuse
to grant a waiver. It is not clear what the consequences of this decision would be.
Both the ACCC and Competition Bureau recognise this possibility and the ACCC
Policy states that a refusal to grant a waiver may constitute a breach of the
cooperation condition of immunity.
Whilst the waiver requirement is framed as a ‘voluntary’ commitment to provide
information to foreign authorities, essentially failure to do so could constitute a
breach of an Immunity Policy. Whilst confidentiality is seen as the bedrock of
immunity policies in terms of ensuring that applicants have full confidence that their
confidential information will not be disclosed, it has been asserted that the waiver
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requirement could potentially ‘swallow’ confidentiality by compelling the disclosure
of confidential information to foreign authorities.181
There is a real risk that the information that is shared with a foreign regulatory
agency will be subject to the discovery requirements in that foreign jurisdiction/s. As
has been demonstrated in the previous section, such confidential information has
increasingly been exposed in the context of cartel cases, despite the best efforts of the
regulatory agency to prevent that disclosure. This is occurring even in the
jurisdictions thought to have the most protected disclosure regimes, such as the
United States.
Therefore, if an immunity applicant is required to grant waivers in multiple
jurisdictions, there is an increased risk that this information will be publicly disclosed
in the foreign jurisdiction, which could expose the applicant to third party damages
actions in multiple jurisdictions.182 This could serve to undermine the incentives to
apply for immunity in the first place and adversely impact on international cartel
enforcement.183
These issues must also be viewed in the context of other international
enforcement issues, namely the varied and inconsistent immunity policy
requirements that exist across the globe and the resultant challenges associated with
simultaneous immunity applications. Although much work has been done at the
international level to harmonise immunity policies worldwide, there are still
significant differences in terms of proffer requirements, timelines for the
establishment of a marker and immunity conditions that an immunity applicant must
have knowledge of when determining which jurisdiction/s to apply for immunity.184
This could result in an applicant being granted immunity in one jurisdiction but not
in another, which makes information sharing between foreign regulatory agencies in
this context difficult.
The ICN has recognised that this situation may also discourage the granting of
waivers, ‘as an undertaking may have to submit more information in one jurisdiction
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than in another in order to benefit from the respective leniency programmes, and may
not want this additional information to be revealed to other agencies with less
demanding leniency programmes.’185 This is exacerbated by the fact that there is no
universally agreed upon definition of what constitutes ‘confidential information.’186
Therefore information classified in one jurisdiction as confidential may not be
deemed confidential in another, leading to the disclosure of that information in the
foreign jurisdiction.
Many of the interviewees recognised these difficulties in international cartel
enforcement and the problems caused by inconsistent immunity policies.187 Some
interviewees believed that these problems could be overcome by a ‘global immunity
strategy’ where large multinational law firms coordinate to simultaneously apply for
immunity in several jurisdictions.188 Some interviewees were of the belief that if you
hired a ‘good lawyer’ in a large-multinational firm then this is an effective way to
overcome the difficulties associated with multi-jurisdictional applications.189 When
questioned further in relation to this, these interviewees acknowledged that smaller,
or purely domestic firms, would have much more difficulty with this process.190
The interviewees were also asked whether they believed it was feasible that a
‘supra-national body’ could be established that would act as the global body for
immunity marker applications.191 John Taladay suggested that either the European
Union or United States competition agencies could act as a body for applicants to
submit a marker for a particular cartel and this marker would recognise their ‘first in’
status in all subsequent jurisdictions the applicant applied in by alerting the
jurisdictions to the fact that a marker had been placed.192 This marker system would
provide an ‘opt-in’ mechanism for agencies that wished to be included in the global
185
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marker system and also provide applicants with the opportunity to select which
jurisdiction/s they wished to apply for a marker. An applicant would then seek
immunity in each jurisdiction where it had applied for a marker by the normal
processes of that jurisdiction. Therefore, there would be no change to the immunity
requirements in each jurisdiction.
The notion of establishing a global marker system, like most agreements at an
international level, has been met with arguments in relation to the protection of
sovereignty.193 In response to this argument, Taladay asserts that such a ‘marker
clearinghouse’ would not impede on sovereignty, as it is merely a ‘convergence of
process, not of legal substance or enforcement prerogative.’194As a result, the
discretion as to whether or not to grant immunity or the determination as to which
cartel to prosecute will still rest firmly with the independent jurisdictions, akin to a
plurilateral initiative.
In response to the growing importance of these issues, the OECD established a
Working Group in December 2014 that discussed the feasibility of implementing a
‘one-stop shop’ for leniency markers pursuant to Taladay’s model.195 The Working
Group recognised that it would be necessary for participating agencies to reach an
agreement on the information required to be submitted by the applicant to secure the
marker. At present, marker requirements can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Taladay suggests that the ICN ‘Model Leniency Programme’ should act as the
proposed model for the marker system, with the following information to be
provided to secure a marker:
-

The Applicant’s name and address;

-

The basis for the concern which led to the leniency approach;

-

The parties to the alleged cartel;

-

The affected product(s);

-

The affected territory (-ies);

-

The duration of the alleged cartel; and

-

The nature of the alleged cartel conduct.196
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Another suggestion that has been put forward states that the ICN could act as the
body to take immunity applications by way of international agreement, in a similar
framework as that adopted by the patent wide application process in the European
Union.197 Some interviewees felt that it would be more likely for the ICN to take on
this role, as many of the jurisdictions that have immunity policies are already
members.
In lieu of creating a universal immunity policy, the ICN could act as a body to
request a marker, in the same way Taladay has suggested, which would recognise the
‘first-in’ status of the immunity applicant. Once the marker had been recognised, the
ICN would notify the selected jurisdictions of the applicant’s ‘first in’ status and the
immunity applicant would seek to submit immunity applications in all of the selected
jurisdictions. In this model, there would be no need for the development of a
universal immunity policy, which could be fraught with political difficulties, as the
applications would proceed as per the normal processes in that jurisdiction. It would
essentially act as an international marker queue for immunity applications. Although
this would not overcome the difficulties associated with globally inconsistent
immunity requirements, it would act as a positive first step towards harmonisation of
the policies and overcome some of the difficulties of simultaneous immunity
applications in multiple jurisdictions.
At a global level, it seems the momentum is growing for the implementation of a
global marker system and the OECD working group is of the belief that it will
provide a ‘a more efficient, more effective and more complete approach to seeking
leniency in multiple jurisdictions for international cartels.’198 However, many of the
interviewees believed that although this idea may be plausible in theory, in reality the
political environment would not permit its implementation. As one interviewee put
it:
Interviewee: Again, just looking at the experience in relation to other aspect of competition law,
adjudication enforcement, I think it’s unlikely. Take for example the experience in relation to
notification of mergers. In that context I think there’s an even stronger argument because we’re
trying to facilitate, you know, conduct that is essentially efficiency and welfare and I’m seeing,
you know, engenders greater investment in global trade and so on and yet there are these very
significant regulatory impediments associated with the fact that international mergers or
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acquisitions will involve parties having to meet different thresholds, different notification
requirements in multiple jurisdictions. My work in merger control in the South East Asia region
we’re now heading towards an economic blueprint in 2015 trying to put together a harmonised
system competition law in the 10 ASEAN countries suggests that it’s just fanciful that these
countries with very significant legal, political and economic landscapes are going to be able to
agree on a uniform notification threshold and requirements. If it’s so difficult in the context of
mergers, as I say, where there are clear public benefits associated with having greater uniformity
and consistency in approaches. In the context of immunity policies where you are immunising
self-confessed cartelists from penalties and proceedings, the prospect is even slimmer I think of
reaching across jurisdictions on those things.199

The OECD working group felt that the practical implementation measures,
such as the development of procedures, guidelines and requirements should fall to
the competition agencies and that the OECD’s role would be to assist agencies in
understanding the implications of these structures.200 Therefore, the real risk to the
implementation of a global marker system is the lack of political will from the
regulatory agencies and/or jurisdictions.
In light of this, most interviewees were of the consensus that immunity
policies need to move towards harmonisation by means of ‘natural progression’ in
the form of continued international discussion and development of best practice
frameworks.201 This may well be the most likely scenario to occur at this point in
time. It is important that regulatory agencies take the initiative to discuss a strategy to
implement the global marker system; as such a step is necessary for the next phase of
international cartel cooperation.

C

Concluding Remarks on Confidentiality and Third Parties: Application of the
Enhanced Criteria

The role of public and private enforcement in Australian competition law is delicate
and complex. Clearly, the issues relating the Immunity Policy in this context require
a considerable degree of consideration in formulating where the balance should lie. A
strict application of the orthodox DOJ effectiveness criteria fails to appreciate the
complexity of the issues that arise when public and private enforcement roles
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intersect. Whilst the non-disclosure of immunity application may lead to greater
certainty for immunity applicants, and therefore encourage applications, the impact
that this policy has on the rights of third parties is also significant. Similarly,
ensuring each domestic immunity regime is serving the needs of the competition
regulator in that particular country needs to be observed in the greater global
enforcement context in which it operates. Thus observing the policy in isolation fails
to appreciate these complex intersections of the law.
This chapter has demonstrated that there is a greater need for transparency in
the context of third party access to immunity information. Whilst this requires a
delicate weighing of competing factors, this chapter has shown that the balance is
currently weighed in favour of the immunity applicant over that of cartel victims.
Given the judicial uncertainty in this area, it is recommended that an information
sharing provision be implemented into the policy to provide a form of restitution to
third parties. This element of transparency will provide a more appropriate balance,
whilst still preserving the detection and deterrence aims of the Immunity Policy. The
United States provides a useful example of this.
Similarly, the confidentiality of immunity applications in a multijurisdictional context needs to be weighed against the requirement for a coordinated
global approach to immunity applications. The regulators need to be explicit about
the risks of disclosure in multi-jurisdictional immunity applications, given the recent
developments in this area creating uncertainty. Guttoso suggests these measures
could include ex post evaluations of the ACCC’s handling of investigation, including
questions such as data handling and document disclosure processes, and being clear
on the extent to which the ACCC can guarantee the immunity applicant’s
confidentiality.202
The ACCC, as an independent statutory authority, needs to be held
accountable to the public for its decision-making. There are currently no published
rights of review in relation to the sharing of confidential immunity information with
other regulators. The sharing of information process is unclear and hence difficult to
measure. There are no accountability mechanisms in place to prevent the ACCC
from sharing information with a regulator in which the immunity applicant has not
been granted immunity. Accountability is intrinsically tied to the notion of
202
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transparency. Therefore, the ACCC needs to increase its levels of transparency, as
outlined above, in order to be held to account for its decisions in relation to
confidentiality.
Moreover, the current treatment of third parties seeking immunity applicant
information for the harm caused by the cartel conduct is inconsistent with the role of
the ACCC as an institution designed to protect consumers from anti-competitive
conduct. This is especially due to the fact that the ACCC rarely exercises its power to
bring proceedings on behalf of those third parties who seek compensation. This is
inconsistent with the role entrusted to the ACCC.
Inconsistency in the context of multi-jurisdictional applications is also
causing a considerable degree of uncertainty for the global anti-cartel enforcement
scheme. The current patchwork immunity approach results in both immunity
applicants and third parties unable to effectively navigate the different immunity
requirements in each jurisdiction. This uncertainty can be overcome with a
considered, harmonised approach to multi-jurisdictional immunity applications, as
outlined in this chapter.
In relation to third party access to immunity information, the ACCC needs to
ensure that providing such confidential information does not adversely affect the
aims of cartel detection and deterrence. Thus, its current approach is rationally
connected to its overall enforcement aims. However, this chapter has demonstrated
that the ACCC can implement processes to facilitate third party actions without
compromising its enforcement objectives. This has been shown to work in the United
States, with the information-sharing requirement.203 This method strikes a more
appropriate balance of ensuring the enforcement needs of the ACCC are met, but
also recognising that the rights of third parties to have access to this information is an
important component of the public enforcement agenda, in terms of rectifying the
harms caused to consumers at the hand of anti-competitive conduct.
Similarly, the disclosure of immunity information to overseas regulators is a
necessary component of a coordinated global anti-cartel enforcement strategy. Every
immunity applicant must recognise the inherent risks associated with these
information-sharing mechanisms. However, this chapter has demonstrated that there
are other measures that are likely to reduce the inconsistencies of the current
203
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approach and are arguably more effective at achieving cartel deterrence and detection
on a global scale. These recommendations are the result of analysing the Immunity
Policy as part of the wider enforcement context in which it operates with the aim of
strengthening its current design and operation and should be adopted as a result.
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VIII

ALTERNATIVES TO IMMUNITY

This thesis has thus far demonstrated that the current methodological approach and
criteria most commonly used to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy has
produced a very narrow view of the operation of the policy in reality. By viewing the
immunity policy in isolation, as one of the ‘single most effective’ methods of cartel
detection and deterrence, fails to adequately take account of other viable methods to
achieve these aims.
Given the number of limitations of the ACCC Immunity Policy that has been
exposed throughout this research, it is pertinent to analyse other key enforcement
tools that may serve to complement the existing Policy. As part of the overall
assessment of the immunity policy, according to the enhanced criteria, it is necessary
to examine whether these alternative methods are likely to be at least equally
effective at achieving cartel detection and deterrence as part of the proportionality
assessment.
This chapter will first analyse the position of cartel participants who are
unable to secure immunity, by way of not being the first eligible applicant. The
ACCC deals with these applicants by way of the Cooperation section of the
Immunity Policy.1 This approach will be compared to the respective policies in
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States to reveal that the current method
is unsatisfactory and in need of further clarification by the ACCC, especially in light
of recent case law developments.
Secondly, this chapter will outline the current whistleblower protection
provisions that exist in Australia pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and
analyse its effectiveness in providing protection for private corporate whistleblowers.
Given that this Act does not apply directly to cartel conduct, these provisions will be
compared to the whistleblower protection frameworks that exist in the above
jurisdictions. This comparative analysis will demonstrate that these whistleblower
protection frameworks are generally insufficient in providing adequate protection for
corporate whistleblowers.

1

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for
Cartel Conduct ' (2014) s H.

269

Given these inadequacies, this chapter will analyse the more controversial
approach of introducing a cartel informant scheme aimed at encouraging third parties
who are not directly involved in the cartel to reveal pertinent information to the
regulator in exchange for financial incentives. This analysis will draw upon the
extensive experience of the United States in relation to these bounty-type
arrangements and will also focus on the specific cartel informant systems in the
United Kingdom, South Korea and Hungary in order to formulate a workable model
for Australia.

A

Subsequent Applications for Immunity: Lenient Treatment of ‘Second-in’
Cartel Offenders - Australia
Prior to the recent review of the ACCC policy, the treatment of subsequent

applicants was dealt with pursuant to the ACCC Cooperation Policy (‘2002
Cooperation Policy’).2 The 2002 Cooperation Policy was intended to provide a
flexible approach to the treatment of subsequent immunity applicants, that is, any
person who did not qualify for ‘first in’ immunity. There are a number of factors the
Commission would have regard to when assessing the appropriate penalty for
‘second-in’ individuals, namely:
-

The probative value of the evidence provided by the applicant, particularly
where the Commission was either otherwise unaware or had insufficient
evident to initiate proceedings;

-

The willingness of the applicant to provide the Commission with full and
frank disclosure of the relevant Contravention, and evidence in support of
this, and cooperate with the Commission’s investigation;

-

A requirement that the applicant did not use the same legal representation as
the firm by which they were employed; and

-

The applicant was not the originator or ringleader of the cartel.3

The Commission would consider the same factors in its assessment of a
subsequent corporate applicant, except for three key points of difference. Firstly,
upon discovery of the cartel, the corporation was required to take prompt and
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effective action to terminate its participation in the cartel.4 This included taking steps
to rectify the situation by providing an undertaking of compliance. Secondly, the
corporation must have been prepared to make restitution, where restitution was
possible.5 And finally, the corporation must not have had a prior record of breaches
of the former Trade Practices Act,6 or any related offences.7
As part of the recent review of the Policy, the ACCC fused the Immunity
Policy and the Cooperation Policy into a single document, in an attempt to streamline
the immunity application process.8 Section H of the Immunity Policy essentially
reiterates the prior position adopted by the ACCC in relation to the treatment of
subsequent applicants, where the ACCC will make joint submissions to the Court
based on the cooperation of a party who is not first in.9 Recent case law has
overturned this practice, which will be discussed below.
Pursuant to section H, it is not a compulsory requirement that the party
seeking lenient treatment make an admission of guilt in order to receive lenient
treatment; instead there ‘may’ be a requirement to make admissions, agree to a
statement of facts and/or provide evidence in proceedings in respect of the cartel
conduct.10 This aspect of the policy is not in line with the treatment of subsequent
immunity applicants in Canada and the United States, where there is a requirement
that these parties admit their wrongdoing in order to receive lenient treatment.11 A
subsequent immunity applicant should not be permitted to bypass this requirement,
as this goes against the spirit of full cooperation in exchange for lenient treatment.
Failure to admit wrongdoing can also potentially cause difficulties for third parties in
their action for damages claims.
As part of the Cooperation policy, it is also possible for the ACCC in ‘rare
and exceptional circumstances’ to grant full immunity to a subsequent leniency
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applicant.12 This is also a unique feature of the ACCC’s treatment of subsequent
applicants. For example, the Canadian policy makes it clear that full immunity will
only apply to the ‘first-in’ applicant.13 According to the Bureau, this practice
encourages parties to apply for immunity as soon as possible and not wait for other
cartel participants, to gauge what they may do, before reporting cartel conduct to the
Bureau.14 According to this view, granting multiple cartelists full immunity will
dilute the incentive of applying first and adversely impact on the ‘race’ for immunity.
Another view would be that it would not be in the interests of fairness and justice to
allow two parties to a cartel to secure the extraordinary benefit of immunity and this
should be opposed on moral grounds.15
The factors that the ACCC will use to assess the extent and value of the
cooperation provided by the cartelist remained largely unchanged from that under the
2002 Cooperation Policy. The only additions included a consideration of the
timeliness of the party seeking to cooperate16 and whether the party had acted in
‘good faith’ in its dealings with the ACCC.17 Most notably, the assessment as to
whether the party has sought to provide restitution has been removed.18
The Cooperation Policy also incorporated a new section that outlines the
factors that the ACCC would take into account in determining whether to reach an
agreement on civil penalties to submit to the court, banning orders or other relief and
the terms of any such agreement:
(a) the extent and value of the party’s cooperation with the ACCC by reference to the
factors set out in paragraph 77;
(b) (for corporate cooperating party) whether the contravention arose out of the conduct
of senior management, or at a lower level;
(c) (for corporate cooperating party) whether the corporation has a corporate culture
conducive to compliance with the law;
(d) the nature and extent of the party’s contravening conduct;
(e) whether the conduct has ceased;
(f) the amount of loss or damage caused;
(g) the circumstances in which the conduct took place;
(h) (for corporate cooperating party) the size and power of the corporation, and
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(i) whether the contravention was deliberate and the period over which it extended.19

In submissions to the ACCC, it was recommended that the ACCC outline
how a cooperating party would be treated in relation to criminal cartel conduct. As a
result, Section H subsections 80-84 were implemented to clarify this position. As is
the case with immunity, prior to recent case law, the CDPP would make a
recommendation for a reduced penalty for criminal cartel conduct in accordance with
the Prosecution Policy20 and not Annexure B (which relates solely to the granting of
immunity for cartel conduct). Similarly to the ACCC, the CDPP had the power to
make recommendations to the Court who would determine the final penalty in
accordance with Section 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). As the CDPP made
their recommendations based on the Prosecution Policy, the CDPP was required to
have regard to whether the evidence the party gave was ‘considered necessary to
secure the conviction of the defendant or is essential to fully disclose the nature and
scope of the offending and the evidence is not available from other sources’ and the
party ‘can reasonably be regarded as significantly less culpable than the defendant.’21
In Australia, the determination of penalties ultimately rests with the court.
Therefore, prior to recent case law, the lenient treatment of offenders was dealt with
by way of joint submissions to the court, which either the ACCC or the CDPP and
the relevant leniency parties had agreed to. In determining whether to reach an
agreement on penalties, and the terms of such agreement, the ACCC specifically
would take into consideration a combination of factors listed in the 2002 Cooperation
Policy on a case-by-case basis.22 Although the court had discretion as to whether to
accept these joint submissions and the agreed penalty, it was common practice that
the court would generally accept these agreed penalties.23
19
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However, recent case law overturns this long established practice; two cases
are significant in this respect. The first relates to the High Court decision in Barbaro
that held that the prosecution was not permitted or required to provide to a
sentencing judge its view as to the bounds of the range of sentences to be imposed.24
The court also held that such a penalty submission was not a submission of law, but a
statement of opinion.25
The case concerned two appellants who had pleaded guilty to serious drugrelated offences. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge made it clear that she did
not wish to hear a submission from any party regarding the sentencing range. As a
result, the prosecution did not make a submission regarding the range of sentences
that it considered might be imposed, which was against usual practice.26 The court
stated:
The prosecution’s statement of what are the bounds of the available range of sentences is a
statement of opinion. Its expression advances no proposition of law or fact which a
sentencing judge may properly take into account in finding the relevant facts, deciding the
applicable principles of law or applying those principles to the facts to yield the sentence to
be imposed. That being so, the prosecution is not required, and should not be permitted, to
make such a statement of bounds to a sentencing judge.27

The principles in Barbaro have been confirmed in a number of cases
following the decision28 with widespread concern that the certainty of agreed penalty
processes had been undermined or diminished.29 Further, it was uncertain whether
judges would continue to hear submissions from civil regulators on the appropriate
penalty, given that Barbaro was a criminal case.
24
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This issue was addressed by the court in the CFMEU30 decision, where the
Full Court held unanimously that Barbaro applied in relation to pecuniary penalties
under the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth), and more
broadly, in other proceedings where pecuniary penalties are sought by the
regulator.31 The full court in CFMEU confirmed the decision in Barbaro, stating that
courts should have: ‘no regard to the agreed figures in fixing the amounts of the
penalties to be imposed, other than to the extent that the agreement demonstrates a
degree of remorse and/or cooperation on the part of each respondent.’32
To this end, the court supported its reasoning by emphasising its unfettered
discretion in determining pecuniary penalties in both the civil and criminal context
and that any agreements or submissions as to the quantum or range of penalties was
no more than an expression of opinion.33 The court also heard evidence from a
number of Commonwealth regulators, including the ACCC, regarding concerns
about the uncertainty that will befall regulators who seek to negotiate penalty
outcomes with applicants via cooperation agreements, such as those dealt with
pursuant to section H of the ACCC Immunity Policy. It has been suggested that
parties would be less willing to agree to resolve matters if the regulator cannot assure
them of any certainty in relation to their potential penalty outcome.34 In response, the
Court held that these concerns are considerably overstated, and that ‘it is to be the
inevitable consequence of entrusting the pecuniary penalty process to the
judiciary.’35 Further, the court did not believe that the consequences of the decision
would be as ‘dire’ as the regulators suggested and that, if anything, there may be
some short term expense incurred in cases where the regulators and respondent have
already identified agreed penalties or agreed ranges.36
It remains to be seen the effect that these decisions will have on the processes
adopted by the ACCC to determine the appropriate penalty for subsequent leniency
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applicants. It is likely to create considerable difficulty for any cartel participant to
ascertain their potential penalty before approaching the ACCC, or even after
discussions with the ACCC. The leniency applicant will not have the same level of
certainty that the ACCC was able to offer in the past and any discount they may
receive as a result of their cooperation will rest firmly with the court. As will be
demonstrated below, this practice is out of line with the treatment of leniency
applicants in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. In particular, this
decision may adversely impact on the Immunity Policy, as there will be an even
stronger incentive to be the ‘first-in’ applicant if leniency applicants decide to contest
facts rather than cooperate with the ACCC. This may lead to an even greater reliance
on the immunity applicant’s evidence, which has been shown in Chapter VI to be
problematic.37
The Commonwealth applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal
the CFMEU decision. Special leave was granted to the Commonwealth on 18 June
2015 and the appeal is likely to be heard in October 2015. Thus, it is too early to tell
what the full implications will be for the ACCC Immunity Policy. There is some
suggestion that the parliament may seek to intervene by way of a legislation solution,
which could address the procedure as to how regulators seek pecuniary penalties.38
Alternatively, it may be more suitable to implement delegated legislation that could
introduce guidelines for the assessment of pecuniary penalties, which seeks to
‘provide parties and the Court with a common starting point for assessment, thereby
potentially reintroducing a degree of certainty to the resolution of pecuniary penalty
proceedings.’39 This process would not be far from the process that existed prior to
the CMFEU decision, where the ACCC would consider a number of factors in its
assessment of the penalty to recommend to the court. Thus, this solution may serve
as an appropriate middle ground. An analysis of the treatment of second and
subsequent immunity applicants in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United
37
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States will reveal the starkly different position in Australia as a result of these recent
court decisions. This will exacerbate the uncertainty that permeates this area of
competition practice.

1

Lenient Treatment of Subsequent Applicants Abroad

This section will outline the position of subsequent immunity applicants in
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom before turning to an analysis of
the key similarities and differences between the regimes, namely (1) the timeliness of
a leniency application versus its probative evidence (2) the calculation of the
discount afforded to those not ‘first-in’ and (3) flexibility v fixed cooperation
discounts.

(a)

Canada
There are three primary conditions of eligibility for leniency in Canada,

where the Bureau will make a recommendation for leniency in sentencing to the
Public Prosecution Service of Canada (‘PPSC’) for an individual or business
organisation that agrees to:
(a) terminate its participation in the cartel;
(b) agrees to cooperate fully and in a timely manner, at its own expense, with the Bureau’s
investigation and any subsequent prosecution of the other cartel participants by the
PPSC;
(c) Agrees to plead guilty. 40

The first step in the process for determining the appropriate penalty to
recommend to the Court will be to formulate a ‘leniency discount.’ The Court
determines the final penalty for leniency applicants but, unlike the position in
Australia post-Barbaro, the Competition Bureau provides a comprehensive
breakdown of the process by which it undertakes in formulating its sentencing
submission to the Court, which the court will generally accept.41 The Bureau will
determine the leniency discount by ascertaining ‘a proxy of 20 percent of the cartel
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participant’s affected volume of commerce in Canada.’42 The determination of the
proxy amount is supplemented in the FAQ document.43
The discount that an applicant may be eligible for is tiered: with the first
leniency applicant being eligible for a 50 per cent reduction of the fine that would
have otherwise been recommended; the second is eligible for a 30per cent reduction
and any subsequent applicants after the second will be determined on a case-by-case
basis and this will significantly depend on the timeliness of the application.44 The
Policy also clearly outlines that the PPSC will have regard to mitigating and
aggravating factors when determining the base level fine proxy in accordance with
the Criminal Code.45
Most importantly, when determining whether to charge a participant, the
Bureau will have regard to the individual’s role and extent of involvement in the
offence (as a cartel instigator or coercer); the degree to which the participant
benefited from the offence; and whether the individual is a recidivist or has a
criminal record.46 The policy also states that the aforementioned factors will be
considered when recommending imprisonment and notes that the recommendation of
prison sentences for subsequent applicants is increasing.47 These are significant
considerations pertaining to the culpability of the cartelist that expressly recognise
the possibility of imprisonment for subsequent applicants.
The Policy comprehensively outlines the step-by-step approach taken by the
Bureau to process a leniency application, commencing with an initial contact or
marker request, through to the conclusion of Court proceedings.48 Importantly, the
Policy indicates what will occur in the event that an applicant seeks to withdraw
from the leniency program and states that any information provided to the Bureau up
until that point ‘will not be used directly against it (the leniency applicant) and will
be treated as either confidential or settlement privileged.’49 The Bureau provides the
same level of detail for its leniency applicants as it does for immunity applicants and
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therefore the process for the determination of penalty for subsequent applicants is
transparent. Despite the fact that the determination of penalty still rests with the court
in Canada, the treatment of subsequent immunity applicants by the Bureau is far
more predictable then the position in Australia post-Barbaro.

(b)

The United Kingdom
In contrast to the Competition Bureau, the CMA does not have a separate

policy for the lenient treatment of subsequent immunity applicants. Instead, an
applicant will be eligible for ‘Type C leniency’, which may include:
(a) Discretionary reductions in corporate penalties of up to 50 per cent; and/or
(b) Discretionary criminal immunity to specific individuals; and
(c) Protection from director disqualification proceedings for all directors of the undertaking
(if a reduction in corporate penalty is granted).50

In order to be afforded lenient treatment by the CMA, an applicant must show
that the information they have provided will ‘add significant value to the CMA’s
investigation;’ meaning that is must ‘genuinely advance the investigation.’51 Contrary
to the ACCC and the Competition Bureau, the CMA expressly recognises that a
delicate consideration of two competing factors needs to be undertaken when
considering the grant of lenient treatment, that being: the value of gaining additional
information versus the consequences of granting leniency to multiple parties in a
single investigation.52
In this vein, the Policy states that where the CMA already has sufficient
evidence to establish the existence of the reported cartel activity, it is ‘highly
unlikely’ that leniency will be granted, unless it is in the public interest to do so.53 As
a result, a subsequent applicant may not be informed of whether they will be treated
leniently until much further along in the investigation, or may in fact, not be granted
leniency at all.54
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Thus, there is clearly less certainty that a subsequent leniency applicant will
be afforded any lenient treatment at all by the CMA, in comparison to the practice of
the ACCC and the Competition Bureau. However, at the expense of certainty, the
CMA has established an important threshold: that leniency applicants should at a
minimum, provide evidence that will advance the cartel investigation, not simply act
as a method by which all cartel participants receive discounted sentences regardless
of the evidence they provide.
Whilst the CMA policy is not as specific as the Bureau’s, it states that Type C
applicants can generally expect to receive discounts in the 25-50 per cent range.55
The CMA policy also states that the queue position of leniency applications is not
decisive. Thus, an applicant who is third in the queue may receive a discount greater
than an applicant who was second to apply.
In contrast to the ACCC and Competition Bureau policies, the CMA policy
does not list the factors relevant to the assessment of a leniency discount, except for
the overall guiding principle that the evidence adds significant value to the CMA’s
investigation. This provides little guidance as to the other mitigating and aggravating
factors that should be pertinent to this assessment. Further to this and similarly to the
ACCC, there is a general lack of information regarding the process by which a
leniency application will be dealt with.56

(c)

The United States
The United States does not have a formalised leniency policy for subsequent

applicants. In contrast to the aforementioned policies, the method by which
subsequent immunity applicants are dealt with by the DOJ is entirely absent from its
policy and FAQ document. Instead, the approach taken can be pieced together with
the aid of other DOJ documents, namely ‘Measuring the Value of Second-In
Cooperation in Corporate Plea Agreements’57 and ‘The United States Model of
Negotiated Plea Agreements: A Good Deal with Benefits for all.’58 The DOJ leniency
policy or the FAQ should at least reference these articles, or they should be
55
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incorporated/annexed onto these documents to help improve the process by which
subsequent applicants are dealt with by the DOJ.
In a similar vein to the CMA Policy, the DOJ acknowledges the criticisms
that have been levelled at the concept of ‘plea bargaining’ and asserts that in the
context of corporate plea agreements, the benefits outweigh the potential negative
consequences of such a practice.59 Furthermore, the DOJ makes it clear that its
position is not to outline fixed discounts for lenient treatment, as this would serve to
undermine the need for proportionality in the assessment of lenient treatment for
subsequent offenders.60
Similarly to the Competition Bureau, the DOJ is willing to adjust the fixed
amount of commerce affected to set a base rate for the determination of a penalty.
The base rate will differ depending on whether the applicant was first-in or
approached the DOJ subsequently. However, if the leniency applicant provides
information that indicates the cartel conduct was broader than initially anticipated, a
leniency applicant’s fine will not be increased as a result of this new information.61
In addition to this, the DOJ will generally offer a ‘cooperation discount’ that
seeks to reflect the overall value of the cooperation provided by the subsequent
applicant.62 On average, the second-in applicant can expect to receive a discount in
the range of 30-35 per cent from the bottom of the Guidelines fine range. Subsequent
applicants can expect to receive a substantially smaller discount.
The two primary considerations the DOJ will take into account when
determining the ‘cooperation discount’ will be related to the timing of the application
and the significance of the evidence provided by the applicant. To help practically
illustrate how the DOJ considers these key factors, the DOJ provides a relevant case
example of a leniency applicant who provided ‘extraordinary cooperation’ and
secured a 59 per cent discount as a result. In this respect, the DOJ’s aim is to increase
the awareness of how it will consider the timing and significance of the evidence
when assessing the cooperation discount, which is pertinent to the transparent
operation of the policy.
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Further to this, the DOJ has provided Model Plea Agreement Templates that
outline the standard form and terms that a leniency applicant will be required to
agree to, even prior to approaching the DOJ.63 This model agreement is a unique
feature of the United States plea negotiation system. Although a potential subsequent
applicant may not be able to ascertain with certainty the level of base rate fine or
cooperation discount they may receive, the DOJ document provides a detailed
breakdown of how the process is likely to proceed. As a result of the
Barbaro/CFMEU decisions, the process of dealing with subsequent leniency
applicants by the ACCC is now starkly different. It would not be possible for the
ACCC to seek to design and implement a Model Cooperation Agreement to ensure
that the rights and obligations pursuant to a cooperation agreement are fair and
transparent. The ACCC is thus out of step with international practice in its treatment
of subsequent immunity applicants. It remains to be seen whether this will reduce the
number of immunity/leniency applications in Australia.

2

An Assessment of the Key Components of Cooperation for Subsequent
Applicants

Pursuant to the preceding analysis of the treatment of subsequent applicants in
Canada, United Kingdom and United States, there are three primary components of a
leniency regime, which each jurisdiction has adopted to differing extents. In contrast,
as a result of recent case law, the process in Australia stands in stark contrast. Given
the widely different approach the ACCC will need to adopt in its treatment of second
and subsequent applicants, it is out of line with current international practice.
Cooperating parties in Australia have been stripped of the certainty that competition
regulators claim is crucial to the operation of the Immunity Policy. As a result, the
ACCC may find that parties who are not ‘first-in’ and granted full immunity, may
not come forward at all, adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach. This will make it more
difficult for the ACCC to gather evidence in relation to the cartel’s operation, as the
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ACCC heavily relies on evidence gathered by way of cooperation to support its
cases.
The first component of leniency policies abroad relates to the key
considerations of leniency, namely the timeliness of the application versus the
probative value of the evidence provided by the applicant. In Canada and the United
States, the emphasis is seemingly weighed in favour of the timeliness of the
application, where the first-in applicant will generally be granted the highest eligible
discount; with a tiered discount determination based on a queue. This is particularly
emphasised in Canada, whereby the marker system acts as an indicator of the queue
by which leniency is sought. These jurisdictions justify this approach by emphasising
the need for timely action on behalf of leniency applicants in cartel investigations.
In contrast, Australia and the United Kingdom place more emphasis on the
probative value of the evidence provided by the applicant and recognise that a ‘thirdin’ applicant may provide more significant evidence than a ‘second-in’ applicant and
this should be reflected in a greater discount recommendation. The ACCC has
acknowledged that potential immunity or leniency applicants may continue to engage
in beneficial cartel conduct for as long as possible on the expectation that they will
be able to obtain a reduced penalty pursuant to the leniency program if the cartel is
reported.64 The ACCC believes that ‘by basing the degree of leniency upon the level
of cooperation provided by the cooperating party rather than order of application, this
risk is minimised,’65 however it is unclear whether the court will adopt the same
position.
In this respect, it is important that competition regulators recognise that both
the timeliness of the application and its probative value are equally important
considerations, and that both carry with them the risk of strategic manipulation. The
regulators should question the motivations for seeking leniency and the surrounding
circumstances that led to a granting of leniency to ascertain whether there was any
intention, or possible attempt, at strategically manipulating the leniency policy in this
regard.
The second component relates to the provision of an Amnesty Plus regime,
where leniency applicants will be granted immunity, subject to conditions, for a new
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and undisclosed cartel offence, in addition to lenient treatment for the existing cartel
offence. All of the relevant jurisdictions have adopted a similar Amnesty Plus
program. The Amnesty Plus regime is perceived as a resource efficient way of
securing information for a new offence and thereby aiding in the detection of cartel
conduct.66
The final component relates to the discount stipulated for lenient treatment.
Canada and the United States provide a discount range for leniency applications.
Whilst the United Kingdom is less clear about the discount range, Australia does not
stipulate a discount range at all. Post-Barbaro this may not even be a possibility for
the ACCC. There are those jurisdictions, such as Japan and the European
Commission that provide a very specific calculation of penalty regime for leniency.67
Whilst Canada and the United States do not go this far, these jurisdictions assert that
the stipulation of penalty amount or a discount range provides the requisite
transparency and predictability necessary for the ‘optimal functioning’ of leniency
programs.68 For instance, the DOJ utilises the Crompton case to illustrate the
operation of the plea agreement system.69
In contrast, jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, emphasise that the
‘uncertainty’ associated with an undisclosed discount amount extenuates the ‘race for
leniency;’ thus the cooperation discount can be tailored to the particular facts of a
case.
The stipulation of discount ranges would strike a more appropriate balance by
ensuring that the process by which leniency is determined is transparent, but not so
predictable so as to undermine the operation of immunity policies or allow for
strategic manipulation of the policy. The ability to exercise discretion in this sense
should be allowed, but the competition regulators should also remain vigilant of the
fact that providing significant penalties for all cartel participants means that cartelists
will essentially know that they can engage in cartel conduct and can expect a reduced
sentence in return, if not full immunity.
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Most importantly, the recent court decisions in relation to the calculation of
penalty discounts in Barbaro and CFMEU marks a new challenge for the ACCC in
the determination of penalty amounts. The long held process of the court accepting
the ACCC agreed penalty amount has now been overturned. It is possible that there
will now be inconsistency, and therefore great uncertainty, as to whether the court
will accept the ACCC or CDPP’s penalty recommendations. This may have an
adverse impact on the ability of cartel participants to assess their position in relation
to cooperation, which may result in the adoption of a ‘wait and see’ approach. It
remains to be seen whether the court will continue to disregard the agreed penalty
outcomes when the decision goes to the High Court in October. The position of
subsequent immunity applicants in Australia is thus in a state of flux.

B

Whistleblower Protection

Whistleblowers have been an integral part of the detection of misconduct
throughout history. It is said to be the internal position of the individual in the
organisation that generally leads them to become aware of internal wrongdoing.
However, it is this very position that can expose them to unfair outcomes or immense
pressure to remain silent.70 Although there is no universally accepted definition of a
‘whistleblower,’ one widely held view in Australia is that it relates to 'the disclosure
by an organisation's members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate
practices under the control of their employers to persons that may be able to effect
action'.71 Generally, the misconduct relates to serious wrongdoing, such as fraud,
health and safety violations and corruption. Since cartel conduct is also serious
wrongdoing, it is important that whistleblower protection is considered as another
enforcement strategy, in addition to immunity.
In the wake of large corporate collapses, such as Enron in 2001, and more
recently the corporate misconduct that led to the Global Financial Crisis, there has
been a greater focus on the role of the whistleblower in the detection of such
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misconduct.72 The value of the whistleblower in the detection of corporate
wrongdoing is reflected in a number of studies that indicate that whistleblowers are a
significant source of fraud detection.73
The importance of whistleblowers has also been recognised by the OECD in
its revised (2004) Principles of Corporate Governance, which states that:
Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, should be able
to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board and
their rights should not be compromised for doing this.74

This OECD statement also reflects the inherent risks faced by whistleblowers
in attempting to reveal corporate wrongdoing. Absent protection, whistleblowers are
faced with the prospect of heavy employer retaliation, leading to the loss of their
jobs, immense distress and possibly even resulting in being blacklisted from the
industry. These are real risks that whistleblowers must consider when deciding
whether to reveal the corporate misconduct they have discovered. This can often lead
to whistleblowers being deemed to be ‘traitors’ or ‘rats’ which brands them as
dishonest or disloyal employees.
Recognising the value of corporate whistleblowers and these inherent risks,
governments around the world have sought to protect whistleblowers by enacting
legislation, to differing degrees, that is aimed at preventing or compensating the
whistleblower for the retaliation they may face after they have blown the whistle.
This chapter will outline the whistleblower protection frameworks for corporate
whistleblowers that exist in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and
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Canada to demonstrate how these protections have largely been deemed ineffective
at protecting whistleblowers. It is important to note that this chapter will focus on the
protection afforded to private or corporate whistleblower provisions, as these
protections are most relevant to the context of cartel whistleblowers.
This analysis will also reveal that there is a lack of specific whistleblower
protection for the detection of cartel conduct by third parties, particularly in
Australia. Much of the scholarly attention has been focused on the role of immunity
and leniency policies in anti-cartel enforcement, without recognising the important
role that third party whistleblowers can also play, given that whistleblowers are a
significant source of detection of corporate misconduct. Arguably, those who have
not been involved in the cartel should be afforded greater protection than those who
are granted immunity, as third party whistleblowers have generally not committed
any wrongdoing.
This section will conclude by outlining the steps that need to be taken by the
Australian Government to legislate for the protection of cartel whistleblowers before
proceeding to a more controversial analysis of the value of implementing a financial
incentive or ‘bounty system’ in Australia, to further aid in the detection of cartel
conduct.

3

The Position in Australia

As part of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 9 ('CLERP 9') reforms,
specific whistleblowing provisions were introduced into the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) in 2004, with the insertion of Part 9.4AAA entitled 'Protection for
Whistleblowers'. Section 1317 AA stipulates that protection will be extended to:
(i)

an officer of a company; or

(ii)

an employee of a company; or

(iii)

a person who has a contract for the supply of services or goods to a company; or

(iv)

an employee of a person who has a contract for the supply of services or goods to a
company.

Pursuant to this provision, a ‘discloser’ will only receive protection where the
disclosure is made to either:75
(i)
75

ASIC; or

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317AA(b).
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(ii)

the company's auditor or a member of an audit team conducting an audit of the company;
or

(iii)

a director, secretary or senior manager of the company; or

(iv)

a person authorised by the company to receive disclosures of that kind.

Subsection C stipulates that a discloser is required to disclose their identity prior
to revealing the disclosure. Subsection D requires that the discloser must have
‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that the company, or officer or employee of that
company, has, or may have, contravened a provision of the Corporations Legislation.
Subsection E requires that the disclosure must have been made in ‘good faith’.
The proceeding sections in the Act outline the protections that are afforded to
the informant in the form of: being exempt from civil and criminal liability,76 being
able to be reinstated if the discloser’s employer terminates the employment on the
basis of the disclosure77 and also prohibits the victimisation of the discloser.78 If the
court is satisfied that the person has contravened these provisions and the victim has
suffered detriment then that person is liable to compensate the victim for the
damage.79
These whistleblower provisions have attracted widespread criticism, particularly
due to their narrow application. The primary criticisms are as follows:
(a)

The Application of the Act – Who the Provisions Protect

Most notably, the definition encompassed within the section does not extend to
former employees, whom can provide vital information in relation to the corporate
misconduct.80 The fact that they are no longer employed by the organisation may
very well be due to the employee’s attempts to reveal or resolve the misconduct,
which is why protection should be extended to former employees. This definition sits
in direct contrast to the recently enacted Public Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth), relating to
the disclosure of public wrongdoing, where the definition does extend to former
public officials.81
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(b)

The Scope of the Conduct to Which the Provisions Relate

One of the most significant criticisms of the whistleblower provisions is that the
nature of the disclosure can only relate to a contravention of the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth). For the purposes of this thesis, this means that a third party
whistleblower that detects cartel conduct within a corporation will not be protected
by these provisions, due to their extremely narrow application. As will be discussed
below, this narrow definition is not in line with other international standards,
particularly that in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act82; an Act that extends to cases of
corporate fraud, or the Bill currently before the United States legislature that
specifically includes disclosure of cartel conduct.83 The public disclosure provisions
in Australia have a wider application, and extend, for example, to the contravention
of any law; conduct that perverts the course of justice; conduct that constitutes
maladministration; and conduct that unreasonably results in a danger to the health or
safety of one or more persons or the environment.84

(c)

No Positive Duty to Investigate

Pursuant to the provisions, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission
(ASIC) is the primary designated investigatory body for the disclosed misconduct.
However, Part 9.4AAA does not place any obligation on the person or agency who
‘receives’ the disclosure to conduct an investigation. Whistleblowers Australia was
strongly critical of this issue in a submission to the Treasury, as part of an Options
Paper released by the Government in 2009.85 They argue that the provisions do not
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oblige the ‘receiver’ to conduct a proper investigation, nor does it require that the
whistleblower be informed of the progress or outcome of the investigation.
Most significantly, the failure of ASIC to properly investigate whistleblower
claims in relation to the misconduct of Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited
and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia featured prominently in the Senate
Committee’s recent review into ASIC’s performance.86 It was claimed that ASIC’s
inadequate investigation of the misconduct resulted in, among other things, further
losses to ‘unsuspecting clients and enabling CFPL/the CBA to cover-up the extent of
the misconduct at CFPL and thereby deny fair and reasonable compensation to
victims.’87
ASIC itself admitted that the Corporations Act does not mandate or enable
ASIC to act on behalf of whistleblowers to ensure their rights as whistleblowers are
protected. As ASIC noted, ‘where a whistleblower…seeks to rely on the statutory
protections against third parties, they will generally have to enforce their own rights
or bring their own proceedings under the relevant legislation to access any remedy.
The legislation does not provide ASIC with a direct power to commence court
proceedings on a whistleblower’s behalf.’88

(d)

The Bona Fide Requirement Should be Removed

The bona fide requirement is another primary criticism of the current Part 9.4AAA
whistleblower provisions. It is presumably aimed at preventing whistleblowers from
revealing conduct based on mixed motives, such as malice or revenge. However, the
86
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motives of the whistleblower should not be relevant to their entitlement to protection;
rather the focus should be on the strength of the allegations and the evidence the
whistleblower supplies.
Arguably, there will always be mixed motives in the context of whistleblowing
and this requirement could unfairly lead to whistleblowers being unprotected from
reprisals, even when part of their intention was to ‘do the right thing’ and report the
misconduct. More importantly, this takes the focus away from the fact that the
corporation has engaged in misconduct, which is the more significant factor. As a
result of these criticisms, there have been calls to remove the Bona Fide requirement
and replace it with a ‘reasonably held, honest belief’ test to be determined on an
objective basis. This test would largely overcome the difficulties associated with the
bona fide requirement and lead to greater protection for whistleblowers.
As a result of these criticisms, the Federal Government released an Options Paper
in 2009, which was aimed at improving the legislative protections for corporate
sector whistleblowers.89 The Options paper revealed that only four whistleblowers
had ever used the protection of the Part 9.4AAA provisions to provide information to
ASIC, since the provisions were introduced in 2004.90 Moreover, further studies up
until 2010, revealed there had been no reported cases of any person seeking
compensation or damages caused by a contravention of the anti-retaliation
provisions, or any reported cases of criminal prosecutions alleging a contravention of
either the confidentiality or anti-retaliation provisions.91 Furthermore, there was no
evidence of any enforcement activity of the whistleblower protection provisions by
ASIC.92 These studies also revealed that only 31.5 per cent of the companies in the
data set had whistleblower policies and procedures in place.93
More recently, in the Senate Committee’s investigation into ASIC’s
performance in June 2014, the Committee noted that there was a general consensus
amongst the submissions that the current whistleblower provisions in the private
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sector are out-of-date, largely inadequate and lagging behind international
standards.94 As a result of these criticisms, ASIC have outlined a number of changes
that have been undertaken in order to improve the regulator’s role in whistleblower
protection, which includes providing a more centralised system for the handling of
whistleblowing complaints; providing prompt and clear communication to
whistleblowers in the assessment and handling of the disclosure and providing
confidentiality within the applicable legal framework.95
The ACCC has also called for greater protection for cartel whistleblowers in
the context of the Competition Law Review (Harper Review).96 The ACCC
recognises the limited protection afforded to whistleblowers within the Competition
and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pursuant to section 162A, in respect of intimidation or
other coercive conduct as a result of the informant’s cooperation with the ACCC.
The ACCC is of the view that improved protection for cartel whistleblowers will
result in greater quality of material provided to aid in the detection of misconduct,
such as cartel conduct.97
This section has demonstrated that the corporate whistleblower protections in
Australia are insufficient and in need of reform. This is particularly in the context of
cartel whistleblowing, where there is no protection for those third parties who wish
to come forward with information to the ACCC in relation to cartel conduct. This
section will now turn to a brief comparative analysis before concluding with the
recommendations needed to extend this protection adequately.

4

The United States
In the wake of the collapse of Enron and the surrounding corporate scandals,

the United States Congress held hearings to investigate how the country's corporate
governance system and law enforcement agencies failed to detect the widespread
misconduct.98 Their investigations found that a number of employees knew about the
94
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corporate misconduct but chose to remain silent. It was within this context that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200299 (‘Sarbanes-Oxley’) was enacted to implement
whistleblower protection mechanisms for corporate whistleblowers.
Specifically,

Sarbanes-Oxley

prohibits

employers

from

discharging,

demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, or discriminating against an employee
of a publicly traded company who provides information about any act that the
employee ‘reasonably believes constitutes a violation of . . . (statutes prohibiting mail
fraud; wire, radio, or television fraud; or commodities fraud), any rule or regulation
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’), or any provision of Federal law
relating to fraud against shareholders.’100 A whistleblower may report this
misconduct externally, to a regulatory agency, primarily the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), to Congress or internally, to a supervisor.101
If a whistleblower demonstrates that they have suffered retaliation, the
employee is entitled to reinstatement;102 back pay with interest;103 and compensation
for legal fees, including court costs.104 These provisions are broadly similar to the
anti-retaliation provisions in Australia, although they have a much wider application
to corporate misconduct, as they are not tied to a contravention of any particular Act.
However, in contrast to ASIC’s position, Sarbanes-Oxley prevents the OSHA
from dismissing a complaint if the employee meets the low burden of making a
prima facie case of retaliation showing that ‘[t]he employee engaged in a protected
activity;’ (2) the employer ‘knew or suspected that the employee engaged in the
protected activity,’ (3) ‘[t]he employee suffered an adverse action,’ and (4) ‘[t]he
circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that the protected activity was a
contributing factor in the adverse action.’105 OSHA need only find reasonable cause
to believe that the employee was retaliated against and it can issue relief.
Due to the wide applicability of the Act, the low burden of proof for
<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/federal/enronhrgs.php>; See, eg, Committee of Financial
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employees and the procedural protections afforded under the Act, many believed that
Sarbanes-Oxley had significantly improved whistleblower protections in the United
States, with Taxpayers Against Fraud deeming it to be ‘the single most effective
measure possible to prevent recurrences of the Enron debacle and similar threats to
the nation's financial markets.’106
However, one of the greatest perceived failures of the Act is that it did not
prevent the corporate misconduct that led to the Global Financial Crisis in 2008,
where ‘corporate officers, government regulators, and law enforcement agencies
ignored the warnings of employees who tried to report problems in the subprime
mortgage industry.’107
Despite the high expectations of Sarbanes-Oxley, the Act has been subject to
wide criticisms in its failure to protect corporate whistleblowers. It is important to
note within this context that the empirical studies that have been undertaken to date
that attempt to measure the effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions show an
incomplete, if not, inconsistent picture. One of the more reliable indicators of the
success of the Act can be garnered from an analysis of whether the Act protected
employees from reprisals and compensated them for the retaliation they had suffered
and this can be largely determined by examining the outcomes of Sarbanes-Oxley
retaliation cases filed with OSHA.
An empirical study of this nature conducted by Professor Richard E. Moberly
revealed that from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s effective date until the end of 2011,
employees won 1.8 per cent of the 1260 cases OSHA decided.108 Significantly,
OHSA did not decide a single case in favour of Sarbanes-Oxley claimants and found
for employers in 488 straight decisions.109
There are many reasons cited for these perceived failures of Sarbanes-Oxley,
that range from: criticisms relating to the limited time period in which to file a
retaliation claim;110 that OSHA was inexperienced in dealing with security laws
claims, did not possess the technical knowledge required and were overburdened,
106
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with no additional resources or personnel allocated to the whistleblower
investigations;111 and a narrow interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions by
the Administrative Review Board.112
In light of these criticisms, and the consequences of the Global Financial
Crisis, a number of changes were implemented in an attempt to reform whistleblower
protection in the United States. Most notably, the implementation of the Dodd-Frank
Act provided enhanced protection amendments to Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley in
two primary ways.
The first relates to the increase in the time that a whistleblower can lodge a
complaint, from ninety days to one hundred and eighty days.113 Secondly, retaliation
protection was extended to protect employees of any subsidiary or affiliate of a
public company whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial
statements of company, or in a nationally recognised statistical rating organisation.114
Additionally, other positive initiatives included:
-

Implementing more training and providing more resources to OSHA;

-

Providing further education in relation to whistleblower investigations and
the creation of the revised Whistleblower Investigation Manual; and;

-

Changes in the Administrative Review Boards composition and approach to
its interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley.115

(e)

Introduction of Specific Cartel Whistleblower Protections
In July 2011, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)

conducted an investigative analysis into the effects of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty
Enhancement and Reform Act116 (ACPERA) based on a reauthorisation mandate. As
part of this process, GAO analysed Department of Justice (DOJ) data on criminal
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cases between 1993-2010, interviewed DOJ officials and also interviewed a sample
of plaintiffs, defence attorneys from 17 civil cases and key stakeholders.117
One of the issues discussed within the GAO interviews was whether there
should be protection for whistleblowers that report criminal antitrust violations and
experience retaliation from their employees as a result of this disclosure. According
to the study, all 16 key stakeholders who provided a response in relation to this issue
generally supported the addition of civil whistleblower protection, although senior
DOJ Antitrust Division officials stated they neither support nor oppose the idea.118 As
a result, the GAO recommended that Congress consider implementing cartel
whistleblower protection specifically.
To this end, Senators Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT), Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, and Ranking Member Chuck Grassley (R-IA) jointly
introduced legislation that would provide anti-retaliatory protections for price-fixing
cartel whistleblowers. On November 4, 2013, the Senate unanimously passed this
bill, after its reintroduction.119 The Leahy-Grassley Criminal Antitrust AntiRetaliation Act of 2013 amends ACPERA by adding civil whistleblower protections
for covered individuals who provide the Federal Government information regarding
or otherwise assisting an investigation or a proceeding relating to:
(a) Any violation of or any act or omission the covered individual reasonably believes
to be a violation of the antitrust laws, or
(b) Any violation of or any act or omission the covered individual reasonably believes
to be a violation of another criminal law committed in conjunction with a potential violation
of the antitrust laws or in conjunction with an investigation by the DOJ of a potential
violation of the antitrust laws.120

The protection does not extend to a covered individual who violates or attempts to
violate the antitrust laws, or obstructs or attempts to obstruct the DOJ’s investigation
of any violation of the antitrust laws.121 Relief pursuant to the Act includes:
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(a) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the covered individual would have
had, but for the discrimination;
(b) the amount of back pay, with interest; and
(c) compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination
including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees.122

Although the Act has passed the Senate, the House of Representatives never
approved it.123 It has recently been reintroduced and the Senate has passed the Act
once more.124
5

United Kingdom
In comparison to Australia and the United States, the United Kingdom

provides a more comprehensive legal framework for the protection of
whistleblowers, as the Act encompasses both public and private disclosures. It has
been noted that it is the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (United Kingdom)
(‘PIDA’), rather than the United States provisions, which have been substantively
replicated around the world.125
PIDA sets forth a wide definition of what constitutes a ‘worker’ for the
purposes of the Act and extends to employees, workers, contractors, trainees, agency
staff, homeworkers, police officers and every professional in the National Health
Service (‘NHS’).126 The only exceptions to this definition are those who are
genuinely self-employed, volunteers, the intelligence services or the armed forces.
The conduct that constitutes a ‘qualifying disclosure’ is also much wider than
the provisions in Australia and the United States, as it is necessary to show that ‘in
the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, the information tends to
show one or more of the following’:
(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed,
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(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to
which he is subject,
(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,
(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,
(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or
(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding
paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.127

For the purposes of this section, whether the discloser ‘reasonably believes’ that
the information tends to show one of the above factors, will be determined
objectively, having regard to the discloser’s personal circumstances.128
Given that cartel conduct is now criminalised in the United Kingdom, it
would follow that an employee who reports cartel conduct to one of the prescribed
persons would be likely be ‘protected,’ pursuant to these provisions. This
demonstrates the much wider application that these provisions have in comparison to
Australia and the United States.
Disclosure can be made to a wide range of internal and external persons
and/or bodies that range from: the employer; in the course of seeking legal advice; to
a Minister of the Crown; to prescribed persons;129 disclosure that meets the
conditions of section 43G;130 and disclosure of an exceptionally serious failure.131
Similarly to Australia, the United Kingdom protections do not impose a positive duty
to investigate upon the prescribed persons receiving the disclosure. This means that
the prescribed person has absolute discretion as to whether or not to investigate the
claim and furthermore, the prescribed person is not required to keep the
whistleblower informed of the progress or outcome of their claim. This factor can
significantly reduce the effectiveness of a whistleblower protection system.
Based on widespread consultation in relation to this issue, the United
Kingdom government proposes to introduce a duty on prescribed persons to report
127
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annually.132 In its most recent report, the Government has stated that it will seek
further consultation in relation to finalising the details of the matter, including
detailed consideration as to what should be included within the annual report that
prescribed persons will be required to submit. The Government expects that it should
include matters such as the number of disclosures received; numbers of claims
investigated; and of those claims investigated, the number of organisations which
had a whistleblowing policy in place.133
If an employee suffers detriment by his or her employer for having made a
protected disclosure, that employee may enforce their rights by presenting a
complaint to an employment tribunal.134 Where an employee is dismissed for having
made a protected disclosure, the employee will be regarded as having been unfairly
dismissed.135 Furthermore, there is no upper limit on the amount of financial
compensation obtainable in a whistleblowing-based unfair dismissal claim.136
Prior to the reforms of 2013, the definition of ‘qualifying disclosure’ used to
require that the disclosure was made in ‘good faith,’ similar to the current Australian
provisions.137 This requirement was criticised for substantially the same reasons as
the Australian equivalent, given there was concern that the requirement would shift
the focus away from the nature of the disclosure, toward the motivations of the
person disclosing.
As a result of these criticisms, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act
2013 was enacted to introduce a number of changes into United Kingdom’s
whistleblowing laws.138 One of the primary changes was the introduction of the
requirement that the disclosure ‘is made in the public interest’ after ‘in the reasonable
belief of the worker making the disclosure’139 to replace the good faith requirement.
Instead, there now exists a provision that allows for the amount of compensation
owed to the employee to be reduced where the disclosure is not made in good
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faith.140
Essentially, the introduction of a ‘public interest’ test was an attempt to
narrow the wide application of the Act, as personal disputes would no longer be
covered under the provisions, such as a dispute over an employment contract.141
However, the definition of ‘public interest’ is not provided in the Act and thus the
interpretation of this provision by the Tribunal remains to be seen. Furthermore,
there is concern that this provision will simply act as another hurdle to be overcome
in order for a ‘worker’ to be afforded protection pursuant to PIDA.142
Pursuant to wide spread scrutiny of PIDA’s provisions and the wide
interpretation adopted by the Tribunals, the United Kingdom Government released a
consultation entitled ‘The Whistleblower Framework: call for evidence’ in July
2013.143 On the back of this consultation, the charity Public Concern at Work (pcaW)
set up the Whistleblowing Commission to examine the effectiveness of existing
arrangements for workplace whistleblowing in the United Kingdom and to make
recommendations for change.144 The final consultation report, released by the
Commission, reveals that the vast majority of respondents were of the view that
PIDA was not working as intended, largely due to the aforementioned criticisms.145
The United Kingdom Government has recently released its Government
Response paper after its review of the consultation submissions and is considering
further changes in order to protect whistleblowers.146 The report identified five
important themes that emerged from the submissions that informed the
Government’s recommendations for reform: (1) the balance of power between the
whistleblower and the employer and the support both parties receive; (2) the level of
140
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protection the whistleblower receives and how this will impact of the effectiveness of
the provisions; (3) the roles that the regulators and prescribed persons play in the
whistleblowing process and analysing how these bodies respond to whistleblower
complaints and how this can have a significant impact on the confidence that
whistleblowers have in the provisions; (4) the categories of worker covered by the
provisions and who qualifies for the protections to identify groups who may witness
malpractice but are currently not afforded a remedy and; (5) the need for cultural
change for perceptions of the role of whistleblowers.
The effectiveness of United Kingdom’s whistleblowing laws will be subject
to the success of the proposed reforms. However, in comparison to the Australia and
United States provisions, a cartel whistleblower is likely to be protected by these
laws without the need to implement specific cartel whistleblower provisions. This
reflects a more uniform and harmonised whistleblower framework that should be
seriously considered by Australia.

6

Canada
In contrast to the aforementioned jurisdictions, Canada lacks adequate

whistleblower protections in the private sector, although there are indicators of a
growing trend towards greater protection. In a 2014 study into the whistleblower
laws in the G20 countries, the results for Canada show that whistleblower protection
was ‘absent’ or ‘not at all comprehensive’ in relation to all of the established criteria,
except for breadth of retaliation.147
The report states that the only provision relating to whistleblower protection
of employees of private companies is encompassed within the Criminal Code RSC
1985, c C-46 (‘Criminal Code’). Section 425.1 prohibits employers from retaliating
or threatening to retaliate against employees who provide information to law
enforcement officials. A violation of this section could result in up to 5 years
imprisonment.148
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However, the scope of this provision is limited, as it only applies to employer
wrongdoing that constitutes a criminal offence or is otherwise unlawful, and only
protects employees who report to law enforcement officials. The Criminal Code does
not protect employees who report wrongdoing, such as misappropriation of funds,
internally within a company.149 Significantly, the G20 Whistleblower report indicates
that there is no evidence or known examples where the provision has ever been
used.150
However, there are specific cartel whistleblower provisions that exist
pursuant to the Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34. Section 66.2 provides that:
(1) No employer shall dismiss, suspend, demote, discipline, harass or otherwise disadvantage
an employee, or deny an employee a benefit of employment, by reason that
(a) the employee, acting in good faith and on the basis of reasonable belief, has
disclosed to the Commissioner that the employer or any other person has committed or
intends to commit an offence under this Act;
(b) the employee, acting in good faith and on the basis of reasonable belief, has
refused or stated an intention of refusing to do anything that is an offence under this Act;
(c) the employee, acting in good faith and on the basis of reasonable belief, has done
or stated an intention of doing anything that is required to be done in order that an offence
not be committed under this Act; or
(d) the employer believes that the employee will do anything referred to in
paragraph (a) or (c) or will refuse to do anything referred to in paragraph (b).

These provisions have existed since 1999 but there is no evidence to suggest
that they have ever been used. Interestingly, the Competition Bureau did not
advocate their introduction into the Competition Act when the bill was passed.151
Until recently, these provisions have largely been considered dormant, until in 2013,
the Interim Commissioner of Competition, John Pecman, announced the launch of
the Bureau's new Whistleblowing Initiative.152
The initiative does not involve introducing further whistleblowing protections
into the Act but instead is directed towards educating members of the ‘public to
149
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provide information to the Bureau regarding possible violations of the criminal cartel
provisions of the Act.’153 The initiative includes the establishment of a Whistleblower
Hotline and the assurances of confidentiality if an employee seeks these
protections.154
Whilst this initiative may signal a move towards greater protection for
whistleblowers, as has been demonstrated in this section, the effectiveness of a
whistleblower protection framework is truly tested by how it is administered. Canada
has not demonstrated any success in its past performance of protecting corporate
whistleblowers, categorised primarily by the patchwork whistleblower protection
framework and the lack of utilisation of existing provisions. Additionally, the
requirement that the disclosure be made in ‘good faith’ is another hurdle that a
whistleblower must overcome in order to receive protection. As discussed above, that
approach is problematic.

7

Conclusion
The analysis of corporate whistleblower protections in Australia, the United

States, the United Kingdom and Canada have revealed that whistleblower protection
is limited in many respects, or is still in the process of development. This is
particularly the case for cartel whistleblower protection in Australia. One of the key
lessons to be drawn from this analysis is that despite the establishment of a
comprehensive whistleblower protection regime, a framework cannot be successful
without effective administration and enforcement as support.
The ACCC has recently recognised the lack of protection that currently exists
in Australia and has called for the government to introduce cartel whistleblower
protections.155 However, the ACCC asserts that these protections should be modeled
upon those in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Part 9AAA.156 Although, this is a
positive development and reform in this respect is much needed, this chapter has
153
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demonstrated the problems apparent in Part 9AAA. There are four key components
to be considered if the Corporations Act approach is to be taken. These components
draw upon the public policy principles of transparency, accountability, consistency
and proportionality to inform the model. These are:
(1)

There must be no requirement that the discloser ‘acts in good
faith.’ Instead, a ‘reasonable, honestly held belief’ will be
sufficient, as the focus must remain on the content of the
disclosure, rather than the motives of the employee;

(2)

The definition should apply to a wide range of disclosers, modeled
upon the definition of ‘worker’ in the PIDA Act. This requirement
would increase the transparency of the provisions, leading to
greater clarity of the framework’s applicability;

(3)

If a Corporations Act model is introduced and the ACCC is the
regulator upon which disclosure can be made, then there must be a
positive duty upon the ACCC to investigate the claim and provide
the

whistleblower

progress/outcome

with

of

the

updated

information

investigation.

This

on

measure

the
of

accountability is necessary to ensure that whistleblowers have
confidence that their complaints will be seriously investigated;
(4)

If the ACCC duties are to be increased in this respect, then the
ACCC should also be provided with additional resources to
compensate for the increased workload, so that the ACCC is not
overburdened as the Occupational Safety Health Administration
was in the United States with its handling of whistleblowing
claims pursuant to the Sarbanes Oxley Act.

Ideally, the government would seek to implement a comprehensive public
and private whistleblower framework, modeled on the United Kingdom approach,
for a more uniform and harmonised whistleblower system. This may be more
difficult in Australia as the Federal Government is constitutionally restricted in this
respect.157 If a complete system were not achievable in the near future, specific cartel
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whistleblower protection would be achievable in the short term. In addition to
ensuring that the whistleblower protection framework is transparent and accountable,
the approach should also be consistent with the developments in the public sector,
which has recently been reformed.158 Clearly, these are complex issues that demand a
comprehensive consultative approach. Much can be learned already from the
consultations that have taken place in the aforementioned jurisdictions.159
Whistleblower protection provisions can enhance the prospect that
whistleblowers will come forward and reveal information related to undisclosed
cartel conduct to the regulator. The ACCC could rely less on cartel investigations
generated by immunity applications, as this information could be derived more often
from whistleblowers. Thus, instead of overreliance on a single enforcement tool, the
adoption of stronger whistleblower protection could provide a viable and
proportionate alternative to immunity.

C

Cartel Informant System – Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers

The concept of implementing financial incentives for whistleblowers, or
‘bounty systems,’ is controversial.160 This holds true even in jurisdictions that
currently utilise financial incentives, particularly the United States.161 The concept
refers to the payment of money in exchange for information related to illegal conduct
to the authorities. In this way, the payment of financial incentives goes one step
further than simply providing protection to whistleblowers, as it seeks to entice
informants to come forward and be ‘rewarded’ for their information.162
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As the previous section has demonstrated, historically whistleblowers have
been crucial in revealing large-scale fraudulent and corrupt conduct that would have
otherwise remained undetected and thus play a pivotal role in exposing illegal
activities.163 However, the personal and financial risks faced by whistleblowers
currently exceed the protections afforded to them pursuant to current whistleblower
protection regimes around the world. This is especially the case in jurisdictions such
as Australia, which does not have adequate whistleblower protections, and further
cannot provide any protection to cartel whistleblowers that come forward to reveal
cartel conduct and are not directly involved in the offence.
The United States has been the frontrunner in recognising the benefits of
implementing a financial reward system.164 This chapter will demonstrate how these
frameworks have operated successfully in many respects. A number of lessons can
be drawn from these experiences to aid in the development of such a system in the
Australian context. More specifically, there are jurisdictions, namely the United
Kingdom, South Korea and Hungary that have implemented specific cartel informant
systems to aid in the detection of cartel conduct. These provide a model framework
for an Australian cartel informant incentive system.165
This section will argue that the many criticisms levelled at the introduction of
a financial reward system are largely overstated and can essentially be offset by
implementing appropriate safeguards to address these issues. Moreover, many of
these criticisms could also be directed at the immunity policy, yet the policy is seen
to be the most effective anti-cartel enforcement tool in the world. These incongruent
positions need to be reconciled in order to aid in the realisation that one tool should
not dominant the entire enforcement agenda, but instead, there needs to be more
serious consideration of adopting alternate means of detecting cartel conduct, such as
the introduction of a financial rewards system for cartel behaviour.
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This section will first provide an overview of the United States bounty
systems, primarily those under the False Claims Act166 and the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘Dodd-Frank Act’).167 This overview
will analyse the key differences between the models upon which the bounty systems
are structured and briefly consider the utility and criticisms directed at these models.
The section will then turn to an analysis of the specific cartel informant systems that
exist in the United Kingdom, South Korea and Hungary before discussing the
primary criticisms aimed at the implementation of financial incentive systems.
This section will systematically review these arguments and show that they
hold relatively little weight. It will then conclude by joining the call from the Senate
Committee that Australia should seriously consider implementing financial
incentives for whistleblowers in order to aid in greater cartel detection and
prosecution. These conclusions will be supported by outlining a framework for the
introduction of such a system in Australia, with appropriate safeguards in place to
offset any significant negative consequences.168

1

The United States: Evidence of Informant Systems
The United States has incorporated many bounty systems into its enforcement

regimes over time and is consequently deemed to be one of the most active
jurisdictions in utilising financial rewards to bolster enforcement efforts. The United
States experience demonstrates that there are primarily two different types of bounty
systems. The first relates to a typical ‘reward-for-information’ bounty system, where
an informant with pertinent information will come forward to a relevant authority to
seek a financial reward in exchange for the provision of information to that authority.
In contrast, the second type, is more unique, and refers to a system by which
an informant will seek a percentage of a penalty amount imposed by that authority as
a result of the information they have provided. However, if that authority chooses not
to proceed with the investigation/prosecution, then the individual informant can
choose to sue the wrongdoer on behalf of the government and as a result receive a
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greater percentage of the penalty outcome. This is referred to as ‘qui tam’ style
litigation. Whilst the United States has adopted numerous bounty programs, such as
that for tax evasion169 and insider trading,170 the focus of this section will be on the
recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act and the long standing False Claims Act. Both of
these statutes are significant and illustrate how both types of financial incentive
schemes operate.

(a)

An Overview of Dodd-Frank
As outlined in the previous section related to whistleblower protection, the

Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in response to the supposed failure of the Sarbanes
Oxley provisions and the resultant Global Financial Crisis.171 In one of the most
controversial reforms, the Act sought to implement financial incentives for any
informant who voluntarily provides the Securities Exchange Commission (‘SEC’)
with original information relating to a violation of securities laws that result in
penalties of over $1 million dollars.
Pursuant to the Act, original information refers to information that:
•

is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower;

•

is not known to the SEC from any other source, unless the whistleblower is the original
source of the information; and

•

is not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a
governmental report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the
whistleblower is a source of the information.172

The payment of an award will be determined within the range of 10 per cent-30 per
cent.173 In determining the award amount, the SEC must consider:
•

the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success of the
covered judicial or administrative action;

•

the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower and any legal representative of the
whistleblower in a covered judicial or administrative action;

•

the programmatic interest of the SEC in deterring violations of the securities laws by making
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awards to whistleblowers who provide information that lead to the successful enforcement of
such laws; and
•

such additional relevant factors as the SEC may establish by rule or regulation.174

Awards cannot be made to a whistleblower who:
•

was a member, officer or employee of an appropriate regulatory agency, Department of
Justice (DOJ), self-regulatory organisation, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board or
a law enforcement organisation;

•

is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which
the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award under this section;

•

gains the information through the performance of an audit of financial statements required
under the securities laws; or

•

who fails to submit information to the SEC in such form as the SEC may, by rule, require.175

Importantly, the provisions provide an express right to review the Commission’s
decision to grant an award by the appropriate Court of Appeals in the United
States.176
The SEC Final rules implementing the Whistleblower Program were approved by the
SEC on 25 May 2011 and serve to supplement the existing provisions in relation to
matters such as: the definition of a whistleblower; what constitutes ‘original
information’; and the criteria for determining an award.177
Since the inception of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC has awarded fourteen
whistleblowers, with nine of these awards being made in the 2014 Fiscal year.178 This
could indicate that the provisions are beginning to take effect after an initial grace
period, which is evidenced by the steady increase of whistleblower tips received by
the SEC over the four-year period.179 The largest award granted at the time of writing
was in September 2014, where a whistleblower was granted USD30 million dollars
for providing original information that led to a successful enforcement action; an
award amount that is double any previous award made by the SEC.180
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Given the controversial nature of these provisions, there have been a number
of criticisms levelled at the introduction of a financial incentive scheme, namely the
following:
(1) the credibility of the informant as a witness;
(2) the risk of frivolous or vexatious claims;
(3) the resultant harm to internal compliance systems;
(4) the resultant administrative burden and resource constraints; and
(5) morality issues.
These criticisms will be discussed at length in the concluding section of this chapter.

(b)

An Overview of the False Claims Act
The preceding overview of the Dodd-Frank provisions provides an

illustration of the first type of financial incentive systems that exists in the United
States. In contrast, the False Claims Act (FCA) is an example of a ‘qui tam’ style of
financial incentive system.181 The False Claims Act was enacted in 1863 as a result of
Congress’ concern that suppliers of goods to the Union Army during the Civil War
were defrauding the government.182 It seeks to enable informants (‘relators’) to sue
on behalf of the government (‘qui tam’ action) when they detect a fraud that is not
already the subject of a federal enforcement action.183 In order to compensate relators
for successful qui tam actions, the Act grants an award of a share of the damages
recovered from the defrauding parties.184 There have been a number of significant
changes to the FCA since its inception, including increasing damages from double
damages to treble damages and raising the penalties from USD2000 to a range of
USD5000 to USD10 000.185
Pursuant to the FCA, any person who knowingly submits a false claim to the
government or causes another to submit a false claim to the government or
knowingly makes a false record or statement to get a false claim paid by the
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government will be held liable.186 A person will also be held liable where they avoid
paying money to the government187 or if they conspire to violate the FCA.188
Most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, are the provisions related to
filing a qui tam complaint.189 After a qui tam complaint is filed, it is initially sealed
for 60 days where the government is required to investigate the allegation in the
complaint. Upon conclusion of this period, the government must then notify the court
that it is either intervening in the action or declining to take over the action, in which
case the relator can proceed with the action.
If the government decides to intervene in the qui tam action, it will have
primary responsibility for prosecuting the action,190 dismissing the action, providing
the relator with a hearing,191 or settling the action, if the court determines this is fair
after the relator’s hearing.192 The award to be granted will be dependent upon
whether the government decides to intervene. If the government does intervene, then
the relator is entitled to an award between 15 and 25 per cent of the amount
recovered by the government. If the government declines to intervene in the action,
the relator’s share increases to 25 to 30 per cent.193 If the court deems that the relator
planned or initiated the fraud, the court may reduce the award without limitation. If a
qui tam action is successful, the relator is also entitled to legal fees and other
expenses of the action by the defendant.194 There are several exceptions to those who
can initiate a qui tam action;195 most significantly, the relator will be barred where
they are convicted of a criminal offense arising from their role in the FCA
violation.196
The qui tam provisions have been deemed to be successful in aiding the
detection and prosecution of fraud in the United States. Awards have increased from
USD2.3 million in 1998 to nearly USD2.8 billion in 2011.197 The reasons for its
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success could be attributed to the valuable information that relators can provide, due
to their relative proximity to information about fraudulent misconduct, compared to
misconduct discovered externally, such as part of an annual audit process.
Advocates of the qui tam provisions also believe that such actions decrease
the likelihood that meritorious cases will remain unenforced due to the DOJ’s lack of
awareness, negligence or deliberate policy choices.198 Furthermore, the qui tam
provisions can also aid in conserving limited public enforcement resources, as the
increased monitoring of fraudulent misconduct by third parties does not require
significant additional resources.199
One of the most notable omissions from the FCA, compared to that of
Sarbanes Oxley provisions and Dodd-Frank, is that there are no anti-retaliation
provisions for the whistleblower should they suffer employment retaliation.
However, it has been suggested that the recovery available to the whistleblower as a
result of the qui tam action may be able to offset any negative consequences that may
result from retaliation, such as a loss of employment.200
There is also criticism relating to the DOJ’s decision to intervene in qui tam
cases. According to one study, the DOJ intervenes in approximately 20 percent of all
qui tam cases201 and of these cases; the DOJ wins judgement or settles ninety-five
percent of these.202 This finding suggests that the DOJ will decide to intervene in
cases only where the DOJ deems the case to be likely to succeed. It is asserted that
this can have the potential impact of creating the assumption that if the DOJ decides
not to intervene, then the case must not be capable of or likely to succeed. Therefore,
shot’ relators who had only filed one action in twenty-five years: David Freeman Engstrom,
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it is asserted that the DOJ should intervene in more cases in order to avoid this
assumption and more effectively utilise the qui tam provisions.

2
(a)

Cartel-Specific Financial Reward Systems
United Kingdom
The CMA informant policy states that the CMA will offer financial rewards

of up to £100 000 (in exceptional) cases for information in relation to cartel
activity.203 The CMA justifies their policy by outlining how difficult cartels are to
detect and even more difficult to prove.204 The policy lists a hotline number that
enables those with cartel information to consult with the CMA in confidence. The
policy states that the identity of the informant will be kept in strict confidence and
that the informant will deal with ‘specially trained officers.’205
In terms of calculating the reward, the policy clearly states that the granting
of any financial reward is entirely at the discretion of the CMA and there is no
requirement that the CMA gives reasons for its decision in relation to payment.206
Furthermore, the CMA is still vested with discretion to grant any reward where the
‘CMA has agreed to accept some information from a person and the information
provides a credible basis for further investigation, the CMA is still free to decide, on
the basis of other more pressing priorities, that it will not use the information given
and will not therefore give a financial reward.’207
Therefore, a cartel informant will have no assurance that the information they
provide will result in any payment, despite the fact that the informant may have
incurred significant risks in providing assistance to the CMA. This stands in stark
contrast to the CMA’s position in relation to the granting of full immunity, where the
CMA asserts that ‘certainty’ is paramount to the effective operation of its leniency
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policy for cartel members, as it encourages the members to come forward and reveal
the misconduct.208
These positions are inconsistent, especially where the certainty of outcome is
only assured to those who have committed wrongdoing and sought immunity.
Furthermore, as outlined in the previous section, blowing the whistle on an employer
can incur significant career and financial risks, even where anti-retaliation provisions
do exist. As the CMA sets the maximum reward at £100 000, it is likely that the
rewards actually provided are significantly less than this figure and are thus
remarkably different to the amount an informant would likely receive in relation to
the United States Dodd-Frank or FCA claim. One hypothetical estimate aimed at
effectively encouraging cartel informants set the bar at USD4-5 million.209 On this
basis, the CMA threshold falls well below an amount that will readily entice an
informant to risk their job and reputation to report to the CMA.
In the event that the CMA does decide to grant an award, the calculation of the
amount is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the following
factors:
•

the value of the information in terms of what the CMA is able to achieve from it;

•

the amount of harm caused to the economy and consumers where the CMA believes that the
information provided by the informant has helped to put a stop to and/or has helped to
disclose;

•

the effort the informant had to invest in order to provide the CMA with the information; and

•

the risk the informant had to take in order to provide the CMA with the information.210

As evident from the above factors, there is no established threshold or minimum
standard of information the informant needs to provide in order for a reward to be
granted. This stands in contrast to the CMA’s treatment of subsequent leniency
applications, where the information provided must ‘add significant value to the
CMA’s investigation’ meaning that is must ‘genuinely advance the investigation.’211
This further compounds the uncertainty as to how a reward, if any, would be
calculated by the CMA.
208
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Another key component of the policy relates to whether a cartel member who is
granted leniency can also claim a financial reward. Whilst the CMA states that
ordinarily informants of this kind will not be granted a reward, it also indicates that
there may be circumstances ‘where the CMA will consider a reward in addition to
immunity from sanction under the leniency policy.’212 It claims that the
circumstances in which this would occur would be in cases where the involvement of
the informant was ‘relatively peripheral.’ However, the policy is not clear whether a
cartel member who did not receive immunity, as they were not the first to reveal the
conduct, will be eligible for a reward.

(b)

South Korea
The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) introduced its first informant

reward system in February 2002, where the reward was set at 20 million won
(approximately AUD23 000). According to the KFTC, the low reward amount did
not generate sufficient informant interest, as there were only five cases where
information was reported pursuant to the policy.213 As a result, the KFTC increased
the reward amount to 100 million won (about AUD115 000).214
The policy was further revised in 2004, which clarified the violations that the
policy will apply to; the way in which the reward amount is calculated; and
stipulated that the reward will only apply to the first informant to provide relevant
evidence to the KTFC.215 Similarly to the CMA policy, there is no fixed reward
amount, as a ‘Reward Review Committee’ determines the amount.216 The award is
determined having regard to the level of sanction and the quality of evidence
provided. The Committee will first determine a ‘standard amount’ calculated with
reference to the level of sanction217 (see Table 2).
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Table 2: Calculating Standard Amount for Reward 1
Seriousness

Standard Amount
a) Surcharge less than 500 mil won : 5 per cent
b) Surcharge between 500 mil won～50 bil won : 1 per cent
Case with More than Surcharge c) Surcharge over 50 bil won : 0.5per cent
* Standard Amount is a) + b) + c)
* Minimum amount is 5 mil won
ㅇ 2 million won per types of violation
Corrective Order or Warning
1 million won for warning

Once the standard amount has been determined, the final amount will be calculated
on the basis of the quality of evidence provided by the informant, which is divided
into three grades218 (see Table 3).
Table 3: Calculating the Reward Amount 1
Quality of Evidence
Top Quality
Medium Quality
Low Quality

Final Amount
80 per cent-100 per cent of 'Standard
Amount'
60 per cent-80 per cent of 'Standard
Amount'
40 per cent-60 per cent of 'Standard
Amount'

In stark contrast to the CMA policy, the calculation of the penalty amount in South
Korea is assessed against set criteria, which ensures that the policy operates in a
predictable and transparent manner.

(c)

Hungary
The Hungarian Competition Authority introduced a ‘Cartel Informant

Reward’ system in April 2010.219 In contrast to the CMA and Korean policies, the
policy is set out in the Hungarian Competition Act220 and is also comprehensively
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supplemented by the HCA’s Frequently Asked Questions document.221 This FAQ
document provides detailed information related to the processes and procedures that
an informant will need to undertake in order to be granted a reward.
Article 79/A of the Hungarian Competition Act states that any natural person
who provides ‘indispensable’ information to the Hungarian Competition Authority
(HCA) for an European Union Competition infringement will be entitled to obtain an
informant reward.

The Act states that evidence can still be classified as

‘indispensable’ even where the HCA has obtained other indispensable evidence prior
to the informant.222 Thus, in contrast to the CMA, the granting of the award is not
discretionary, as the HCA will grant an award where an informant meets the
‘indispensable’ evidence threshold. What qualifies as ‘indispensable’ is further
elaborated upon by the HCA in its FAQ document, which states that:
As a main rule, a reward may be offered if the informant reveals evidence that can be related
to the elements of the statement of facts concerning the hardcore cartel (e.g. the undertakings
being parties to the cartel, the restrictive practice); it is not sufficient providing evidence that
may facilitate the identification of the aspects relevant for sanctioning the infringement
concerned.223

Furthermore, the amount of award is clearly stipulated as ‘one percent of the
fine imposed by the Competition Council proceeding in the case, but maximum
HUF50 million.’224 This calculation method represents an approach adopted from the
United States style of financial reward systems, where the informant receives a
percentage of fines imposed, except that the HCA has legislatively capped the
amount that can be recovered. Whilst this approach may be clearer than that adopted
in the United Kingdom, it has been asserted that this maximum amount is not
sufficient to entice informants to report to the HCA for the reasons described
above.225
The Act also states that multiple informants can receive an award, provided
they meet the indispensable evidence threshold, and that the evidence is not derived
from a single source.226 This contrasts to the position adopted in South Korea, where
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only the first informant who provides relevant evidence will receive a reward. Most
notably, the HCA is precluded from granting financial rewards to those informants
who have obtained evidence as a result of a crime or an offence.227 Consequently, it
would seem that cartel participants would be ineligible to receive an informant
award, in addition to obtaining immunity. This is confirmed in the HCA’s FAQ
document.228
This position more appropriately reflects the view that criminals should not
be entitled to benefit from their crimes, especially in addition to obtaining immunity
for their misconduct. However, the FAQ document states that any person who was
involved in the conduct but does not seek immunity will be entitled to the reward,
such as former employees.229
The Act further sets a timeframe of 30 days in which an informant will be
paid after a resolution is made230 and provides an avenue for judicial review of the
HCA’s decision regarding the financial reward payment.231 This is an important
aspect in ensuring the policy is delivered in a fair and transparent manner and that
informants have a right to seek review, particularly if the decision was unfair or
unjust. This right of review is absent from the CMA and the South Korean policies,
which increases the uncertainty surrounding the operation of these policies.

3

Key Criticisms of Financial Informant Systems – A Rebuttal
After outlining a number of jurisdictions that have adopted financial

informant systems, there is clearly established precedent demonstrating that the
implementation of such systems is a viable option. Further proof lies in the fact that
there are a growing number of jurisdictions that are moving toward adopting such a
model, such as Slovakia232 and Pakistan.233
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One of the more difficult questions to arise in this context is determining
whether these policies aid in the detection and prosecution of cartels. The KFTC has
stated that they have provided AUD 400 000 in 46 cases between 2002 and 2011,
with the biggest reward being AUD 200 000 in 2007 for information in relation to a
sugar cartel.234 These statistics do not take into account the 2012 reforms, which have
increased the maximum reward to 3 billion won. In Hungary, even though the policy
was enacted in 2010, the HCA have claimed to receive approximately 40 approaches
in 2011 and 2012. Although many of these approaches did not meet the requirement
of ‘indispensable evidence,’ the HCA believes the information provided has still
helped with their investigations.235
One of the greatest empirical difficulties faced in attempting to assess the
effectiveness of these programs is surrounding the lack of data available, due to each
jurisdiction adhering to strict confidentiality assurances.236 In this respect, authorities
could potentially publish the reward amount but at some time after the case has been
finalised to ensure that confidentiality is still maintained.
Despite these statistics, financial reward systems are a relatively new
phenomenon in the context of cartels, and require adequate time to develop. This has
been illustrated by the history of immunity policies, which have steadily grown in
popularity after the initial slow-start in the United States at its inception. This section
will now turn to a critical analysis of the key criticisms levelled at financial
informant systems in order to demonstrate that these arguments are largely
inadequate and overstated.

(a)

Credibility of Informants

As part of the reauthorisation mandate for the Antitrust Criminal Penalty
Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA),237 the Government Accountability Office
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(GAO) was commissioned to study ACPERA’s effect.238 The report addresses key
stakeholder

perspectives

on

rewards

and

anti-retaliatory

protection

for

whistleblowers reporting criminal antitrust offenses.
One of the key concerns emanating from those who opposed the introduction of
financial rewards, particularly from senior officials of the DOJ, was that the payment
of rewards would serve to ‘jeopardise’ the credibility of a potential witness, if the
case were to go before a jury.239 In support of this argument, it is asserted that the
jurors will not believe a witness who stands to ‘benefit financially from successful
enforcement action against those he implicated.’240 The DOJ believes that these
issues are compounded in the context of a criminal cartel case, where the burden of
proof is higher and the need for ‘insider information’ is crucial.
Furthermore, there is concern that this lack of credibility will adversely affect
leverage the DOJ has in obtaining plea agreements. However, one of the key
considerations that have been overlooked in the context of these arguments is that
these credibility issues are very similar to those that currently exist with immunised
witnesses. As demonstrated in Chapter VI, the credibility of immunised witnesses
can also be jeopardised by the fact that they are implicating other people in a crime
they also committed.241 The DOJ has found ways to overcome these credibility issues
by processes, such as corroborating evidence. Arguably, the DOJ could use these
same practices to overcome the associated credibility issues with informant
credibility. Either way, it would be severely incongruent to allow one policy to stand
that has inherent credibility issues and reject introducing a new policy on the very
same grounds.
Moreover, as most cartel cases proceed by way of settlement, the issue of
credibility before a jury diminishes.242 In the model that will be proposed in the
concluding section, the informant reward system would operate concurrently with an
immunity policy, and therefore the regulators would still have access to the crucial
‘insider information’ needed for leverage in plea negotiations and to substantiate the
evidence gathered.
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(b)

The Prospect of Frivolous and Vexatious Claims

This concern was of paramount importance when the interviewees of this study were
questioned over the prospect of introducing financial rewards. As the empirical
chapter demonstrates, most of these concerns were directed at the situation where
informants would come forward to reveal claims that were baseless, misguided or
designed with an ulterior motive, such as revenge or simply to make some extra
money.243 These are valid concerns with any policy that seeks to introduce financial
rewards, as these situations can and do arise. However, this factor alone cannot be
seen as a bar to introducing such a policy. Rather, there is a need to implement
appropriate safeguards in order to minimise these risks. In fact, the very same risks
can arise in the context of immunity, where an immunity applicant can downplay the
role they have played in the cartel and exaggerate the roles played by others. These
safeguards exist in other financial incentive schemes around the world, namely the
United States. These include:
i. Processes to corroborate evidence;
ii. Ensuring the reward is not paid until successful prosecution,
such as qui tam style litigation;
iii. A requirement that the informant declare, under the penalty of
perjury, that the information they submit is true and correct to
the best of their knowledge and belief;244
iv. Threshold of evidence to apply: The regulator could introduce
a threshold of evidence, such as the SEC’s ‘original
information’ requirement to filter out frivolous or misguided
claims;245 and
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v. A more onerous suggestion has been to require that in the
event of a frivolous claim, the court costs would revert back to
the informant.246

(c)

Harm Internal Compliance Systems

Opponents of the financial rewards system claim that such payments essentially
encourage informants to bypass internal compliance and reporting systems, to report
directly to the regulator to obtain an award.247 These opponents also argue that the
rewards, particularly those based on a percentage amount, act as an incentive for the
informant to intentionally delay reporting to the regulator in order for their reward
amount to increase as the scale of the misconduct grows larger.248 These are valid
concerns that should not be overlooked. However, proponents have argued that
where informants bypass internal reporting systems, this is simply evidence of an
ineffective compliance system or corporate culture that is not conducive to
reporting.249 In this vein, proponents assert that the introduction of financial rewards
can have the effect of creating an incentive for companies to improve their internal
reporting systems and build a better corporate culture surrounding reporting.
The introduction of financial rewards could also have the effect of increasing the
costs associated with operating a cartel, as its members would need to ‘pay more
people off’ in order to keep employee informants from reporting, which can help
increase cartel instability.250 Moreover, there are appropriate safeguards that can be
implemented in order to minimise the risks associated with this issue. In the United
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States, the SEC has introduced incentives to encourage informants to first report the
misconduct to the company. Firstly, those informants who do report to the company
before turning to the SEC will receive an increase in their reward.251 Secondly, if the
employee first reports to the company, from the date in which they report, the SEC
will classify the informant’s evidence as ‘original evidence,’ even if the SEC has
received evidence pertaining to the misconduct after this date.252 Thirdly, in the event
that the employee first reports to the company and the company then reports to the
SEC, the employee is still eligible for the reward.253 Finally, a more controversial
suggestion has been to introduce penalties for those employees who intentionally
delay the reporting of the misconduct.254 However, it would seem that any employee
who does intentionally delay reporting in the United States may be at risk of not
meeting the ‘original evidence’ requirement of the SEC and thus be ineligible for a
reward.

(d)

Administrative Burden

Opponents of financial reward systems have consistently argued that the introduction
of such a system would overburden the resources of regulatory agencies, as the
regulator would need to invest additional time and resources in order to investigate
the increased number of claims.255 This is an important consideration for any
jurisdiction that intends to introduce such a system, as the system is unlikely to be
successful where adequate administrative support does not exist. In order to
accommodate for this, the SEC final rules introduced a range of measures to improve
information management, such as the establishment of the Office of the
Whistleblower and a dedicated web page with standardised forms and
communication procedures.256 Moreover, it is asserted that the costs associated with
the introduction of the financial rewards system could reduce the need to grant high
leniency reductions to obtain evidence, which could help offset these costs.257
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(e)

Morality issues

This was another key argument advocated by the interviewees when questioned
about financial reward systems. There were claims that payment in exchange for
money was ‘against good conscience’ and that people should instead just be ‘good
Samaritans.’258 Many opponents find support in a study conducted by Yuval Feldman
and Orly Lobel in 2010, which examined the role incentives play in whistleblower’s
decisions to report illegal activity.259 The study found that in cases where an
informant has a ‘greater ethical stake in the outcome’ monetary incentives might be
unnecessary and counterproductive because they may offset the whistleblower’s
internal ethical motivations.260
Essentially, this research points to the suggestion that where the misconduct
has significant ethical and moral implications, an informant does not need monetary
incentives to induce them to report the misconduct, but with less severe misconduct,
financial incentives could encourage reporting. Whilst this research may have
adverse implications for fraudulent misconduct, a recent Australian study has shown
that the Australian public does not deem cartel conduct to be ‘morally wrong.’ The
results of this study may suggest that financial incentives can act as an incentive in
the cartel context.261
Moreover, whilst the interviewees of this study were quick to identify the
moral ambiguities that surround the introduction of a financial rewards system, many
of these same interviewees could not perceive the requisite moral ambiguity in
relation to immunity policies. This is despite the fact that at the crux of both of these
policies, the idea is the same: an incentive, either money or immunity, in exchange
for information.262 Arguably, these two policies sit on the same moral grounds and it
is difficult to reconcile how the immunity policy can be held in such high regard by
258
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authorities worldwide, whilst a policy based on a very similar idea, can cause such
controversy and opposition. These policies are complementary incentive schemes
designed to improve the enforcement efforts of competition regulators and should be
recognised as such.

D

Key Recommendations for a Financial Rewards Model

The preceding analysis has demonstrated that opposition to a financial rewards
system is largely overstated and does not constitute a sufficient basis to prevent its
implementation. Whilst some of the criticisms may be valid, as has been asserted, the
associated risks can be minimised through the introduction of appropriate safeguards.
This section will conclude by outlining the key recommendations for such a model in
Australia, which would require careful consideration and consultation by the
legislature in order to be successfully implemented. It is important to note that this
model should be introduced in addition to the introduction of cartel-specific
whistleblower protection provisions. This model will be informed by the public
policy principles of transparency, accountability, consistency and proportionality.

1

Administration

If the Parliament envisages a cartel specific rewards system, then presumably the
ACCC would oversee the administration of the system. A key component of the
success of the model would be attributed to ensuring there is sufficient and
appropriate administrative support to deal with an increase in informant tips. This
would require an increase in resources to the ACCC to account for the additional
time and costs associated with investigating informant tips. By its very nature, the
ACCC already receives a number of tips regarding competition and consumer
matters and may well have processes that have been adopted to accommodate this
purpose. However, as the SEC and ASIC have done, it is important to establish a
Whistleblower Office whose role would be to overseer the handling and investigation
of the informant tips.263 This would need to be met with appropriate training and the
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introduction of information management processes, including a dedicated online
portal for such tips. There have also recently been developments of an App that
allows for the confidential disclosure of corporate misconduct.264

2

Reward Amount

This is a key consideration that will strike at the heart of the program’s success and it
is important that this aspect is transparent. As demonstrated, the threshold reward
amount needs to be an amount that will offset the risks associated with reporting.265
At present, the amounts in the United Kingdom, South Korea and Hungary are
arguably not sufficient, as the low maximum threshold have resulted in relatively
small rewards provided. Furthermore, like the FCA and Dodd-Frank, Australia
should adopt a percentage range qui tam style of reward system, where the scope can
be adjusted dependent on the quality of information provided. As Australia does not
currently have treble damages, the fines imposed and therefore the reward is likely to
be significantly lower than in the United States. There have been a number of calls
for Australia to consider implementing treble damages and this could form part of the
review.266

The Harper Review was intended as a comprehensive review of

Australian competition policy and practice. The final report was released in March
2015 and did not address the issue of treble damages. Thus, it is unlikely such a
proposal will be implemented in Australia in the near future.
3

Evidence Threshold

The ACCC should establish a minimum threshold of evidence to apply to ensure that
the quality of evidence that is provided is high and to minimise the risks of frivolous
or vexatious claims. The SEC’s ‘original information’ requirement is a lower
threshold requirement than HCA’s ‘indispensable evidence’ and strikes a more
264

See eg, Liam Tung, Whistleblower App FraudSec Features Anonymising Encrypted Messaging
(May 15 2015) The Age <http://www.theage.com.au/it-pro/business-it/whistleblower-app-fraudsecfeatures-anonymising-encrypted-messaging-20150511-1mzc51.html>.
265
Stephan, above n 209, 15-18; Kovacic, above n 250, 9-10; Kovacic, above n 198, 1819.
266
See eg, Australian Securities & Investment Commission, 'Penalties for Corporate Wrongdoing Report 387' (Australian Securities & Investment Commission, 2014)
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1344548/rep387-published-20-March-2014.pdf>; R Tomasic,
Casino Capitalism? Insider Trading in Australia (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1 ed, 1991)
Chapter 9.
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appropriate balance between securing quality evidence and ensuring that the
informant program can successfully generate rewards.
The informant will need to show that there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that their claim
is sound and must sign a document to attest to this, with the penalty being perjury.
Once the threshold has been met, the ACCC could develop criteria in order to
determine where the reward lies in the percentage range, in a similar fashion to the
SEC. Factors such as the value of evidence provided, the role in the offence (if any),
and the promptness in disclosure could be included. This could be conducted in
similar way to the way in which the ACCC currently administers its Cooperation
Policy, with many of these existing factors being relevant to the assessment. The
criteria should be clear and published in order to increase its transparent operation.

4

Eligibility

The policy should be open to anyone who can meet the minimum threshold
requirement, in order to encourage wide reporting. The main exceptions to this
would be: (1) Any person who qualifies for immunity (2) Any person who had a
legal duty to report or the misconduct is discovered as part of their employment role,
such as auditors (3) Any person who coerced or orchestrated the cartel or those who
are found guilty of an offence or breach of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010
(Cth). These exclusions are necessary safeguards to ensure that those who have
committed wrongdoing are not rewarded for their misconduct, especially in addition
to receiving immunity.267 In this way, the informant model would be designed to
complement the Immunity Policy, as opposed to undermining it.

5

Judicial Review

An integral aspect of ensuring a policy is delivered in a fair and transparent manner
is ensuring that there is a right to have the decision reviewed by an independent
judicial body and is therefore accountable. Thus, the decision by the ACCC to grant
a reward should be subject to judicial review in the same way that immunity
decisions should also have a right of review. In this vein, Australia should adopt the
267

See eg, Hungarian Competition Act, Art 79/A(5); Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(6)(c)(2)(b).
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approach of the HCA by creating an express right,268 or the ACCC should consider
another appropriate administrative body to independently review its decisions by
way of agreement.

6

Confidentiality

Confidentiality assurances are paramount to the successful operation of any
informant program, as the risks associated with anti-retaliation have been well
demonstrated. Therefore, the ACCC should afford the highest levels of
confidentiality to informants, and where requested, maintain the anonymity of
informants in the most delicate manner. These assurances should be consistent with
those afforded to immunity applicants to ensure certainty and confidence in the cartel
informant system.

7

Qui Tam

Finally, if no action is taken by the ACCC within a set period, such as 60 days, then
the informant should be given the right to initiate a qui tam action on behalf of the
government.269 The Senate Committee has recently recommended that the
Government consider the introduction of qui tam style provisions and the
Government should adopt this recommendation.270
In addition to the whistleblower protection provisions, the introduction of a cartel
informant model would improve cartel detection and deterrence, by providing
another avenue for cartel whistleblowers to reveal information pertaining to cartel
conduct. This diversification of enforcement tools would help strengthen the existing
anti-cartel enforcement regime, as it does not solely rely on cartel participants
applying for immunity. In light of its criticisms, the outlined financial rewards model

268

See, eg, Hungarian Competition Act, Art 79/A(4).
Department of Justice, above n 182, 2: The qui tam complaint is initially sealed for 60 days. The
government is required to investigate the allegations in the complaint; if the government cannot
complete its investigation in 60 days, it can seek extensions of the seal period while it continues its
investigation. The government must then notify the court that it is proceeding with the action
(generally referred to as ‘intervening’ in the action) or declining to take over the action, in which case
the relator can proceed with the action.
270
Senate Economics References Committee, above n 86, Recommendation 16.
269
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has been designed with appropriate safeguards, in line with the enhanced criteria, to
ensure

the

measures

are

proportionate
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to

its

aims.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis has argued that the current method commonly used to assess the
effectiveness of the immunity policy is flawed; producing an unduly narrow and
unconvincing approach. This is due to the fact that the rational actor model upon
which the policy is theoretically based is not an accurate reflection of human
behaviour. Whilst the Behavioural Economics (‘BE’) approach cannot yet provide a
cogent set of criteria to assess the immunity policy, it does indicate that there are
serious flaws in the rational actor model. It has been this overreliance on economic
assumptions and methods of assessment that has led to the policy being viewed in a
vacuum; isolated from the enforcement context in which it operates.
This thesis has overcome these limitations in two primary ways. Firstly, the
development of enhanced criteria to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy
in line with widely accepted public policy principles of transparency, accountability,
consistency and proportionality allows the policy to be viewed within the wider anticartel enforcement context in which it operates. This approach enables one to assess
the policy’s interaction and impact on other areas of the law. Importantly, assessing
the policy in its wider context leads to the recognition that the ACCC Immunity
Policy is but one enforcement tool that can be utilised by the ACCC. Whilst the
immunity policy undeniably plays an important role in cartel detection and
deterrence, it is not deserving of the title ‘most effective cartel enforcement tool in
the world’1, unless viable alternatives to immunity are also seriously considered and
adopted within Australia. This thesis has developed two alternate models to
immunity for Australia in the form of cartel specific whistleblower protection and a
cartel informant system, which could serve this purpose.
The second contribution this thesis has provided is a shift away from the neoclassical economic emphasis on quantitative methods to assess the operation and
effectiveness of the policy, instead utilising a qualitative approach to inform the
design of the research and the recommendations within each chapter. This qualitative

1

See, eg, Gary Spratling, 'Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting Violations'
(2001) 69 George Washington Law Review 798, 799: the United States Corporate Leniency Policy has
been the ‘most effective generator of cartel cases and is believed to be the most successful program in
United States history for detecting large commercial crimes’.
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approach is necessary to overcome some of the uncertainty that plagues researchers
in this area, particularly given that the number of cartels operating at any time is
unknown, and the fact that competition authorities are not forthcoming and
transparent in providing immunity application information.
The qualitative interviews provided much-needed insight into the nuances of
the policy that are not readily apparent from the little information available in
relation to immunity applications. For instance, there has not been a criminal cartel
case in Australia, despite cartel conduct being criminalised in 2009. Knowing this
information does not help to explain the reasons that may lie behind this fact.
However, the qualitative data revealed that there are a number of issues associated
with the relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP, including cultural and
institutional differences, that impact upon the likelihood of a criminal cartel case.
The qualitative data can aid in explaining the gaps left by this quantitative data.
These qualitative semi-structured interviews provided valuable empirical insight into
the design and operation of the Immunity Policy. These findings were complemented
by a cross-comparative analysis of the respective policies in Canada, the United
Kingdom and the United States to help inform recommendations for best practice.
Chapter II sets the context for the immunity policy; it provided an overview
of the origin and design of the policy within the United States Department of Justice
(‘DOJ’). This chapter showed that the policy is based on an adaptation of game
theory and the prisoner’s dilemma and at its heart lie the rational actor model. The
chapter proceeded to demonstrate that the assumptions upon which the policy is
based, and how it is intended to operate, are based on largely speculative and
overgeneralised assumptions. Importantly, this chapter demonstrated that the
immunity policy was designed at a time when neo-classical influence was at its peak
at the DOJ, which clearly informed the way it was designed and intended to operate.
Chapter III then built upon this analysis by tracing the concept of rationality
and its impact on competition law development. It provided an overview of the most
influential theoretical developments in competition law, namely the Chicago School
of neo-classical economic thought, and more recently the Post-Chicago and NeoChicago theories and demonstrated how each theory was premised on the rational
actor model. The Chapter then turned to an analysis of the behavioural economics or
BE approach to shed light on the limitations of the rational actor model and to
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question whether the BE approach was a more appropriate theoretical model for the
immunity policy. It concluded that whilst the BE approach is useful at demonstrating
the limitations of the rational actor model, it does not provide a cogent set of criteria
to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy.
This was accompanied by the recognition that this overreliance on economic
assumptions to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy produced an overly
narrow and unconvincing approach and that the assessment of the policy needed to
be more holistic in two primary ways (1) the criteria to assess the policy (2) the
method used to inform the research into the policy’s design and operation. The
chapter concluded by enhancing the orthodox DOJ criteria to include an assessment
of widely held public policy principles, namely transparency, accountability,
consistency and overall proportionality.
Chapter IV focused on the second approach to enhancing the assessment of
the immunity policy by outlining a qualitative, rather than a quantitative method to
inform the design and form of the research. As a result, this chapter outlined the key
empirical findings that informed the structure and development of the remaining
chapters of the thesis. These findings revealed specific and nuanced considerations in
relation to the design and operation of the immunity policy, which were previously
unavailable in the context of the ACCC Immunity Policy.
As a result of these findings, Chapter V outlined a number of
recommendations that would strengthen the ACCC Immunity Policy in relation to its
eligibility and cooperation requirements. This included recommending an automatic
exclusion provision for recidivists from reapplying for immunity for a second or
subsequent time within a 6-7 year period; clarifying and expanding the definition of
‘coercion’; shedding light on the limitations of the bifurcated model of enforcement
between the ACCC and CDPP, including indicating areas in need of particular
attention leading up to Australia’s first contested cartel case; and the need for the
right of appeal in relation to an ACCC immunity related decision.
Chapter VI focussed on the tension between the roles of public and private
enforcement and how these roles intersect with the Immunity Policy. The chapter
analysed the delicate balance that exists between ensuring that confidentiality is
afforded to immunity applicants versus allowing third parties access to this
information to seek compensation for harm caused to them. An analysis of the
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common law and newly enacted statutory provisions demonstrated that these
provisions are currently inadequate in providing access to immunity information and
how this adversely affects the victims of cartel conduct. The balance is currently
tipped in favour of the immunity applicants, despite the fact that the ACCC has the
power to bring proceedings on behalf of those victims, but chooses not to.2 This
chapter argues that the balance can be restored by implementing a restitutionary
provision that allows for the sharing of immunity information, which would assist
third parties pursue their action for damages.
Furthermore, this chapter outlined the problems associated with the sharing of
confidential immunity information between competition authorities, and how this can
lead to exposure in areas in which the applicant has not yet applied for immunity.
The chapter concluded by outlining a number of ways in which greater
harmonisation can be achieved, particularly through the implementation of a global
marker system with the ICN.
Finally, Chapter VII, in reflection of all of the inadequacies of the current
approach, outlines viable alternatives to immunity that have been proven to work in
other jurisdictions. This included firming up the existing cooperation policy, which
has fallen into disarray as a result of recent court decisions; the implementation of
cartel specific whistleblower provisions given the inadequacies of current Australian
corporate whistleblower provisions; and the introduction of cartel specific informant
system and/or qui tam provisions.
Overall, this thesis has demonstrated that the ACCC Immunity Policy is not
operating in accordance with standards widely expected of public policy. The ACCC
has not been readily transparent in relation to several areas relating to the Immunity
Policy. For instance, the ACCC has not published the consultations that were
submitted by various stakeholders in the ACCC’s recent review of the policy. The
regulator has also failed to provide reasons for the inclusion and exclusion of the
recommendations in its final version of the Immunity Policy. Additionally, this thesis
has demonstrated a number of areas in need of further clarification in order for the
ACCC to meet the democratic requirement for openness.
Furthermore, the ACCC is largely unaccountable for its decisions in relation
to the Immunity Policy. This is most evidently reflected in the fact that there is no
2

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87 (1A) (b).
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right or process of review stipulated in the Policy in the event that an applicant
wishes to appeal the ACCC’s decision to revoke immunity. The ACCC should be
accountable for the manner in which it exercises its discretion in relation to
immunity, as the ACCC is not a directly elected body and should be held accountable
for its decisions in other ways.3
There are also many areas where the policy is operating inconsistently against
the interests of fair administration, creating high levels of uncertainty. The issues
associated with the relationship between the ACCC and CDPP, in terms of their
cultural and institutional differences, is creating inconsistencies in the way each
authority perceives and processes immunity applications. This has led to
considerable delay in the determination of conditional criminal immunity. It remains
to be seen whether the implementation of a ‘letter of comfort’ can overcome these
inconsistencies and provide the certainty required to encourage immunity applicants
to apply. Furthermore, the inconsistent requirements that exist in the context of
multi-jurisdictional immunity applications can also create a considerable degree of
uncertainty. The ACCC should attempt to resolve this inconsistency by calling for a
global marker system as a first step towards harmonisation in this area.
Overall, it is important that the immunity policy be proportionate to its aims
of cartel detection and deterrence. As part of this assessment, there is a need to
consider whether there are equally effective measures that can also achieve the
policy’s aims.4 This thesis has demonstrated that there are two primary alternatives to
Immunity, in the form of cartel specific whistleblower protection and a cartel
informant system, which could be implemented to reduce the overreliance on the
immunity policy and increase the number of tools available to the ACCC to achieve
its aims of cartel detection and deterrence.
These conclusions could not be drawn by simply focusing on the
predictability of the immunity policy, the threat of sanctions or the fear of detection;
the three factors that currently categorise the model used to assess the policy’s
effectiveness. These conclusions could also not be drawn from a purely quantitative
assessment of the immunity policy on the basis of overgeneralised economic
3

Arnold Bloch Leibler, 'Competition Policy Review - Final Report' (Australian Government - The
Treasury, 2015)56-58.
4
See also, Gordon Schnell and Aymeric Dumas-Emard, 'How to Catch A Thief - Corporate Leniency
and the Irrepressible Challenge of Cartel Detection; Finding a Better Way' (2011) 9 CPI Antitrust
Chronicle 1.
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assumptions of the rational actor model or incomplete information in relation to
immunity. Instead, this thesis has contributed to a new approach to the assessment of
the Immunity policy, but firstly enhancing the criteria used to assess the policy’s
effectiveness and secondly, by employing a qualitative and cross-comparative
approach to inform the research.
In line with this new approach, what is needed is further empirical research,
such as that undertaken by Professor Caron Beaton-Wells, who commenced a similar
study during the time of this research, into the design and operation of the ACCC
Immunity Policy and the way it is assessed.5 There is a particular need for this type
of research in further comparative study, or in jurisdictions that have newly
implemented an immunity policy or may do so in the future. The assessment of the
immunity policy also needs to be accompanied by a greater focus on corporate
compliance, which could not be achieved within this research. For instance,
Professor Brent Fisse has recently suggested that an adequate corporate compliance
program should be a condition of corporate immunity.6
Despite the recent review of the ACCC Immunity Policy, this thesis has
demonstrated that many components of the policy’s design and operation still remain
highly unsatisfactory. This may be due to the fact that the review was narrowly
defined and largely inadequate in comprehensively addressing the number of issues
associated with the policy or its impact and interaction with other areas of the law.
As a result, the ACCC should seek to implement the recommendations outlined in
this thesis in order to strengthen the Immunity Policy. Most importantly, the ACCC
should seriously consider the adoption of alternative methods to immunity, as this is
a key area that has been overlooked by the regulator. This should be accompanied by
a comprehensive public consultation to arrive at the model that will best fit the
Australian anti-cartel enforcement context. In its assessment of these measures, the
ACCC should adopt the new approach to assessing the Immunity Policy argued in

5

See Caron Beaton-Wells, 'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review' (2013)
41 Australian Business Law Review 171; Caron Beaton-Wells, 'Immunity Policy: Revolution or
Religion? An Australian Case-Study' (2013) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 126.
6
Brent Fisse, Reconditioning Corporate Leniency: The Possibility of Making Compliance Programs a
Condition of Immunity Brent Fisse
<http://www.brentfisse.com/images/Fisse_Compliance_Programs_as_Condition_of_Corporate_Immu
nity_201114.pdf>.
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this thesis by employing the enhanced criteria of assessment and by utilising the
qualitative and cross-comparative method to inform their review.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1.

Demographic/introductory questions
a. History of the institution
b. Role of the individual
c. Professional background
d. Personal experience with the immunity policy

2.

General views on the immunity policy
a. What is your opinion of the immunity policy for cartel conduct generally?
1. What role do you think the immunity policy plays in cartel
enforcement?
2. Has your opinion changed since the policy was first implemented?
3. What/Who do you believe has had the biggest influence on the
enforcement of the immunity policy in Australia?
4. What about influences outside of Australia?
5. Cartel Project Survey – Almost 50per cent of public disagreed
with the use of an immunity policy – what is your opinion of this?
6. Difficulties of locating information regarding immunity – what is
your experience of this? (ie is it counterintuitive to deterrence as
one of goals)
7. OVERRELIANCE – suggestion that the ACCC over-relies on the
policy – what is your opinion on that?

3.

Theory underpinning the immunity policy
a. What theory do you believe informs the design and operation of the immunity
policy?
1. What is your opinion of this theory’s operation?
2. Explain this part – anomalies in immunity policy with greater
understanding of “rationality.”

4.

Practical components of the immunity policy
a. What elements do you think are the most successful in the immunity policy?
b. What do you see as the most challenging aspects of enforcement of the immunity
policy and why?
1. Eligibility/Administration
a. What is your opinion of the relationship between the
ACCC and the CDPP in relation to the granting of
immunity?
b. Exclusion -How is a cartel ‘ringleader’ defined?
c. How can immunity be revoked?
d. Is there an appeal process for refused/revoked
applications for immunity?
e. How do you feel about cartel recidivists being excluded
from immunity applications?
f. What do you think of the ‘carve out’ policy? (Found
mostly in the U.S.)
g. What is your opinion of the use of the ‘omnibus
question’? This occurs at the end of the interview, where
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a witness may be asked if they are aware of any other
cartels or illegal anticompetitive practices that they have
not been questioned over and about which they can
provide information.
i. What is the position in Australia regarding the
use of the ‘omnibus’ question?
2.

Cooperation
a. What is required to fulfill the “ongoing disclosure”
requirement?
b. What is your opinion of the “ongoing disclosure”
requirement?
c. What do you think of the Amnesty Plus/Minus policy
found in the U.S and Canada?
i. Would you recommend this policy be
implemented in Australia?
d. What do you think of the U.S requirement that immunity
applicants must provide restitution to injured parties?
e. What is your opinion of the ACCC Cooperation Policy?
i. How does it compare to the U.S/Canada
/European Union process?

3.

Confidentiality
a. How is the Protected Cartel Information Scheme (PCI)
intended to operate?
b. Does the PCI scheme strike the appropriate balance
between ensuring victims of cartel behaviour have access
to information to establish their case versus ensuring a
high level of confidentiality is afforded to immunity
applicants?
c. Should the identity of immunity applicants be maintained
before and after the court decision, as is the practice of
the United States and Canada?

4.

Alternatives to an Immunity Policy
a. What is your opinion of a ‘Cartel informant system’ such
as those that currently exist in South Korea and United
Kingdom?
b. What other proactive enforcement tools could the ACCC
focus on as part of its cartel enforcement efforts?

5.

Miscellaneous
a. What is your opinion regarding the credibility of
immunity applicants in cartel cases?
i. Is your opinion the same regarding contested
criminal cartel cases, as opposed to civil cases?
ii. How do you feel about Model Jury Directions
being used in this context?
b. What happens in the event that immunity is obtained in
one jurisdiction and then refused in another?
c. What is your opinion of the idea of establishing a “onestop global shop for leniency – such as a clearinghouse
marker system suggested by John Taladay?
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d.

i. What consequences does this have for
international cartel enforcement?
How is derivative immunity for employees of corporate
immunity applicants achieved?
i. What is your opinion on this process?
ii. Are employees advised of the application, and
their rights and obligations? If so, when?
Former employees?
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APPENDIX B
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
Researcher
Miss Pariz Marshall, LLB (Hons), PhD Candidate, Sessional Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of
Wollongong. Ph 0423 450 145 Email: pl490@uowmail.edu.au.
The Project
The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: A Critical Legal Analysis
This project aims to undertake qualitative semi-structured interviews of various stakeholders who
have expert knowledge and/or experience with the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct. This research will be conducted with a view to
critiquing its theoretical and practical design and operation. This project aims to generate much
needed empirical evidence regarding this policy, specifically in Australia and the United States, with
the purpose of assisting with the policy’s development and refinement.
The ACCC Immunity policy was first implemented in Australia in 2005 and revised in
July 2009. It is largely deemed by regulators worldwide as the ‘single most effective cartel
enforcement tool’. The policy works by offering immunity to the first cartel participant to come
forward and reveal their conduct, subject to a number of conditions. Despite its heavy endorsement,
the policy has not been subject to any substantial critical review regarding its theoretical and practical
operation in Australia, particularly as compared to other jurisdictions such as the United States, the
United Kingdom and Canada.
The aims of this Project include the generation of empirical evidence to better understand the way
the policy operates in order to assess its effects and identify the challenges involved in its
enforcement. Specifically, the Project will:
•
•
•
•
•

undertake a critical legal analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the immunity policy and
assess its utility in the context of the way in which business people interact with the law;
critically analyse the practical components of the immunity policy including issues relating to
eligibility, cooperation, administration and alternatives to immunity;
assess the likely impact of the immunity policy on cartel deterrence and compliance with the
law;
compare the ACCC Immunity policy and its enforcement with the immunity policies in the
United States, United Kingdom and Canada; and
make recommendations that will further help to strengthen the immunity policy and cartel
enforcement more generally.

Obtaining the views of senior people in various stakeholder organisations, including enforcement
agencies, the legal profession, the business sector and cartel experts is crucial to fulfilling these aims.
Purpose of the interview
The purpose of this interview is to gain an understanding of how people involved in
stakeholder organisations such as the enforcement agencies, the legal profession, and cartel experts
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view the immunity policy for cartel conduct. Data from these stakeholder interviews will provide
empirical evidence to enable the researcher to make recommendations and draw conclusions about the
issues set out above.
Comparing responses of Australian stakeholders with stakeholders in the United States, said to be the
‘father’ of cartel law, will assist in comparing and contrasting the position in each country as to: its
theoretical design, its practical components and operation and ultimately inform recommendations to
shed light on the policy’s limitations and strengthen its enforcement.
Why are you being asked to participate in this Project?
As a senior member of a stakeholder organization in the United States, the researcher
believes that you would be able to comment on cartel immunity and some or all of the issues relevant
to this Project.
The researcher identified you as a potential interviewee through your extensive knowledge
and experience regarding competition policy in the United States as a leading international
competition lawyer and as the Co-Chair of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law's
Presidential Transition Report Task Force.
As a highly esteemed lawyer in the field of competition policy, you are well placed to offer
comments from an operational and policy point of view regarding the Immunity Policy in the United
States which will be extremely valuable to the research on Australia’s immunity policy. The interview
questions will include questions, as relevant, about:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Demographic/Introductory questions,
Government Industry relations/views on immunity policies,
The theory underpinning the immunity policy,
The practical design and operation of the policy including issues relating to eligibility,
cooperation, administration and alternatives to immunity,
The effectiveness of the policy and its potential limitations,
Patterns in cartel enforcement relating to the immunity policy,
Any other points you think it important for us to understand.

Your comments and views will be used in the researcher’s analysis of the theoretical and practical
design and operation of the immunity policy, including its strengths and limitations. Additionally,
your comments and views will also inform practical recommendations the researcher will make in
respect of the implementation and enforcement of the ACCC Immunity policy, which will form the
final chapter of the researcher’s thesis.
What is involved in agreeing to participate?
Participating will involve you giving us an interview which should take approximately 1- 1.5 hours.
If you agree, the researcher would like to record and transcribe the interview so that the researcher can
analyse it later. The researcher will discuss the time and place for the interview with you and arrange a
mutually convenient time and place.
Will my information be kept confidential?
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The data from this research project will be published in a thesis and potentially will be used in
journals and presented at conferences; however, your identity will be kept confidential and published
only with your permission. Although I will report direct quotations from the interview, if requested,
you will be given a pseudonym, and all identifying information (including relevant possibilities such
as the name of the institution, the participant’s position, etc.) will be removed from the published
material. Or if you would prefer, we can use a generic description of your position rather than your
name. Some people, who have knowledge of your organisation, may still be able to identify you from
your responses. If you choose to keep your identity confidential, then we will not disclose your name
unless we are required to by law. We will set out the detail of any confidentiality arrangements in the
consent form.
If you agree, can you change your mind later?
Participating in this Project is entirely up to you. You may change your mind about participating at
any time and withdraw your data from the study without having to give an explanation, up until the
point that the data is analysed.
What will happen to the information you give to the Project?
The record of your interview will only be available to members of the research team as set out above.
The researcher will keep the physical records in a locked filing cabinet and the electronic records in a
password protected electronic file and we will not disclose any confidential information unless
required by law.
Information from your interview will only be published in accordance with any
confidentiality terms we agree with you. Audio recordings of your interview will not be released so
you will not be identified by your voice. Audio recordings will be kept for a period of at least 5 years
after the Project is completed and they will be identifiable, however the researchers will work from
transcriptions of the recordings.
The researcher may use information provided in your interview in their publications about
the immunity policy and cartel enforcement more generally. Publications are expected to take the
form primarily in a doctrinal thesis, but potentially also journal articles, conferences and scholarly
books. You will be sent a transcript of the interview and asked to confirm its accuracy. You will not
be quoted directly from the transcript prior to this confirmation being provided.
How do you take part in the Project or find further information about the Project?
The researcher will discuss your participation with you. You are welcome to contact any of the
research team at any time to talk about the Project and ask any questions. You can contact us as set
out below.
If you agree to participate in the Project then the researcher will arrange for you to sign a consent
form.
What if you have concerns about the Project?
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We are happy to talk about any queries or concerns that you may have. You may contact the
researchers as below.
•

Pariz Marshall, 0423 450 145, pl490@uowmail.edu.au

If you still have concerns about the Project after we have discussed them with you then you can
contact the Ethics Manager, Human Research Ethics, The University of Wollongong, Australia –
Eve Steinke Ph: (02) 4221 4457 Email: eves@uow.edu.au
Thank you for your time in reviewing our Project materials so far.
Yours sincerely,
Miss Pariz Marshall LLB (Hons)
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APPENDIX C
CONSENT FORM - STAKEHOLDERS
The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: A critical legal analysis
This document indicates that you consent to participate in an interview to assist with research
into the Project ‘The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: A critical legal analysis’ and how
your interview will be dealt with.
You may withdraw your consent to your involvement in this Project at any time and may also
withdraw any unprocessed data.
All the interview data will be kept securely for at least 5 years after publication of the results
and may be used by the research team in further research during or after that time.
If the data from your interview will be used without identifying you, then we will not publish your
name or other identifying information unless required to by law. However, it may still be possible for
readers to identify you from your responses to some of the interview questions.
A record of the interview will be made as indicated below. You will be identified as indicated below.
Miss Pariz Marshall
0423 450 145
pl490@uowmail.edu.au
I consent to be interviewed for the Research Project ‘The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct:
A critical legal analysis.’ I have been given a copy of this consent form and the Participant
Information Sheet to keep. What I say in the interview may be recorded and used by the research team
in publications.
I consent to the interview being recorded …………Y/N
I consent to being named in publications …………Y/N
I consent to my position being described in publications …Y/N
The special identification arrangements for my interview are (please describe)
Signed:…………………………………….

Signed:…………………………………….

(participant signature)
Name: ……………………………………..

Name: ……………………………………..

(Print name)
Date: ………………………………………

(Print name)
Date:
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APPENDIX D
INTERVIEWEE LIST
1. Professor Christine Parker – Monash University (9.07.2013)
2. Andrew Christopher - Webb Henderson – Partner (22.07.2013)
3. Professor Caron-Beaton Wells – Melbourne University (26.04.2013)
Melbourne
4. Bruce Lloyd – Clayton Utz – Partner (17.06.2013)
5. Simon White SC – Sixth Floor – Barrister (25.07.2013)
6. Carolyn Oddie – Allens – Partner (23.07.2013)
7. Graeme Samuel – Former Chairman of the ACCC (26.04.2013) - Melbourne
8. Murray Deakin – K & L Gates – Partner (15.07.2013)
9. Georgina Foster – Baker & McKenzie – Partner (15.07.2013)
10. Michael Gray – Herbert Smith Freehills (29.07.2013)
11. Louie Lou – Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(19.08.2013)
12. Trudy Hall – Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(19.08.2013)
13. Nick McHugh – Norton Rose Fulbright – Head of Antitrust and Competition
(22.07.2013)
14. Ross Zaurrini – Ashurst – Partner (23.08.2013)
15. Elizabeth Sarofim – Ashurst – Senior Associate (23.08.2013)
16. Melissa Fraser – Ashurst – Senior Associate (23.08.2013)
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